X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=c_sharp%2Fsrc%2Forg%2Fldk%2Fstructs%2FChannelHandshakeLimits.cs;fp=c_sharp%2Fsrc%2Forg%2Fldk%2Fstructs%2FChannelHandshakeLimits.cs;h=408bc248908d4ff5a1510c8c9385c436fe02b9af;hb=810f7404202e04f70db946ced7363b64ddaf4ce4;hp=0000000000000000000000000000000000000000;hpb=fa130da4108815a8b17c3c093a91fc3d83754a0f;p=ldk-java diff --git a/c_sharp/src/org/ldk/structs/ChannelHandshakeLimits.cs b/c_sharp/src/org/ldk/structs/ChannelHandshakeLimits.cs new file mode 100644 index 00000000..408bc248 --- /dev/null +++ b/c_sharp/src/org/ldk/structs/ChannelHandshakeLimits.cs @@ -0,0 +1,365 @@ +using org.ldk.impl; +using org.ldk.enums; +using org.ldk.util; +using System; + +namespace org { namespace ldk { namespace structs { + + +/** + * Optional channel limits which are applied during channel creation. + * + * These limits are only applied to our counterparty's limits, not our own. + * + * Use 0/::max_value() as appropriate to skip checking. + * + * Provides sane defaults for most configurations. + * + * Most additional limits are disabled except those with which specify a default in individual + * field documentation. Note that this may result in barely-usable channels, but since they + * are applied mostly only to incoming channels that's not much of a problem. + */ +public class ChannelHandshakeLimits : CommonBase { + internal ChannelHandshakeLimits(object _dummy, long ptr) : base(ptr) { } + ~ChannelHandshakeLimits() { + if (ptr != 0) { bindings.ChannelHandshakeLimits_free(ptr); } + } + + /** + * Minimum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded. This is supplied by the sender and so + * only applies to inbound channels. + * + * Default value: 0. + */ + public long get_min_funding_satoshis() { + long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeLimits_get_min_funding_satoshis(this.ptr); + GC.KeepAlive(this); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Minimum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded. This is supplied by the sender and so + * only applies to inbound channels. + * + * Default value: 0. + */ + public void set_min_funding_satoshis(long val) { + bindings.ChannelHandshakeLimits_set_min_funding_satoshis(this.ptr, val); + GC.KeepAlive(this); + GC.KeepAlive(val); + } + + /** + * Maximum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded. This is supplied by the sender and so + * only applies to inbound channels. + * + * Default value: 2^24 - 1. + */ + public long get_max_funding_satoshis() { + long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeLimits_get_max_funding_satoshis(this.ptr); + GC.KeepAlive(this); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Maximum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded. This is supplied by the sender and so + * only applies to inbound channels. + * + * Default value: 2^24 - 1. + */ + public void set_max_funding_satoshis(long val) { + bindings.ChannelHandshakeLimits_set_max_funding_satoshis(this.ptr, val); + GC.KeepAlive(this); + GC.KeepAlive(val); + } + + /** + * The remote node sets a limit on the minimum size of HTLCs we can send to them. This allows + * you to limit the maximum minimum-size they can require. + * + * Default value: u64::max_value. + */ + public long get_max_htlc_minimum_msat() { + long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeLimits_get_max_htlc_minimum_msat(this.ptr); + GC.KeepAlive(this); + return ret; + } + + /** + * The remote node sets a limit on the minimum size of HTLCs we can send to them. This allows + * you to limit the maximum minimum-size they can require. + * + * Default value: u64::max_value. + */ + public void set_max_htlc_minimum_msat(long val) { + bindings.ChannelHandshakeLimits_set_max_htlc_minimum_msat(this.ptr, val); + GC.KeepAlive(this); + GC.KeepAlive(val); + } + + /** + * The remote node sets a limit on the maximum value of pending HTLCs to them at any given + * time to limit their funds exposure to HTLCs. This allows you to set a minimum such value. + * + * Default value: 0. + */ + public long get_min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat() { + long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeLimits_get_min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(this.ptr); + GC.KeepAlive(this); + return ret; + } + + /** + * The remote node sets a limit on the maximum value of pending HTLCs to them at any given + * time to limit their funds exposure to HTLCs. This allows you to set a minimum such value. + * + * Default value: 0. + */ + public void set_min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(long val) { + bindings.ChannelHandshakeLimits_set_min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(this.ptr, val); + GC.KeepAlive(this); + GC.KeepAlive(val); + } + + /** + * The remote node will require we keep a certain amount in direct payment to ourselves at all + * time, ensuring that we are able to be punished if we broadcast an old state. This allows to + * you limit the amount which we will have to keep to ourselves (and cannot use for HTLCs). + * + * Default value: u64::max_value. + */ + public long get_max_channel_reserve_satoshis() { + long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeLimits_get_max_channel_reserve_satoshis(this.ptr); + GC.KeepAlive(this); + return ret; + } + + /** + * The remote node will require we keep a certain amount in direct payment to ourselves at all + * time, ensuring that we are able to be punished if we broadcast an old state. This allows to + * you limit the amount which we will have to keep to ourselves (and cannot use for HTLCs). + * + * Default value: u64::max_value. + */ + public void set_max_channel_reserve_satoshis(long val) { + bindings.ChannelHandshakeLimits_set_max_channel_reserve_satoshis(this.ptr, val); + GC.KeepAlive(this); + GC.KeepAlive(val); + } + + /** + * The remote node sets a limit on the maximum number of pending HTLCs to them at any given + * time. This allows you to set a minimum such value. + * + * Default value: 0. + */ + public short get_min_max_accepted_htlcs() { + short ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeLimits_get_min_max_accepted_htlcs(this.ptr); + GC.KeepAlive(this); + return ret; + } + + /** + * The remote node sets a limit on the maximum number of pending HTLCs to them at any given + * time. This allows you to set a minimum such value. + * + * Default value: 0. + */ + public void set_min_max_accepted_htlcs(short val) { + bindings.ChannelHandshakeLimits_set_min_max_accepted_htlcs(this.ptr, val); + GC.KeepAlive(this); + GC.KeepAlive(val); + } + + /** + * Before a channel is usable the funding transaction will need to be confirmed by at least a + * certain number of blocks, specified by the node which is not the funder (as the funder can + * assume they aren't going to double-spend themselves). + * This config allows you to set a limit on the maximum amount of time to wait. + * + * Default value: 144, or roughly one day and only applies to outbound channels. + */ + public int get_max_minimum_depth() { + int ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeLimits_get_max_minimum_depth(this.ptr); + GC.KeepAlive(this); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Before a channel is usable the funding transaction will need to be confirmed by at least a + * certain number of blocks, specified by the node which is not the funder (as the funder can + * assume they aren't going to double-spend themselves). + * This config allows you to set a limit on the maximum amount of time to wait. + * + * Default value: 144, or roughly one day and only applies to outbound channels. + */ + public void set_max_minimum_depth(int val) { + bindings.ChannelHandshakeLimits_set_max_minimum_depth(this.ptr, val); + GC.KeepAlive(this); + GC.KeepAlive(val); + } + + /** + * Whether we implicitly trust funding transactions generated by us for our own outbound + * channels to not be double-spent. + * + * If this is set, we assume that our own funding transactions are *never* double-spent, and + * thus we can trust them without any confirmations. This is generally a reasonable + * assumption, given we're the only ones who could ever double-spend it (assuming we have sole + * control of the signing keys). + * + * You may wish to un-set this if you allow the user to (or do in an automated fashion) + * double-spend the funding transaction to RBF with an alternative channel open. + * + * This only applies if our counterparty set their confirmations-required value to 0, and we + * always trust our own funding transaction at 1 confirmation irrespective of this value. + * Thus, this effectively acts as a `min_minimum_depth`, with the only possible values being + * `true` (0) and `false` (1). + * + * Default value: true + */ + public bool get_trust_own_funding_0conf() { + bool ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeLimits_get_trust_own_funding_0conf(this.ptr); + GC.KeepAlive(this); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Whether we implicitly trust funding transactions generated by us for our own outbound + * channels to not be double-spent. + * + * If this is set, we assume that our own funding transactions are *never* double-spent, and + * thus we can trust them without any confirmations. This is generally a reasonable + * assumption, given we're the only ones who could ever double-spend it (assuming we have sole + * control of the signing keys). + * + * You may wish to un-set this if you allow the user to (or do in an automated fashion) + * double-spend the funding transaction to RBF with an alternative channel open. + * + * This only applies if our counterparty set their confirmations-required value to 0, and we + * always trust our own funding transaction at 1 confirmation irrespective of this value. + * Thus, this effectively acts as a `min_minimum_depth`, with the only possible values being + * `true` (0) and `false` (1). + * + * Default value: true + */ + public void set_trust_own_funding_0conf(bool val) { + bindings.ChannelHandshakeLimits_set_trust_own_funding_0conf(this.ptr, val); + GC.KeepAlive(this); + GC.KeepAlive(val); + } + + /** + * Set to force an incoming channel to match our announced channel preference in + * [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`]. + * + * For a node which is not online reliably, this should be set to true and + * [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] set to false, ensuring that no announced (aka public) + * channels will ever be opened. + * + * Default value: true. + */ + public bool get_force_announced_channel_preference() { + bool ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeLimits_get_force_announced_channel_preference(this.ptr); + GC.KeepAlive(this); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Set to force an incoming channel to match our announced channel preference in + * [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`]. + * + * For a node which is not online reliably, this should be set to true and + * [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] set to false, ensuring that no announced (aka public) + * channels will ever be opened. + * + * Default value: true. + */ + public void set_force_announced_channel_preference(bool val) { + bindings.ChannelHandshakeLimits_set_force_announced_channel_preference(this.ptr, val); + GC.KeepAlive(this); + GC.KeepAlive(val); + } + + /** + * Set to the amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. + * + * Not checking this value would be a security issue, as our peer would be able to set it to + * max relative lock-time (a year) and we would \"lose\" money as it would be locked for a long time. + * + * Default value: 2016, which we also enforce as a maximum value so you can tweak config to + * reduce the loss of having useless locked funds (if your peer accepts) + */ + public short get_their_to_self_delay() { + short ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeLimits_get_their_to_self_delay(this.ptr); + GC.KeepAlive(this); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Set to the amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. + * + * Not checking this value would be a security issue, as our peer would be able to set it to + * max relative lock-time (a year) and we would \"lose\" money as it would be locked for a long time. + * + * Default value: 2016, which we also enforce as a maximum value so you can tweak config to + * reduce the loss of having useless locked funds (if your peer accepts) + */ + public void set_their_to_self_delay(short val) { + bindings.ChannelHandshakeLimits_set_their_to_self_delay(this.ptr, val); + GC.KeepAlive(this); + GC.KeepAlive(val); + } + + /** + * Constructs a new ChannelHandshakeLimits given each field + */ + public static ChannelHandshakeLimits of(long min_funding_satoshis_arg, long max_funding_satoshis_arg, long max_htlc_minimum_msat_arg, long min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat_arg, long max_channel_reserve_satoshis_arg, short min_max_accepted_htlcs_arg, int max_minimum_depth_arg, bool trust_own_funding_0conf_arg, bool force_announced_channel_preference_arg, short their_to_self_delay_arg) { + long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeLimits_new(min_funding_satoshis_arg, max_funding_satoshis_arg, max_htlc_minimum_msat_arg, min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat_arg, max_channel_reserve_satoshis_arg, min_max_accepted_htlcs_arg, max_minimum_depth_arg, trust_own_funding_0conf_arg, force_announced_channel_preference_arg, their_to_self_delay_arg); + GC.KeepAlive(min_funding_satoshis_arg); + GC.KeepAlive(max_funding_satoshis_arg); + GC.KeepAlive(max_htlc_minimum_msat_arg); + GC.KeepAlive(min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat_arg); + GC.KeepAlive(max_channel_reserve_satoshis_arg); + GC.KeepAlive(min_max_accepted_htlcs_arg); + GC.KeepAlive(max_minimum_depth_arg); + GC.KeepAlive(trust_own_funding_0conf_arg); + GC.KeepAlive(force_announced_channel_preference_arg); + GC.KeepAlive(their_to_self_delay_arg); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + org.ldk.structs.ChannelHandshakeLimits ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelHandshakeLimits(null, ret); } + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(ret_hu_conv); }; + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + internal long clone_ptr() { + long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeLimits_clone_ptr(this.ptr); + GC.KeepAlive(this); + return ret; + } + + /** + * Creates a copy of the ChannelHandshakeLimits + */ + public ChannelHandshakeLimits clone() { + long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeLimits_clone(this.ptr); + GC.KeepAlive(this); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + org.ldk.structs.ChannelHandshakeLimits ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelHandshakeLimits(null, ret); } + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(this); }; + return ret_hu_conv; + } + + /** + * Creates a "default" ChannelHandshakeLimits. See struct and individual field documentaiton for details on which values are used. + */ + public static ChannelHandshakeLimits with_default() { + long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeLimits_default(); + if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } + org.ldk.structs.ChannelHandshakeLimits ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelHandshakeLimits(null, ret); } + if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(ret_hu_conv); }; + return ret_hu_conv; + } + +} +} } }