X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fchain%2Fchannelmonitor.rs;h=db17810599d66e4d472d96ec96af76f1ced407f3;hb=dc39799c60317d024733f4d3042c40448a4d39d7;hp=5c1e102aefc8e2cc44350acc052f99ffdab5e224;hpb=8170c84d9d393a4884599e80e9a9ea95016fce8e;p=rust-lightning

diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
index 5c1e102a..db178105 100644
--- a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
@@ -2325,6 +2325,17 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 					log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
 					self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
 					if *should_broadcast {
+						// There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one
+						// confirmed (even with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as
+						// duplicate/conflicting.
+						let detected_funding_spend = self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
+							self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
+								OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
+								_ => false,
+							}).is_some();
+						if detected_funding_spend {
+							continue;
+						}
 						self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
 						// If the channel supports anchor outputs, we'll need to emit an external
 						// event to be consumed such that a child transaction is broadcast with a
@@ -3032,10 +3043,10 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 						if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
 							watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
 						}
-						// Since there may be multiple HTLCs (all from the same commitment) being
-						// claimed by the counterparty within the same transaction, and
-						// `check_spend_counterparty_htlc` already checks for all of them, we can
-						// safely break from our loop.
+						// Since there may be multiple HTLCs for this channel (all spending the
+						// same commitment tx) being claimed by the counterparty within the same
+						// transaction, and `check_spend_counterparty_htlc` already checks all the
+						// ones relevant to this channel, we can safely break from our loop.
 						break;
 					}
 				}