X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fchain%2Fchannelmonitor.rs;h=7088d32d1607e1f4fa0137d6ceda9182d32ca3b2;hb=a8fa5a1685d84d3b07732e4ecc04e2dc7ba06a00;hp=cb267524fb0ff18d1c2f312a8a5741efaa3300a9;hpb=966465a282f91a91ec8b058a0dea5f7b0c6bf21c;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs index cb267524..7088d32d 100644 --- a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs @@ -31,8 +31,9 @@ use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash}; use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature}; use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey}; -use bitcoin::secp256k1; +use bitcoin::{secp256k1, EcdsaSighashType}; +use crate::ln::channel::INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER; use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage}; use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError; use crate::ln::chan_utils; @@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ use crate::sync::{Mutex, LockTestExt}; /// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction /// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment /// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size. -#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] +#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] #[must_use] pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate { pub(crate) updates: Vec, @@ -133,7 +134,7 @@ pub enum MonitorEvent { HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate), /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was confirmed. - CommitmentTxConfirmed(OutPoint), + HolderForceClosed(OutPoint), /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] for more information on how this is used. @@ -149,24 +150,18 @@ pub enum MonitorEvent { /// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted. monitor_update_id: u64, }, - - /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has failed. See - /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`] for more information on how this is used. - /// - /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure - UpdateFailed(OutPoint), } impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent, - // Note that Completed and UpdateFailed are currently never serialized to disk as they are - // generated only in ChainMonitor + // Note that Completed is currently never serialized to disk as it is generated only in + // ChainMonitor. (0, Completed) => { (0, funding_txo, required), (2, monitor_update_id, required), }, ; (2, HTLCEvent), - (4, CommitmentTxConfirmed), - (6, UpdateFailed), + (4, HolderForceClosed), + // 6 was `UpdateFailed` until LDK 0.0.117 ); /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on @@ -486,7 +481,7 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent, ); -#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] +#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep { LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, @@ -888,6 +883,14 @@ pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl { /// The node_id of our counterparty counterparty_node_id: Option, + + /// Initial counterparty commmitment data needed to recreate the commitment tx + /// in the persistence pipeline for third-party watchtowers. This will only be present on + /// monitors created after 0.0.117. + /// + /// Ordering of tuple data: (their_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_sats, + /// to_countersignatory_sats) + initial_counterparty_commitment_info: Option<(PublicKey, u32, u64, u64)>, } /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends. @@ -1028,7 +1031,7 @@ impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl true, - MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => true, + MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) => true, _ => false, }).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?; for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() { @@ -1037,7 +1040,7 @@ impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl 1u8.write(writer)?, + MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?, _ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below } } @@ -1078,6 +1081,7 @@ impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl ChannelMonitor { best_block, counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), + initial_counterparty_commitment_info: None, }) } @@ -1236,11 +1241,31 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret) } + /// A variant of `Self::provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx` used to provide + /// additional information to the monitor to store in order to recreate the initial + /// counterparty commitment transaction during persistence (mainly for use in third-party + /// watchtowers). + /// + /// This is used to provide the counterparty commitment information directly to the monitor + /// before the initial persistence of a new channel. + pub(crate) fn provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx( + &self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option>)>, + commitment_number: u64, their_cur_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u32, + to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, logger: &L, + ) + where L::Target: Logger + { + self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(txid, + htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_cur_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, + to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, logger); + } + /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction. /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible. /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers. - pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx( + #[cfg(test)] + fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx( &self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option>)>, @@ -1376,6 +1401,22 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { ret } + /// Gets the counterparty's initial commitment transaction. The returned commitment + /// transaction is unsigned. This is intended to be called during the initial persistence of + /// the monitor (inside an implementation of [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]), to allow for + /// watchtowers in the persistence pipeline to have enough data to form justice transactions. + /// + /// This is similar to [`Self::counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update`], except + /// that for the initial commitment transaction, we don't have a corresponding update. + /// + /// This will only return `Some` for channel monitors that have been created after upgrading + /// to LDK 0.0.117+. + /// + /// [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist::persist_new_channel + pub fn initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(&self) -> Option { + self.inner.lock().unwrap().initial_counterparty_commitment_tx() + } + /// Gets all of the counterparty commitment transactions provided by the given update. This /// may be empty if the update doesn't include any new counterparty commitments. Returned /// commitment transactions are unsigned. @@ -1383,7 +1424,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// This is provided so that watchtower clients in the persistence pipeline are able to build /// justice transactions for each counterparty commitment upon each update. It's intended to be /// used within an implementation of [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`], which is provided - /// with a monitor and an update. + /// with a monitor and an update. Once revoked, signing a justice transaction can be done using + /// [`Self::sign_to_local_justice_tx`]. /// /// It is expected that a watchtower client may use this method to retrieve the latest counterparty /// commitment transaction(s), and then hold the necessary data until a later update in which @@ -1399,6 +1441,27 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(update) } + /// Wrapper around [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output`] to make + /// signing the justice transaction easier for implementors of + /// [`chain::chainmonitor::Persist`]. On success this method returns the provided transaction + /// signing the input at `input_idx`. This method will only produce a valid signature for + /// a transaction spending the `to_local` output of a commitment transaction, i.e. this cannot + /// be used for revoked HTLC outputs. + /// + /// `Value` is the value of the output being spent by the input at `input_idx`, committed + /// in the BIP 143 signature. + /// + /// This method will only succeed if this monitor has received the revocation secret for the + /// provided `commitment_number`. If a commitment number is provided that does not correspond + /// to the commitment transaction being revoked, this will return a signed transaction, but + /// the signature will not be valid. + /// + /// [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output`]: crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output + /// [`Persist`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist + pub fn sign_to_local_justice_tx(&self, justice_tx: Transaction, input_idx: usize, value: u64, commitment_number: u64) -> Result { + self.inner.lock().unwrap().sign_to_local_justice_tx(justice_tx, input_idx, value, commitment_number) + } + pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 { self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret() } @@ -1419,21 +1482,20 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id } - /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of - /// the Channel was out-of-date. + /// Used by [`ChannelManager`] deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy + /// of the channel state was out-of-date. /// /// You may also use this to broadcast the latest local commitment transaction, either because - /// a monitor update failed with [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`] or because we've - /// fallen behind (i.e. we've received proof that our counterparty side knows a revocation - /// secret we gave them that they shouldn't know). + /// a monitor update failed or because we've fallen behind (i.e. we've received proof that our + /// counterparty side knows a revocation secret we gave them that they shouldn't know). /// /// Broadcasting these transactions in the second case is UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty /// side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to broadcast them if counterparty doesn't /// close channel with their commitment transaction after a substantial amount of time. Best /// may be to contact the other node operator out-of-band to coordinate other options available - /// to you. In any-case, the choice is up to you. + /// to you. /// - /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure + /// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec where L::Target: Logger { self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger) @@ -1607,6 +1669,33 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { current_height, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger, ); } + + /// Returns the descriptors for relevant outputs (i.e., those that we can spend) within the + /// transaction if they exist and the transaction has at least [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] + /// confirmations. + /// + /// Descriptors returned by this method are primarily exposed via [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] + /// once they are no longer under reorg risk. This method serves as a way to retrieve these + /// descriptors at a later time, either for historical purposes, or to replay any + /// missed/unhandled descriptors. For the purpose of gathering historical records, if the + /// channel close has fully resolved (i.e., [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] returns + /// an empty set), you can retrieve all spendable outputs by providing all descendant spending + /// transactions starting from the channel's funding or closing transaction that have at least + /// [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations. + /// + /// `tx` is a transaction we'll scan the outputs of. Any transaction can be provided. If any + /// outputs which can be spent by us are found, at least one descriptor is returned. + /// + /// `confirmation_height` must be the height of the block in which `tx` was included in. + pub fn get_spendable_outputs(&self, tx: &Transaction, confirmation_height: u32) -> Vec { + let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap(); + let current_height = inner.best_block.height; + if current_height.saturating_sub(ANTI_REORG_DELAY) + 1 >= confirmation_height { + inner.get_spendable_outputs(tx) + } else { + Vec::new() + } + } } impl ChannelMonitorImpl { @@ -2255,6 +2344,25 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { Ok(()) } + pub(crate) fn provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx( + &mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option>)>, + commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u32, + to_broadcaster_value: u64, to_countersignatory_value: u64, logger: &L + ) + where L::Target: Logger + { + self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info = Some((their_per_commitment_point.clone(), + feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value)); + + #[cfg(debug_assertions)] { + let rebuilt_commitment_tx = self.initial_counterparty_commitment_tx().unwrap(); + debug_assert_eq!(rebuilt_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), txid); + } + + self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, + their_per_commitment_point, logger); + } + pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger { // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close. @@ -2445,7 +2553,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { txs.push(tx); } broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&txs); - self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0)); + self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(self.funding_info.0)); } pub fn update_monitor(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> @@ -2511,6 +2619,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => { log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret"); if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) { + debug_assert!(false, "Latest counterparty commitment secret was invalid"); log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:"); log_error!(logger, " {}", e); ret = Err(()); @@ -2554,10 +2663,10 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { } } else if !self.holder_tx_signed { log_error!(logger, "WARNING: You have a potentially-unsafe holder commitment transaction available to broadcast"); - log_error!(logger, " in channel monitor for channel {}!", log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id())); + log_error!(logger, " in channel monitor for channel {}!", &self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()); log_error!(logger, " Read the docs for ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn and take manual action!"); } else { - // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed, the ChannelManager + // If we generated a MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed, the ChannelManager // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we // shouldn't print the scary warning above. log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction."); @@ -2684,6 +2793,17 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { ret } + pub(crate) fn initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(&mut self) -> Option { + let (their_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_value, + to_countersignatory_value) = self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info?; + let htlc_outputs = vec![]; + + let commitment_tx = self.build_counterparty_commitment_tx(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, + &their_per_commitment_point, to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value, + feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs); + Some(commitment_tx) + } + fn build_counterparty_commitment_tx( &self, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, to_broadcaster_value: u64, to_countersignatory_value: u64, feerate_per_kw: u32, @@ -2733,6 +2853,31 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { }).collect() } + pub(crate) fn sign_to_local_justice_tx( + &self, mut justice_tx: Transaction, input_idx: usize, value: u64, commitment_number: u64 + ) -> Result { + let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).ok_or(())?; + let per_commitment_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secret).map_err(|_| ())?; + let their_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key( + &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key); + + let revocation_pubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key( + &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &their_per_commitment_point, + &self.holder_revocation_basepoint); + let delayed_key = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, + &their_per_commitment_point, + &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key); + let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key); + + let sig = self.onchain_tx_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_output( + &justice_tx, input_idx, value, &per_commitment_key, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx)?; + justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All); + justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push(&[1u8]); + justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push(revokeable_redeemscript.as_bytes()); + Ok(justice_tx) + } + /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> { self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx) @@ -3265,7 +3410,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 { let mut balance_spendable_csv = None; log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.", - log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), txid); + &self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id(), txid); self.funding_spend_seen = true; let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None; if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 { @@ -3323,7 +3468,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { } self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger); - self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger); + self.check_tx_and_push_spendable_outputs(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger); } } @@ -3366,8 +3511,10 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()); let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height()); claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package); - self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0)); - let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript); + self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(self.funding_info.0)); + // Although we aren't signing the transaction directly here, the transaction will be signed + // in the claim that is queued to OnchainTxHandler. We set holder_tx_signed here to reject + // new channel updates. self.holder_tx_signed = true; // We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is // unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in @@ -3377,7 +3524,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here. let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height()); - let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx); + let unsigned_commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_unsigned_holder_commitment_tx(); + let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &unsigned_commitment_tx); if !new_outputs.is_empty() { watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs)); } @@ -3866,34 +4014,18 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { } } - /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own - fn is_paying_spendable_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger { - let mut spendable_output = None; - for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us - if i > ::core::u16::MAX as usize { - // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the - // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not - // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who - // wishes to give us money for no reason. - // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere - // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's - // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently - // non-standard due to their size. - // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in - // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills - // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case. - continue; - } + fn get_spendable_outputs(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Vec { + let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new(); + for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script { - spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { + spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 }, output: outp.clone(), }); - break; } if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script { if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey { - spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor { + spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor { outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 }, per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1, to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv, @@ -3902,27 +4034,32 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id, channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis, })); - break; } } if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey { - spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor { + spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor { outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 }, output: outp.clone(), channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id, channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis, })); - break; } if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) { - spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { + spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 }, output: outp.clone(), }); - break; } } - if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output { + spendable_outputs + } + + /// Checks if the confirmed transaction is paying funds back to some address we can assume to + /// own. + fn check_tx_and_push_spendable_outputs( + &mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L, + ) where L::Target: Logger { + for spendable_output in self.get_spendable_outputs(tx) { let entry = OnchainEventEntry { txid: tx.txid(), transaction: Some(tx.clone()), @@ -4127,7 +4264,7 @@ impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len { let ev = match ::read(reader)? { 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?), - 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_info.0), + 1 => MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_info.0), _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }; pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev); @@ -4195,6 +4332,7 @@ impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None; let mut spendable_txids_confirmed = Some(Vec::new()); let mut counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs = Some(HashMap::new()); + let mut initial_counterparty_commitment_info = None; read_tlv_fields!(reader, { (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option), (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, optional_vec), @@ -4204,6 +4342,7 @@ impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP (11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option), (13, spendable_txids_confirmed, optional_vec), (15, counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, option), + (17, initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option), }); Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl { @@ -4259,6 +4398,7 @@ impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP best_block, counterparty_node_id, + initial_counterparty_commitment_info, }))) } } @@ -4283,13 +4423,12 @@ mod tests { use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator; use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep; - use crate::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err}; + use crate::{check_added_monitors, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err}; use crate::chain::{BestBlock, Confirm}; use crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor; use crate::chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT}; use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint; use crate::sign::InMemorySigner; - use crate::events::ClosureReason; use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash}; use crate::ln::chan_utils; use crate::ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters}; @@ -4355,18 +4494,14 @@ mod tests { let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000); unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0) - ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, - assert!(err.contains("ChannelMonitor storage failure"))); - check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); // After the failure we generate a close-channel monitor update - check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); - check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() }, - [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000); + ), false, APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress, {}); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); // Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update // and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates // an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied. let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap(); - let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().skip(1).next().unwrap().clone(); + let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().next().unwrap().clone(); assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1); if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] { } else { panic!(); }