X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fchain%2Fchannelmonitor.rs;h=0bfd944456ab6851749505350c781e8ec267d27e;hb=384c4dc7753e4b7ac53ea380e52809babd8f0f9b;hp=e79e50172f9f3f1c5c8a2e98d378f118e6841001;hpb=ad24b8c8911f712a672cf4d3d7ee27ed51dc4ba6;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs index e79e5017..0bfd9444 100644 --- a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs @@ -21,8 +21,7 @@ //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices. use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader; -use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction}; -use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint; +use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint, TxOut, Transaction}; use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder}; use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; @@ -34,30 +33,34 @@ use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature}; use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey}; use bitcoin::secp256k1; -use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage}; -use ln::msgs::DecodeError; -use ln::chan_utils; -use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCType, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction}; -use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource; -use chain; -use chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput}; -use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator}; -use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData}; -use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface}; -use chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler; -use chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput}; -use chain::Filter; -use util::logger::Logger; -use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48, OptionDeserWrapper}; -use util::byte_utils; -use util::events::Event; - -use prelude::*; +use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage}; +use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError; +use crate::ln::chan_utils; +use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCClaim, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction}; +use crate::ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource; +use crate::chain; +use crate::chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput}; +use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator}; +use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData}; +use crate::chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface}; +#[cfg(anchors)] +use crate::chain::onchaintx::ClaimEvent; +use crate::chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler; +use crate::chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput}; +use crate::chain::Filter; +use crate::util::logger::Logger; +use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48, OptionDeserWrapper}; +use crate::util::byte_utils; +use crate::util::events::Event; +#[cfg(anchors)] +use crate::util::events::{AnchorDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent}; + +use crate::prelude::*; use core::{cmp, mem}; -use io::{self, Error}; +use crate::io::{self, Error}; use core::convert::TryInto; use core::ops::Deref; -use sync::Mutex; +use crate::sync::Mutex; /// An update generated by the underlying channel itself which contains some new information the /// [`ChannelMonitor`] should be made aware of. @@ -66,7 +69,7 @@ use sync::Mutex; /// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction /// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment /// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size. -#[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))] +#[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq, Eq))] #[derive(Clone)] #[must_use] pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate { @@ -76,12 +79,14 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate { /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with one exception specified below. /// /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned - /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given + /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] have been applied to all copies of a given /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called. /// /// The only instance where update_id values are not strictly increasing is the case where we /// allow post-force-close updates with a special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. See /// its docs for more details. + /// + /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress pub update_id: u64, } @@ -123,7 +128,7 @@ impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate { } /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager. -#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] +#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] pub enum MonitorEvent { /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate. HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate), @@ -132,10 +137,10 @@ pub enum MonitorEvent { CommitmentTxConfirmed(OutPoint), /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See - /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`] for more information on how this is used. + /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] for more information on how this is used. /// - /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure - UpdateCompleted { + /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress + Completed { /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated funding_txo: OutPoint, /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or @@ -147,15 +152,15 @@ pub enum MonitorEvent { }, /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has failed. See - /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure`] for more information on how this is used. + /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`] for more information on how this is used. /// - /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure + /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure UpdateFailed(OutPoint), } impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent, - // Note that UpdateCompleted and UpdateFailed are currently never serialized to disk as they are + // Note that Completed and UpdateFailed are currently never serialized to disk as they are // generated only in ChainMonitor - (0, UpdateCompleted) => { + (0, Completed) => { (0, funding_txo, required), (2, monitor_update_id, required), }, @@ -168,7 +173,7 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent, /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds. -#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] +#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] pub struct HTLCUpdate { pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash, pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option, @@ -234,7 +239,7 @@ pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6; pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS; // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction -#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] +#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] struct HolderSignedTx { /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster txid: Txid, @@ -261,9 +266,23 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, { (14, htlc_outputs, vec_type) }); +#[cfg(anchors)] +impl HolderSignedTx { + fn non_dust_htlcs(&self) -> Vec { + self.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _, _)| { + if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index { + Some(htlc.clone()) + } else { + None + } + }) + .collect() + } +} + /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions. -#[derive(PartialEq)] +#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)] struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, @@ -313,14 +332,15 @@ impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { } } -/// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height when the event was observed and the -/// transaction causing it. +/// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height and hash when the event was +/// observed, as well as the transaction causing it. /// /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization. -#[derive(PartialEq)] +#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)] struct OnchainEventEntry { txid: Txid, height: u32, + block_hash: Option, // Added as optional, will be filled in for any entry generated on 0.0.113 or after event: OnchainEvent, transaction: Option, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in LDK 0.0.110 } @@ -359,7 +379,7 @@ type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, u64)>; /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY) -#[derive(PartialEq)] +#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)] enum OnchainEvent { /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used /// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out @@ -421,6 +441,7 @@ impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry { (0, self.txid, required), (1, self.transaction, option), (2, self.height, required), + (3, self.block_hash, option), (4, self.event, required), }); Ok(()) @@ -431,16 +452,18 @@ impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry { fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result, DecodeError> { let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros(); let mut transaction = None; + let mut block_hash = None; let mut height = 0; let mut event = None; read_tlv_fields!(reader, { (0, txid, required), (1, transaction, option), (2, height, required), + (3, block_hash, option), (4, event, ignorable), }); if let Some(ev) = event { - Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, event: ev })) + Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, block_hash, event: ev })) } else { Ok(None) } @@ -469,7 +492,7 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent, ); -#[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))] +#[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq, Eq))] #[derive(Clone)] pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep { LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { @@ -617,7 +640,7 @@ pub enum Balance { } /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY. -#[derive(PartialEq)] +#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)] struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { commitment_tx_output_idx: Option, /// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC @@ -793,7 +816,10 @@ pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl { // of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager. funding_spend_seen: bool, + /// Set to `Some` of the confirmed transaction spending the funding input of the channel after + /// reaching `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` confirmations. funding_spend_confirmed: Option, + confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo, /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the @@ -1216,7 +1242,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { B::Target: BroadcasterInterface, L::Target: Logger, { - self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger) + self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger); } /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel @@ -1283,9 +1309,11 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list /// in the process. /// - /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to - /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do - /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors. + /// This is called by the [`EventsProvider::process_pending_events`] implementation for + /// [`ChainMonitor`]. + /// + /// [`EventsProvider::process_pending_events`]: crate::util::events::EventsProvider::process_pending_events + /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec { self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_events() } @@ -1311,14 +1339,20 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of - /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of - /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows - /// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these - /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to - /// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a - /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact - /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you. - /// In any-case, choice is up to the user. + /// the Channel was out-of-date. + /// + /// You may also use this to broadcast the latest local commitment transaction, either because + /// a monitor update failed with [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`] or because we've + /// fallen behind (i.e. we've received proof that our counterparty side knows a revocation + /// secret we gave them that they shouldn't know). + /// + /// Broadcasting these transactions in the second case is UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty + /// side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to broadcast them if counterparty doesn't + /// close channel with their commitment transaction after a substantial amount of time. Best + /// may be to contact the other node operator out-of-band to coordinate other options available + /// to you. In any-case, the choice is up to you. + /// + /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec where L::Target: Logger { self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger) @@ -1454,11 +1488,11 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain. - pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec { + pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option)> { let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap(); - let mut txids: Vec = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf + let mut txids: Vec<(Txid, Option)> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf .iter() - .map(|entry| entry.txid) + .map(|entry| (entry.txid, entry.block_hash)) .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter()) .collect(); txids.sort_unstable(); @@ -1911,7 +1945,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC. macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs { ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr, $commitment_tx_confirmed: expr, - $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { { + $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $commitment_tx_conf_hash: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { { debug_assert_eq!($commitment_tx_confirmed.txid(), $commitment_txid_confirmed); macro_rules! check_htlc_fails { @@ -1955,6 +1989,7 @@ macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs { txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed, transaction: Some($commitment_tx_confirmed.clone()), height: $commitment_tx_conf_height, + block_hash: Some(*$commitment_tx_conf_hash), event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: (**source).clone(), payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(), @@ -2142,7 +2177,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { macro_rules! claim_htlcs { ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => { let (htlc_claim_reqs, _) = self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info($commitment_number, $txid, None); - self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger); + self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger); } } if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid { @@ -2168,10 +2203,10 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC // transactions. let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height()); - self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger); + self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger); if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx { let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx, self.best_block.height()); - self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger); + self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger); } } } @@ -2211,6 +2246,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!"); } let mut ret = Ok(()); + let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator); for update in updates.updates.iter() { match update { ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => { @@ -2228,7 +2264,6 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { }, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => { log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage"); - let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator); self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger) }, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => { @@ -2244,8 +2279,29 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { self.lockdown_from_offchain = true; if *should_broadcast { self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger); + // If the channel supports anchor outputs, we'll need to emit an external + // event to be consumed such that a child transaction is broadcast with a + // high enough feerate for the parent commitment transaction to confirm. + if self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() { + let funding_output = HolderFundingOutput::build( + self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, + self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors(), + ); + let best_block_height = self.best_block.height(); + let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package( + self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, + PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_output), + best_block_height, false, best_block_height, + ); + self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests( + vec![commitment_package], best_block_height, best_block_height, + broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger, + ); + } } else if !self.holder_tx_signed { - log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take"); + log_error!(logger, "WARNING: You have a potentially-unsafe holder commitment transaction available to broadcast"); + log_error!(logger, " in channel monitor for channel {}!", log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id())); + log_error!(logger, " Read the docs for ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn and take manual action!"); } else { // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed, the ChannelManager // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we @@ -2296,6 +2352,34 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec { let mut ret = Vec::new(); mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events); + #[cfg(anchors)] + for claim_event in self.onchain_tx_handler.get_and_clear_pending_claim_events().drain(..) { + match claim_event { + ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment { + package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, commitment_tx, anchor_output_idx, + } => { + let commitment_txid = commitment_tx.txid(); + debug_assert_eq!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, commitment_txid); + let pending_htlcs = self.current_holder_commitment_tx.non_dust_htlcs(); + let commitment_tx_fee_satoshis = self.channel_value_satoshis - + commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0u64, |sum, output| sum + output.value); + ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { + package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, + commitment_tx, + commitment_tx_fee_satoshis, + anchor_descriptor: AnchorDescriptor { + channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id, + channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis, + outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { + txid: commitment_txid, + vout: anchor_output_idx, + }, + }, + pending_htlcs, + })); + }, + } + } ret } @@ -2324,7 +2408,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { /// Returns packages to claim the revoked output(s), as well as additional outputs to watch and /// general information about the output that is to the counterparty in the commitment /// transaction. - fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) + fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) -> (Vec, TransactionOutputs, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo) where L::Target: Logger { // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing @@ -2395,13 +2479,13 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option { fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height, - per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| + block_hash, per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref())) ), logger); } else { debug_assert!(false, "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn"); fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height, - [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger); + block_hash, [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger); } } } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option { @@ -2418,7 +2502,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number); log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid); - fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height, + fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash, per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref())) ), logger); @@ -2508,13 +2592,13 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, - preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone())) + preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors())) } else { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput( CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, - htlc.clone())) + htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors())) }; let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true }; let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0); @@ -2554,7 +2638,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs))) } - // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnChainTxHandler, so that the handler can + // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnchainTxHandler, so that the handler can // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain. fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) { @@ -2599,7 +2683,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints. /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds. /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions. - fn check_spend_holder_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger { + fn check_spend_holder_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger { let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); let mut claim_requests = Vec::new(); let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new(); @@ -2622,7 +2706,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx); append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch); fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, tx, height, - self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() + block_hash, self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() .map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger); } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx { if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid { @@ -2631,7 +2715,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height); let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx); append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch); - fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height, + fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash, holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger); } @@ -2650,6 +2734,11 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript); let txid = commitment_tx.txid(); let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx]; + // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only valid once the commitment + // transaction confirms. + if self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() { + return holder_transactions; + } for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index { let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered { @@ -2683,6 +2772,11 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript); let txid = commitment_tx.txid(); let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx]; + // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only final once the commitment + // transaction confirms due to the CSV 1 encumberance. + if self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() { + return holder_transactions; + } for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index { let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered { @@ -2729,7 +2823,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { if height > self.best_block.height() { self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height); - self.block_confirmed(height, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger) + self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger) } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash() { self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height); self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height); @@ -2781,14 +2875,14 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None; if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 { let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, counterparty_output_idx_sats) = - self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger); + self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger); commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = counterparty_output_idx_sats; if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() { watch_outputs.push(new_outputs); } claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints); if new_outpoints.is_empty() { - if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger) { + if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger) { debug_assert!(commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output.is_none(), "A commitment transaction matched as both a counterparty and local commitment tx?"); if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() { @@ -2803,7 +2897,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry { txid, transaction: Some((*tx).clone()), - height: height, + height, + block_hash: Some(block_hash), event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv, commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, @@ -2822,28 +2917,30 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus, // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check. - self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger); + self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger); - self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger); + self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger); } if height > self.best_block.height() { self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height); } - self.block_confirmed(height, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger) + self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger) } /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding - /// complexity especially in `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`. + /// complexity especially in + /// `OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_requests`/`OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_matched_txn`. /// /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height. fn block_confirmed( &mut self, conf_height: u32, + conf_hash: BlockHash, txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>, mut watch_outputs: Vec, mut claimable_outpoints: Vec, @@ -2861,21 +2958,26 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger); if should_broadcast { - let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone()); + let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors()); let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), false, self.best_block.height()); claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package); self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0)); let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript); self.holder_tx_signed = true; - // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package - // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers - // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here. - let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height()); - let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx); - if !new_outputs.is_empty() { - watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs)); + // We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is + // unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in + // `transactions_confirmed`. + if !self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors() { + // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package + // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers + // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here. + let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height()); + let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx); + if !new_outputs.is_empty() { + watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs)); + } + claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints); } - claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints); } // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold. @@ -2954,7 +3056,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { } } - self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger); + self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger); + self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_matched_txn(&txn_matched, conf_height, conf_hash, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger); // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch, // updating the latter in the process. @@ -3068,6 +3171,16 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { } fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(&self, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger { + // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one confirmed (even + // with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as duplicate/conflicting. + if self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() || + self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event { + OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true, + _ => false, + }).is_some() + { + return false; + } // We need to consider all HTLCs which are: // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or @@ -3133,28 +3246,20 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC - fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger { + fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger { 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input { let mut payment_data = None; - let witness_items = input.witness.len(); - let htlctype = input.witness.last().map(|w| w.len()).and_then(HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype); - let prev_last_witness_len = input.witness.second_to_last().map(|w| w.len()).unwrap_or(0); - let revocation_sig_claim = (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33) - || (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33); - let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) - && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32; + let htlc_claim = HTLCClaim::from_witness(&input.witness); + let revocation_sig_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::Revocation); + let accepted_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedPreimage); #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] - let accepted_timeout_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim; - let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && - !revocation_sig_claim && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32; - + let accepted_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedTimeout); + let offered_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedPreimage); #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] - let offered_timeout_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC); + let offered_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedTimeout); let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]); - if accepted_preimage_claim { - payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap()); - } else if offered_preimage_claim { + if offered_preimage_claim || accepted_preimage_claim { payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap()); } @@ -3226,7 +3331,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false); let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered; self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry { - txid: tx.txid(), height, transaction: Some(tx.clone()), + txid: tx.txid(), height, block_hash: Some(*block_hash), transaction: Some(tx.clone()), event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout, preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { @@ -3270,6 +3375,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry { txid: tx.txid(), height, + block_hash: Some(*block_hash), transaction: Some(tx.clone()), event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout, @@ -3293,6 +3399,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { txid: tx.txid(), transaction: Some(tx.clone()), height, + block_hash: Some(*block_hash), event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout, preimage: Some(payment_preimage), @@ -3320,6 +3427,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { txid: tx.txid(), transaction: Some(tx.clone()), height, + block_hash: Some(*block_hash), event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000), @@ -3334,7 +3442,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { } /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own - fn is_paying_spendable_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger { + fn is_paying_spendable_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger { let mut spendable_output = None; for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us if i > ::core::u16::MAX as usize { @@ -3393,7 +3501,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { let entry = OnchainEventEntry { txid: tx.txid(), transaction: Some(tx.clone()), - height: height, + height, + block_hash: Some(*block_hash), event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() }, }; log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold()); @@ -3435,7 +3544,7 @@ where self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3); } - fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec { + fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option)> { self.0.get_relevant_txids() } } @@ -3743,27 +3852,26 @@ mod tests { use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator; use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep; - use ::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err}; - use chain::{BestBlock, Confirm}; - use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor; - use chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT}; - use chain::transaction::OutPoint; - use chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner; - use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash}; - use ln::chan_utils; - use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters}; - use ln::channelmanager::PaymentSendFailure; - use ln::features::InitFeatures; - use ln::functional_test_utils::*; - use ln::script::ShutdownScript; - use util::errors::APIError; - use util::events::{ClosureReason, MessageSendEventsProvider}; - use util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator}; - use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable}; - use sync::{Arc, Mutex}; - use io; + use crate::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err}; + use crate::chain::{BestBlock, Confirm}; + use crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor; + use crate::chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT}; + use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint; + use crate::chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner; + use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash}; + use crate::ln::chan_utils; + use crate::ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters}; + use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentSendFailure, PaymentId}; + use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*; + use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript; + use crate::util::errors::APIError; + use crate::util::events::{ClosureReason, MessageSendEventsProvider}; + use crate::util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator}; + use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable}; + use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex}; + use crate::io; use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, TxMerkleNode, Witness}; - use prelude::*; + use crate::prelude::*; fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) { // Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction @@ -3782,9 +3890,9 @@ mod tests { let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]); let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes( - &nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); + &nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); create_announced_chan_between_nodes( - &nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); + &nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); // Rebalance somewhat send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000); @@ -3818,7 +3926,7 @@ mod tests { // If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass // the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed). let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000); - unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), + unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert!(err.contains("ChannelMonitor storage failure"))); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); // After the failure we generate a close-channel monitor update