X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fchain%2Fchannelmonitor.rs;h=66d083377b0e6c23b5f863adb1c2f2aa0b7f98a4;hb=2c0fcf21f227ad1a01e4a884dda72b9537c16fae;hp=1dab9c8c8ffba1456c78671b8150323a595ee181;hpb=2b04f193b9dc8eb6d0d0e5b513a47e668324debd;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs index 1dab9c8c..66d08337 100644 --- a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs @@ -44,19 +44,20 @@ use crate::chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput}; use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator}; use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData}; use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, SignerProvider, EntropySource}; -use crate::chain::onchaintx::{ClaimEvent, OnchainTxHandler}; +use crate::chain::onchaintx::{ClaimEvent, FeerateStrategy, OnchainTxHandler}; use crate::chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput}; use crate::chain::Filter; use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record}; use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, RequiredWrapper, MaybeReadable, UpgradableRequired, Writer, Writeable, U48}; use crate::util::byte_utils; -use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler}; +use crate::events::{ClosureReason, Event, EventHandler}; use crate::events::bump_transaction::{AnchorDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent}; +#[allow(unused_imports)] use crate::prelude::*; + use core::{cmp, mem}; use crate::io::{self, Error}; -use core::convert::TryInto; use core::ops::Deref; use crate::sync::{Mutex, LockTestExt}; @@ -71,6 +72,15 @@ use crate::sync::{Mutex, LockTestExt}; #[must_use] pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate { pub(crate) updates: Vec, + /// Historically, [`ChannelMonitor`]s didn't know their counterparty node id. However, + /// `ChannelManager` really wants to know it so that it can easily look up the corresponding + /// channel. For now, this results in a temporary map in `ChannelManager` to look up channels + /// by only the funding outpoint. + /// + /// To eventually remove that, we repeat the counterparty node id here so that we can upgrade + /// `ChannelMonitor`s to become aware of the counterparty node id if they were generated prior + /// to when it was stored directly in them. + pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: Option, /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with two exceptions specified below. @@ -87,6 +97,11 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate { /// /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress pub update_id: u64, + /// The channel ID associated with these updates. + /// + /// Will be `None` for `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.121 and + /// always `Some` otherwise. + pub channel_id: Option, } /// The update ID used for a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] that is either: @@ -107,7 +122,10 @@ impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate { for update_step in self.updates.iter() { update_step.write(w)?; } - write_tlv_fields!(w, {}); + write_tlv_fields!(w, { + (1, self.counterparty_node_id, option), + (3, self.channel_id, option), + }); Ok(()) } } @@ -122,8 +140,13 @@ impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate { updates.push(upd); } } - read_tlv_fields!(r, {}); - Ok(Self { update_id, updates }) + let mut counterparty_node_id = None; + let mut channel_id = None; + read_tlv_fields!(r, { + (1, counterparty_node_id, option), + (3, channel_id, option), + }); + Ok(Self { update_id, counterparty_node_id, updates, channel_id }) } } @@ -133,6 +156,17 @@ pub enum MonitorEvent { /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate. HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate), + /// Indicates we broadcasted the channel's latest commitment transaction and thus closed the + /// channel. Holds information about the channel and why it was closed. + HolderForceClosedWithInfo { + /// The reason the channel was closed. + reason: ClosureReason, + /// The funding outpoint of the channel. + outpoint: OutPoint, + /// The channel ID of the channel. + channel_id: ChannelId, + }, + /// Indicates we broadcasted the channel's latest commitment transaction and thus closed the /// channel. HolderForceClosed(OutPoint), @@ -144,6 +178,8 @@ pub enum MonitorEvent { Completed { /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated funding_txo: OutPoint, + /// The channel ID of the channel associated with the [`ChannelMonitor`] + channel_id: ChannelId, /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`]. /// @@ -158,6 +194,12 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent, (0, Completed) => { (0, funding_txo, required), (2, monitor_update_id, required), + (4, channel_id, required), + }, + (5, HolderForceClosedWithInfo) => { + (0, reason, upgradable_required), + (2, outpoint, required), + (4, channel_id, required), }, ; (2, HTLCEvent), @@ -362,7 +404,7 @@ impl OnchainEventEntry { } fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool { - best_block.height() >= self.confirmation_threshold() + best_block.height >= self.confirmation_threshold() } } @@ -758,6 +800,7 @@ pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl { channel_keys_id: [u8; 32], holder_revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint, + channel_id: ChannelId, funding_info: (OutPoint, ScriptBuf), current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option, prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option, @@ -892,6 +935,9 @@ pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl { /// Ordering of tuple data: (their_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_sats, /// to_countersignatory_sats) initial_counterparty_commitment_info: Option<(PublicKey, u32, u64, u64)>, + + /// The first block height at which we had no remaining claimable balances. + balances_empty_height: Option, } /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends. @@ -1033,6 +1079,7 @@ impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl true, MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) => true, + MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => true, _ => false, }).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?; for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() { @@ -1042,6 +1089,10 @@ impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl 1u8.write(writer)?, + // `HolderForceClosedWithInfo` replaced `HolderForceClosed` in v0.0.122. To keep + // backwards compatibility, we write a `HolderForceClosed` event along with the + // `HolderForceClosedWithInfo` event. This is deduplicated in the reader. + MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => 1u8.write(writer)?, _ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below } } @@ -1051,8 +1102,8 @@ impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl true, + _ => false, + }) { + Some(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { outpoint, .. }) => { + let mut pending_monitor_events = self.pending_monitor_events.clone(); + pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(*outpoint)); + pending_monitor_events + } + _ => self.pending_monitor_events.clone(), + }; + write_tlv_fields!(writer, { (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option), (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, required_vec), - (5, self.pending_monitor_events, required_vec), + (5, pending_monitor_events, required_vec), (7, self.funding_spend_seen, required), (9, self.counterparty_node_id, option), (11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option), (13, self.spendable_txids_confirmed, required_vec), (15, self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, required), (17, self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option), + (19, self.channel_id, required), + (21, self.balances_empty_height, option), }); Ok(()) @@ -1146,7 +1212,7 @@ impl<'a, L: Deref> WithChannelMonitor<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger { pub(crate) fn from_impl(logger: &'a L, monitor_impl: &ChannelMonitorImpl) -> Self { let peer_id = monitor_impl.counterparty_node_id; - let channel_id = Some(monitor_impl.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()); + let channel_id = Some(monitor_impl.channel_id()); WithChannelMonitor { logger, peer_id, channel_id, } @@ -1167,7 +1233,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { funding_redeemscript: ScriptBuf, channel_value_satoshis: u64, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64, initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, - best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelMonitor { + best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId, + ) -> ChannelMonitor { assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48)); let counterparty_payment_script = chan_utils::get_counterparty_payment_script( @@ -1207,7 +1274,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx ); - let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new(); + let mut outputs_to_watch = new_hash_map(); outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]); Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl { @@ -1221,6 +1288,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { channel_keys_id, holder_revocation_basepoint, + channel_id, funding_info, current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None, prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None, @@ -1233,17 +1301,17 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay, commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(), - counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(), - counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(), - counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(), - counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: HashMap::new(), + counterparty_claimable_outpoints: new_hash_map(), + counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: new_hash_map(), + counterparty_hash_commitment_number: new_hash_map(), + counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: new_hash_map(), prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None, current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx, current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48, current_holder_commitment_number, - payment_preimages: HashMap::new(), + payment_preimages: new_hash_map(), pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(), pending_events: Vec::new(), is_processing_pending_events: false, @@ -1264,6 +1332,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { best_block, counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), initial_counterparty_commitment_info: None, + balances_empty_height: None, }) } @@ -1372,6 +1441,11 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone() } + /// Gets the channel_id of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for. + pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId { + self.inner.lock().unwrap().channel_id() + } + /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected(). pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>)> { @@ -1382,8 +1456,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs /// have been registered. - pub fn load_outputs_to_watch(&self, filter: &F, logger: &L) - where + pub fn load_outputs_to_watch(&self, filter: &F, logger: &L) + where F::Target: chain::Filter, L::Target: Logger, { let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap(); @@ -1528,28 +1602,30 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id } - /// Used by [`ChannelManager`] deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy - /// of the channel state was out-of-date. - /// - /// You may also use this to broadcast the latest local commitment transaction, either because + /// You may use this to broadcast the latest local commitment transaction, either because /// a monitor update failed or because we've fallen behind (i.e. we've received proof that our /// counterparty side knows a revocation secret we gave them that they shouldn't know). /// - /// Broadcasting these transactions in the second case is UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty + /// Broadcasting these transactions in this manner is UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty /// side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to broadcast them if counterparty doesn't /// close channel with their commitment transaction after a substantial amount of time. Best /// may be to contact the other node operator out-of-band to coordinate other options available /// to you. - /// - /// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager - pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec - where L::Target: Logger { + pub fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn( + &self, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L + ) + where + B::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger + { let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap(); + let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&**fee_estimator); let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner); - inner.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&logger) + inner.queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast(broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger); } - /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework + /// Unsafe test-only version of `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` used by our test framework /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate /// revoked commitment transaction. #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))] @@ -1729,7 +1805,26 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner); let current_height = inner.best_block.height; inner.onchain_tx_handler.rebroadcast_pending_claims( - current_height, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger, + current_height, FeerateStrategy::HighestOfPreviousOrNew, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger, + ); + } + + /// Triggers rebroadcasts of pending claims from a force-closed channel after a transaction + /// signature generation failure. + pub fn signer_unblocked( + &self, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L, + ) + where + B::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, + { + let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator); + let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap(); + let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner); + let current_height = inner.best_block.height; + inner.onchain_tx_handler.rebroadcast_pending_claims( + current_height, FeerateStrategy::RetryPrevious, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger, ); } @@ -1766,6 +1861,52 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { spendable_outputs } + /// Checks if the monitor is fully resolved. Resolved monitor is one that has claimed all of + /// its outputs and balances (i.e. [`Self::get_claimable_balances`] returns an empty set). + /// + /// This function returns true only if [`Self::get_claimable_balances`] has been empty for at least + /// 2016 blocks as an additional protection against any bugs resulting in spuriously empty balance sets. + pub fn is_fully_resolved(&self, logger: &L) -> bool { + let mut is_all_funds_claimed = self.get_claimable_balances().is_empty(); + let current_height = self.current_best_block().height; + let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap(); + + if is_all_funds_claimed { + if !inner.funding_spend_seen { + debug_assert!(false, "We should see funding spend by the time a monitor clears out"); + is_all_funds_claimed = false; + } + } + + match (inner.balances_empty_height, is_all_funds_claimed) { + (Some(balances_empty_height), true) => { + // Claimed all funds, check if reached the blocks threshold. + const BLOCKS_THRESHOLD: u32 = 4032; // ~four weeks + return current_height >= balances_empty_height + BLOCKS_THRESHOLD; + }, + (Some(_), false) => { + // previously assumed we claimed all funds, but we have new funds to claim. + // Should not happen in practice. + debug_assert!(false, "Thought we were done claiming funds, but claimable_balances now has entries"); + log_error!(logger, + "WARNING: LDK thought it was done claiming all the available funds in the ChannelMonitor for channel {}, but later decided it had more to claim. This is potentially an important bug in LDK, please report it at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/new", + inner.get_funding_txo().0); + inner.balances_empty_height = None; + false + }, + (None, true) => { + // Claimed all funds but `balances_empty_height` is None. It is set to the + // current block height. + inner.balances_empty_height = Some(current_height); + false + }, + (None, false) => { + // Have funds to claim. + false + }, + } + } + #[cfg(test)] pub fn get_counterparty_payment_script(&self) -> ScriptBuf { self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_payment_script.clone() @@ -1775,6 +1916,12 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { pub fn set_counterparty_payment_script(&self, script: ScriptBuf) { self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_payment_script = script; } + + #[cfg(test)] + pub fn do_signer_call ()>(&self, mut f: F) { + let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap(); + f(&inner.onchain_tx_handler.signer); + } } impl ChannelMonitorImpl { @@ -2140,7 +2287,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// HTLCs which were resolved on-chain (i.e. where the final HTLC resolution was done by an /// event from this `ChannelMonitor`). pub(crate) fn get_all_current_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap)> { - let mut res = HashMap::new(); + let mut res = new_hash_map(); // Just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs on // `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification. let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap(); @@ -2192,7 +2339,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { return self.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs(); } - let mut res = HashMap::new(); + let mut res = new_hash_map(); macro_rules! walk_htlcs { ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => { for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter { @@ -2212,7 +2359,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { // before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we // provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event. Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index && - us.best_block.height() >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1 + us.best_block.height >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1 } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event { // If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC // immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager @@ -2613,7 +2760,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { macro_rules! claim_htlcs { ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => { let (htlc_claim_reqs, _) = self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info($commitment_number, $txid, None); - self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger); + self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height, self.best_block.height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger); } } if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid { @@ -2660,24 +2807,71 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC // transactions. - let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height()); - self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger); + let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height); + self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height, self.best_block.height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger); } } } - fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &WithChannelMonitor) - where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - L::Target: Logger, - { - let commit_txs = self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger); - let mut txs = vec![]; - for tx in commit_txs.iter() { - log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx)); - txs.push(tx); + fn generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs(&mut self, reason: ClosureReason) -> (Vec, Vec) { + let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build( + self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), + self.channel_value_satoshis, + self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone() + ); + let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package( + self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, + PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), + self.best_block.height, self.best_block.height + ); + let mut claimable_outpoints = vec![commitment_package]; + let event = MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { + reason, + outpoint: self.funding_info.0, + channel_id: self.channel_id, + }; + self.pending_monitor_events.push(event); + + // Although we aren't signing the transaction directly here, the transaction will be signed + // in the claim that is queued to OnchainTxHandler. We set holder_tx_signed here to reject + // new channel updates. + self.holder_tx_signed = true; + let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new(); + // We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is + // unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in + // `transactions_confirmed`. + if !self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { + // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package + // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers + // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here. + let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims( + &self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height + ); + let unsigned_commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_unsigned_holder_commitment_tx(); + let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs( + &self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &unsigned_commitment_tx + ); + if !new_outputs.is_empty() { + watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs)); + } + claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints); } - broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&txs); - self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(self.funding_info.0)); + (claimable_outpoints, watch_outputs) + } + + pub(crate) fn queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast( + &mut self, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, logger: &WithChannelMonitor + ) + where + B::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, + { + let (claimable_outpoints, _) = self.generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs(ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed); + self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests( + claimable_outpoints, self.best_block.height, self.best_block.height, broadcaster, + fee_estimator, logger + ); } fn update_monitor( @@ -2697,6 +2891,15 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} change(s).", log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len()); } + + if updates.counterparty_node_id.is_some() { + if self.counterparty_node_id.is_none() { + self.counterparty_node_id = updates.counterparty_node_id; + } else { + debug_assert_eq!(self.counterparty_node_id, updates.counterparty_node_id); + } + } + // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a preimage for a // broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd like to claim on-chain. If this // is the case, we no longer have guaranteed access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a @@ -2767,30 +2970,11 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { log_trace!(logger, "Avoiding commitment broadcast, already detected confirmed spend onchain"); continue; } - self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger); - // If the channel supports anchor outputs, we'll need to emit an external - // event to be consumed such that a child transaction is broadcast with a - // high enough feerate for the parent commitment transaction to confirm. - if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { - let funding_output = HolderFundingOutput::build( - self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, - self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone(), - ); - let best_block_height = self.best_block.height(); - let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package( - self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, - PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_output), - best_block_height, best_block_height - ); - self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests( - vec![commitment_package], best_block_height, best_block_height, - broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger, - ); - } + self.queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast(broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger); } else if !self.holder_tx_signed { log_error!(logger, "WARNING: You have a potentially-unsafe holder commitment transaction available to broadcast"); - log_error!(logger, " in channel monitor for channel {}!", &self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()); - log_error!(logger, " Read the docs for ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn and take manual action!"); + log_error!(logger, " in channel monitor for channel {}!", &self.channel_id()); + log_error!(logger, " Read the docs for ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn to take manual action!"); } else { // If we generated a MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed, the ChannelManager // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we @@ -2835,6 +3019,10 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { &self.funding_info } + pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId { + self.channel_id + } + fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap> { // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because @@ -2862,12 +3050,19 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment { package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, commitment_tx, anchor_output_idx, } => { + let channel_id = self.channel_id; + // unwrap safety: `ClaimEvent`s are only available for Anchor channels, + // introduced with v0.0.116. counterparty_node_id is guaranteed to be `Some` + // since v0.0.110. + let counterparty_node_id = self.counterparty_node_id.unwrap(); let commitment_txid = commitment_tx.txid(); debug_assert_eq!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, commitment_txid); let pending_htlcs = self.current_holder_commitment_tx.non_dust_htlcs(); let commitment_tx_fee_satoshis = self.channel_value_satoshis - commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0u64, |sum, output| sum + output.value); ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { + channel_id, + counterparty_node_id, claim_id, package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, commitment_tx, @@ -2889,6 +3084,11 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { ClaimEvent::BumpHTLC { target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, htlcs, tx_lock_time, } => { + let channel_id = self.channel_id; + // unwrap safety: `ClaimEvent`s are only available for Anchor channels, + // introduced with v0.0.116. counterparty_node_id is guaranteed to be `Some` + // since v0.0.110. + let counterparty_node_id = self.counterparty_node_id.unwrap(); let mut htlc_descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs.len()); for htlc in htlcs { htlc_descriptors.push(HTLCDescriptor { @@ -2909,6 +3109,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { }); } ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { + channel_id, + counterparty_node_id, claim_id, target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, htlc_descriptors, @@ -3103,7 +3305,11 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref())) ), logger); } else { - debug_assert!(false, "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn"); + // Our fuzzers aren't constrained by pesky things like valid signatures, so can + // spend our funding output with a transaction which doesn't match our past + // commitment transactions. Thus, we can only debug-assert here when not + // fuzzing. + debug_assert!(cfg!(fuzzing), "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn"); fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash, [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger); } @@ -3363,43 +3569,56 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { } } - fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn( - &mut self, logger: &WithChannelMonitor, - ) -> Vec where L::Target: Logger { - log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!"); - self.holder_tx_signed = true; - let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript); - let txid = commitment_tx.txid(); - let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx]; - // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only valid once the commitment - // transaction confirms. - if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { - return holder_transactions; + /// Cancels any existing pending claims for a commitment that previously confirmed and has now + /// been replaced by another. + pub fn cancel_prev_commitment_claims( + &mut self, logger: &L, confirmed_commitment_txid: &Txid + ) where L::Target: Logger { + for (counterparty_commitment_txid, _) in &self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain { + // Cancel any pending claims for counterparty commitments we've seen confirm. + if counterparty_commitment_txid == confirmed_commitment_txid { + continue; + } + for (htlc, _) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(counterparty_commitment_txid).unwrap_or(&vec![]) { + log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously confirmed counterparty commitment {}", + counterparty_commitment_txid); + let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: *counterparty_commitment_txid, vout: 0 }; + if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index { + outpoint.vout = vout; + self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint); + } + } } - for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { - if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index { - let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered { - if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else { - // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage - continue; + if self.holder_tx_signed { + // If we've signed, we may have broadcast either commitment (prev or current), and + // attempted to claim from it immediately without waiting for a confirmation. + if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid != *confirmed_commitment_txid { + log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously broadcast holder commitment {}", + self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid); + let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, vout: 0 }; + for (htlc, _, _) in &self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs { + if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index { + outpoint.vout = vout; + self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint); + } + } + } + if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx { + if prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid != *confirmed_commitment_txid { + log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously broadcast holder commitment {}", + prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid); + let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid, vout: 0 }; + for (htlc, _, _) in &prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs { + if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index { + outpoint.vout = vout; + self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint); + } } - } else if htlc.0.cltv_expiry > self.best_block.height() + 1 { - // Don't broadcast HTLC-Timeout transactions immediately as they don't meet the - // current locktime requirements on-chain. We will broadcast them in - // `block_confirmed` when `should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn` returns true. - // Note that we add + 1 as transactions are broadcastable when they can be - // confirmed in the next block. - continue; - } else { None }; - if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx( - &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) { - holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx); } } + } else { + // No previous claim. } - // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do. - // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation. - holder_transactions } #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))] @@ -3424,9 +3643,12 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { continue; } } else { None }; - if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx( - &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) { - holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx); + if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_maybe_signed_htlc_tx( + &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage + ) { + if htlc_tx.is_fully_signed() { + holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx.0); + } } } } @@ -3463,11 +3685,11 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { { let block_hash = header.block_hash(); - if height > self.best_block.height() { + if height > self.best_block.height { self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height); log_trace!(logger, "Connecting new block {} at height {}", block_hash, height); self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, logger) - } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash() { + } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash { self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height); log_trace!(logger, "Best block re-orged, replaced with new block {} at height {}", block_hash, height); self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height); @@ -3545,7 +3767,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 { let mut balance_spendable_csv = None; log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.", - &self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id(), txid); + &self.channel_id(), txid); self.funding_spend_seen = true; let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None; if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 { @@ -3558,6 +3780,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints); if new_outpoints.is_empty() { if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger) { + #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] debug_assert!(commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output.is_none(), "A commitment transaction matched as both a counterparty and local commitment tx?"); if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() { @@ -3578,6 +3801,10 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, }, }); + // Now that we've detected a confirmed commitment transaction, attempt to cancel + // pending claims for any commitments that were previously confirmed such that + // we don't continue claiming inputs that no longer exist. + self.cancel_prev_commitment_claims(&logger, &txid); } } if tx.input.len() >= 1 { @@ -3607,7 +3834,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { } } - if height > self.best_block.height() { + if height > self.best_block.height { self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height); } @@ -3639,33 +3866,13 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { L::Target: Logger, { log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height); - debug_assert!(self.best_block.height() >= conf_height); + debug_assert!(self.best_block.height >= conf_height); let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger); if should_broadcast { - let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()); - let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height()); - claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package); - self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(self.funding_info.0)); - // Although we aren't signing the transaction directly here, the transaction will be signed - // in the claim that is queued to OnchainTxHandler. We set holder_tx_signed here to reject - // new channel updates. - self.holder_tx_signed = true; - // We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is - // unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in - // `transactions_confirmed`. - if !self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { - // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package - // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers - // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here. - let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height()); - let unsigned_commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_unsigned_holder_commitment_tx(); - let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &unsigned_commitment_tx); - if !new_outputs.is_empty() { - watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs)); - } - claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints); - } + let (mut new_outpoints, mut new_outputs) = self.generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs(ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut); + claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints); + watch_outputs.append(&mut new_outputs); } // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold. @@ -3731,7 +3938,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor)); self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs: vec![descriptor], - channel_id: Some(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), + channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()), }); self.spendable_txids_confirmed.push(entry.txid); }, @@ -3750,8 +3957,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { } } - self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger); - self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_matched_txn(&txn_matched, conf_height, conf_hash, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger); + self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger); + self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_matched_txn(&txn_matched, conf_height, conf_hash, self.best_block.height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger); // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch, // updating the latter in the process. @@ -3830,7 +4037,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child /// transactions thereof. fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> { - let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new(); + let mut matched_txn = new_hash_set(); txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| { let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx); for input in tx.input.iter() { @@ -3902,7 +4109,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway. - let height = self.best_block.height(); + let height = self.best_block.height; macro_rules! scan_commitment { ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => { for ref htlc in $htlcs { @@ -4174,6 +4381,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2, channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id, channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis, + channel_transaction_parameters: Some(self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone()), })); } } @@ -4345,7 +4553,7 @@ impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP } let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64)); + let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64)); for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len { let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?; let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; @@ -4359,7 +4567,7 @@ impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP } let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32)); + let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32)); for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len { let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?; let commitment_number = ::read(reader)?.0; @@ -4369,7 +4577,7 @@ impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP } let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32)); + let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32)); for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len { let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?; let commitment_number = ::read(reader)?.0; @@ -4392,7 +4600,7 @@ impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP let current_holder_commitment_number = ::read(reader)?.0; let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32)); + let mut payment_preimages = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32)); for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len { let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?; let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array()); @@ -4432,7 +4640,7 @@ impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP } let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::() + mem::size_of::() + mem::size_of::>()))); + let mut outputs_to_watch = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::() + mem::size_of::() + mem::size_of::>()))); for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len { let txid = Readable::read(reader)?; let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; @@ -4474,8 +4682,10 @@ impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP let mut counterparty_node_id = None; let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None; let mut spendable_txids_confirmed = Some(Vec::new()); - let mut counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs = Some(HashMap::new()); + let mut counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs = Some(new_hash_map()); let mut initial_counterparty_commitment_info = None; + let mut balances_empty_height = None; + let mut channel_id = None; read_tlv_fields!(reader, { (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option), (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, optional_vec), @@ -4486,8 +4696,20 @@ impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP (13, spendable_txids_confirmed, optional_vec), (15, counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, option), (17, initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option), + (19, channel_id, option), + (21, balances_empty_height, option), }); + // `HolderForceClosedWithInfo` replaced `HolderForceClosed` in v0.0.122. If we have both + // events, we can remove the `HolderForceClosed` event and just keep the `HolderForceClosedWithInfo`. + if let Some(ref mut pending_monitor_events) = pending_monitor_events { + if pending_monitor_events.iter().any(|e| matches!(e, MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_))) && + pending_monitor_events.iter().any(|e| matches!(e, MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. })) + { + pending_monitor_events.retain(|e| !matches!(e, MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_))); + } + } + // Monitors for anchor outputs channels opened in v0.0.116 suffered from a bug in which the // wrong `counterparty_payment_script` was being tracked. Fix it now on deserialization to // give them a chance to recognize the spendable output. @@ -4499,7 +4721,7 @@ impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP chan_utils::get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh(); } - Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl { + Ok((best_block.block_hash, ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl { latest_update_id, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, @@ -4510,6 +4732,7 @@ impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP channel_keys_id, holder_revocation_basepoint, + channel_id: channel_id.unwrap_or(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint)), funding_info, current_counterparty_commitment_txid, prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, @@ -4553,6 +4776,7 @@ impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP best_block, counterparty_node_id, initial_counterparty_commitment_info, + balances_empty_height, }))) } } @@ -4584,7 +4808,7 @@ mod tests { use crate::chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT}; use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint; use crate::sign::InMemorySigner; - use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash}; + use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, ChannelId}; use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, DelayedPaymentKey, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint, RevocationKey}; use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self,HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters}; use crate::ln::channelmanager::{PaymentSendFailure, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields}; @@ -4597,6 +4821,8 @@ mod tests { use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex}; use crate::io; use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures; + + #[allow(unused_imports)] use crate::prelude::*; use std::str::FromStr; @@ -4727,7 +4953,7 @@ mod tests { preimages_slice_to_htlcs!($preimages_slice).into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, None)).collect() } } - let dummy_sig = crate::util::crypto::sign(&secp_ctx, + let dummy_sig = crate::crypto::utils::sign(&secp_ctx, &bitcoin::secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()); @@ -4760,6 +4986,7 @@ mod tests { htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())) }; let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() }; + let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint); let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters { holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(), holder_selected_contest_delay: 66, @@ -4779,7 +5006,7 @@ mod tests { Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &ScriptBuf::new(), (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, ScriptBuf::new()), &channel_parameters, ScriptBuf::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()), - best_block, dummy_key); + best_block, dummy_key, channel_id); let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]); let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs); @@ -5009,6 +5236,7 @@ mod tests { htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())), }; let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() }; + let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint); let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters { holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(), holder_selected_contest_delay: 66, @@ -5026,9 +5254,9 @@ mod tests { Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &ScriptBuf::new(), (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, ScriptBuf::new()), &channel_parameters, ScriptBuf::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()), - best_block, dummy_key); + best_block, dummy_key, channel_id); - let chan_id = monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().funding_info.0.to_channel_id().clone(); + let chan_id = monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().channel_id(); let context_logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&logger, &monitor); log_error!(context_logger, "This is an error"); log_warn!(context_logger, "This is an error");