X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fchain%2Fchannelmonitor.rs;h=db17810599d66e4d472d96ec96af76f1ced407f3;hb=7eac8977467c06fb5746cb2ec0789ce1f37e02fa;hp=684824ee359686d97e8547a5cf625ac71d968546;hpb=d7027c2d5b6546f7709ccd033a35feac6de1c690;p=rust-lightning

diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
index 684824ee..db178105 100644
--- a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable,
 use crate::util::byte_utils;
 use crate::util::events::Event;
 #[cfg(anchors)]
-use crate::util::events::{AnchorDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent};
+use crate::util::events::{AnchorDescriptor, HTLCDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent};
 
 use crate::prelude::*;
 use core::{cmp, mem};
@@ -2325,6 +2325,17 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 					log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
 					self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
 					if *should_broadcast {
+						// There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one
+						// confirmed (even with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as
+						// duplicate/conflicting.
+						let detected_funding_spend = self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
+							self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
+								OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
+								_ => false,
+							}).is_some();
+						if detected_funding_spend {
+							continue;
+						}
 						self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
 						// If the channel supports anchor outputs, we'll need to emit an external
 						// event to be consumed such that a child transaction is broadcast with a
@@ -2425,6 +2436,27 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 						pending_htlcs,
 					}));
 				},
+				ClaimEvent::BumpHTLC {
+					target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, htlcs,
+				} => {
+					let mut htlc_descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs.len());
+					for htlc in htlcs {
+						htlc_descriptors.push(HTLCDescriptor {
+							channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
+							channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
+							channel_parameters: self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
+							commitment_txid: htlc.commitment_txid,
+							per_commitment_number: htlc.per_commitment_number,
+							htlc: htlc.htlc,
+							preimage: htlc.preimage,
+							counterparty_sig: htlc.counterparty_sig,
+						});
+					}
+					ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution {
+						target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
+						htlc_descriptors,
+					}));
+				}
 			}
 		}
 		ret
@@ -3011,10 +3043,10 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 						if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
 							watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
 						}
-						// Since there may be multiple HTLCs (all from the same commitment) being
-						// claimed by the counterparty within the same transaction, and
-						// `check_spend_counterparty_htlc` already checks for all of them, we can
-						// safely break from our loop.
+						// Since there may be multiple HTLCs for this channel (all spending the
+						// same commitment tx) being claimed by the counterparty within the same
+						// transaction, and `check_spend_counterparty_htlc` already checks all the
+						// ones relevant to this channel, we can safely break from our loop.
 						break;
 					}
 				}