X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fchain%2Fchannelmonitor.rs;h=6daab991922f160be0d4062f5cb392545f69789e;hb=b5902fecd40574fe4017a5b173fd2576b0d595f9;hp=1699e4827236c89ba6e1dc6fef6b7ff726db6366;hpb=19191b450c8f07e7b703ec83eabaa0d268757bd7;p=rust-lightning

diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
index 1699e482..6daab991 100644
--- a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
 
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
@@ -29,8 +29,8 @@ use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
 
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
 
 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC
 use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
 use chain;
 use chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
-use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
+use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
 use chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ use sync::Mutex;
 
 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
-#[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
+#[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
 #[derive(Clone)]
 #[must_use]
 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
@@ -115,14 +115,6 @@ impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
 	}
 }
 
-/// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
-/// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
-/// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
-/// corrupted.
-/// Contains a developer-readable error message.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
-pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
-
 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 pub enum MonitorEvent {
@@ -174,11 +166,11 @@ pub struct HTLCUpdate {
 	pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 	pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
 	pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
-	pub(crate) onchain_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
+	pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
 }
 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
 	(0, payment_hash, required),
-	(1, onchain_value_satoshis, option),
+	(1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
 	(2, source, required),
 	(4, payment_preimage, option),
 });
@@ -264,7 +256,7 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
 
 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
 	counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
 	counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
@@ -318,7 +310,7 @@ impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
 /// transaction causing it.
 ///
 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 struct OnchainEventEntry {
 	txid: Txid,
 	height: u32,
@@ -354,7 +346,7 @@ impl OnchainEventEntry {
 
 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 enum OnchainEvent {
 	/// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
 	///  * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
@@ -365,10 +357,10 @@ enum OnchainEvent {
 	HTLCUpdate {
 		source: HTLCSource,
 		payment_hash: PaymentHash,
-		onchain_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
+		htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
 		/// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
 		/// transaction which appeared on chain.
-		input_idx: Option<u32>,
+		commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
 	},
 	MaturingOutput {
 		descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
@@ -389,7 +381,7 @@ enum OnchainEvent {
 	///  * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
 	///    signature.
 	HTLCSpendConfirmation {
-		input_idx: u32,
+		commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
 		/// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
 		preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
 		/// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
@@ -431,9 +423,9 @@ impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
 	(0, HTLCUpdate) => {
 		(0, source, required),
-		(1, onchain_value_satoshis, option),
+		(1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
 		(2, payment_hash, required),
-		(3, input_idx, option),
+		(3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
 	},
 	(1, MaturingOutput) => {
 		(0, descriptor, required),
@@ -442,14 +434,14 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
 		(0, on_local_output_csv, option),
 	},
 	(5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
-		(0, input_idx, required),
+		(0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
 		(2, preimage, option),
 		(4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
 	},
 
 );
 
-#[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
+#[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
 #[derive(Clone)]
 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
 	LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
@@ -460,7 +452,7 @@ pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
 		commitment_txid: Txid,
 		htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
 		commitment_number: u64,
-		their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
+		their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
 	},
 	PaymentPreimage {
 		payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
@@ -481,6 +473,19 @@ pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
 	},
 }
 
+impl ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
+	fn variant_name(&self) -> &'static str {
+		match self {
+			ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo",
+			ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo",
+			ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => "PaymentPreimage",
+			ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { .. } => "CommitmentSecret",
+			ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => "ChannelForceClosed",
+			ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { .. } => "ShutdownScript",
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
 	(0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
 		(0, commitment_tx, required),
@@ -489,7 +494,7 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
 	(1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
 		(0, commitment_txid, required),
 		(2, commitment_number, required),
-		(4, their_revocation_point, required),
+		(4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
 		(6, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
 	},
 	(2, PaymentPreimage) => {
@@ -561,15 +566,15 @@ pub enum Balance {
 }
 
 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
-	input_idx: u32,
+	commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
 	/// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
 	payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
 }
 
 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC, {
-	(0, input_idx, required),
+	(0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
 	(2, payment_preimage, option),
 });
 
@@ -596,6 +601,13 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: Sign> {
 	inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
 }
 
+impl<Signer: Sign> Clone for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
+	fn clone(&self) -> Self {
+		Self { inner: Mutex::new(self.inner.lock().unwrap().clone()) }
+	}
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
 	latest_update_id: u64,
 	commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
@@ -614,8 +626,8 @@ pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
 	counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
 	funding_redeemscript: Script,
 	channel_value_satoshis: u64,
-	// first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
-	their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
+	// first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
+	their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
 
 	on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
 
@@ -650,6 +662,10 @@ pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
 	// deserialization
 	current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
 
+	/// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
+	/// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
+	/// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
+	/// revoked.
 	payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
 
 	// Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
@@ -695,6 +711,11 @@ pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
 	// remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
 	holder_tx_signed: bool,
 
+	// If a spend of the funding output is seen, we set this to true and reject any further
+	// updates. This prevents any further changes in the offchain state no matter the order
+	// of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
+	funding_spend_seen: bool,
+
 	funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
 	/// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
 	/// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
@@ -708,15 +729,18 @@ pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
 	// the full block_connected).
 	best_block: BestBlock,
 
+	/// The node_id of our counterparty
+	counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
+
 	secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
 }
 
 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
 
-#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
-/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
-/// underlying object
+#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
+/// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
+/// object
 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 	fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
 		let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
@@ -725,9 +749,9 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 	}
 }
 
-#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
-/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
-/// underlying object
+#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
+/// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
+/// object
 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 	fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
 		if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
@@ -743,7 +767,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			self.counterparty_commitment_params != other.counterparty_commitment_params ||
 			self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
 			self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
-			self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
+			self.their_cur_per_commitment_points != other.their_cur_per_commitment_points ||
 			self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
 			self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
 			self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
@@ -760,6 +784,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
 			self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
 			self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed ||
+			self.funding_spend_seen != other.funding_spend_seen ||
 			self.funding_spend_confirmed != other.funding_spend_confirmed ||
 			self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain != other.htlcs_resolved_on_chain
 		{
@@ -817,7 +842,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
 		self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
 
-		match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
+		match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
 			Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
 				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
 				writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
@@ -854,6 +879,9 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
 			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
 			for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
+				debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
+						|| Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
+					"HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
 				serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
 				htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
 			}
@@ -935,6 +963,8 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			(1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
 			(3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
 			(5, self.pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
+			(7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
+			(9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
 		});
 
 		Ok(())
@@ -942,13 +972,20 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 }
 
 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
+	/// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
+	/// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
+	/// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
+	fn from_impl(imp: ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>) -> Self {
+		ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
+	}
+
 	pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
 	                  on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
 	                  channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
 	                  funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 	                  commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
 	                  initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
-	                  best_block: BestBlock) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
+	                  best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 
 		assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
 		let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
@@ -989,62 +1026,62 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 		let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
 		outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
 
-		ChannelMonitor {
-			inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
-				latest_update_id: 0,
-				commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
+		Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
+			latest_update_id: 0,
+			commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
 
-				destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
-				broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
-				counterparty_payment_script,
-				shutdown_script,
+			destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
+			broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
+			counterparty_payment_script,
+			shutdown_script,
 
-				channel_keys_id,
-				holder_revocation_basepoint,
-				funding_info,
-				current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
-				prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
+			channel_keys_id,
+			holder_revocation_basepoint,
+			funding_info,
+			current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
+			prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
 
-				counterparty_commitment_params,
-				funding_redeemscript,
-				channel_value_satoshis,
-				their_cur_revocation_points: None,
+			counterparty_commitment_params,
+			funding_redeemscript,
+			channel_value_satoshis,
+			their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
 
-				on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
+			on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
 
-				commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
-				counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
-				counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
-				counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
+			commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
+			counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
+			counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
+			counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
 
-				prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
-				current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
-				current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
-				current_holder_commitment_number,
+			prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
+			current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
+			current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
+			current_holder_commitment_number,
 
-				payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
-				pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
-				pending_events: Vec::new(),
+			payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
+			pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
+			pending_events: Vec::new(),
 
-				onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
-				outputs_to_watch,
+			onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
+			outputs_to_watch,
 
-				onchain_tx_handler,
+			onchain_tx_handler,
 
-				lockdown_from_offchain: false,
-				holder_tx_signed: false,
-				funding_spend_confirmed: None,
-				htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
+			lockdown_from_offchain: false,
+			holder_tx_signed: false,
+			funding_spend_seen: false,
+			funding_spend_confirmed: None,
+			htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
 
-				best_block,
+			best_block,
+			counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
 
-				secp_ctx,
-			}),
-		}
+			secp_ctx,
+		})
 	}
 
 	#[cfg(test)]
-	fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
+	fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
 		self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
 	}
 
@@ -1057,30 +1094,29 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 		txid: Txid,
 		htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
 		commitment_number: u64,
-		their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
+		their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
 		logger: &L,
 	) where L::Target: Logger {
 		self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
-			txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger)
+			txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, logger)
 	}
 
 	#[cfg(test)]
 	fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
-		&self,
-		holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
+		&self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
 		htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
-	) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
-		self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
-			holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)
+	) -> Result<(), ()> {
+		self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs).map_err(|_| ())
 	}
 
-	#[cfg(test)]
+	/// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
+	/// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
 	pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
 		&self,
 		payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
 		payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
 		broadcaster: &B,
-		fee_estimator: &F,
+		fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
 		logger: &L,
 	) where
 		B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
@@ -1110,9 +1146,9 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 		&self,
 		updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
 		broadcaster: &B,
-		fee_estimator: &F,
+		fee_estimator: F,
 		logger: &L,
-	) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
+	) -> Result<(), ()>
 	where
 		B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
 		F::Target: FeeEstimator,
@@ -1185,6 +1221,14 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 		self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
 	}
 
+	/// Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
+	///
+	/// Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
+	/// otherwise.
+	pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
+		self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
+	}
+
 	/// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
 	/// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
 	/// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
@@ -1276,8 +1320,9 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 		F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 		L::Target: Logger,
 	{
+		let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
 		self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
-			header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
+			header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
 	}
 
 	/// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
@@ -1297,8 +1342,9 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 		F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 		L::Target: Logger,
 	{
+		let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
 		self.inner.lock().unwrap().transaction_unconfirmed(
-			txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
+			txid, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
 	}
 
 	/// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
@@ -1321,8 +1367,9 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 		F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 		L::Target: Logger,
 	{
+		let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
 		self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block_updated(
-			header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
+			header, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
 	}
 
 	/// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
@@ -1380,16 +1427,32 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 		macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
 			($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
 				for htlc in $htlc_iter {
-					if let Some(htlc_input_idx) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
-						if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.input_idx == htlc_input_idx) {
-							assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
+					if let Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+						if let Some(conf_thresh) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
+							if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) } = &event.event {
+								if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
+							} else { None }
+						}) {
+							debug_assert!($holder_commitment);
+							res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+								claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+								confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+							});
+						} else if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
+							// Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
+							// HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
+							// commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
+							// reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
+							// ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
+							debug_assert!($holder_commitment || us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
 						} else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
 							// If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
 							// indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
 							// and awaiting confirmations on it.
 							let htlc_update_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
-								if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { input_idx: Some(input_idx), .. } = event.event {
-									if input_idx == htlc_input_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
+								if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
+									if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx {
+										Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
 								} else { None }
 							});
 							if let Some(conf_thresh) = htlc_update_pending {
@@ -1410,8 +1473,8 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 							// preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
 							// to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
 							let htlc_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
-								if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, preimage, .. } = event.event {
-									if input_idx == htlc_input_idx {
+								if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } = event.event {
+									if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx {
 										Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()))
 									} else { None }
 								} else { None }
@@ -1520,7 +1583,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 		macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
 			($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
 				for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
-					if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| Some(v.input_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
+					if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| Some(v.commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
 						// We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
 						// have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
 						// would fail.
@@ -1531,17 +1594,17 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 						// indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
 						// and awaiting confirmations on it.
 						let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
-							if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { input_idx: Some(input_idx), .. } = event.event {
+							if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
 								// If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
 								// before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
 								// provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
-								Some(input_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
+								Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
 									us.best_block.height() >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
-							} else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, .. } = event.event {
+							} else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
 								// If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
 								// immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
 								// the preimage.
-								Some(input_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
+								Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
 							} else { false }
 						});
 						if !htlc_update_confd {
@@ -1605,6 +1668,10 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 
 		res
 	}
+
+	pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
+		self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
+	}
 }
 
 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
@@ -1623,7 +1690,8 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
-	($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
+	($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr,
+	 $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
 		macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
 			($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
 				if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
@@ -1639,9 +1707,14 @@ macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
 							// cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
 							// need to here.
 							let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
+
 							let mut matched_htlc = false;
 							for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
-								if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source {
+								if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
+									(Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
+									 (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
+									  broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
+									  broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
 									matched_htlc = true;
 									break;
 								}
@@ -1657,17 +1730,18 @@ macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
 								}
 							});
 							let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
-								txid: *$txid,
+								txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
 								height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
 								event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
 									source: (**source).clone(),
 									payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
-									onchain_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
-									input_idx: None,
+									htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
+									commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
 								},
 							};
-							log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
-								log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type, entry.confirmation_threshold());
+							log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
+								log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
+								$commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
 							$self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
 						}
 					}
@@ -1683,13 +1757,33 @@ macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
 	} }
 }
 
+// In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
+// witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
+// in-line tests later.
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
+	let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.into_u8(); 136];
+	ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
+	ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
+	ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
+	ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
+	ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.into_u8();
+	Vec::from(&ret[..])
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
+	vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
+}
+
 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 	/// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
 	/// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
 	/// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
-	fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
+	fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
 		if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
-			return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
+			return Err("Previous secret did not match new one");
 		}
 
 		// Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
@@ -1735,7 +1829,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		Ok(())
 	}
 
-	pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
+	pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
 		// TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
 		// so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
 		// (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
@@ -1750,22 +1844,22 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
 		self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
 		//TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
-		match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
+		match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
 			Some(old_points) => {
 				if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
-					self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
+					self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
 				} else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
 					if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
-						self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
+						self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
 					} else {
-						self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+						self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
 					}
 				} else {
-					self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+					self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
 				}
 			},
 			None => {
-				self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+				self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
 			}
 		}
 		let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
@@ -1781,7 +1875,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 	/// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
 	/// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
 	/// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
-	fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
+	fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
 		// block for Rust 1.34 compat
 		let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = {
 			let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
@@ -1804,14 +1898,16 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
 		self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
 		if self.holder_tx_signed {
-			return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected"));
+			return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
 		}
 		Ok(())
 	}
 
 	/// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
 	/// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
-	fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L)
+	fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
+		&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B,
+		fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
 	where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
 		    F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 		    L::Target: Logger,
@@ -1868,42 +1964,57 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
 	}
 
-	pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
+	pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
 	where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
-		    F::Target: FeeEstimator,
-		    L::Target: Logger,
+		F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+		L::Target: Logger,
 	{
+		log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} changes.",
+			log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
 		// ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
 		// preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
 		// like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
 		// access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
 		if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
+			assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
 			match updates.updates[0] {
 				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
-				_ => panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage"),
+				_ => {
+					log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
+					panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
+				},
 			}
-			assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
 		} else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
 			panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
 		}
+		let mut ret = Ok(());
 		for update in updates.updates.iter() {
 			match update {
 				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
 					log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
 					if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
-					self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone())?
+					if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone()) {
+						log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
+						log_error!(logger, "    {}", e);
+						ret = Err(());
+					}
 				}
-				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } => {
+				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point } => {
 					log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
-					self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_revocation_point, logger)
+					self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
 				},
 				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
 					log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
-					self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
+					let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
+					self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
 				},
 				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
 					log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
-					self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret)?
+					if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
+						log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
+						log_error!(logger, "    {}", e);
+						ret = Err(());
+					}
 				},
 				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
 					log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
@@ -1928,7 +2039,11 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			}
 		}
 		self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
-		Ok(())
+
+		if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen {
+			log_error!(logger, "Refusing Channel Monitor Update as counterparty attempted to update commitment after funding was spent");
+			Err(())
+		} else { ret }
 	}
 
 	pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
@@ -2030,7 +2145,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 								tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
 							return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
 						}
-						let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone());
+						let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
 						let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, true, height);
 						claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
 					}
@@ -2046,7 +2161,16 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 				}
 				self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
 
-				fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", height, [].iter().map(|a| *a), logger);
+				if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
+					fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, height,
+						per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
+							(htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
+						), logger);
+				} else {
+					debug_assert!(false, "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
+					fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, height,
+						[].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
+				}
 			}
 		} else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
 			// While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
@@ -2062,7 +2186,10 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
 
 			log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
-			fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", height, per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(a, b)| (a, b.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()))), logger);
+			fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, height,
+				per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
+					(htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
+				), logger);
 
 			let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
 			for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
@@ -2076,18 +2203,18 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 	fn get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>) -> Vec<PackageTemplate> {
 		let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
 		if let Some(htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
-			if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
-				let revocation_point_option =
+			if let Some(per_commitment_points) = self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
+				let per_commitment_point_option =
 					// If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
 					// per-commitment point
-					if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
-					else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
+					if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&per_commitment_points.1) }
+					else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
 						// If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
 						// their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
 						// them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
-						if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
+						if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
 					} else { None };
-				if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
+				if let Some(per_commitment_point) = per_commitment_point_option {
 					for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
 						if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
 							if let Some(transaction) = tx {
@@ -2098,7 +2225,19 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 							}
 							let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
 							if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
-								let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone())) } else { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, htlc.clone())) };
+								let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
+									PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
+										CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
+											self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+											self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+											preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone()))
+								} else {
+									PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
+										CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
+											self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+											self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+											htlc.clone()))
+								};
 								let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
 								let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
 								claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
@@ -2206,7 +2345,9 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
 			let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
 			append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
-			fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", height, self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, c)| (a, c.as_ref())), logger);
+			fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, height,
+				self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
+				.map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
 		} else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
 			if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
 				is_holder_tx = true;
@@ -2214,7 +2355,9 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 				let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
 				let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
 				append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
-				fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", height, holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, c)| (a, c.as_ref())), logger);
+				fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, height,
+					holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
+					logger);
 			}
 		}
 
@@ -2289,7 +2432,8 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		let block_hash = header.block_hash();
 		self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
 
-		self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
+		let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
+		self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
 	}
 
 	fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
@@ -2297,7 +2441,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		header: &BlockHeader,
 		height: u32,
 		broadcaster: B,
-		fee_estimator: F,
+		fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
 		logger: L,
 	) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
 	where
@@ -2324,7 +2468,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		txdata: &TransactionData,
 		height: u32,
 		broadcaster: B,
-		fee_estimator: F,
+		fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
 		logger: L,
 	) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
 	where
@@ -2357,6 +2501,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 					let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
 					log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
 						log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), tx.txid());
+					self.funding_spend_seen = true;
 					if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
 						let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
 						if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
@@ -2420,7 +2565,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
 		mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
 		broadcaster: &B,
-		fee_estimator: &F,
+		fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
 		logger: &L,
 	) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
 	where
@@ -2477,7 +2622,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		// Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
 		for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
 			match entry.event {
-				OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, onchain_value_satoshis, input_idx } => {
+				OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
 					// Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
 					#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 					{
@@ -2494,15 +2639,16 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 						matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
 					}
 
-					log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+					log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
+						log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.txid);
 					self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
 						payment_hash,
 						payment_preimage: None,
 						source: source.clone(),
-						onchain_value_satoshis,
+						htlc_value_satoshis,
 					}));
-					if let Some(idx) = input_idx {
-						self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { input_idx: idx, payment_preimage: None });
+					if let Some(idx) = commitment_tx_output_idx {
+						self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { commitment_tx_output_idx: idx, payment_preimage: None });
 					}
 				},
 				OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
@@ -2511,8 +2657,8 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 						outputs: vec![descriptor]
 					});
 				},
-				OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, preimage, .. } => {
-					self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { input_idx, payment_preimage: preimage });
+				OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
+					self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { commitment_tx_output_idx, payment_preimage: preimage });
 				},
 				OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => {
 					self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
@@ -2557,7 +2703,8 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		//- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
 		self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
 
-		self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
+		let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
+		self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
 
 		self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
 	}
@@ -2566,14 +2713,17 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		&mut self,
 		txid: &Txid,
 		broadcaster: B,
-		fee_estimator: F,
+		fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
 		logger: L,
 	) where
 		B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
 		F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 		L::Target: Logger,
 	{
-		self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.txid != *txid);
+		self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.txid == *txid {
+			log_info!(logger, "Removing onchain event with txid {}", txid);
+			false
+		} else { true });
 		self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
 	}
 
@@ -2604,14 +2754,21 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 					if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
 						#[cfg(test)]
 						{
-						        // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
-						        // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
-						        // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
-						        if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
-						                assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().clone()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
-						        } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
-						                assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
-						        } else { panic!(); }
+							// If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
+							// appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
+							// actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
+							if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
+								if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
+									// In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
+									// script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
+									// and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
+									return true;
+								}
+
+								assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
+							} else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
+								assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
+							} else { panic!(); }
 						}
 						return true;
 					}
@@ -2691,20 +2848,26 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 	fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
 		'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
 			let mut payment_data = None;
-			let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
-				|| (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
-			let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
+			let witness_items = input.witness.len();
+			let htlctype = input.witness.last().map(|w| w.len()).and_then(HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype);
+			let prev_last_witness_len = input.witness.second_to_last().map(|w| w.len()).unwrap_or(0);
+			let revocation_sig_claim = (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33)
+				|| (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33);
+			let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
+				&& input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
 			#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
-			let accepted_timeout_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
-			let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
+			let accepted_timeout_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
+			let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) &&
+				!revocation_sig_claim && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
+
 			#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
-			let offered_timeout_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
+			let offered_timeout_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
 
 			let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
 			if accepted_preimage_claim {
-				payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
+				payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
 			} else if offered_preimage_claim {
-				payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
+				payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
 			}
 
 			macro_rules! log_claim {
@@ -2778,7 +2941,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 									self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
 										txid: tx.txid(), height,
 										event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
-											input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
+											commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
 											preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
 												Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
 											// If this is a payment to us (!outbound_htlc, above),
@@ -2829,7 +2992,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 							txid: tx.txid(),
 							height,
 							event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
-								input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
+								commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
 								preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
 								on_to_local_output_csv: None,
 							},
@@ -2838,7 +3001,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 							source,
 							payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
 							payment_hash,
-							onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
+							htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
 						}));
 					}
 				} else if offered_preimage_claim {
@@ -2850,7 +3013,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 							txid: tx.txid(),
 							height,
 							event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
-								input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
+								commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
 								preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
 								on_to_local_output_csv: None,
 							},
@@ -2859,7 +3022,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 							source,
 							payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
 							payment_hash,
-							onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
+							htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
 						}));
 					}
 				} else {
@@ -2877,8 +3040,8 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 						height,
 						event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
 							source, payment_hash,
-							onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
-							input_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
+							htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
+							commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
 						},
 					};
 					log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
@@ -2962,9 +3125,8 @@ where
 	F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 	L::Target: Logger,
 {
-	fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
-		let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
-		self.0.block_connected(&block.header, &txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
+	fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
+		self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
 	}
 
 	fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
@@ -3047,7 +3209,7 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
 		let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
 		let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
 
-		let their_cur_revocation_points = {
+		let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
 			let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
 			if first_idx == 0 {
 				None
@@ -3206,104 +3368,216 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
 
 		let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
 		let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
+		let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
+		let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
 		read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
 			(1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
 			(3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
 			(5, pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
+			(7, funding_spend_seen, option),
+			(9, counterparty_node_id, option),
 		});
 
 		let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 		secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
 
-		Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor {
-			inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
-				latest_update_id,
-				commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
+		Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
+			latest_update_id,
+			commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
 
-				destination_script,
-				broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
-				counterparty_payment_script,
-				shutdown_script,
+			destination_script,
+			broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
+			counterparty_payment_script,
+			shutdown_script,
 
-				channel_keys_id,
-				holder_revocation_basepoint,
-				funding_info,
-				current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
-				prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
+			channel_keys_id,
+			holder_revocation_basepoint,
+			funding_info,
+			current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
+			prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
 
-				counterparty_commitment_params,
-				funding_redeemscript,
-				channel_value_satoshis,
-				their_cur_revocation_points,
+			counterparty_commitment_params,
+			funding_redeemscript,
+			channel_value_satoshis,
+			their_cur_per_commitment_points,
 
-				on_holder_tx_csv,
+			on_holder_tx_csv,
 
-				commitment_secrets,
-				counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
-				counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
-				counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
+			commitment_secrets,
+			counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
+			counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
+			counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
 
-				prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
-				current_holder_commitment_tx,
-				current_counterparty_commitment_number,
-				current_holder_commitment_number,
+			prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
+			current_holder_commitment_tx,
+			current_counterparty_commitment_number,
+			current_holder_commitment_number,
 
-				payment_preimages,
-				pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
-				pending_events,
+			payment_preimages,
+			pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
+			pending_events,
 
-				onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
-				outputs_to_watch,
+			onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
+			outputs_to_watch,
 
-				onchain_tx_handler,
+			onchain_tx_handler,
 
-				lockdown_from_offchain,
-				holder_tx_signed,
-				funding_spend_confirmed,
-				htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
+			lockdown_from_offchain,
+			holder_tx_signed,
+			funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
+			funding_spend_confirmed,
+			htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
 
-				best_block,
+			best_block,
+			counterparty_node_id,
 
-				secp_ctx,
-			}),
-		}))
+			secp_ctx,
+		})))
 	}
 }
 
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
+	use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
 	use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
 	use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-	use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
+	use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, EcdsaSighashType};
 	use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
-	use bitcoin::util::bip143;
+	use bitcoin::util::sighash;
 	use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
 	use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
 	use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
-	use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
+	use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
 	use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
+	use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+	use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+
 	use hex;
-	use chain::BestBlock;
+
+	use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
+
+	use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
+	use ::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
+	use chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
 	use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
-	use chain::package::{WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
+	use chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
 	use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+	use chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
 	use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
 	use ln::chan_utils;
 	use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
+	use ln::channelmanager::PaymentSendFailure;
+	use ln::features::InitFeatures;
+	use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
 	use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
+	use util::errors::APIError;
+	use util::events::{ClosureReason, MessageSendEventsProvider};
 	use util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
-	use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
-	use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+	use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
 	use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
-	use chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
+	use io;
+	use bitcoin::Witness;
 	use prelude::*;
 
+	fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
+		// Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
+		// confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
+		// the counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it without recourse as
+		// long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block first, the full commitment update dance
+		// occurs after the block is connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
+		// Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the counterparty would be risking
+		// their full channel balance for it, but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the
+		// potential ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
+		//
+		// This test checks said behavior, as well as ensuring a ChannelMonitorUpdate with multiple
+		// updates is handled correctly in such conditions.
+		let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
+		let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
+		let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
+		let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+		let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
+			&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+		create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
+			&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+
+		// Rebalance somewhat
+		send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
+
+		// First route two payments for testing at the end
+		let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
+		let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
+
+		let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel.2);
+		assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
+		let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel.2);
+		assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 3); // Commitment and two HTLC-Timeouts
+		check_spends!(remote_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
+		check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
+		let broadcast_tx = if use_local_txn { &local_txn[0] } else { &remote_txn[0] };
+
+		// Connect a commitment transaction, but only to the ChainMonitor/ChannelMonitor. The
+		// channel is now closed, but the ChannelManager doesn't know that yet.
+		let new_header = BlockHeader {
+			version: 2, time: 0, bits: 0, nonce: 0,
+			prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_info().0,
+			merkle_root: Default::default() };
+		let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
+		nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
+			&[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
+
+		let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
+						&mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
+						&nodes[1].keys_manager.backing).unwrap();
+
+		// If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
+		// the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
+		let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
+		unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)),
+			true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
+			assert!(err.contains("ChannelMonitor storage failure")));
+		check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); // After the failure we generate a close-channel monitor update
+		check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
+		check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() });
+
+		// Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
+		// and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
+		// an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
+		let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
+		let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().skip(1).next().unwrap().clone();
+		assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
+		if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
+		} else { panic!(); }
+		replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_1 });
+		replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_2 });
+
+		let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::new(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
+		assert!(
+			pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
+			.is_err());
+		// Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
+		// transaction
+		let txn_broadcasted = broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+		assert!(txn_broadcasted.len() >= 2);
+		let htlc_txn = txn_broadcasted.iter().filter(|tx| {
+			assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
+			tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == broadcast_tx.txid()
+		}).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+		assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
+		check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], broadcast_tx);
+		check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], broadcast_tx);
+	}
+	#[test]
+	fn test_funding_spend_refuses_updates() {
+		do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(true);
+		do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(false);
+	}
+
 	#[test]
 	fn test_prune_preimages() {
 		let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 		let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
 		let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))});
-		let fee_estimator = Arc::new(TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) });
+		let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
 
 		let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
 		let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
@@ -3359,6 +3633,7 @@ mod tests {
 			SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
 			SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
 			SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
+			SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
 			[41; 32],
 			0,
 			[0; 32]
@@ -3392,7 +3667,7 @@ mod tests {
 		                                  (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
 		                                  &channel_parameters,
 		                                  Script::new(), 46, 0,
-		                                  HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block);
+		                                  HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block, dummy_key);
 
 		monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
 		let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
@@ -3401,7 +3676,8 @@ mod tests {
 		monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
 		monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
 		for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
-			monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger);
+			let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
+			monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
 		}
 
 		// Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
@@ -3444,36 +3720,38 @@ mod tests {
 		let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 		let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
 		let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
-		let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
 
 		macro_rules! sign_input {
 			($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
 				let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
-					offered: if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC || *$weight == WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC { true } else { false },
+					offered: if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) { true } else { false },
 					amount_msat: 0,
 					cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
 					payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
 					transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
 				};
 				let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
-				let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
-				let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
-				$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
-				$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
-				sum_actual_sigs += $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len();
+				let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
+				let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
+				let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
+				ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
+				$sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len();
+				let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
+				witness.push(ser_sig);
 				if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
-					$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec!(1));
-				} else if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC || *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC {
-					$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
-				} else if *$weight == WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC {
-					$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec![0]);
+					witness.push(vec!(1));
+				} else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
+					witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
+				} else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
+					witness.push(vec![0]);
 				} else {
-					$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
+					witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
 				}
-				$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
-				println!("witness[0] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len());
-				println!("witness[1] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[1].len());
-				println!("witness[2] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[2].len());
+				witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
+				let witness = witness.to_vec();
+				println!("witness[0] {}", witness[0].len());
+				println!("witness[1] {}", witness[1].len());
+				println!("witness[2] {}", witness[2].len());
 			}
 		}
 
@@ -3481,83 +3759,98 @@ mod tests {
 		let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
 
 		// Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
-		let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
-		for i in 0..4 {
-			claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
-				previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
-					txid,
-					vout: i,
-				},
-				script_sig: Script::new(),
-				sequence: 0xfffffffd,
-				witness: Vec::new(),
+		for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
+			let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+			let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
+			for i in 0..4 {
+				claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
+					previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+						txid,
+						vout: i,
+					},
+					script_sig: Script::new(),
+					sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+					witness: Witness::new(),
+				});
+			}
+			claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
+				script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
+				value: 0,
 			});
-		}
-		claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
-			script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
-			value: 0,
-		});
-		let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
-		let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC];
-		let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
-		{
-			let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
-			for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
-				sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, false);
-				inputs_total_weight += inp;
+			let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
+			let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
+			let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
+			{
+				let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
+				for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
+					sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
+					inputs_total_weight += inp;
+				}
 			}
+			assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize,  claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
 		}
-		assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize,  claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
 
 		// Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
-		claim_tx.input.clear();
-		sum_actual_sigs = 0;
-		for i in 0..4 {
+		for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
+			let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+			let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
+			for i in 0..4 {
+				claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
+					previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
+						txid,
+						vout: i,
+					},
+					script_sig: Script::new(),
+					sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+					witness: Witness::new(),
+				});
+			}
+			claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
+				script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
+				value: 0,
+			});
+			let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
+			let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
+			let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
+			{
+				let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
+				for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
+					sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
+					inputs_total_weight += inp;
+				}
+			}
+			assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize,  claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+		}
+
+		// Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
+		for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
+			let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+			let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
 			claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
 				previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
 					txid,
-					vout: i,
+					vout: 0,
 				},
 				script_sig: Script::new(),
 				sequence: 0xfffffffd,
-				witness: Vec::new(),
+				witness: Witness::new(),
 			});
-		}
-		let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
-		let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC];
-		let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
-		{
-			let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
-			for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
-				sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, false);
-				inputs_total_weight += inp;
-			}
-		}
-		assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize,  claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
-
-		// Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
-		claim_tx.input.clear();
-		sum_actual_sigs = 0;
-		claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
-			previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
-				txid,
-				vout: 0,
-			},
-			script_sig: Script::new(),
-			sequence: 0xfffffffd,
-			witness: Vec::new(),
-		});
-		let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
-		let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
-		let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
-		{
-			let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
-			for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
-				sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, false);
-				inputs_total_weight += inp;
+			claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
+				script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
+				value: 0,
+			});
+			let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
+			let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
+			let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
+			{
+				let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
+				for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
+					sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
+					inputs_total_weight += inp;
+				}
 			}
+			assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
 		}
-		assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
 	}
 
 	// Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.