X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fchain%2Fchannelmonitor.rs;h=d5664e453d42e7c7ae7d4268f12acba6b2e8c265;hb=3cb3d18e1d3a7ab8f1ecaa3923faaf7a6887b062;hp=8be785f29d2c38c3165023816e8821b1853418d1;hpb=0a31c12f85b55dd2b3a85e929a5c92086bc8842b;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs index 8be785f29..d5664e453 100644 --- a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs @@ -225,8 +225,6 @@ pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6; /// fail this HTLC, /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it, -/// 3) if we are waiting on a connection or a channel state update to send an HTLC to a peer, and -/// that HTLC expires within this many blocks, we will simply fail the HTLC instead. /// /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage. @@ -234,9 +232,6 @@ pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6; /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it). -/// -/// (3) is about our counterparty - we don't want to relay an HTLC to a counterparty when they may -/// end up force-closing the channel on us to claim it. pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS; // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction @@ -2360,7 +2355,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output; if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 { let mut balance_spendable_csv = None; - log_info!(logger, "Channel closed by funding output spend in txid {}.", log_bytes!(tx.txid())); + log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.", + log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), tx.txid()); if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 { let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger); if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {