X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fchain%2Fchannelmonitor.rs;h=920cbd060fca84b57b165a27f3c47e8ff3fce17d;hb=40b1d4f027c8827f057d77abbc4f3b46b1b67abd;hp=69cdf824a61db429725ba7808aa7820712fbb68d;hpb=313810ebdc8d7a90e68db07774cfdf7a653159e0;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs index 69cdf824..920cbd06 100644 --- a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ use sync::Mutex; /// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction /// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment /// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size. -#[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))] +#[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq, Eq))] #[derive(Clone)] #[must_use] pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate { @@ -76,14 +76,14 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate { /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with one exception specified below. /// /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned - /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`] have been applied to all copies of a given + /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] have been applied to all copies of a given /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called. /// /// The only instance where update_id values are not strictly increasing is the case where we /// allow post-force-close updates with a special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. See /// its docs for more details. /// - /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure + /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress pub update_id: u64, } @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate { } /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager. -#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] +#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] pub enum MonitorEvent { /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate. HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate), @@ -134,10 +134,10 @@ pub enum MonitorEvent { CommitmentTxConfirmed(OutPoint), /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See - /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`] for more information on how this is used. + /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] for more information on how this is used. /// - /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure - UpdateCompleted { + /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress + Completed { /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated funding_txo: OutPoint, /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or @@ -149,15 +149,15 @@ pub enum MonitorEvent { }, /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has failed. See - /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure`] for more information on how this is used. + /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`] for more information on how this is used. /// - /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure + /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure UpdateFailed(OutPoint), } impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent, - // Note that UpdateCompleted and UpdateFailed are currently never serialized to disk as they are + // Note that Completed and UpdateFailed are currently never serialized to disk as they are // generated only in ChainMonitor - (0, UpdateCompleted) => { + (0, Completed) => { (0, funding_txo, required), (2, monitor_update_id, required), }, @@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent, /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds. -#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] +#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] pub struct HTLCUpdate { pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash, pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option, @@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6; pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS; // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction -#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] +#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] struct HolderSignedTx { /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster txid: Txid, @@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, { /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions. -#[derive(PartialEq)] +#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)] struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, @@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { /// transaction causing it. /// /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization. -#[derive(PartialEq)] +#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)] struct OnchainEventEntry { txid: Txid, height: u32, @@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, u64)>; /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY) -#[derive(PartialEq)] +#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)] enum OnchainEvent { /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used /// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out @@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent, ); -#[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))] +#[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq, Eq))] #[derive(Clone)] pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep { LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { @@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ pub enum Balance { } /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY. -#[derive(PartialEq)] +#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)] struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { commitment_tx_output_idx: Option, /// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC @@ -1319,8 +1319,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// the Channel was out-of-date. /// /// You may also use this to broadcast the latest local commitment transaction, either because - /// a monitor update failed with [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure`] or because we've - /// fallen behind (i.e we've received proof that our counterparty side knows a revocation + /// a monitor update failed with [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`] or because we've + /// fallen behind (i.e. we've received proof that our counterparty side knows a revocation /// secret we gave them that they shouldn't know). /// /// Broadcasting these transactions in the second case is UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty @@ -1329,7 +1329,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// may be to contact the other node operator out-of-band to coordinate other options available /// to you. In any-case, the choice is up to you. /// - /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure + /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec where L::Target: Logger { self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger) @@ -2521,13 +2521,13 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, - preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone())) + preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors())) } else { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput( CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, - htlc.clone())) + htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors())) }; let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true }; let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0); @@ -2826,7 +2826,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry { txid, transaction: Some((*tx).clone()), - height: height, + height, event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv, commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, @@ -2884,7 +2884,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger); if should_broadcast { - let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone()); + let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, self.onchain_tx_handler.opt_anchors()); let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), false, self.best_block.height()); claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package); self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0)); @@ -3418,7 +3418,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { let entry = OnchainEventEntry { txid: tx.txid(), transaction: Some(tx.clone()), - height: height, + height, event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() }, }; log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());