X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fchain%2Fchannelmonitor.rs;h=56228906ede3ed68916916ceaec9ce0f5bb6268c;hb=543ad4fd23c1f52e2afa68bbd09d3213d9e2761d;hp=a74c18e725d2bc0a5ec58614bf3cdcf622bed2b0;hpb=0607ed766a5593d93977126e00f43f8113722ced;p=rust-lightning

diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
index a74c18e7..56228906 100644
--- a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
@@ -502,6 +502,9 @@ pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
 		htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
 		commitment_number: u64,
 		their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
+		feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>,
+		to_broadcaster_value_sat: Option<u64>,
+		to_countersignatory_value_sat: Option<u64>,
 	},
 	PaymentPreimage {
 		payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
@@ -544,8 +547,11 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
 	},
 	(1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
 		(0, commitment_txid, required),
+		(1, feerate_per_kw, option),
 		(2, commitment_number, required),
+		(3, to_broadcaster_value_sat, option),
 		(4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
+		(5, to_countersignatory_value_sat, option),
 		(6, htlc_outputs, required_vec),
 	},
 	(2, PaymentPreimage) => {
@@ -2122,7 +2128,7 @@ macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
 								},
 							};
 							log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
-								log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
+								&htlc.payment_hash, $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
 								$commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
 							$self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
 						}
@@ -2471,7 +2477,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 						ret = Err(());
 					}
 				}
-				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point } => {
+				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
 					log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
 					self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
 				},
@@ -3348,7 +3354,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 					}
 
 					log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
-						log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.txid);
+						&payment_hash, entry.txid);
 					self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
 						payment_hash,
 						payment_preimage: None,
@@ -3365,7 +3371,8 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 				OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
 					log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
 					self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
-						outputs: vec![descriptor]
+						outputs: vec![descriptor],
+						channel_id: Some(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()),
 					});
 					self.spendable_txids_confirmed.push(entry.txid);
 				},
@@ -3624,12 +3631,12 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 							(outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
 						log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
 							$tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
-							if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
+							if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, &$htlc.payment_hash,
 							if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back. We can likely claim the HTLC output with a revocation claim" });
 					} else {
 						log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
 							$tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
-							if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
+							if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, &$htlc.payment_hash,
 							if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
 					}
 				}
@@ -3776,7 +3783,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 							commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
 						},
 					};
-					log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
+					log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", &payment_hash, entry.confirmation_threshold());
 					self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
 				}
 			}
@@ -4276,7 +4283,8 @@ mod tests {
 			assert!(err.contains("ChannelMonitor storage failure")));
 		check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); // After the failure we generate a close-channel monitor update
 		check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
-		check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() });
+		check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() }, 
+			[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 
 		// Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
 		// and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates