X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fchain%2Fchannelmonitor.rs;h=da30f86149b7b918065de56dfa821267c563f721;hb=62236c70d863bf9456e28a3a1ba784b2e4680a88;hp=ed84750590a1c95ac220ce9408c40135b5aca0ec;hpb=a795e45b429ba2ef6a1a335b60804025b05c1245;p=rust-lightning

diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
index ed847505..da30f861 100644
--- a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
@@ -793,7 +793,10 @@ pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
 	// of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
 	funding_spend_seen: bool,
 
+	/// Set to `Some` of the confirmed transaction spending the funding input of the channel after
+	/// reaching `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` confirmations.
 	funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
+
 	confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
 	/// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
 	/// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
@@ -1630,7 +1633,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 	/// confirmations on the claim transaction.
 	///
 	/// Note that for `ChannelMonitors` which track a channel which went on-chain with versions of
-	/// LDK prior to 0.0.108, balances may not be fully captured if our counterparty broadcasted
+	/// LDK prior to 0.0.111, balances may not be fully captured if our counterparty broadcasted
 	/// a revoked state.
 	///
 	/// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
@@ -3068,6 +3071,16 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 	}
 
 	fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
+		// There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one confirmed (even
+		// with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as duplicate/conflicting.
+		if self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
+			self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
+				OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
+				_ => false,
+			}).is_some()
+		{
+			return false;
+		}
 		// We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
 		//  * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
 		//    transactions and we'd end up in a race, or