X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fchain%2Fchannelmonitor.rs;h=d78f40f3facf3bccec9ced5e483e74bb4bea969d;hb=a0183d7ef1bdf95eb009b1c85849585e3faa0217;hp=f98c0bcac8c0ef453d281b700272b8ac69dd4d06;hpb=df237ba3b455f0ef246604125b8933a7f0074fc5;p=rust-lightning

diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
index f98c0bca..d78f40f3 100644
--- a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
@@ -20,29 +20,30 @@
 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
 
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint, TxOut, Transaction};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf};
 
 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
-use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
+use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
 
 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
+use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
 
+use crate::ln::channel::INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER;
 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
-use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCClaim, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
+use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCClaim, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys};
 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, SentHTLCId};
 use crate::chain;
 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
-use crate::sign::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, SignerProvider, EntropySource};
+use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, SignerProvider, EntropySource};
 use crate::chain::onchaintx::{ClaimEvent, OnchainTxHandler};
 use crate::chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
 use crate::chain::Filter;
@@ -50,7 +51,7 @@ use crate::util::logger::Logger;
 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, RequiredWrapper, MaybeReadable, UpgradableRequired, Writer, Writeable, U48};
 use crate::util::byte_utils;
 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler};
-use crate::events::bump_transaction::{ChannelDerivationParameters, AnchorDescriptor, HTLCDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent};
+use crate::events::bump_transaction::{AnchorDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent};
 
 use crate::prelude::*;
 use core::{cmp, mem};
@@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ use crate::sync::{Mutex, LockTestExt};
 /// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction
 /// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment
 /// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size.
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
 #[must_use]
 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
 	pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
@@ -132,8 +133,9 @@ pub enum MonitorEvent {
 	/// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
 	HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
 
-	/// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was confirmed.
-	CommitmentTxConfirmed(OutPoint),
+	/// Indicates we broadcasted the channel's latest commitment transaction and thus closed the
+	/// channel.
+	HolderForceClosed(OutPoint),
 
 	/// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See
 	/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] for more information on how this is used.
@@ -149,24 +151,18 @@ pub enum MonitorEvent {
 		/// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted.
 		monitor_update_id: u64,
 	},
-
-	/// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has failed. See
-	/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
-	///
-	/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure
-	UpdateFailed(OutPoint),
 }
 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent,
-	// Note that Completed and UpdateFailed are currently never serialized to disk as they are
-	// generated only in ChainMonitor
+	// Note that Completed is currently never serialized to disk as it is generated only in
+	// ChainMonitor.
 	(0, Completed) => {
 		(0, funding_txo, required),
 		(2, monitor_update_id, required),
 	},
 ;
 	(2, HTLCEvent),
-	(4, CommitmentTxConfirmed),
-	(6, UpdateFailed),
+	(4, HolderForceClosed),
+	// 6 was `UpdateFailed` until LDK 0.0.117
 );
 
 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
@@ -280,7 +276,7 @@ impl HolderSignedTx {
 
 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
-#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
 	counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
 	counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
@@ -334,7 +330,7 @@ impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
 /// observed, as well as the transaction causing it.
 ///
 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
-#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
 struct OnchainEventEntry {
 	txid: Txid,
 	height: u32,
@@ -377,7 +373,7 @@ type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, u64)>;
 
 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
-#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
 enum OnchainEvent {
 	/// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
 	///  * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
@@ -486,7 +482,7 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
 
 );
 
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
 	LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
 		commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
@@ -502,6 +498,9 @@ pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
 		htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
 		commitment_number: u64,
 		their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
+		feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>,
+		to_broadcaster_value_sat: Option<u64>,
+		to_countersignatory_value_sat: Option<u64>,
 	},
 	PaymentPreimage {
 		payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
@@ -518,7 +517,7 @@ pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
 		should_broadcast: bool,
 	},
 	ShutdownScript {
-		scriptpubkey: Script,
+		scriptpubkey: ScriptBuf,
 	},
 }
 
@@ -544,8 +543,11 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
 	},
 	(1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
 		(0, commitment_txid, required),
+		(1, feerate_per_kw, option),
 		(2, commitment_number, required),
+		(3, to_broadcaster_value_sat, option),
 		(4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
+		(5, to_countersignatory_value_sat, option),
 		(6, htlc_outputs, required_vec),
 	},
 	(2, PaymentPreimage) => {
@@ -576,14 +578,14 @@ pub enum Balance {
 	ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 		/// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
 		/// required to do so.
-		claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
+		amount_satoshis: u64,
 	},
 	/// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
 	/// we consider it spendable.
 	ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 		/// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
 		/// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
-		claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
+		amount_satoshis: u64,
 		/// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
 		/// amount.
 		confirmation_height: u32,
@@ -598,7 +600,7 @@ pub enum Balance {
 	ContentiousClaimable {
 		/// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
 		/// required to do so.
-		claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
+		amount_satoshis: u64,
 		/// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
 		/// done so.
 		timeout_height: u32,
@@ -613,7 +615,7 @@ pub enum Balance {
 	MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 		/// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
 		/// which will be required to do so.
-		claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
+		amount_satoshis: u64,
 		/// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
 		/// done so.
 		claimable_height: u32,
@@ -626,7 +628,7 @@ pub enum Balance {
 	MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 		/// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
 		/// which will be required to do so.
-		claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
+		amount_satoshis: u64,
 		/// The height at which our counterparty will be able to claim the balance if we have not
 		/// yet received the preimage and claimed it ourselves.
 		expiry_height: u32,
@@ -643,7 +645,7 @@ pub enum Balance {
 		///
 		/// Note that for outputs from HTLC balances this may be excluding some on-chain fees that
 		/// were already spent.
-		claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
+		amount_satoshis: u64,
 	},
 }
 
@@ -656,33 +658,20 @@ impl Balance {
 	/// On-chain fees required to claim the balance are not included in this amount.
 	pub fn claimable_amount_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
 		match self {
-			Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
-				claimable_amount_satoshis,
-			} => *claimable_amount_satoshis,
-			Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
-				claimable_amount_satoshis,
-				..
-			} => *claimable_amount_satoshis,
-			Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
-				claimable_amount_satoshis,
-				..
-			} => *claimable_amount_satoshis,
-			Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
-				..
-			} => 0,
-			Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
-				..
-			} => 0,
-			Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
-				claimable_amount_satoshis,
-				..
-			} => *claimable_amount_satoshis,
+			Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis, .. }|
+			Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { amount_satoshis, .. }|
+			Balance::ContentiousClaimable { amount_satoshis, .. }|
+			Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { amount_satoshis, .. }
+				=> *amount_satoshis,
+			Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { .. }|
+			Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { .. }
+				=> 0,
 		}
 	}
 }
 
 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
-#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
 	commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
 	/// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
@@ -750,24 +739,31 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
 	pub(super) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
 }
 
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
+impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Clone for ChannelMonitor<Signer> where Signer: Clone {
+	fn clone(&self) -> Self {
+		let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap().clone();
+		ChannelMonitor::from_impl(inner)
+	}
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
 	latest_update_id: u64,
 	commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
 
-	destination_script: Script,
-	broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
-	counterparty_payment_script: Script,
-	shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
+	destination_script: ScriptBuf,
+	broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(ScriptBuf, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
+	counterparty_payment_script: ScriptBuf,
+	shutdown_script: Option<ScriptBuf>,
 
 	channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
 	holder_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
-	funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
+	funding_info: (OutPoint, ScriptBuf),
 	current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
 	prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
 
 	counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
-	funding_redeemscript: Script,
+	funding_redeemscript: ScriptBuf,
 	channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 	// first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
 	their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
@@ -836,7 +832,7 @@ pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
 	// interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
 	// be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
 	// Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
-	outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,
+	outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>>,
 
 	#[cfg(test)]
 	pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
@@ -888,6 +884,14 @@ pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
 
 	/// The node_id of our counterparty
 	counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
+
+	/// Initial counterparty commmitment data needed to recreate the commitment tx
+	/// in the persistence pipeline for third-party watchtowers. This will only be present on
+	/// monitors created after 0.0.117.
+	///
+	/// Ordering of tuple data: (their_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_sats,
+	/// to_countersignatory_sats)
+	initial_counterparty_commitment_info: Option<(PublicKey, u32, u64, u64)>,
 }
 
 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
@@ -937,7 +941,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signe
 		self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
 		match &self.shutdown_script {
 			Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
-			None => Script::new().write(writer)?,
+			None => ScriptBuf::new().write(writer)?,
 		}
 
 		self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
@@ -1028,7 +1032,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signe
 
 		writer.write_all(&(self.pending_monitor_events.iter().filter(|ev| match ev {
 			MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(_) => true,
-			MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => true,
+			MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) => true,
 			_ => false,
 		}).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
 		for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
@@ -1037,7 +1041,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signe
 					0u8.write(writer)?;
 					upd.write(writer)?;
 				},
-				MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
+				MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
 				_ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below
 			}
 		}
@@ -1078,6 +1082,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signe
 			(11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
 			(13, self.spendable_txids_confirmed, required_vec),
 			(15, self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, required),
+			(17, self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option),
 		});
 
 		Ok(())
@@ -1128,17 +1133,18 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 		ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
 	}
 
-	pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
-	                  on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
+	pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<ScriptBuf>,
+	                  on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, ScriptBuf),
 	                  channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
-	                  funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
+	                  funding_redeemscript: ScriptBuf, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 	                  commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
 	                  initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
 	                  best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 
 		assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
-		let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
-		let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
+		let counterparty_payment_script = chan_utils::get_counterparty_payment_script(
+			&channel_parameters.channel_type_features, &keys.pubkeys().payment_point
+		);
 
 		let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
 		let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
@@ -1168,9 +1174,10 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 			(holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
 		};
 
-		let onchain_tx_handler =
-			OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
-			channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx);
+		let onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(
+			channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id, destination_script.into(), keys,
+			channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx
+		);
 
 		let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
 		outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
@@ -1179,7 +1186,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 			latest_update_id: 0,
 			commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
 
-			destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
+			destination_script: destination_script.into(),
 			broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
 			counterparty_payment_script,
 			shutdown_script,
@@ -1228,6 +1235,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 
 			best_block,
 			counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
+			initial_counterparty_commitment_info: None,
 		})
 	}
 
@@ -1236,11 +1244,31 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 		self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
 	}
 
+	/// A variant of `Self::provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx` used to provide
+	/// additional information to the monitor to store in order to recreate the initial
+	/// counterparty commitment transaction during persistence (mainly for use in third-party
+	/// watchtowers).
+	///
+	/// This is used to provide the counterparty commitment information directly to the monitor
+	/// before the initial persistence of a new channel.
+	pub(crate) fn provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
+		&self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
+		commitment_number: u64, their_cur_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u32,
+		to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, logger: &L,
+	)
+	where L::Target: Logger
+	{
+		self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(txid,
+			htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_cur_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
+			to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, logger);
+	}
+
 	/// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
 	/// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
 	/// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
 	/// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
-	pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
+	#[cfg(test)]
+	fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
 		&self,
 		txid: Txid,
 		htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
@@ -1286,7 +1314,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 		&self,
 		updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
 		broadcaster: &B,
-		fee_estimator: F,
+		fee_estimator: &F,
 		logger: &L,
 	) -> Result<(), ()>
 	where
@@ -1304,13 +1332,13 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 	}
 
 	/// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
-	pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, Script) {
+	pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, ScriptBuf) {
 		self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
 	}
 
 	/// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
 	/// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
-	pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>)> {
+	pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>)> {
 		self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
 			.iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
 	}
@@ -1376,6 +1404,67 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 		ret
 	}
 
+	/// Gets the counterparty's initial commitment transaction. The returned commitment
+	/// transaction is unsigned. This is intended to be called during the initial persistence of
+	/// the monitor (inside an implementation of [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]), to allow for
+	/// watchtowers in the persistence pipeline to have enough data to form justice transactions.
+	///
+	/// This is similar to [`Self::counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update`], except
+	/// that for the initial commitment transaction, we don't have a corresponding update.
+	///
+	/// This will only return `Some` for channel monitors that have been created after upgrading
+	/// to LDK 0.0.117+.
+	///
+	/// [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist::persist_new_channel
+	pub fn initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(&self) -> Option<CommitmentTransaction> {
+		self.inner.lock().unwrap().initial_counterparty_commitment_tx()
+	}
+
+	/// Gets all of the counterparty commitment transactions provided by the given update. This
+	/// may be empty if the update doesn't include any new counterparty commitments. Returned
+	/// commitment transactions are unsigned.
+	///
+	/// This is provided so that watchtower clients in the persistence pipeline are able to build
+	/// justice transactions for each counterparty commitment upon each update. It's intended to be
+	/// used within an implementation of [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`], which is provided
+	/// with a monitor and an update. Once revoked, signing a justice transaction can be done using
+	/// [`Self::sign_to_local_justice_tx`].
+	///
+	/// It is expected that a watchtower client may use this method to retrieve the latest counterparty
+	/// commitment transaction(s), and then hold the necessary data until a later update in which
+	/// the monitor has been updated with the corresponding revocation data, at which point the
+	/// monitor can sign the justice transaction.
+	///
+	/// This will only return a non-empty list for monitor updates that have been created after
+	/// upgrading to LDK 0.0.117+. Note that no restriction lies on the monitors themselves, which
+	/// may have been created prior to upgrading.
+	///
+	/// [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist::update_persisted_channel
+	pub fn counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(&self, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Vec<CommitmentTransaction> {
+		self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(update)
+	}
+
+	/// Wrapper around [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output`] to make
+	/// signing the justice transaction easier for implementors of
+	/// [`chain::chainmonitor::Persist`]. On success this method returns the provided transaction
+	/// signing the input at `input_idx`. This method will only produce a valid signature for
+	/// a transaction spending the `to_local` output of a commitment transaction, i.e. this cannot
+	/// be used for revoked HTLC outputs.
+	///
+	/// `Value` is the value of the output being spent by the input at `input_idx`, committed
+	/// in the BIP 143 signature.
+	///
+	/// This method will only succeed if this monitor has received the revocation secret for the
+	/// provided `commitment_number`. If a commitment number is provided that does not correspond
+	/// to the commitment transaction being revoked, this will return a signed transaction, but
+	/// the signature will not be valid.
+	///
+	/// [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output`]: crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output
+	/// [`Persist`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist
+	pub fn sign_to_local_justice_tx(&self, justice_tx: Transaction, input_idx: usize, value: u64, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<Transaction, ()> {
+		self.inner.lock().unwrap().sign_to_local_justice_tx(justice_tx, input_idx, value, commitment_number)
+	}
+
 	pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
 		self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
 	}
@@ -1396,21 +1485,20 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 		self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
 	}
 
-	/// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
-	/// the Channel was out-of-date.
+	/// Used by [`ChannelManager`] deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy
+	/// of the channel state was out-of-date.
 	///
 	/// You may also use this to broadcast the latest local commitment transaction, either because
-	/// a monitor update failed with [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`] or because we've
-	/// fallen behind (i.e. we've received proof that our counterparty side knows a revocation
-	/// secret we gave them that they shouldn't know).
+	/// a monitor update failed or because we've fallen behind (i.e. we've received proof that our
+	/// counterparty side knows a revocation secret we gave them that they shouldn't know).
 	///
 	/// Broadcasting these transactions in the second case is UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty
 	/// side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to broadcast them if counterparty doesn't
 	/// close channel with their commitment transaction after a substantial amount of time. Best
 	/// may be to contact the other node operator out-of-band to coordinate other options available
-	/// to you. In any-case, the choice is up to you.
+	/// to you.
 	///
-	/// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure
+	/// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
 	pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
 	where L::Target: Logger {
 		self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
@@ -1438,7 +1526,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 	/// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
 	pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
 		&self,
-		header: &BlockHeader,
+		header: &Header,
 		txdata: &TransactionData,
 		height: u32,
 		broadcaster: B,
@@ -1458,7 +1546,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 	/// appropriately.
 	pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
 		&self,
-		header: &BlockHeader,
+		header: &Header,
 		height: u32,
 		broadcaster: B,
 		fee_estimator: F,
@@ -1481,7 +1569,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 	/// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
 	pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
 		&self,
-		header: &BlockHeader,
+		header: &Header,
 		txdata: &TransactionData,
 		height: u32,
 		broadcaster: B,
@@ -1529,7 +1617,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 	/// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
 	pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
 		&self,
-		header: &BlockHeader,
+		header: &Header,
 		height: u32,
 		broadcaster: B,
 		fee_estimator: F,
@@ -1584,6 +1672,49 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 			current_height, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger,
 		);
 	}
+
+	/// Returns the descriptors for relevant outputs (i.e., those that we can spend) within the
+	/// transaction if they exist and the transaction has at least [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`]
+	/// confirmations. For [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] descriptors to be
+	/// returned, the transaction must have at least `max(ANTI_REORG_DELAY, to_self_delay)`
+	/// confirmations.
+	///
+	/// Descriptors returned by this method are primarily exposed via [`Event::SpendableOutputs`]
+	/// once they are no longer under reorg risk. This method serves as a way to retrieve these
+	/// descriptors at a later time, either for historical purposes, or to replay any
+	/// missed/unhandled descriptors. For the purpose of gathering historical records, if the
+	/// channel close has fully resolved (i.e., [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] returns
+	/// an empty set), you can retrieve all spendable outputs by providing all descendant spending
+	/// transactions starting from the channel's funding transaction and going down three levels.
+	///
+	/// `tx` is a transaction we'll scan the outputs of. Any transaction can be provided. If any
+	/// outputs which can be spent by us are found, at least one descriptor is returned.
+	///
+	/// `confirmation_height` must be the height of the block in which `tx` was included in.
+	pub fn get_spendable_outputs(&self, tx: &Transaction, confirmation_height: u32) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
+		let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
+		let current_height = inner.best_block.height;
+		let mut spendable_outputs = inner.get_spendable_outputs(tx);
+		spendable_outputs.retain(|descriptor| {
+			let mut conf_threshold = current_height.saturating_sub(ANTI_REORG_DELAY) + 1;
+			if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) = descriptor {
+				conf_threshold = cmp::min(conf_threshold,
+					current_height.saturating_sub(descriptor.to_self_delay as u32) + 1);
+			}
+			conf_threshold >= confirmation_height
+		});
+		spendable_outputs
+	}
+
+	#[cfg(test)]
+	pub fn get_counterparty_payment_script(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
+		self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_payment_script.clone()
+	}
+
+	#[cfg(test)]
+	pub fn set_counterparty_payment_script(&self, script: ScriptBuf) {
+		self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_payment_script = script;
+	}
 }
 
 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
@@ -1623,7 +1754,19 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 				},
 				OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
 					descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor) }
-				if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
+				if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().enumerate()
+					.any(|(input_idx, inp)|
+						 Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
+							inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx &&
+								// A maturing output for an HTLC claim will always be at the same
+								// index as the HTLC input. This is true pre-anchors, as there's
+								// only 1 input and 1 output. This is also true post-anchors,
+								// because we have a SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY signature from our
+								// channel counterparty.
+								descriptor.outpoint.index as usize == input_idx
+					))
+					.unwrap_or(false)
+				=> {
 					debug_assert!(holder_delayed_output_pending.is_none());
 					holder_delayed_output_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
 				},
@@ -1665,7 +1808,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_delayed_output_pending {
 			debug_assert!(holder_commitment);
 			return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
-				claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+				amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
 				confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
 			});
 		} else if htlc_resolved.is_some() && !htlc_output_spend_pending {
@@ -1703,7 +1846,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 				debug_assert!(!htlc.offered || htlc_spend_pending.is_none() || !htlc_spend_pending.unwrap().1,
 					"We don't (currently) generate preimage claims against revoked outputs, where did you get one?!");
 				return Some(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
-					claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+					amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
 				});
 			}
 		} else if htlc.offered == holder_commitment {
@@ -1712,12 +1855,12 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			// and awaiting confirmations on it.
 			if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_timeout_spend_pending {
 				return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
-					claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+					amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
 					confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
 				});
 			} else {
 				return Some(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
-					claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+					amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
 					claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
 					payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
 				});
@@ -1731,12 +1874,12 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
 			if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
 				return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
-					claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+					amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
 					confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
 				});
 			} else {
 				return Some(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
-					claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+					amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
 					timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
 					payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
 					payment_preimage: *payment_preimage,
@@ -1744,7 +1887,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			}
 		} else if htlc_resolved.is_none() {
 			return Some(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
-				claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+				amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
 				expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
 				payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
 			});
@@ -1764,8 +1907,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 	/// confirmations on the claim transaction.
 	///
 	/// Note that for `ChannelMonitors` which track a channel which went on-chain with versions of
-	/// LDK prior to 0.0.111, balances may not be fully captured if our counterparty broadcasted
-	/// a revoked state.
+	/// LDK prior to 0.0.111, not all or excess balances may be included.
 	///
 	/// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
 	/// may be returned here and their meanings.
@@ -1817,7 +1959,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 						} else { None }
 					}) {
 						res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
-							claimable_amount_satoshis: value,
+							amount_satoshis: value,
 							confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
 						});
 					} else {
@@ -1840,7 +1982,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 							descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { output, .. }
 						} = &event.event {
 							res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
-								claimable_amount_satoshis: output.value,
+								amount_satoshis: output.value,
 								confirmation_height: event.confirmation_threshold(),
 							});
 							if let Some(confirmed_to_self_idx) = confirmed_counterparty_output.map(|(idx, _)| idx) {
@@ -1859,7 +2001,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 							.is_output_spend_pending(&BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, confirmed_to_self_idx));
 						if output_spendable {
 							res.push(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
-								claimable_amount_satoshis: amt,
+								amount_satoshis: amt,
 							});
 						}
 					} else {
@@ -1872,7 +2014,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 				walk_htlcs!(true, false, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
 				if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
 					res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
-						claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
+						amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
 						confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
 					});
 				}
@@ -1882,7 +2024,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 					walk_htlcs!(true, false, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
 					if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
 						res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
-							claimable_amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
+							amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
 							confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
 						});
 					}
@@ -1895,7 +2037,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 					// neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
 					// the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
 					res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
-						claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
+						amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
 						confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
 					});
 				}
@@ -1906,7 +2048,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 				if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
 				if htlc.offered {
 					res.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
-						claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+						amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
 						claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
 						payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
 					});
@@ -1916,14 +2058,14 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 					// As long as the HTLC is still in our latest commitment state, treat
 					// it as potentially claimable, even if it has long-since expired.
 					res.push(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
-						claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+						amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
 						expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
 						payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
 					});
 				}
 			}
 			res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
-				claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
+				amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
 			});
 		}
 
@@ -2128,7 +2270,7 @@ macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
 								},
 							};
 							log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
-								log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
+								&htlc.payment_hash, $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
 								$commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
 							$self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
 						}
@@ -2151,6 +2293,7 @@ macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
 
 #[cfg(test)]
 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
+	use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
 	let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
 	ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
 	ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
@@ -2232,6 +2375,25 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		Ok(())
 	}
 
+	pub(crate) fn provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
+		&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
+		commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u32,
+		to_broadcaster_value: u64, to_countersignatory_value: u64, logger: &L
+	)
+	where L::Target: Logger
+	{
+		self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info = Some((their_per_commitment_point.clone(),
+			feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value));
+
+		#[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
+			let rebuilt_commitment_tx = self.initial_counterparty_commitment_tx().unwrap();
+			debug_assert_eq!(rebuilt_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), txid);
+		}
+
+		self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number,
+				their_per_commitment_point, logger);
+	}
+
 	pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
 		// TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
 		// so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
@@ -2372,6 +2534,18 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 	{
 		self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
 
+		let confirmed_spend_txid = self.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
+			self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| match event.event {
+				OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => Some(event.txid),
+				_ => None,
+			})
+		});
+		let confirmed_spend_txid = if let Some(txid) = confirmed_spend_txid {
+			txid
+		} else {
+			return;
+		};
+
 		// If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
 		// First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
 		macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
@@ -2381,14 +2555,24 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			}
 		}
 		if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
-			if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
-				claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
+			if txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
+				if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
+					claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
+				} else {
+					debug_assert!(false);
+					log_error!(logger, "Detected counterparty commitment tx on-chain without tracking commitment number");
+				}
 				return;
 			}
 		}
 		if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
-			if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
-				claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
+			if txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
+				if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
+					claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
+				} else {
+					debug_assert!(false);
+					log_error!(logger, "Detected counterparty commitment tx on-chain without tracking commitment number");
+				}
 				return;
 			}
 		}
@@ -2399,13 +2583,22 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		// *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
 		// holder commitment transactions.
 		if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
-			// Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
-			// block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
-			// transactions.
-			let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
-			self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
-			if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
-				let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx, self.best_block.height());
+			let holder_commitment_tx = if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
+				Some(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx)
+			} else if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
+				if prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
+					Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx)
+				} else {
+					None
+				}
+			} else {
+				None
+			};
+			if let Some(holder_commitment_tx) = holder_commitment_tx {
+				// Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
+				// block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
+				// transactions.
+				let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
 				self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
 			}
 		}
@@ -2422,10 +2615,10 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			txs.push(tx);
 		}
 		broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&txs);
-		self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
+		self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(self.funding_info.0));
 	}
 
-	pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
+	pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
 	where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
 		F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 		L::Target: Logger,
@@ -2465,7 +2658,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
 		}
 		let mut ret = Ok(());
-		let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
+		let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&**fee_estimator);
 		for update in updates.updates.iter() {
 			match update {
 				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources } => {
@@ -2477,17 +2670,18 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 						ret = Err(());
 					}
 				}
-				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point } => {
+				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
 					log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
 					self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
 				},
 				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
 					log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
-					self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
+					self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
 				},
 				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
 					log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
 					if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
+						debug_assert!(false, "Latest counterparty commitment secret was invalid");
 						log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
 						log_error!(logger, "    {}", e);
 						ret = Err(());
@@ -2531,10 +2725,10 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 						}
 					} else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
 						log_error!(logger, "WARNING: You have a potentially-unsafe holder commitment transaction available to broadcast");
-						log_error!(logger, "    in channel monitor for channel {}!", log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()));
+						log_error!(logger, "    in channel monitor for channel {}!", &self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id());
 						log_error!(logger, "    Read the docs for ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn and take manual action!");
 					} else {
-						// If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed, the ChannelManager
+						// If we generated a MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed, the ChannelManager
 						// will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
 						// shouldn't print the scary warning above.
 						log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
@@ -2549,6 +2743,10 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			}
 		}
 
+		#[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
+			self.counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(updates);
+		}
+
 		// If the updates succeeded and we were in an already closed channel state, then there's no
 		// need to refuse any updates we expect to receive afer seeing a confirmed commitment.
 		if ret.is_ok() && updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID && self.latest_update_id == updates.update_id {
@@ -2569,11 +2767,11 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		self.latest_update_id
 	}
 
-	pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
+	pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, ScriptBuf) {
 		&self.funding_info
 	}
 
-	pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
+	pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>> {
 		// If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
 		// of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
 		// its trivial to do, double-check that here.
@@ -2640,6 +2838,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 							per_commitment_point: self.onchain_tx_handler.signer.get_per_commitment_point(
 								htlc.per_commitment_number, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
 							),
+							feerate_per_kw: 0,
 							htlc: htlc.htlc,
 							preimage: htlc.preimage,
 							counterparty_sig: htlc.counterparty_sig,
@@ -2657,6 +2856,91 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		ret
 	}
 
+	pub(crate) fn initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(&mut self) -> Option<CommitmentTransaction> {
+		let (their_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_value,
+			to_countersignatory_value) = self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info?;
+		let htlc_outputs = vec![];
+
+		let commitment_tx = self.build_counterparty_commitment_tx(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+			&their_per_commitment_point, to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value,
+			feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs);
+		Some(commitment_tx)
+	}
+
+	fn build_counterparty_commitment_tx(
+		&self, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: &PublicKey,
+		to_broadcaster_value: u64, to_countersignatory_value: u64, feerate_per_kw: u32,
+		mut nondust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>
+	) -> CommitmentTransaction {
+		let broadcaster_keys = &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters
+			.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys;
+		let countersignatory_keys =
+			&self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys;
+
+		let broadcaster_funding_key = broadcaster_keys.funding_pubkey;
+		let countersignatory_funding_key = countersignatory_keys.funding_pubkey;
+		let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&their_per_commitment_point,
+			&broadcaster_keys, &countersignatory_keys, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx);
+		let channel_parameters =
+			&self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable();
+
+		CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
+			to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value, broadcaster_funding_key,
+			countersignatory_funding_key, keys, feerate_per_kw, &mut nondust_htlcs,
+			channel_parameters)
+	}
+
+	pub(crate) fn counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(&self, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Vec<CommitmentTransaction> {
+		update.updates.iter().filter_map(|update| {
+			match update {
+				&ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid,
+					ref htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point,
+					feerate_per_kw: Some(feerate_per_kw),
+					to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(to_broadcaster_value),
+					to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(to_countersignatory_value) } => {
+
+					let nondust_htlcs = htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _)| {
+						htlc.transaction_output_index.map(|_| (htlc.clone(), None))
+					}).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+					let commitment_tx = self.build_counterparty_commitment_tx(commitment_number,
+							&their_per_commitment_point, to_broadcaster_value,
+							to_countersignatory_value, feerate_per_kw, nondust_htlcs);
+
+					debug_assert_eq!(commitment_tx.trust().txid(), commitment_txid);
+
+					Some(commitment_tx)
+				},
+				_ => None,
+			}
+		}).collect()
+	}
+
+	pub(crate) fn sign_to_local_justice_tx(
+		&self, mut justice_tx: Transaction, input_idx: usize, value: u64, commitment_number: u64
+	) -> Result<Transaction, ()> {
+		let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).ok_or(())?;
+		let per_commitment_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secret).map_err(|_| ())?;
+		let their_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(
+			&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
+
+		let revocation_pubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(
+			&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &their_per_commitment_point,
+			&self.holder_revocation_basepoint);
+		let delayed_key = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
+			&their_per_commitment_point,
+			&self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key);
+		let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
+			self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
+
+		let sig = self.onchain_tx_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_output(
+			&justice_tx, input_idx, value, &per_commitment_key, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx)?;
+		justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All);
+		justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push(&[1u8]);
+		justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push(revokeable_redeemscript.as_bytes());
+		Ok(justice_tx)
+	}
+
 	/// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
 	fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
 		self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
@@ -2703,7 +2987,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			};
 		}
 
-		let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.0 as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
+		let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
 		if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
 			let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
 			let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
@@ -2920,7 +3204,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 	// Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnchainTxHandler, so that the handler can
 	// broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
 	// script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
-	fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
+	fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(ScriptBuf, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
 		let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
 
 		let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
@@ -3074,7 +3358,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 						continue;
 					}
 				} else { None };
-				if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
+				if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 					&::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 					holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
 				}
@@ -3083,7 +3367,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		holder_transactions
 	}
 
-	pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
+	pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
 		where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
 		      F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 					L::Target: Logger,
@@ -3097,7 +3381,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 
 	fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
 		&mut self,
-		header: &BlockHeader,
+		header: &Header,
 		height: u32,
 		broadcaster: B,
 		fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
@@ -3123,7 +3407,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 
 	fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
 		&mut self,
-		header: &BlockHeader,
+		header: &Header,
 		txdata: &TransactionData,
 		height: u32,
 		broadcaster: B,
@@ -3189,10 +3473,10 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 				if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
 					let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
 					log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
-						log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), txid);
+						&self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id(), txid);
 					self.funding_spend_seen = true;
 					let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
-					if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
+					if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
 						let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, counterparty_output_idx_sats) =
 							self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
 						commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = counterparty_output_idx_sats;
@@ -3247,7 +3531,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 				}
 				self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
 
-				self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
+				self.check_tx_and_push_spendable_outputs(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
 			}
 		}
 
@@ -3290,8 +3574,10 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone());
 			let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height());
 			claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
-			self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
-			let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
+			self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(self.funding_info.0));
+			// Although we aren't signing the transaction directly here, the transaction will be signed
+			// in the claim that is queued to OnchainTxHandler. We set holder_tx_signed here to reject
+			// new channel updates.
 			self.holder_tx_signed = true;
 			// We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is
 			// unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in
@@ -3301,7 +3587,8 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 				// assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
 				// "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
 				let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
-				let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
+				let unsigned_commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_unsigned_holder_commitment_tx();
+				let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &unsigned_commitment_tx);
 				if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
 					watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
 				}
@@ -3354,7 +3641,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 					}
 
 					log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
-						log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.txid);
+						&payment_hash, entry.txid);
 					self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
 						payment_hash,
 						payment_preimage: None,
@@ -3371,7 +3658,8 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 				OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
 					log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
 					self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
-						outputs: vec![descriptor]
+						outputs: vec![descriptor],
+						channel_id: Some(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()),
 					});
 					self.spendable_txids_confirmed.push(entry.txid);
 				},
@@ -3416,7 +3704,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		watch_outputs
 	}
 
-	pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
+	pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &Header, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
 		where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
 		      F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 		      L::Target: Logger,
@@ -3504,7 +3792,7 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 									return true;
 								}
 
-								assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
+								assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&ScriptBuf::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 							} else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
 								assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 							} else { panic!(); }
@@ -3630,12 +3918,12 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 							(outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
 						log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
 							$tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
-							if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
+							if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, &$htlc.payment_hash,
 							if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back. We can likely claim the HTLC output with a revocation claim" });
 					} else {
 						log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
 							$tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
-							if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
+							if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, &$htlc.payment_hash,
 							if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
 					}
 				}
@@ -3782,41 +4070,25 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 							commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
 						},
 					};
-					log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
+					log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", &payment_hash, entry.confirmation_threshold());
 					self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
 				}
 			}
 		}
 	}
 
-	/// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
-	fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
-		let mut spendable_output = None;
-		for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
-			if i > ::core::u16::MAX as usize {
-				// While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
-				// 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
-				// in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
-				// wishes to give us money for no reason.
-				// Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
-				// near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
-				// scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
-				// non-standard due to their size.
-				// Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
-				// us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
-				// nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
-				continue;
-			}
+	fn get_spendable_outputs(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
+		let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
+		for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
 			if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
-				spendable_output =  Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
+				spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
 					outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
 					output: outp.clone(),
 				});
-				break;
 			}
 			if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
 				if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
-					spendable_output =  Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
+					spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
 						outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
 						per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
 						to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
@@ -3825,27 +4097,33 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 						channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
 						channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
 					}));
-					break;
 				}
 			}
 			if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
-				spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
+				spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
 					outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
 					output: outp.clone(),
 					channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
 					channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
+					channel_transaction_parameters: Some(self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone()),
 				}));
-				break;
 			}
 			if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
-				spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
+				spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
 					outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
 					output: outp.clone(),
 				});
-				break;
 			}
 		}
-		if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
+		spendable_outputs
+	}
+
+	/// Checks if the confirmed transaction is paying funds back to some address we can assume to
+	/// own.
+	fn check_tx_and_push_spendable_outputs<L: Deref>(
+		&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L,
+	) where L::Target: Logger {
+		for spendable_output in self.get_spendable_outputs(tx) {
 			let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
 				txid: tx.txid(),
 				transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
@@ -3865,11 +4143,11 @@ where
 	F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 	L::Target: Logger,
 {
-	fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
+	fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
 		self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
 	}
 
-	fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
+	fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
 		self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
 	}
 }
@@ -3881,7 +4159,7 @@ where
 	F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 	L::Target: Logger,
 {
-	fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
+	fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
 		self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
 	}
 
@@ -3889,7 +4167,7 @@ where
 		self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
 	}
 
-	fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
+	fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
 		self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
 	}
 
@@ -3930,9 +4208,9 @@ impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP
 			1 => { None },
 			_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
 		};
-		let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let mut counterparty_payment_script: ScriptBuf = Readable::read(reader)?;
 		let shutdown_script = {
-			let script = <Script as Readable>::read(reader)?;
+			let script = <ScriptBuf as Readable>::read(reader)?;
 			if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
 		};
 
@@ -4038,7 +4316,7 @@ impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP
 		let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
 		for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
 			let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
-			let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
+			let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
 			if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
 				return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
 			}
@@ -4050,7 +4328,7 @@ impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP
 		for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
 			let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
 				0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
-				1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_info.0),
+				1 => MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_info.0),
 				_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
 			};
 			pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
@@ -4075,11 +4353,11 @@ impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP
 		}
 
 		let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
-		let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
+		let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<ScriptBuf>>())));
 		for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
 			let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
 			let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
-			let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Script>())));
+			let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<ScriptBuf>())));
 			for _ in 0..outputs_len {
 				outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
 			}
@@ -4118,6 +4396,7 @@ impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP
 		let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None;
 		let mut spendable_txids_confirmed = Some(Vec::new());
 		let mut counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs = Some(HashMap::new());
+		let mut initial_counterparty_commitment_info = None;
 		read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
 			(1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
 			(3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, optional_vec),
@@ -4127,8 +4406,20 @@ impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP
 			(11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
 			(13, spendable_txids_confirmed, optional_vec),
 			(15, counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, option),
+			(17, initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option),
 		});
 
+		// Monitors for anchor outputs channels opened in v0.0.116 suffered from a bug in which the
+		// wrong `counterparty_payment_script` was being tracked. Fix it now on deserialization to
+		// give them a chance to recognize the spendable output.
+		if onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() &&
+			counterparty_payment_script.is_v0_p2wpkh()
+		{
+			let payment_point = onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys.payment_point;
+			counterparty_payment_script =
+				chan_utils::get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh();
+		}
+
 		Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
 			latest_update_id,
 			commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
@@ -4182,17 +4473,20 @@ impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP
 
 			best_block,
 			counterparty_node_id,
+			initial_counterparty_commitment_info,
 		})))
 	}
 }
 
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
-	use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
+	use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
+	use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
 	use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-	use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, EcdsaSighashType};
+	use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut};
 	use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
-	use bitcoin::util::sighash;
+	use bitcoin::sighash;
+	use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
 	use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
 	use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
 	use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
@@ -4200,19 +4494,17 @@ mod tests {
 	use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
 	use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
 	use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
-
-	use hex;
+	use bitcoin::{Sequence, Witness};
 
 	use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
 
 	use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
-	use crate::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
+	use crate::{check_added_monitors, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
 	use crate::chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
 	use crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
 	use crate::chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
 	use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
 	use crate::sign::InMemorySigner;
-	use crate::events::ClosureReason;
 	use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
 	use crate::ln::chan_utils;
 	use crate::ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
@@ -4224,10 +4516,11 @@ mod tests {
 	use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
 	use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
 	use crate::io;
-	use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Witness};
 	use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
 	use crate::prelude::*;
 
+	use std::str::FromStr;
+
 	fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
 		// Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
 		// confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
@@ -4278,17 +4571,14 @@ mod tests {
 		let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
 		unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
 				RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
-			), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
-			assert!(err.contains("ChannelMonitor storage failure")));
-		check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); // After the failure we generate a close-channel monitor update
-		check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
-		check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() });
+			), false, APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress, {});
+		check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 
 		// Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
 		// and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
 		// an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
 		let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
-		let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().skip(1).next().unwrap().clone();
+		let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().next().unwrap().clone();
 		assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
 		if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
 		} else { panic!(); }
@@ -4297,7 +4587,7 @@ mod tests {
 
 		let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
 		assert!(
-			pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
+			pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &&chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
 			.is_err());
 		// Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
 		// transaction
@@ -4330,7 +4620,7 @@ mod tests {
 		{
 			for i in 0..20 {
 				let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
-				let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
+				let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
 				preimages.push((preimage, hash));
 			}
 		}
@@ -4406,18 +4696,18 @@ mod tests {
 		let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
 		let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(Network::Testnet);
 		let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
-			Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &Script::new(),
-			(OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
-			&channel_parameters, Script::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()),
+			Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &ScriptBuf::new(),
+			(OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, ScriptBuf::new()),
+			&channel_parameters, ScriptBuf::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()),
 			best_block, dummy_key);
 
 		let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]);
 		let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
 		monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
 			htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
-		monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"1").into_inner()),
+		monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"1").to_byte_array()),
 			preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
-		monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"2").into_inner()),
+		monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"2").to_byte_array()),
 			preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
 		for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
 			let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
@@ -4426,23 +4716,23 @@ mod tests {
 
 		// Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
 		let mut secret = [0; 32];
-		secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
+		secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 		monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
 		assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
 		test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
 		test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
 
-		monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"3").into_inner()),
+		monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"3").to_byte_array()),
 			preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
 
 		// Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
-		secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
+		secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 		monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
 		assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
 		test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
 		test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
 
-		monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"4").into_inner()),
+		monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"4").to_byte_array()),
 			preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
 
 		// Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
@@ -4451,7 +4741,7 @@ mod tests {
 		let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
 		monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
 			htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
-		secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
+		secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 		monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
 		assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
 		test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
@@ -4462,7 +4752,7 @@ mod tests {
 		let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
 		monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx,
 			htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
-		secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
+		secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 		monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
 		assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
 		test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
@@ -4474,7 +4764,7 @@ mod tests {
 		// not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
 
 		let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
-		let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+		let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
 		let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
 
 		macro_rules! sign_input {
@@ -4491,7 +4781,7 @@ mod tests {
 				let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
 				let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
 				ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
-				$sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len();
+				$sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len() as u64;
 				let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
 				witness.push(ser_sig);
 				if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
@@ -4512,11 +4802,11 @@ mod tests {
 		}
 
 		let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
-		let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
+		let txid = Txid::from_str("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
 
 		// Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
 		for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
-			let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+			let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
 			let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
 			for i in 0..4 {
 				claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
@@ -4524,7 +4814,7 @@ mod tests {
 						txid,
 						vout: i,
 					},
-					script_sig: Script::new(),
+					script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
 					sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
 					witness: Witness::new(),
 				});
@@ -4533,7 +4823,7 @@ mod tests {
 				script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
 				value: 0,
 			});
-			let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
+			let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
 			let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
 			let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
 			{
@@ -4543,12 +4833,12 @@ mod tests {
 					inputs_total_weight += inp;
 				}
 			}
-			assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize,  claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+			assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
 		}
 
 		// Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
 		for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
-			let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+			let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
 			let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
 			for i in 0..4 {
 				claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
@@ -4556,7 +4846,7 @@ mod tests {
 						txid,
 						vout: i,
 					},
-					script_sig: Script::new(),
+					script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
 					sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
 					witness: Witness::new(),
 				});
@@ -4565,7 +4855,7 @@ mod tests {
 				script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
 				value: 0,
 			});
-			let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
+			let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
 			let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
 			let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
 			{
@@ -4575,19 +4865,19 @@ mod tests {
 					inputs_total_weight += inp;
 				}
 			}
-			assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize,  claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+			assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
 		}
 
 		// Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
 		for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
-			let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+			let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
 			let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
 			claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
 				previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
 					txid,
 					vout: 0,
 				},
-				script_sig: Script::new(),
+				script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
 				sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
 				witness: Witness::new(),
 			});
@@ -4595,7 +4885,7 @@ mod tests {
 				script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
 				value: 0,
 			});
-			let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
+			let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
 			let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
 			let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
 			{
@@ -4605,7 +4895,7 @@ mod tests {
 					inputs_total_weight += inp;
 				}
 			}
-			assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+			assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
 		}
 	}