X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fchain%2Fchannelmonitor.rs;h=da30f86149b7b918065de56dfa821267c563f721;hb=62236c70d863bf9456e28a3a1ba784b2e4680a88;hp=fb2cbaddf533a9aa56cbc8586ba7f68f997345f7;hpb=5e86bbf97030c69b0118d1bef39554febfb1cbef;p=rust-lightning

diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
index fb2cbadd..da30f861 100644
--- a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
@@ -20,8 +20,9 @@
 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
 
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
 
@@ -29,8 +30,8 @@ use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
 
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
 
 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
@@ -40,7 +41,7 @@ use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC
 use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
 use chain;
 use chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
-use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
+use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
 use chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
@@ -54,11 +55,17 @@ use util::events::Event;
 use prelude::*;
 use core::{cmp, mem};
 use io::{self, Error};
+use core::convert::TryInto;
 use core::ops::Deref;
 use sync::Mutex;
 
-/// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
-/// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
+/// An update generated by the underlying channel itself which contains some new information the
+/// [`ChannelMonitor`] should be made aware of.
+///
+/// Because this represents only a small number of updates to the underlying state, it is generally
+/// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction
+/// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment
+/// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size.
 #[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
 #[derive(Clone)]
 #[must_use]
@@ -166,11 +173,11 @@ pub struct HTLCUpdate {
 	pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 	pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
 	pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
-	pub(crate) onchain_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
+	pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
 }
 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
 	(0, payment_hash, required),
-	(1, onchain_value_satoshis, option),
+	(1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
 	(2, source, required),
 	(4, payment_preimage, option),
 });
@@ -315,6 +322,7 @@ struct OnchainEventEntry {
 	txid: Txid,
 	height: u32,
 	event: OnchainEvent,
+	transaction: Option<Transaction>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in LDK 0.0.110
 }
 
 impl OnchainEventEntry {
@@ -344,6 +352,11 @@ impl OnchainEventEntry {
 	}
 }
 
+/// The (output index, sats value) for the counterparty's output in a commitment transaction.
+///
+/// This was added as an `Option` in 0.0.110.
+type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, u64)>;
+
 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
 #[derive(PartialEq)]
@@ -357,11 +370,13 @@ enum OnchainEvent {
 	HTLCUpdate {
 		source: HTLCSource,
 		payment_hash: PaymentHash,
-		onchain_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
+		htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
 		/// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
 		/// transaction which appeared on chain.
-		input_idx: Option<u32>,
+		commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
 	},
+	/// An output waiting on [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations before we hand the user the
+	/// [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`].
 	MaturingOutput {
 		descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
 	},
@@ -371,6 +386,12 @@ enum OnchainEvent {
 		/// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
 		/// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
 		on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
+		/// If the funding spend transaction was a known remote commitment transaction, we track
+		/// the output index and amount of the counterparty's `to_self` output here.
+		///
+		/// This allows us to generate a [`Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`] for the
+		/// counterparty output.
+		commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
 	},
 	/// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
 	/// is constructed. This is used when
@@ -380,8 +401,11 @@ enum OnchainEvent {
 	///  * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
 	///  * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
 	///    signature.
+	///  * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by an
+	///    HTLC-Success/HTLC-Failure transaction (and is still claimable with a revocation
+	///    signature).
 	HTLCSpendConfirmation {
-		input_idx: u32,
+		commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
 		/// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
 		preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
 		/// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
@@ -395,6 +419,7 @@ impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
 	fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
 		write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
 			(0, self.txid, required),
+			(1, self.transaction, option),
 			(2, self.height, required),
 			(4, self.event, required),
 		});
@@ -404,16 +429,18 @@ impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
 
 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
 	fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
-		let mut txid = Default::default();
+		let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
+		let mut transaction = None;
 		let mut height = 0;
 		let mut event = None;
 		read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
 			(0, txid, required),
+			(1, transaction, option),
 			(2, height, required),
 			(4, event, ignorable),
 		});
 		if let Some(ev) = event {
-			Ok(Some(Self { txid, height, event: ev }))
+			Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, event: ev }))
 		} else {
 			Ok(None)
 		}
@@ -423,18 +450,19 @@ impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
 	(0, HTLCUpdate) => {
 		(0, source, required),
-		(1, onchain_value_satoshis, option),
+		(1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
 		(2, payment_hash, required),
-		(3, input_idx, option),
+		(3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
 	},
 	(1, MaturingOutput) => {
 		(0, descriptor, required),
 	},
 	(3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
 		(0, on_local_output_csv, option),
+		(1, commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, option),
 	},
 	(5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
-		(0, input_idx, required),
+		(0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
 		(2, preimage, option),
 		(4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
 	},
@@ -452,7 +480,7 @@ pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
 		commitment_txid: Txid,
 		htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
 		commitment_number: u64,
-		their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
+		their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
 	},
 	PaymentPreimage {
 		payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
@@ -494,7 +522,7 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
 	(1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
 		(0, commitment_txid, required),
 		(2, commitment_number, required),
-		(4, their_revocation_point, required),
+		(4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
 		(6, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
 	},
 	(2, PaymentPreimage) => {
@@ -555,28 +583,84 @@ pub enum Balance {
 	/// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
 	/// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
 	/// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
-	MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
-		/// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
-		/// required to do so.
+	MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+		/// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
+		/// which will be required to do so.
 		claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
 		/// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
 		/// done so.
 		claimable_height: u32,
 	},
+	/// HTLCs which we received from our counterparty which are claimable with a preimage which we
+	/// do not currently have. This will only be claimable if we receive the preimage from the node
+	/// to which we forwarded this HTLC before the timeout.
+	MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+		/// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
+		/// which will be required to do so.
+		claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
+		/// The height at which our counterparty will be able to claim the balance if we have not
+		/// yet received the preimage and claimed it ourselves.
+		expiry_height: u32,
+	},
+	/// The channel has been closed, and our counterparty broadcasted a revoked commitment
+	/// transaction.
+	///
+	/// Thus, we're able to claim all outputs in the commitment transaction, one of which has the
+	/// following amount.
+	CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+		/// The amount, in satoshis, of the output which we can claim.
+		///
+		/// Note that for outputs from HTLC balances this may be excluding some on-chain fees that
+		/// were already spent.
+		claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
+	},
 }
 
 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
 #[derive(PartialEq)]
 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
-	input_idx: u32,
+	commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
+	/// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
+	/// was not present in the confirmed commitment transaction), HTLC-Success, or HTLC-Timeout
+	/// transaction.
+	resolving_txid: Option<Txid>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in 0.0.110
 	/// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
 	payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
 }
 
-impl_writeable_tlv_based!(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC, {
-	(0, input_idx, required),
-	(2, payment_preimage, option),
-});
+// In LDK versions prior to 0.0.111 commitment_tx_output_idx was not Option-al and
+// IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC objects only existed for non-dust HTLCs. This was a bug, but to maintain
+// backwards compatibility we must ensure we always write out a commitment_tx_output_idx field,
+// using `u32::max_value()` as a sentinal to indicate the HTLC was dust.
+impl Writeable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
+	fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+		let mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = self.commitment_tx_output_idx.unwrap_or(u32::max_value());
+		write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
+			(0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
+			(1, self.resolving_txid, option),
+			(2, self.payment_preimage, option),
+		});
+		Ok(())
+	}
+}
+
+impl Readable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
+	fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+		let mut mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = 0;
+		let mut resolving_txid = None;
+		let mut payment_preimage = None;
+		read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+			(0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
+			(1, resolving_txid, option),
+			(2, payment_preimage, option),
+		});
+		Ok(Self {
+			commitment_tx_output_idx: if mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx == u32::max_value() { None } else { Some(mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx) },
+			resolving_txid,
+			payment_preimage,
+		})
+	}
+}
 
 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
@@ -619,8 +703,8 @@ pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
 	counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
 	funding_redeemscript: Script,
 	channel_value_satoshis: u64,
-	// first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
-	their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
+	// first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
+	their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
 
 	on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
 
@@ -655,6 +739,10 @@ pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
 	// deserialization
 	current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
 
+	/// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
+	/// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
+	/// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
+	/// revoked.
 	payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
 
 	// Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
@@ -705,7 +793,11 @@ pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
 	// of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
 	funding_spend_seen: bool,
 
+	/// Set to `Some` of the confirmed transaction spending the funding input of the channel after
+	/// reaching `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` confirmations.
 	funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
+
+	confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
 	/// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
 	/// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
 	/// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
@@ -718,6 +810,9 @@ pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
 	// the full block_connected).
 	best_block: BestBlock,
 
+	/// The node_id of our counterparty
+	counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
+
 	secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
 }
 
@@ -753,7 +848,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			self.counterparty_commitment_params != other.counterparty_commitment_params ||
 			self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
 			self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
-			self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
+			self.their_cur_per_commitment_points != other.their_cur_per_commitment_points ||
 			self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
 			self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
 			self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
@@ -772,6 +867,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed ||
 			self.funding_spend_seen != other.funding_spend_seen ||
 			self.funding_spend_confirmed != other.funding_spend_confirmed ||
+			self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output != other.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output ||
 			self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain != other.htlcs_resolved_on_chain
 		{
 			false
@@ -828,7 +924,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
 		self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
 
-		match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
+		match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
 			Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
 				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
 				writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
@@ -865,6 +961,9 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
 			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
 			for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
+				debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
+						|| Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
+					"HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
 				serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
 				htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
 			}
@@ -947,6 +1046,8 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			(3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
 			(5, self.pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
 			(7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
+			(9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
+			(11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
 		});
 
 		Ok(())
@@ -954,13 +1055,20 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 }
 
 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
+	/// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
+	/// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
+	/// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
+	fn from_impl(imp: ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>) -> Self {
+		ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
+	}
+
 	pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
 	                  on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
 	                  channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
 	                  funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 	                  commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
 	                  initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
-	                  best_block: BestBlock) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
+	                  best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 
 		assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
 		let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
@@ -1001,59 +1109,59 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 		let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
 		outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
 
-		ChannelMonitor {
-			inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
-				latest_update_id: 0,
-				commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
+		Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
+			latest_update_id: 0,
+			commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
 
-				destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
-				broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
-				counterparty_payment_script,
-				shutdown_script,
+			destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
+			broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
+			counterparty_payment_script,
+			shutdown_script,
 
-				channel_keys_id,
-				holder_revocation_basepoint,
-				funding_info,
-				current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
-				prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
+			channel_keys_id,
+			holder_revocation_basepoint,
+			funding_info,
+			current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
+			prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
 
-				counterparty_commitment_params,
-				funding_redeemscript,
-				channel_value_satoshis,
-				their_cur_revocation_points: None,
+			counterparty_commitment_params,
+			funding_redeemscript,
+			channel_value_satoshis,
+			their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
 
-				on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
+			on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
 
-				commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
-				counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
-				counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
-				counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
+			commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
+			counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
+			counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
+			counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
 
-				prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
-				current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
-				current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
-				current_holder_commitment_number,
+			prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
+			current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
+			current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
+			current_holder_commitment_number,
 
-				payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
-				pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
-				pending_events: Vec::new(),
+			payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
+			pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
+			pending_events: Vec::new(),
 
-				onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
-				outputs_to_watch,
+			onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
+			outputs_to_watch,
 
-				onchain_tx_handler,
+			onchain_tx_handler,
 
-				lockdown_from_offchain: false,
-				holder_tx_signed: false,
-				funding_spend_seen: false,
-				funding_spend_confirmed: None,
-				htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
+			lockdown_from_offchain: false,
+			holder_tx_signed: false,
+			funding_spend_seen: false,
+			funding_spend_confirmed: None,
+			confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: None,
+			htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
 
-				best_block,
+			best_block,
+			counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
 
-				secp_ctx,
-			}),
-		}
+			secp_ctx,
+		})
 	}
 
 	#[cfg(test)]
@@ -1070,11 +1178,11 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 		txid: Txid,
 		htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
 		commitment_number: u64,
-		their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
+		their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
 		logger: &L,
 	) where L::Target: Logger {
 		self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
-			txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger)
+			txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, logger)
 	}
 
 	#[cfg(test)]
@@ -1085,13 +1193,14 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 		self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs).map_err(|_| ())
 	}
 
-	#[cfg(test)]
+	/// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
+	/// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
 	pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
 		&self,
 		payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
 		payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
 		broadcaster: &B,
-		fee_estimator: &F,
+		fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
 		logger: &L,
 	) where
 		B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
@@ -1121,7 +1230,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 		&self,
 		updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
 		broadcaster: &B,
-		fee_estimator: &F,
+		fee_estimator: F,
 		logger: &L,
 	) -> Result<(), ()>
 	where
@@ -1196,6 +1305,14 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 		self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
 	}
 
+	/// Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
+	///
+	/// Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
+	/// otherwise.
+	pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
+		self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
+	}
+
 	/// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
 	/// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
 	/// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
@@ -1287,8 +1404,9 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 		F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 		L::Target: Logger,
 	{
+		let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
 		self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
-			header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
+			header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
 	}
 
 	/// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
@@ -1308,8 +1426,9 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 		F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 		L::Target: Logger,
 	{
+		let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
 		self.inner.lock().unwrap().transaction_unconfirmed(
-			txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
+			txid, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
 	}
 
 	/// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
@@ -1332,8 +1451,9 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 		F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 		L::Target: Logger,
 	{
+		let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
 		self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block_updated(
-			header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
+			header, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
 	}
 
 	/// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
@@ -1354,7 +1474,155 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 	pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
 		self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
 	}
+}
 
+impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
+	/// Helper for get_claimable_balances which does the work for an individual HTLC, generating up
+	/// to one `Balance` for the HTLC.
+	fn get_htlc_balance(&self, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, holder_commitment: bool,
+		counterparty_revoked_commitment: bool, confirmed_txid: Option<Txid>)
+	-> Option<Balance> {
+		let htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx =
+			if let Some(v) = htlc.transaction_output_index { v } else { return None; };
+
+		let mut htlc_spend_txid_opt = None;
+		let mut holder_timeout_spend_pending = None;
+		let mut htlc_spend_pending = None;
+		let mut holder_delayed_output_pending = None;
+		for event in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
+			match event.event {
+				OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx, htlc_value_satoshis, .. }
+				if commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) => {
+					debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
+					htlc_spend_txid_opt = event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.txid());
+					debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
+					debug_assert_eq!(htlc_value_satoshis.unwrap(), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
+					holder_timeout_spend_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
+				},
+				OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. }
+				if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
+					debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
+					htlc_spend_txid_opt = event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.txid());
+					debug_assert!(htlc_spend_pending.is_none());
+					htlc_spend_pending = Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()));
+				},
+				OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
+					descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor) }
+				if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
+					debug_assert!(holder_delayed_output_pending.is_none());
+					holder_delayed_output_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
+				},
+				_ => {},
+			}
+		}
+		let htlc_resolved = self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter()
+			.find(|v| if v.commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
+				debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
+				htlc_spend_txid_opt = v.resolving_txid;
+				true
+			} else { false });
+		debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_resolved.is_some() as u8 <= 1);
+
+		let htlc_output_to_spend =
+			if let Some(txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
+				debug_assert!(
+					self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_none(),
+					"This code needs updating for anchors");
+				BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, 0)
+			} else {
+				BitcoinOutPoint::new(confirmed_txid.unwrap(), htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx)
+			};
+		let htlc_output_spend_pending = self.onchain_tx_handler.is_output_spend_pending(&htlc_output_to_spend);
+
+		if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_delayed_output_pending {
+			debug_assert!(holder_commitment);
+			return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+				claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+				confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+			});
+		} else if htlc_resolved.is_some() && !htlc_output_spend_pending {
+			// Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
+			// HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
+			// commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
+			// reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
+			// ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
+			debug_assert!(holder_commitment || self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
+		} else if counterparty_revoked_commitment {
+			let htlc_output_claim_pending = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
+				if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
+					descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { .. }
+				} = &event.event {
+					if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| {
+						if let Some(htlc_spend_txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
+							Some(tx.txid()) == htlc_spend_txid_opt ||
+								inp.previous_output.txid == htlc_spend_txid
+						} else {
+							Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
+								inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx
+						}
+					})).unwrap_or(false) {
+						Some(())
+					} else { None }
+				} else { None }
+			});
+			if htlc_output_claim_pending.is_some() {
+				// We already push `Balance`s onto the `res` list for every
+				// `StaticOutput` in a `MaturingOutput` in the revoked
+				// counterparty commitment transaction case generally, so don't
+				// need to do so again here.
+			} else {
+				debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none(),
+					"HTLCUpdate OnchainEvents should never appear for preimage claims");
+				debug_assert!(!htlc.offered || htlc_spend_pending.is_none() || !htlc_spend_pending.unwrap().1,
+					"We don't (currently) generate preimage claims against revoked outputs, where did you get one?!");
+				return Some(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+					claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+				});
+			}
+		} else if htlc.offered == holder_commitment {
+			// If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
+			// indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
+			// and awaiting confirmations on it.
+			if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_timeout_spend_pending {
+				return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+					claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+					confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+				});
+			} else {
+				return Some(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
+					claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+					claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
+				});
+			}
+		} else if self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
+			// Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
+			// we know the preimage.
+			// Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
+			// preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
+			// to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
+			debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
+			if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
+				return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+					claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+					confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+				});
+			} else {
+				return Some(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+					claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+					timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
+				});
+			}
+		} else if htlc_resolved.is_none() {
+			return Some(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+				claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+				expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
+			});
+		}
+		None
+	}
+}
+
+impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 	/// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
 	/// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
 	/// confirmation).
@@ -1364,9 +1632,9 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 	/// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
 	/// confirmations on the claim transaction.
 	///
-	/// Note that the balances available when you or your counterparty have broadcasted revoked
-	/// state(s) may not be fully captured here.
-	// TODO, fix that ^
+	/// Note that for `ChannelMonitors` which track a channel which went on-chain with versions of
+	/// LDK prior to 0.0.111, balances may not be fully captured if our counterparty broadcasted
+	/// a revoked state.
 	///
 	/// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
 	/// may be returned here and their meanings.
@@ -1375,9 +1643,13 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 		let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
 
 		let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
+		let mut confirmed_counterparty_output = us.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output;
 		let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
 		let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
-			if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
+			if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } =
+				event.event
+			{
+				confirmed_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
 				Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
 			} else { None }
 		});
@@ -1389,70 +1661,12 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 		}
 
 		macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
-			($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
+			($holder_commitment: expr, $counterparty_revoked_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
 				for htlc in $htlc_iter {
-					if let Some(htlc_input_idx) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
-						if let Some(conf_thresh) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
-							if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) } = &event.event {
-								if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_input_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
-							} else { None }
-						}) {
-							debug_assert!($holder_commitment);
-							res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
-								claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
-								confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
-							});
-						} else if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.input_idx == htlc_input_idx) {
-							// Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
-							// HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
-							// commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
-							// reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
-							// ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
-							debug_assert!($holder_commitment || us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
-						} else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
-							// If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
-							// indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
-							// and awaiting confirmations on it.
-							let htlc_update_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
-								if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { input_idx: Some(input_idx), .. } = event.event {
-									if input_idx == htlc_input_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
-								} else { None }
-							});
-							if let Some(conf_thresh) = htlc_update_pending {
-								res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
-									claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
-									confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
-								});
-							} else {
-								res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
-									claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
-									claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
-								});
-							}
-						} else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
-							// Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
-							// we know the preimage.
-							// Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
-							// preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
-							// to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
-							let htlc_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
-								if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, preimage, .. } = event.event {
-									if input_idx == htlc_input_idx {
-										Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()))
-									} else { None }
-								} else { None }
-							});
-							if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
-								res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
-									claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
-									confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
-								});
-							} else {
-								res.push(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
-									claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
-									timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
-								});
-							}
+					if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
+
+						if let Some(bal) = us.get_htlc_balance(htlc, $holder_commitment, $counterparty_revoked_commitment, confirmed_txid) {
+							res.push(bal);
 						}
 					}
 				}
@@ -1461,8 +1675,8 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 
 		if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
 			let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
-			if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
-				walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
+			if let Some(counterparty_tx_htlcs) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
+				// First look for the to_remote output back to us.
 				if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
 					if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
 						if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
@@ -1481,9 +1695,50 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 						// confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
 					}
 				}
+				if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
+					walk_htlcs!(false, false, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
+				} else {
+					walk_htlcs!(false, true, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
+					// The counterparty broadcasted a revoked state!
+					// Look for any StaticOutputs first, generating claimable balances for those.
+					// If any match the confirmed counterparty revoked to_self output, skip
+					// generating a CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable.
+					let mut spent_counterparty_output = false;
+					for event in us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
+						if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
+							descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { output, .. }
+						} = &event.event {
+							res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+								claimable_amount_satoshis: output.value,
+								confirmation_height: event.confirmation_threshold(),
+							});
+							if let Some(confirmed_to_self_idx) = confirmed_counterparty_output.map(|(idx, _)| idx) {
+								if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx|
+									tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.vout == confirmed_to_self_idx)
+								).unwrap_or(false) {
+									spent_counterparty_output = true;
+								}
+							}
+						}
+					}
+
+					if spent_counterparty_output {
+					} else if let Some((confirmed_to_self_idx, amt)) = confirmed_counterparty_output {
+						let output_spendable = us.onchain_tx_handler
+							.is_output_spend_pending(&BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, confirmed_to_self_idx));
+						if output_spendable {
+							res.push(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
+								claimable_amount_satoshis: amt,
+							});
+						}
+					} else {
+						// Counterparty output is missing, either it was broadcasted on a
+						// previous version of LDK or the counterparty hadn't met dust.
+					}
+				}
 				found_commitment_tx = true;
 			} else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
-				walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
+				walk_htlcs!(true, false, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
 				if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
 					res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 						claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
@@ -1493,7 +1748,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 				found_commitment_tx = true;
 			} else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
 				if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
-					walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
+					walk_htlcs!(true, false, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
 					if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
 						res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 							claimable_amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
@@ -1514,19 +1769,24 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 					});
 				}
 			}
-			// TODO: Add logic to provide claimable balances for counterparty broadcasting revoked
-			// outputs.
 		} else {
 			let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
 			for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 				if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
 				if htlc.offered {
-					res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+					res.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 						claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
 						claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
 					});
 				} else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
 					claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
+				} else {
+					// As long as the HTLC is still in our latest commitment state, treat
+					// it as potentially claimable, even if it has long-since expired.
+					res.push(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
+						claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+						expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
+					});
 				}
 			}
 			res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
@@ -1546,7 +1806,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 		macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
 			($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
 				for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
-					if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| Some(v.input_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
+					if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
 						// We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
 						// have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
 						// would fail.
@@ -1557,17 +1817,17 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 						// indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
 						// and awaiting confirmations on it.
 						let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
-							if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { input_idx: Some(input_idx), .. } = event.event {
+							if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
 								// If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
 								// before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
 								// provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
-								Some(input_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
+								Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
 									us.best_block.height() >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
-							} else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, .. } = event.event {
+							} else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
 								// If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
 								// immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
 								// the preimage.
-								Some(input_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
+								Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
 							} else { false }
 						});
 						if !htlc_update_confd {
@@ -1631,6 +1891,10 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 
 		res
 	}
+
+	pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
+		self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
+	}
 }
 
 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
@@ -1649,7 +1913,10 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
-	($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
+	($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr, $commitment_tx_confirmed: expr,
+	 $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
+		debug_assert_eq!($commitment_tx_confirmed.txid(), $commitment_txid_confirmed);
+
 		macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
 			($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
 				if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
@@ -1665,9 +1932,14 @@ macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
 							// cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
 							// need to here.
 							let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
+
 							let mut matched_htlc = false;
 							for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
-								if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source {
+								if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
+									(Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
+									 (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
+									  broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
+									  broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
 									matched_htlc = true;
 									break;
 								}
@@ -1683,17 +1955,19 @@ macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
 								}
 							});
 							let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
-								txid: *$txid,
+								txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
+								transaction: Some($commitment_tx_confirmed.clone()),
 								height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
 								event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
 									source: (**source).clone(),
 									payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
-									onchain_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
-									input_idx: None,
+									htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
+									commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
 								},
 							};
-							log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
-								log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type, entry.confirmation_threshold());
+							log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
+								log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
+								$commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
 							$self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
 						}
 					}
@@ -1709,6 +1983,26 @@ macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
 	} }
 }
 
+// In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
+// witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
+// in-line tests later.
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
+	let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
+	ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
+	ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
+	ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
+	ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
+	ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.to_u8();
+	Vec::from(&ret[..])
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
+	vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
+}
+
 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 	/// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
 	/// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
@@ -1761,7 +2055,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		Ok(())
 	}
 
-	pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
+	pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
 		// TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
 		// so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
 		// (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
@@ -1776,22 +2070,22 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
 		self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
 		//TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
-		match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
+		match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
 			Some(old_points) => {
 				if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
-					self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
+					self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
 				} else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
 					if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
-						self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
+						self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
 					} else {
-						self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+						self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
 					}
 				} else {
-					self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+					self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
 				}
 			},
 			None => {
-				self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
+				self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
 			}
 		}
 		let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
@@ -1837,7 +2131,9 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 
 	/// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
 	/// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
-	fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L)
+	fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
+		&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B,
+		fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
 	where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
 		    F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 		    L::Target: Logger,
@@ -1848,7 +2144,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		// First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
 		macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
 			($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
-				let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs($commitment_number, $txid, None);
+				let (htlc_claim_reqs, _) = self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info($commitment_number, $txid, None);
 				self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
 			}
 		}
@@ -1894,10 +2190,10 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
 	}
 
-	pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
+	pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
 	where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
-		    F::Target: FeeEstimator,
-		    L::Target: Logger,
+		F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+		L::Target: Logger,
 	{
 		log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} changes.",
 			log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
@@ -1929,13 +2225,14 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 						ret = Err(());
 					}
 				}
-				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } => {
+				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point } => {
 					log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
-					self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_revocation_point, logger)
+					self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
 				},
 				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
 					log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
-					self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
+					let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
+					self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
 				},
 				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
 					log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
@@ -2026,13 +2323,18 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 	/// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
 	/// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
 	/// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
-	/// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
-	/// revoked counterparty commitment tx
-	fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs) where L::Target: Logger {
+	///
+	/// Returns packages to claim the revoked output(s), as well as additional outputs to watch and
+	/// general information about the output that is to the counterparty in the commitment
+	/// transaction.
+	fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L)
+		-> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo)
+	where L::Target: Logger {
 		// Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
 		// a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
 		let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
 		let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
+		let mut to_counterparty_output_info = None;
 
 		let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
 		let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
@@ -2041,12 +2343,12 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			( $thing : expr ) => {
 				match $thing {
 					Ok(a) => a,
-					Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
+					Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
 				}
 			};
 		}
 
-		let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
+		let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.0 as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
 		if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
 			let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
 			let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
@@ -2063,6 +2365,8 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 					let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
 					let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
 					claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
+					to_counterparty_output_info =
+						Some((idx.try_into().expect("Txn can't have more than 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
 				}
 			}
 
@@ -2072,7 +2376,9 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 					if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
 						if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
 								tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
-							return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
+							// per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
+							return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs),
+								to_counterparty_output_info);
 						}
 						let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
 						let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, true, height);
@@ -2090,7 +2396,16 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 				}
 				self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
 
-				fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", height, [].iter().map(|a| *a), logger);
+				if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
+					fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
+						per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
+							(htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
+						), logger);
+				} else {
+					debug_assert!(false, "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
+					fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
+						[].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
+				}
 			}
 		} else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
 			// While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
@@ -2106,53 +2421,112 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
 
 			log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
-			fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", height, per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(a, b)| (a, b.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()))), logger);
-
-			let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
+			fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
+				per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
+					(htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
+				), logger);
+
+			let (htlc_claim_reqs, counterparty_output_info) =
+				self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
+			to_counterparty_output_info = counterparty_output_info;
 			for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
 				claimable_outpoints.push(req);
 			}
 
 		}
-		(claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
+		(claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
 	}
 
-	fn get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>) -> Vec<PackageTemplate> {
+	/// Returns the HTLC claim package templates and the counterparty output info
+	fn get_counterparty_output_claim_info(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>)
+	-> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo) {
 		let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
-		if let Some(htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
-			if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
-				let revocation_point_option =
-					// If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
-					// per-commitment point
-					if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
-					else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
-						// If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
-						// their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
-						// them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
-						if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
-					} else { None };
-				if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
-					for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
-						if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
-							if let Some(transaction) = tx {
-								if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
-									transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
-										return claimable_outpoints; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
-									}
-							}
-							let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
-							if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
-								let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone())) } else { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, htlc.clone())) };
-								let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
-								let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
-								claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
-							}
-						}
+		let mut to_counterparty_output_info: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = None;
+
+		let htlc_outputs = match self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
+			Some(outputs) => outputs,
+			None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
+		};
+		let per_commitment_points = match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
+			Some(points) => points,
+			None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
+		};
+
+		let per_commitment_point =
+			// If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
+			// per-commitment point
+			if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { &per_commitment_points.1 }
+			else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
+				// If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
+				// their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
+				// them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
+				if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
+					point
+				} else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); }
+			} else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); };
+
+		if let Some(transaction) = tx {
+			let revokeable_p2wsh_opt =
+				if let Ok(revocation_pubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(
+					&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint)
+				{
+					if let Ok(delayed_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx,
+						&per_commitment_point,
+						&self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key)
+					{
+						Some(chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
+							self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
+							&delayed_key).to_v0_p2wsh())
+					} else {
+						debug_assert!(false, "Failed to derive a delayed payment key for a commitment state we accepted");
+						None
+					}
+				} else {
+					debug_assert!(false, "Failed to derive a revocation pubkey key for a commitment state we accepted");
+					None
+				};
+			if let Some(revokeable_p2wsh) = revokeable_p2wsh_opt {
+				for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
+					if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
+						to_counterparty_output_info =
+							Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
 					}
 				}
 			}
 		}
-		claimable_outpoints
+
+		for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
+			if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+				if let Some(transaction) = tx {
+					if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
+						transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
+							// per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
+							return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
+						}
+				}
+				let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
+				if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
+					let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
+						PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
+							CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
+								self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+								self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+								preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone()))
+					} else {
+						PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
+							CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
+								self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+								self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+								htlc.clone()))
+					};
+					let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
+					let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
+					claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+		(claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info)
 	}
 
 	/// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
@@ -2250,7 +2624,9 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
 			let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
 			append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
-			fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", height, self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, c)| (a, c.as_ref())), logger);
+			fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
+				self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
+				.map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
 		} else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
 			if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
 				is_holder_tx = true;
@@ -2258,7 +2634,9 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 				let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
 				let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
 				append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
-				fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", height, holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, c)| (a, c.as_ref())), logger);
+				fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
+					holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
+					logger);
 			}
 		}
 
@@ -2333,7 +2711,8 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		let block_hash = header.block_hash();
 		self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
 
-		self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
+		let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
+		self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
 	}
 
 	fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
@@ -2341,7 +2720,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		header: &BlockHeader,
 		height: u32,
 		broadcaster: B,
-		fee_estimator: F,
+		fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
 		logger: L,
 	) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
 	where
@@ -2368,7 +2747,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		txdata: &TransactionData,
 		height: u32,
 		broadcaster: B,
-		fee_estimator: F,
+		fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
 		logger: L,
 	) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
 	where
@@ -2402,14 +2781,19 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 					log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
 						log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), tx.txid());
 					self.funding_spend_seen = true;
-					if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
-						let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
+					let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
+					if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
+						let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, counterparty_output_idx_sats) =
+							self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
+						commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = counterparty_output_idx_sats;
 						if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
 							watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
 						}
 						claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
 						if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
 							if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger) {
+								debug_assert!(commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output.is_none(),
+									"A commitment transaction matched as both a counterparty and local commitment tx?");
 								if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
 									watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
 								}
@@ -2421,9 +2805,11 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 					let txid = tx.txid();
 					self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
 						txid,
+						transaction: Some((*tx).clone()),
 						height: height,
 						event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
 							on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
+							commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
 						},
 					});
 				} else {
@@ -2465,7 +2851,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
 		mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
 		broadcaster: &B,
-		fee_estimator: &F,
+		fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
 		logger: &L,
 	) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
 	where
@@ -2522,7 +2908,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		// Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
 		for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
 			match entry.event {
-				OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, onchain_value_satoshis, input_idx } => {
+				OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
 					// Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
 					#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 					{
@@ -2539,16 +2925,18 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 						matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
 					}
 
-					log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+					log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
+						log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.txid);
 					self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
 						payment_hash,
 						payment_preimage: None,
 						source: source.clone(),
-						onchain_value_satoshis,
+						htlc_value_satoshis,
 					}));
-					if let Some(idx) = input_idx {
-						self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { input_idx: idx, payment_preimage: None });
-					}
+					self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
+						commitment_tx_output_idx, resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
+						payment_preimage: None,
+					});
 				},
 				OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
 					log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
@@ -2556,11 +2944,15 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 						outputs: vec![descriptor]
 					});
 				},
-				OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, preimage, .. } => {
-					self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { input_idx, payment_preimage: preimage });
+				OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
+					self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
+						commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
+						payment_preimage: preimage,
+					});
 				},
-				OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => {
+				OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } => {
 					self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
+					self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
 				},
 			}
 		}
@@ -2602,7 +2994,8 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		//- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
 		self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
 
-		self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
+		let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
+		self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
 
 		self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
 	}
@@ -2611,14 +3004,17 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		&mut self,
 		txid: &Txid,
 		broadcaster: B,
-		fee_estimator: F,
+		fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
 		logger: L,
 	) where
 		B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
 		F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 		L::Target: Logger,
 	{
-		self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.txid != *txid);
+		self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.txid == *txid {
+			log_info!(logger, "Removing onchain event with txid {}", txid);
+			false
+		} else { true });
 		self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
 	}
 
@@ -2649,14 +3045,21 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 					if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
 						#[cfg(test)]
 						{
-						        // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
-						        // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
-						        // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
-						        if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
-						                assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().clone()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
-						        } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
-						                assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
-						        } else { panic!(); }
+							// If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
+							// appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
+							// actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
+							if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
+								if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
+									// In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
+									// script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
+									// and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
+									return true;
+								}
+
+								assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
+							} else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
+								assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
+							} else { panic!(); }
 						}
 						return true;
 					}
@@ -2668,6 +3071,16 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 	}
 
 	fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
+		// There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one confirmed (even
+		// with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as duplicate/conflicting.
+		if self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
+			self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
+				OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
+				_ => false,
+			}).is_some()
+		{
+			return false;
+		}
 		// We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
 		//  * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
 		//    transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
@@ -2736,20 +3149,26 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 	fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
 		'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
 			let mut payment_data = None;
-			let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
-				|| (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
-			let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
+			let witness_items = input.witness.len();
+			let htlctype = input.witness.last().map(|w| w.len()).and_then(HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype);
+			let prev_last_witness_len = input.witness.second_to_last().map(|w| w.len()).unwrap_or(0);
+			let revocation_sig_claim = (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33)
+				|| (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33);
+			let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
+				&& input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
 			#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
-			let accepted_timeout_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
-			let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
+			let accepted_timeout_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
+			let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) &&
+				!revocation_sig_claim && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
+
 			#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
-			let offered_timeout_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
+			let offered_timeout_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
 
 			let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
 			if accepted_preimage_claim {
-				payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
+				payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
 			} else if offered_preimage_claim {
-				payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
+				payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
 			}
 
 			macro_rules! log_claim {
@@ -2772,7 +3191,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 						log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
 							$tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
 							if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
-							if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
+							if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back. We can likely claim the HTLC output with a revocation claim" });
 					} else {
 						log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
 							$tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
@@ -2819,29 +3238,20 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 							if payment_data.is_none() {
 								log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
 								let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
-								if !outbound_htlc || revocation_sig_claim {
-									self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
-										txid: tx.txid(), height,
-										event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
-											input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
-											preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
-												Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
-											// If this is a payment to us (!outbound_htlc, above),
-											// wait for the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from
-											// claimable balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success
-											// transaction.
-											on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim {
-												Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
-										},
-									});
-								} else {
-									// Outbound claims should always have payment_data, unless
-									// we've already failed the HTLC as the commitment transaction
-									// which was broadcasted was revoked. In that case, we should
-									// spend the HTLC output here immediately, and expose that fact
-									// as a Balance, something which we do not yet do.
-									// TODO: Track the above as claimable!
-								}
+								self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
+									txid: tx.txid(), height, transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
+									event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
+										commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
+										preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
+											Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
+										// If this is a payment to us (ie !outbound_htlc), wait for
+										// the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from claimable
+										// balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success transaction (ie
+										// accepted_preimage_claim).
+										on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim && !outbound_htlc {
+											Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
+									},
+								});
 								continue 'outer_loop;
 							}
 						}
@@ -2873,8 +3283,9 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 						self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
 							txid: tx.txid(),
 							height,
+							transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
 							event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
-								input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
+								commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
 								preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
 								on_to_local_output_csv: None,
 							},
@@ -2883,7 +3294,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 							source,
 							payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
 							payment_hash,
-							onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
+							htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
 						}));
 					}
 				} else if offered_preimage_claim {
@@ -2893,9 +3304,10 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 						} else { false }) {
 						self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
 							txid: tx.txid(),
+							transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
 							height,
 							event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
-								input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
+								commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
 								preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
 								on_to_local_output_csv: None,
 							},
@@ -2904,7 +3316,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 							source,
 							payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
 							payment_hash,
-							onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
+							htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
 						}));
 					}
 				} else {
@@ -2919,11 +3331,12 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 					});
 					let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
 						txid: tx.txid(),
+						transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
 						height,
 						event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
 							source, payment_hash,
-							onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
-							input_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
+							htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
+							commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
 						},
 					};
 					log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
@@ -2992,6 +3405,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
 			let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
 				txid: tx.txid(),
+				transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
 				height: height,
 				event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
 			};
@@ -3007,9 +3421,8 @@ where
 	F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 	L::Target: Logger,
 {
-	fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
-		let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
-		self.0.block_connected(&block.header, &txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
+	fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
+		self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
 	}
 
 	fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
@@ -3092,7 +3505,7 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
 		let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
 		let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
 
-		let their_cur_revocation_points = {
+		let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
 			let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
 			if first_idx == 0 {
 				None
@@ -3252,69 +3665,73 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
 		let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
 		let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
 		let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
+		let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
+		let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None;
 		read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
 			(1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
 			(3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
 			(5, pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
 			(7, funding_spend_seen, option),
+			(9, counterparty_node_id, option),
+			(11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
 		});
 
 		let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 		secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
 
-		Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor {
-			inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
-				latest_update_id,
-				commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
+		Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
+			latest_update_id,
+			commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
 
-				destination_script,
-				broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
-				counterparty_payment_script,
-				shutdown_script,
+			destination_script,
+			broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
+			counterparty_payment_script,
+			shutdown_script,
 
-				channel_keys_id,
-				holder_revocation_basepoint,
-				funding_info,
-				current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
-				prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
+			channel_keys_id,
+			holder_revocation_basepoint,
+			funding_info,
+			current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
+			prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
 
-				counterparty_commitment_params,
-				funding_redeemscript,
-				channel_value_satoshis,
-				their_cur_revocation_points,
+			counterparty_commitment_params,
+			funding_redeemscript,
+			channel_value_satoshis,
+			their_cur_per_commitment_points,
 
-				on_holder_tx_csv,
+			on_holder_tx_csv,
 
-				commitment_secrets,
-				counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
-				counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
-				counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
+			commitment_secrets,
+			counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
+			counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
+			counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
 
-				prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
-				current_holder_commitment_tx,
-				current_counterparty_commitment_number,
-				current_holder_commitment_number,
+			prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
+			current_holder_commitment_tx,
+			current_counterparty_commitment_number,
+			current_holder_commitment_number,
 
-				payment_preimages,
-				pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
-				pending_events,
+			payment_preimages,
+			pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
+			pending_events,
 
-				onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
-				outputs_to_watch,
+			onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
+			outputs_to_watch,
 
-				onchain_tx_handler,
+			onchain_tx_handler,
 
-				lockdown_from_offchain,
-				holder_tx_signed,
-				funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
-				funding_spend_confirmed,
-				htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
+			lockdown_from_offchain,
+			holder_tx_signed,
+			funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
+			funding_spend_confirmed,
+			confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output,
+			htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
 
-				best_block,
+			best_block,
+			counterparty_node_id,
 
-				secp_ctx,
-			}),
-		}))
+			secp_ctx,
+		})))
 	}
 }
 
@@ -3323,19 +3740,21 @@ mod tests {
 	use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
 	use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
 	use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-	use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
+	use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, EcdsaSighashType};
 	use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
-	use bitcoin::util::bip143;
+	use bitcoin::util::sighash;
 	use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
 	use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
 	use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
 	use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
 	use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
-	use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+	use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
 	use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
 
 	use hex;
 
+	use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
+
 	use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
 	use ::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
 	use chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
@@ -3356,6 +3775,7 @@ mod tests {
 	use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
 	use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
 	use io;
+	use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, TxMerkleNode, Witness};
 	use prelude::*;
 
 	fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
@@ -3399,7 +3819,7 @@ mod tests {
 		let new_header = BlockHeader {
 			version: 2, time: 0, bits: 0, nonce: 0,
 			prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_info().0,
-			merkle_root: Default::default() };
+			merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros() };
 		let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
 		nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
 			&[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
@@ -3431,7 +3851,7 @@ mod tests {
 
 		let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::new(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
 		assert!(
-			pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &&chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
+			pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
 			.is_err());
 		// Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
 		// transaction
@@ -3456,10 +3876,10 @@ mod tests {
 		let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 		let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
 		let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))});
-		let fee_estimator = Arc::new(TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) });
+		let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
 
 		let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
-		let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+		let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
 
 		let mut preimages = Vec::new();
 		{
@@ -3525,7 +3945,7 @@ mod tests {
 			delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap()),
 			htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())
 		};
-		let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Default::default(), index: u16::max_value() };
+		let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
 		let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
 			holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
 			holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
@@ -3546,7 +3966,7 @@ mod tests {
 		                                  (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
 		                                  &channel_parameters,
 		                                  Script::new(), 46, 0,
-		                                  HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block);
+		                                  HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block, dummy_key);
 
 		monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
 		let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
@@ -3555,7 +3975,8 @@ mod tests {
 		monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
 		monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
 		for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
-			monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger);
+			let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
+			monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
 		}
 
 		// Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
@@ -3609,24 +4030,27 @@ mod tests {
 					transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
 				};
 				let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
-				let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
-				let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
-				$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
-				$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
-				$sum_actual_sigs += $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len();
+				let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
+				let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
+				let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
+				ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
+				$sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len();
+				let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
+				witness.push(ser_sig);
 				if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
-					$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec!(1));
+					witness.push(vec!(1));
 				} else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
-					$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
+					witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
 				} else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
-					$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec![0]);
+					witness.push(vec![0]);
 				} else {
-					$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
+					witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
 				}
-				$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
-				println!("witness[0] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len());
-				println!("witness[1] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[1].len());
-				println!("witness[2] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[2].len());
+				witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
+				let witness = witness.to_vec();
+				println!("witness[0] {}", witness[0].len());
+				println!("witness[1] {}", witness[1].len());
+				println!("witness[2] {}", witness[2].len());
 			}
 		}
 
@@ -3635,7 +4059,7 @@ mod tests {
 
 		// Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
 		for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
-			let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+			let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
 			let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
 			for i in 0..4 {
 				claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
@@ -3644,30 +4068,30 @@ mod tests {
 						vout: i,
 					},
 					script_sig: Script::new(),
-					sequence: 0xfffffffd,
-					witness: Vec::new(),
+					sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
+					witness: Witness::new(),
 				});
 			}
 			claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
 				script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
 				value: 0,
 			});
-			let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
+			let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
 			let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
 			let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
 			{
-				let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
+				let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
 				for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
 					sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
 					inputs_total_weight += inp;
 				}
 			}
-			assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize,  claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+			assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize,  claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
 		}
 
 		// Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
 		for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
-			let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+			let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
 			let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
 			for i in 0..4 {
 				claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
@@ -3676,30 +4100,30 @@ mod tests {
 						vout: i,
 					},
 					script_sig: Script::new(),
-					sequence: 0xfffffffd,
-					witness: Vec::new(),
+					sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
+					witness: Witness::new(),
 				});
 			}
 			claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
 				script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
 				value: 0,
 			});
-			let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
+			let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
 			let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
 			let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
 			{
-				let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
+				let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
 				for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
 					sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
 					inputs_total_weight += inp;
 				}
 			}
-			assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize,  claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+			assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize,  claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
 		}
 
 		// Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
 		for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
-			let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
+			let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
 			let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
 			claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
 				previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
@@ -3707,24 +4131,24 @@ mod tests {
 					vout: 0,
 				},
 				script_sig: Script::new(),
-				sequence: 0xfffffffd,
-				witness: Vec::new(),
+				sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
+				witness: Witness::new(),
 			});
 			claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
 				script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
 				value: 0,
 			});
-			let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
+			let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
 			let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
 			let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
 			{
-				let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
+				let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
 				for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
 					sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
 					inputs_total_weight += inp;
 				}
 			}
-			assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+			assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
 		}
 	}