X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fchain%2Fchannelmonitor.rs;h=0c207fa8b17429b32e31f1eda65ea0270dcdad82;hb=75c058670cdfd2db97102d70d869757a77f1ac04;hp=ce8279234a54f71a201521e9a19545b29e319941;hpb=c6c684be30f78678e4041b36eba7c404482274ac;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs index ce827923..0c207fa8 100644 --- a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs @@ -33,10 +33,11 @@ use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature}; use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey}; use bitcoin::secp256k1; +use crate::ln::channel::INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER; use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage}; use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError; use crate::ln::chan_utils; -use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCClaim, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction}; +use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCClaim, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys}; use crate::ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, SentHTLCId}; use crate::chain; use crate::chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput}; @@ -502,6 +503,9 @@ pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep { htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, + feerate_per_kw: Option, + to_broadcaster_value_sat: Option, + to_countersignatory_value_sat: Option, }, PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, @@ -544,8 +548,11 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, }, (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => { (0, commitment_txid, required), + (1, feerate_per_kw, option), (2, commitment_number, required), + (3, to_broadcaster_value_sat, option), (4, their_per_commitment_point, required), + (5, to_countersignatory_value_sat, option), (6, htlc_outputs, required_vec), }, (2, PaymentPreimage) => { @@ -576,14 +583,14 @@ pub enum Balance { ClaimableOnChannelClose { /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be /// required to do so. - claimable_amount_satoshis: u64, + amount_satoshis: u64, }, /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until /// we consider it spendable. ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction. - claimable_amount_satoshis: u64, + amount_satoshis: u64, /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this /// amount. confirmation_height: u32, @@ -598,7 +605,7 @@ pub enum Balance { ContentiousClaimable { /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be /// required to do so. - claimable_amount_satoshis: u64, + amount_satoshis: u64, /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not /// done so. timeout_height: u32, @@ -613,7 +620,7 @@ pub enum Balance { MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees /// which will be required to do so. - claimable_amount_satoshis: u64, + amount_satoshis: u64, /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not /// done so. claimable_height: u32, @@ -626,7 +633,7 @@ pub enum Balance { MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees /// which will be required to do so. - claimable_amount_satoshis: u64, + amount_satoshis: u64, /// The height at which our counterparty will be able to claim the balance if we have not /// yet received the preimage and claimed it ourselves. expiry_height: u32, @@ -643,7 +650,7 @@ pub enum Balance { /// /// Note that for outputs from HTLC balances this may be excluding some on-chain fees that /// were already spent. - claimable_amount_satoshis: u64, + amount_satoshis: u64, }, } @@ -656,27 +663,14 @@ impl Balance { /// On-chain fees required to claim the balance are not included in this amount. pub fn claimable_amount_satoshis(&self) -> u64 { match self { - Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { - claimable_amount_satoshis, - } => *claimable_amount_satoshis, - Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis, - .. - } => *claimable_amount_satoshis, - Balance::ContentiousClaimable { - claimable_amount_satoshis, - .. - } => *claimable_amount_satoshis, - Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { - .. - } => 0, - Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { - .. - } => 0, - Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { - claimable_amount_satoshis, - .. - } => *claimable_amount_satoshis, + Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis, .. }| + Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { amount_satoshis, .. }| + Balance::ContentiousClaimable { amount_satoshis, .. }| + Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { amount_satoshis, .. } + => *amount_satoshis, + Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { .. }| + Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { .. } + => 0, } } } @@ -895,6 +889,14 @@ pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl { /// The node_id of our counterparty counterparty_node_id: Option, + + /// Initial counterparty commmitment data needed to recreate the commitment tx + /// in the persistence pipeline for third-party watchtowers. This will only be present on + /// monitors created after 0.0.117. + /// + /// Ordering of tuple data: (their_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_sats, + /// to_countersignatory_sats) + initial_counterparty_commitment_info: Option<(PublicKey, u32, u64, u64)>, } /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends. @@ -1085,6 +1087,7 @@ impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl ChannelMonitor { best_block, counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), + initial_counterparty_commitment_info: None, }) } @@ -1243,11 +1247,31 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret) } + /// A variant of `Self::provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx` used to provide + /// additional information to the monitor to store in order to recreate the initial + /// counterparty commitment transaction during persistence (mainly for use in third-party + /// watchtowers). + /// + /// This is used to provide the counterparty commitment information directly to the monitor + /// before the initial persistence of a new channel. + pub(crate) fn provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx( + &self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option>)>, + commitment_number: u64, their_cur_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u32, + to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, logger: &L, + ) + where L::Target: Logger + { + self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(txid, + htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_cur_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, + to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, logger); + } + /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction. /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible. /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers. - pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx( + #[cfg(test)] + fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx( &self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option>)>, @@ -1383,6 +1407,45 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { ret } + /// Gets the counterparty's initial commitment transaction. The returned commitment + /// transaction is unsigned. This is intended to be called during the initial persistence of + /// the monitor (inside an implementation of [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]), to allow for + /// watchtowers in the persistence pipeline to have enough data to form justice transactions. + /// + /// This is similar to [`Self::counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update`], except + /// that for the initial commitment transaction, we don't have a corresponding update. + /// + /// This will only return `Some` for channel monitors that have been created after upgrading + /// to LDK 0.0.117+. + /// + /// [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist::persist_new_channel + pub fn initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(&self) -> Option { + self.inner.lock().unwrap().initial_counterparty_commitment_tx() + } + + /// Gets all of the counterparty commitment transactions provided by the given update. This + /// may be empty if the update doesn't include any new counterparty commitments. Returned + /// commitment transactions are unsigned. + /// + /// This is provided so that watchtower clients in the persistence pipeline are able to build + /// justice transactions for each counterparty commitment upon each update. It's intended to be + /// used within an implementation of [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`], which is provided + /// with a monitor and an update. + /// + /// It is expected that a watchtower client may use this method to retrieve the latest counterparty + /// commitment transaction(s), and then hold the necessary data until a later update in which + /// the monitor has been updated with the corresponding revocation data, at which point the + /// monitor can sign the justice transaction. + /// + /// This will only return a non-empty list for monitor updates that have been created after + /// upgrading to LDK 0.0.117+. Note that no restriction lies on the monitors themselves, which + /// may have been created prior to upgrading. + /// + /// [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist::update_persisted_channel + pub fn counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(&self, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Vec { + self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(update) + } + pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 { self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret() } @@ -1672,7 +1735,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_delayed_output_pending { debug_assert!(holder_commitment); return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, + amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, confirmation_height: conf_thresh, }); } else if htlc_resolved.is_some() && !htlc_output_spend_pending { @@ -1710,7 +1773,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { debug_assert!(!htlc.offered || htlc_spend_pending.is_none() || !htlc_spend_pending.unwrap().1, "We don't (currently) generate preimage claims against revoked outputs, where did you get one?!"); return Some(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { - claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, + amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, }); } } else if htlc.offered == holder_commitment { @@ -1719,12 +1782,12 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { // and awaiting confirmations on it. if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_timeout_spend_pending { return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, + amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, confirmation_height: conf_thresh, }); } else { return Some(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, + amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry, payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash, }); @@ -1738,12 +1801,12 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none()); if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending { return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, + amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, confirmation_height: conf_thresh, }); } else { return Some(Balance::ContentiousClaimable { - claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, + amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry, payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage: *payment_preimage, @@ -1751,7 +1814,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { } } else if htlc_resolved.is_none() { return Some(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, + amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry, payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash, }); @@ -1824,7 +1887,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } else { None } }) { res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: value, + amount_satoshis: value, confirmation_height: conf_thresh, }); } else { @@ -1847,7 +1910,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { output, .. } } = &event.event { res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: output.value, + amount_satoshis: output.value, confirmation_height: event.confirmation_threshold(), }); if let Some(confirmed_to_self_idx) = confirmed_counterparty_output.map(|(idx, _)| idx) { @@ -1866,7 +1929,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { .is_output_spend_pending(&BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, confirmed_to_self_idx)); if output_spendable { res.push(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { - claimable_amount_satoshis: amt, + amount_satoshis: amt, }); } } else { @@ -1879,7 +1942,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { walk_htlcs!(true, false, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a)); if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh { res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat, + amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat, confirmation_height: conf_thresh, }); } @@ -1889,7 +1952,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { walk_htlcs!(true, false, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a)); if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh { res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat, + amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat, confirmation_height: conf_thresh, }); } @@ -1902,7 +1965,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty. res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { - claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat, + amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat, confirmation_height: conf_thresh, }); } @@ -1913,7 +1976,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; } if htlc.offered { res.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, + amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry, payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash, }); @@ -1923,14 +1986,14 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { // As long as the HTLC is still in our latest commitment state, treat // it as potentially claimable, even if it has long-since expired. res.push(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { - claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, + amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry, payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash, }); } } res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { - claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat, + amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat, }); } @@ -2135,7 +2198,7 @@ macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs { }, }; log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", - log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type, + &htlc.payment_hash, $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type, $commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold()); $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry); } @@ -2239,6 +2302,25 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { Ok(()) } + pub(crate) fn provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx( + &mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option>)>, + commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u32, + to_broadcaster_value: u64, to_countersignatory_value: u64, logger: &L + ) + where L::Target: Logger + { + self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info = Some((their_per_commitment_point.clone(), + feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value)); + + #[cfg(debug_assertions)] { + let rebuilt_commitment_tx = self.initial_counterparty_commitment_tx().unwrap(); + debug_assert_eq!(rebuilt_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), txid); + } + + self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, + their_per_commitment_point, logger); + } + pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger { // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close. @@ -2484,7 +2566,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { ret = Err(()); } } - ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point } => { + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, .. } => { log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info"); self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger) }, @@ -2556,6 +2638,10 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { } } + #[cfg(debug_assertions)] { + self.counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(updates); + } + // If the updates succeeded and we were in an already closed channel state, then there's no // need to refuse any updates we expect to receive afer seeing a confirmed commitment. if ret.is_ok() && updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID && self.latest_update_id == updates.update_id { @@ -2664,6 +2750,66 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { ret } + pub(crate) fn initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(&mut self) -> Option { + let (their_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_value, + to_countersignatory_value) = self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info?; + let htlc_outputs = vec![]; + + let commitment_tx = self.build_counterparty_commitment_tx(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, + &their_per_commitment_point, to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value, + feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs); + Some(commitment_tx) + } + + fn build_counterparty_commitment_tx( + &self, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, + to_broadcaster_value: u64, to_countersignatory_value: u64, feerate_per_kw: u32, + mut nondust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option>)> + ) -> CommitmentTransaction { + let broadcaster_keys = &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters + .counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys; + let countersignatory_keys = + &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys; + + let broadcaster_funding_key = broadcaster_keys.funding_pubkey; + let countersignatory_funding_key = countersignatory_keys.funding_pubkey; + let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&their_per_commitment_point, + &broadcaster_keys, &countersignatory_keys, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx); + let channel_parameters = + &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable(); + + CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number, + to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value, broadcaster_funding_key, + countersignatory_funding_key, keys, feerate_per_kw, &mut nondust_htlcs, + channel_parameters) + } + + pub(crate) fn counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(&self, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Vec { + update.updates.iter().filter_map(|update| { + match update { + &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, + ref htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, + feerate_per_kw: Some(feerate_per_kw), + to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(to_broadcaster_value), + to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(to_countersignatory_value) } => { + + let nondust_htlcs = htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _)| { + htlc.transaction_output_index.map(|_| (htlc.clone(), None)) + }).collect::>(); + + let commitment_tx = self.build_counterparty_commitment_tx(commitment_number, + &their_per_commitment_point, to_broadcaster_value, + to_countersignatory_value, feerate_per_kw, nondust_htlcs); + + debug_assert_eq!(commitment_tx.trust().txid(), commitment_txid); + + Some(commitment_tx) + }, + _ => None, + } + }).collect() + } + /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> { self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx) @@ -3361,7 +3507,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { } log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", - log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.txid); + &payment_hash, entry.txid); self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate { payment_hash, payment_preimage: None, @@ -3378,7 +3524,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => { log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor)); self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs { - outputs: vec![descriptor] + outputs: vec![descriptor], + channel_id: Some(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), }); self.spendable_txids_confirmed.push(entry.txid); }, @@ -3637,12 +3784,12 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) { log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!", $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(), - if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), + if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, &$htlc.payment_hash, if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back. We can likely claim the HTLC output with a revocation claim" }); } else { log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}", $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(), - if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), + if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, &$htlc.payment_hash, if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" }); } } @@ -3789,7 +3936,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout), }, }; - log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold()); + log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", &payment_hash, entry.confirmation_threshold()); self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry); } } @@ -4125,6 +4272,7 @@ impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None; let mut spendable_txids_confirmed = Some(Vec::new()); let mut counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs = Some(HashMap::new()); + let mut initial_counterparty_commitment_info = None; read_tlv_fields!(reader, { (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option), (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, optional_vec), @@ -4134,6 +4282,7 @@ impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP (11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option), (13, spendable_txids_confirmed, optional_vec), (15, counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, option), + (17, initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option), }); Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl { @@ -4189,6 +4338,7 @@ impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP best_block, counterparty_node_id, + initial_counterparty_commitment_info, }))) } } @@ -4289,7 +4439,8 @@ mod tests { assert!(err.contains("ChannelMonitor storage failure"))); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); // After the failure we generate a close-channel monitor update check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); - check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() }); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() }, + [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000); // Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update // and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates