X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=c_sharp%2Fsrc%2Forg%2Fldk%2Fstructs%2FEcdsaChannelSigner.cs;h=cb33ab8895ce22ac5f95389337851e6fd5b63600;hb=8de7213fbf663ff60322896282dad51e8ab2f001;hp=e5c55b5143b228c1ee687e39d20a09168516775e;hpb=afc50e5d491a11364849383b75a8f939df703bac;p=ldk-java diff --git a/c_sharp/src/org/ldk/structs/EcdsaChannelSigner.cs b/c_sharp/src/org/ldk/structs/EcdsaChannelSigner.cs index e5c55b51..cb33ab88 100644 --- a/c_sharp/src/org/ldk/structs/EcdsaChannelSigner.cs +++ b/c_sharp/src/org/ldk/structs/EcdsaChannelSigner.cs @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ + using org.ldk.impl; using org.ldk.enums; using org.ldk.util; @@ -5,6 +6,132 @@ using System; namespace org { namespace ldk { namespace structs { + + +/** An implementation of EcdsaChannelSigner */ +public interface EcdsaChannelSignerInterface { + /**Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions. + * + * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed. + * + * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount + * sent to us and checking the HTLCs. + * + * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided. + * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching + * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored. + * + * Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional + * irrelevant or duplicate preimages. + */ + Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages); + /**Validate the counterparty's revocation. + * + * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved + * forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment. + */ + Result_NoneNoneZ validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret); + /**Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction. + * + * This will be called + * - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`. + * - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close. + * + * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction. + * + * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked. + */ + Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_commitment(HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx); + /**Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output + * or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state. + * + * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are + * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here. + * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards + * to an upcoming timelock expiration. + * + * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature. + * + * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they + * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does + * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do + * so). + */ + Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key); + /**Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction + * HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state. + * + * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are + * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here. + * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards + * to an upcoming timelock expiration. + * + * `amount` is the value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 + * signature. + * + * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they + * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does + * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do + * so). + * + * `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script + * (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures). + */ + Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc); + /**Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's HTLC output used as an input within + * `htlc_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction at index `input`. The signature returned + * must be be computed using [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]. + * + * Note that this may be called for HTLCs in the penultimate commitment transaction if a + * [`ChannelMonitor`] [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas) + * broadcasts it before receiving the update for the latest commitment transaction. + * + * [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType::All + * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor + */ + Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor); + /**Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment + * transaction, either offered or received. + * + * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the + * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be + * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is + * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration. + * + * `witness_script` is either an offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC + * outputs. + * + * `amount` is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature. + * + * `per_commitment_point` is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state + * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive + * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the + * BIP 143 signature. + */ + Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc); + /**Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction. + * + * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have + * chosen to forgo their output as dust. + */ + Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(ClosingTransaction closing_tx); + /**Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an + * input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`. + */ + Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input); + /**Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key proving it comes from one of the + * channel participants. + * + * Channel announcements also require a signature from each node's network key. Our node + * signature is computed through [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`]. + * + * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and + * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the + * protocol. + */ + Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg); +} + /** * A trait to sign Lightning channel transactions as described in * [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md). @@ -15,238 +142,117 @@ namespace org { namespace ldk { namespace structs { * for an example of such policies. */ public class EcdsaChannelSigner : CommonBase { - internal readonly bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner bindings_instance; + internal bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner bindings_instance; + internal long instance_idx; + internal EcdsaChannelSigner(object _dummy, long ptr) : base(ptr) { bindings_instance = null; } - private EcdsaChannelSigner(bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner arg, bindings.LDKChannelSigner ChannelSigner, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) : base(bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner_new(arg, ChannelSigner, pubkeys == null ? 0 : pubkeys.clone_ptr())) { - this.ptrs_to.AddLast(arg); - this.ptrs_to.AddLast(ChannelSigner); - this.bindings_instance = arg; - } ~EcdsaChannelSigner() { if (ptr != 0) { bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_free(ptr); } } - public interface EcdsaChannelSignerInterface { - /** - * Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions. - * - * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed. - * - * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount - * sent to us and checking the HTLCs. - * - * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided. - * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching - * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored. - * - * Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional - * irrelevant or duplicate preimages. - */ - Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(CommitmentTransaction _commitment_tx, byte[][] _preimages); - /** - * Validate the counterparty's revocation. - * - * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved - * forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment. - */ - Result_NoneNoneZ validate_counterparty_revocation(long _idx, byte[] _secret); - /** - * Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions. - * - * This will be called - * - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`. - * - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close. - * - with the previous `commitment_tx`, just to get claiming HTLC - * signatures, if we are reacting to a [`ChannelMonitor`] - * [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas) - * that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest `commitment_tx`. - * - * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction. - * - * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked. - * - * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor - */ - Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(HolderCommitmentTransaction _commitment_tx); - /** - * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output - * or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state. - * - * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are - * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here. - * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards - * to an upcoming timelock expiration. - * - * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature. - * - * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they - * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does - * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do - * so). - */ - Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] _justice_tx, long _input, long _amount, byte[] _per_commitment_key); - /** - * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction - * HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state. - * - * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are - * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here. - * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards - * to an upcoming timelock expiration. - * - * `amount` is the value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 - * signature. - * - * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they - * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does - * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do - * so). - * - * `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script - * (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures). - */ - Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] _justice_tx, long _input, long _amount, byte[] _per_commitment_key, HTLCOutputInCommitment _htlc); - /** - * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's HTLC output used as an input within - * `htlc_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction at index `input`. The signature returned - * must be be computed using [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]. Note that this should only be used to - * sign HTLC transactions from channels supporting anchor outputs after all additional - * inputs/outputs have been added to the transaction. - * - * [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType::All - */ - Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] _htlc_tx, long _input, HTLCDescriptor _htlc_descriptor); - /** - * Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment - * transaction, either offered or received. - * - * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the - * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be - * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is - * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration. - * - * `witness_script` is either an offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC - * outputs. - * - * `amount` is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature. - * - * `per_commitment_point` is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state - * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive - * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the - * BIP 143 signature. - */ - Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] _htlc_tx, long _input, long _amount, byte[] _per_commitment_point, HTLCOutputInCommitment _htlc); - /** - * Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction. - * - * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have - * chosen to forgo their output as dust. - */ - Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(ClosingTransaction _closing_tx); - /** - * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an - * input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`. - */ - Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] _anchor_tx, long _input); - /** - * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key proving it comes from one of the - * channel participants. - * - * Channel announcements also require a signature from each node's network key. Our node - * signature is computed through [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`]. - * - * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and - * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the - * protocol. - */ - Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(UnsignedChannelAnnouncement _msg); - } private class LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder { internal EcdsaChannelSigner held; } private class LDKEcdsaChannelSignerImpl : bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner { internal LDKEcdsaChannelSignerImpl(EcdsaChannelSignerInterface arg, LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder impl_holder) { this.arg = arg; this.impl_holder = impl_holder; } private EcdsaChannelSignerInterface arg; private LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder impl_holder; - public long sign_counterparty_commitment(long _commitment_tx, byte[][] _preimages) { + public long sign_counterparty_commitment(long _commitment_tx, long _preimages) { org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction _commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (_commitment_tx < 0 || _commitment_tx > 4096) { _commitment_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction(null, _commitment_tx); } - Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_commitment(_commitment_tx_hu_conv, _preimages); + int _preimages_conv_8_len = InternalUtils.getArrayLength(_preimages); + byte[][] _preimages_conv_8_arr = new byte[_preimages_conv_8_len][]; + for (int i = 0; i < _preimages_conv_8_len; i++) { + long _preimages_conv_8 = InternalUtils.getU64ArrayElem(_preimages, i); + byte[] _preimages_conv_8_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_preimages_conv_8); + _preimages_conv_8_arr[i] = _preimages_conv_8_conv; + } + bindings.free_buffer(_preimages); + Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_commitment(_commitment_tx_hu_conv, _preimages_conv_8_arr); GC.KeepAlive(arg); long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr(); return result; } - public long validate_counterparty_revocation(long _idx, byte[] _secret) { - Result_NoneNoneZ ret = arg.validate_counterparty_revocation(_idx, _secret); + public long validate_counterparty_revocation(long _idx, long _secret) { + byte[] _secret_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_secret); + Result_NoneNoneZ ret = arg.validate_counterparty_revocation(_idx, _secret_conv); GC.KeepAlive(arg); long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr(); return result; } - public long sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(long _commitment_tx) { + public long sign_holder_commitment(long _commitment_tx) { org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction _commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (_commitment_tx < 0 || _commitment_tx > 4096) { _commitment_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction(null, _commitment_tx); } - Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(_commitment_tx_hu_conv); + Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_commitment(_commitment_tx_hu_conv); GC.KeepAlive(arg); long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr(); return result; } - public long sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] _justice_tx, long _input, long _amount, byte[] _per_commitment_key) { - Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_output(_justice_tx, _input, _amount, _per_commitment_key); + public long sign_justice_revoked_output(long _justice_tx, long _input, long _amount, long _per_commitment_key) { + byte[] _justice_tx_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_justice_tx); + byte[] _per_commitment_key_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_per_commitment_key); + Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_output(_justice_tx_conv, _input, _amount, _per_commitment_key_conv); GC.KeepAlive(arg); long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr(); return result; } - public long sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] _justice_tx, long _input, long _amount, byte[] _per_commitment_key, long _htlc) { + public long sign_justice_revoked_htlc(long _justice_tx, long _input, long _amount, long _per_commitment_key, long _htlc) { + byte[] _justice_tx_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_justice_tx); + byte[] _per_commitment_key_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_per_commitment_key); org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment _htlc_hu_conv = null; if (_htlc < 0 || _htlc > 4096) { _htlc_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, _htlc); } - Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(_justice_tx, _input, _amount, _per_commitment_key, _htlc_hu_conv); + Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(_justice_tx_conv, _input, _amount, _per_commitment_key_conv, _htlc_hu_conv); GC.KeepAlive(arg); long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr(); return result; } - public long sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] _htlc_tx, long _input, long _htlc_descriptor) { + public long sign_holder_htlc_transaction(long _htlc_tx, long _input, long _htlc_descriptor) { + byte[] _htlc_tx_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_htlc_tx); org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor _htlc_descriptor_hu_conv = null; if (_htlc_descriptor < 0 || _htlc_descriptor > 4096) { _htlc_descriptor_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor(null, _htlc_descriptor); } - Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(_htlc_tx, _input, _htlc_descriptor_hu_conv); + Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(_htlc_tx_conv, _input, _htlc_descriptor_hu_conv); GC.KeepAlive(arg); long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr(); return result; } - public long sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] _htlc_tx, long _input, long _amount, byte[] _per_commitment_point, long _htlc) { + public long sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(long _htlc_tx, long _input, long _amount, long _per_commitment_point, long _htlc) { + byte[] _htlc_tx_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_htlc_tx); + byte[] _per_commitment_point_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_per_commitment_point); org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment _htlc_hu_conv = null; if (_htlc < 0 || _htlc > 4096) { _htlc_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, _htlc); } - Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(_htlc_tx, _input, _amount, _per_commitment_point, _htlc_hu_conv); + Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(_htlc_tx_conv, _input, _amount, _per_commitment_point_conv, _htlc_hu_conv); GC.KeepAlive(arg); long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr(); return result; } public long sign_closing_transaction(long _closing_tx) { org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction _closing_tx_hu_conv = null; if (_closing_tx < 0 || _closing_tx > 4096) { _closing_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction(null, _closing_tx); } - Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_closing_transaction(_closing_tx_hu_conv); + Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_closing_transaction(_closing_tx_hu_conv); GC.KeepAlive(arg); long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr(); return result; } - public long sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] _anchor_tx, long _input) { - Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_anchor_input(_anchor_tx, _input); + public long sign_holder_anchor_input(long _anchor_tx, long _input) { + byte[] _anchor_tx_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(_anchor_tx); + Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_anchor_input(_anchor_tx_conv, _input); GC.KeepAlive(arg); long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr(); return result; } public long sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(long _msg) { org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement _msg_hu_conv = null; if (_msg < 0 || _msg > 4096) { _msg_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement(null, _msg); } - Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(_msg_hu_conv); + Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(_msg_hu_conv); GC.KeepAlive(arg); long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr(); return result; } } - public static EcdsaChannelSigner new_impl(EcdsaChannelSignerInterface arg, ChannelSigner.ChannelSignerInterface ChannelSigner_impl, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) { + + /** Creates a new instance of EcdsaChannelSigner from a given implementation */ + public static EcdsaChannelSigner new_impl(EcdsaChannelSignerInterface arg, ChannelSignerInterface channelSigner_impl, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) { LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder impl_holder = new LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder(); - impl_holder.held = new EcdsaChannelSigner(new LDKEcdsaChannelSignerImpl(arg, impl_holder), ChannelSigner.new_impl(ChannelSigner_impl, pubkeys).bindings_instance, pubkeys); - return impl_holder.held; - } + LDKEcdsaChannelSignerImpl impl = new LDKEcdsaChannelSignerImpl(arg, impl_holder); + ChannelSigner channelSigner = ChannelSigner.new_impl(channelSigner_impl, pubkeys); + long[] ptr_idx = bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner_new(impl, channelSigner.instance_idx, pubkeys == null ? 0 : pubkeys.clone_ptr()); - /** - * Gets the underlying ChannelSigner. - */ - public ChannelSigner get_channel_signer() { - ChannelSigner res = new ChannelSigner(null, bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner_get_ChannelSigner(this.ptr)); - this.ptrs_to.AddLast(res); - return res; + impl_holder.held = new EcdsaChannelSigner(null, ptr_idx[0]); + impl_holder.held.instance_idx = ptr_idx[1]; + impl_holder.held.bindings_instance = impl; + impl_holder.held.ptrs_to.AddLast(channelSigner); + return impl_holder.held; } /** @@ -264,13 +270,13 @@ public class EcdsaChannelSigner : CommonBase { * Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional * irrelevant or duplicate preimages. */ - public Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages) { - long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr, preimages != null ? InternalUtils.mapArray(preimages, preimages_conv_8 => InternalUtils.check_arr_len(preimages_conv_8, 32)) : null); + public Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages) { + long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint64Array(InternalUtils.mapArray(preimages, preimages_conv_8 => InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(preimages_conv_8, 32))))); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(commitment_tx); GC.KeepAlive(preimages); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } - Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(commitment_tx); }; return ret_hu_conv; } @@ -282,7 +288,7 @@ public class EcdsaChannelSigner : CommonBase { * forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment. */ public Result_NoneNoneZ validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret) { - long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_validate_counterparty_revocation(this.ptr, idx, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(secret, 32)); + long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_validate_counterparty_revocation(this.ptr, idx, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(secret, 32))); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(idx); GC.KeepAlive(secret); @@ -292,28 +298,22 @@ public class EcdsaChannelSigner : CommonBase { } /** - * Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions. + * Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction. * * This will be called * - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`. * - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close. - * - with the previous `commitment_tx`, just to get claiming HTLC - * signatures, if we are reacting to a [`ChannelMonitor`] - * [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas) - * that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest `commitment_tx`. * * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction. * * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked. - * - * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor */ - public Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx) { - long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr); + public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_commitment(org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx) { + long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(commitment_tx); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } - Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(commitment_tx); }; return ret_hu_conv; } @@ -334,15 +334,15 @@ public class EcdsaChannelSigner : CommonBase { * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do * so). */ - public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key) { - long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_justice_revoked_output(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32)); + public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key) { + long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_justice_revoked_output(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(justice_tx), input, amount, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32))); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(justice_tx); GC.KeepAlive(input); GC.KeepAlive(amount); GC.KeepAlive(per_commitment_key); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } - Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } @@ -366,8 +366,8 @@ public class EcdsaChannelSigner : CommonBase { * `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script * (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures). */ - public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) { - long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_justice_revoked_htlc(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr); + public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) { + long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_justice_revoked_htlc(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(justice_tx), input, amount, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32)), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(justice_tx); GC.KeepAlive(input); @@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ public class EcdsaChannelSigner : CommonBase { GC.KeepAlive(per_commitment_key); GC.KeepAlive(htlc); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } - Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(htlc); }; return ret_hu_conv; } @@ -383,20 +383,23 @@ public class EcdsaChannelSigner : CommonBase { /** * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's HTLC output used as an input within * `htlc_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction at index `input`. The signature returned - * must be be computed using [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]. Note that this should only be used to - * sign HTLC transactions from channels supporting anchor outputs after all additional - * inputs/outputs have been added to the transaction. + * must be be computed using [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]. + * + * Note that this may be called for HTLCs in the penultimate commitment transaction if a + * [`ChannelMonitor`] [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas) + * broadcasts it before receiving the update for the latest commitment transaction. * * [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType::All + * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor */ - public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor) { - long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, htlc_tx, input, htlc_descriptor == null ? 0 : htlc_descriptor.ptr); + public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor) { + long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(htlc_tx), input, htlc_descriptor == null ? 0 : htlc_descriptor.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(htlc_tx); GC.KeepAlive(input); GC.KeepAlive(htlc_descriptor); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } - Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(htlc_descriptor); }; return ret_hu_conv; } @@ -420,8 +423,8 @@ public class EcdsaChannelSigner : CommonBase { * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the * BIP 143 signature. */ - public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) { - long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, htlc_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_point, 33), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr); + public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) { + long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(htlc_tx), input, amount, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_point, 33)), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(htlc_tx); GC.KeepAlive(input); @@ -429,7 +432,7 @@ public class EcdsaChannelSigner : CommonBase { GC.KeepAlive(per_commitment_point); GC.KeepAlive(htlc); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } - Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(htlc); }; return ret_hu_conv; } @@ -440,12 +443,12 @@ public class EcdsaChannelSigner : CommonBase { * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have * chosen to forgo their output as dust. */ - public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction closing_tx) { + public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction closing_tx) { long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_closing_transaction(this.ptr, closing_tx == null ? 0 : closing_tx.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(closing_tx); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } - Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(closing_tx); }; return ret_hu_conv; } @@ -454,13 +457,13 @@ public class EcdsaChannelSigner : CommonBase { * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an * input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`. */ - public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input) { - long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_anchor_input(this.ptr, anchor_tx, input); + public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input) { + long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_anchor_input(this.ptr, InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(anchor_tx), input); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(anchor_tx); GC.KeepAlive(input); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } - Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); return ret_hu_conv; } @@ -475,12 +478,12 @@ public class EcdsaChannelSigner : CommonBase { * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the * protocol. */ - public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg) { + public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg) { long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(this.ptr, msg == null ? 0 : msg.ptr); GC.KeepAlive(this); GC.KeepAlive(msg); if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; } - Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); + Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret); if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(msg); }; return ret_hu_conv; }