X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fchain%2Fchannelmonitor.rs;h=dc009c4d52cf3e5ef228e505abda9bf3b25d5ea2;hb=4c4d99b291c5336130d3d5cfeffa8ab88fd97783;hp=a7af1a01ec4295b659a8d4395e2922cb8ab29abe;hpb=8ee7d841b6a2a7464d11c5f811e4746d149252b0;p=rust-lightning

diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
index a7af1a01..dc009c4d 100644
--- a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@
 
 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
 
@@ -38,24 +37,25 @@ use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
 use ln::chan_utils;
 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCType, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
-use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, HTLCSource};
-use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
+use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
 use chain;
-use chain::WatchedOutput;
+use chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
+use chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
+use chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
 use chain::Filter;
 use util::logger::Logger;
-use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
+use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48, OptionDeserWrapper};
 use util::byte_utils;
 use util::events::Event;
 
-use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
+use prelude::*;
 use core::{cmp, mem};
-use std::io::Error;
+use io::{self, Error};
 use core::ops::Deref;
-use std::sync::Mutex;
+use sync::Mutex;
 
 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
@@ -88,29 +88,35 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
 
 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
-	fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+	fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+		write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
 		self.update_id.write(w)?;
 		(self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
 		for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
 			update_step.write(w)?;
 		}
+		write_tlv_fields!(w, {});
 		Ok(())
 	}
 }
 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
-	fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+	fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+		let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
 		let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
 		let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
 		let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
 		for _ in 0..len {
-			updates.push(Readable::read(r)?);
+			if let Some(upd) = MaybeReadable::read(r)? {
+				updates.push(upd);
+			}
 		}
+		read_tlv_fields!(r, {});
 		Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
 	}
 }
 
 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]
 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
 	/// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
 	/// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
@@ -195,9 +201,15 @@ pub enum MonitorEvent {
 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
 	pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 	pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
-	pub(crate) source: HTLCSource
+	pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
+	pub(crate) onchain_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
 }
-impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
+	(0, payment_hash, required),
+	(1, onchain_value_satoshis, option),
+	(2, source, required),
+	(4, payment_preimage, option),
+});
 
 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
@@ -263,6 +275,16 @@ struct HolderSignedTx {
 	feerate_per_kw: u32,
 	htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
 }
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
+	(0, txid, required),
+	(2, revocation_key, required),
+	(4, a_htlc_key, required),
+	(6, b_htlc_key, required),
+	(8, delayed_payment_key, required),
+	(10, per_commitment_point, required),
+	(12, feerate_per_kw, required),
+	(14, htlc_outputs, vec_type)
+});
 
 /// We use this to track counterparty commitment transactions and htlcs outputs and
 /// use it to generate any justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
@@ -275,10 +297,7 @@ struct CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
 }
 
 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
-	fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
-		self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(w)?;
-		self.counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(w)?;
-		w.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_counterparty_tx_csv))?;
+	fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
 		w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
 		for (ref txid, ref htlcs) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
 			w.write_all(&txid[..])?;
@@ -287,15 +306,17 @@ impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
 				htlc.write(w)?;
 			}
 		}
+		write_tlv_fields!(w, {
+			(0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
+			(2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
+			(4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
+		});
 		Ok(())
 	}
 }
 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
-	fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+	fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 		let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
-			let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
-			let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
-			let on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
 			let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
 			let mut per_htlc = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_htlc_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
 			for _  in 0..per_htlc_len {
@@ -310,9 +331,17 @@ impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
 					return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
 				}
 			}
+			let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
+			let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
+			let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
+			read_tlv_fields!(r, {
+				(0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
+				(2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
+				(4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
+			});
 			CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
-				counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
-				counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+				counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
+				counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
 				on_counterparty_tx_csv,
 				per_htlc,
 			}
@@ -321,151 +350,6 @@ impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
 	}
 }
 
-/// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
-/// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
-/// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-pub(crate) enum InputMaterial {
-	Revoked {
-		per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
-		counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
-		counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
-		per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
-		input_descriptor: InputDescriptors,
-		amount: u64,
-		htlc: Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
-		on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
-	},
-	CounterpartyHTLC {
-		per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
-		counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
-		counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
-		preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
-		htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment
-	},
-	HolderHTLC {
-		preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
-		amount: u64,
-	},
-	Funding {
-		funding_redeemscript: Script,
-	}
-}
-
-impl Writeable for InputMaterial  {
-	fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
-		match self {
-			&InputMaterial::Revoked { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref per_commitment_key, ref input_descriptor, ref amount, ref htlc, ref on_counterparty_tx_csv} => {
-				writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
-				per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
-				counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
-				counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
-				writer.write_all(&per_commitment_key[..])?;
-				input_descriptor.write(writer)?;
-				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
-				htlc.write(writer)?;
-				on_counterparty_tx_csv.write(writer)?;
-			},
-			&InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref preimage, ref htlc} => {
-				writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
-				per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
-				counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
-				counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
-				preimage.write(writer)?;
-				htlc.write(writer)?;
-			},
-			&InputMaterial::HolderHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
-				writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
-				preimage.write(writer)?;
-				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
-			},
-			&InputMaterial::Funding { ref funding_redeemscript } => {
-				writer.write_all(&[3; 1])?;
-				funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
-			}
-		}
-		Ok(())
-	}
-}
-
-impl Readable for InputMaterial {
-	fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
-		let input_material = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
-			0 => {
-				let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
-				let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
-				let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
-				let per_commitment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
-				let input_descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
-				let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
-				let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
-				let on_counterparty_tx_csv = Readable::read(reader)?;
-				InputMaterial::Revoked {
-					per_commitment_point,
-					counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
-					counterparty_htlc_base_key,
-					per_commitment_key,
-					input_descriptor,
-					amount,
-					htlc,
-					on_counterparty_tx_csv
-				}
-			},
-			1 => {
-				let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
-				let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
-				let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
-				let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
-				let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
-				InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC {
-					per_commitment_point,
-					counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
-					counterparty_htlc_base_key,
-					preimage,
-					htlc
-				}
-			},
-			2 => {
-				let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
-				let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
-				InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
-					preimage,
-					amount,
-				}
-			},
-			3 => {
-				InputMaterial::Funding {
-					funding_redeemscript: Readable::read(reader)?,
-				}
-			}
-			_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
-		};
-		Ok(input_material)
-	}
-}
-
-/// ClaimRequest is a descriptor structure to communicate between detection
-/// and reaction module. They are generated by ChannelMonitor while parsing
-/// onchain txn leaked from a channel and handed over to OnchainTxHandler which
-/// is responsible for opportunistic aggregation, selecting and enforcing
-/// bumping logic, building and signing transactions.
-pub(crate) struct ClaimRequest {
-	// Block height before which claiming is exclusive to one party,
-	// after reaching it, claiming may be contentious.
-	pub(crate) absolute_timelock: u32,
-	// Timeout tx must have nLocktime set which means aggregating multiple
-	// ones must take the higher nLocktime among them to satisfy all of them.
-	// Sadly it has few pitfalls, a) it takes longuer to get fund back b) CLTV_DELTA
-	// of a sooner-HTLC could be swallowed by the highest nLocktime of the HTLC set.
-	// Do simplify we mark them as non-aggregable.
-	pub(crate) aggregable: bool,
-	// Basic bitcoin outpoint (txid, vout)
-	pub(crate) outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
-	// Following outpoint type, set of data needed to generate transaction digest
-	// and satisfy witness program.
-	pub(crate) witness_data: InputMaterial
-}
-
 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height when the event was observed and the
 /// transaction causing it.
 ///
@@ -479,11 +363,19 @@ struct OnchainEventEntry {
 
 impl OnchainEventEntry {
 	fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
-		self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
+		let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
+		if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
+			descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
+		} = self.event {
+			// A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
+			// it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
+			conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
+		}
+		conf_threshold
 	}
 
-	fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
-		height >= self.confirmation_threshold()
+	fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
+		best_block.height() >= self.confirmation_threshold()
 	}
 }
 
@@ -495,13 +387,55 @@ enum OnchainEvent {
 	/// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
 	/// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
 	HTLCUpdate {
-		htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
+		source: HTLCSource,
+		payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+		onchain_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
 	},
 	MaturingOutput {
 		descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
 	},
 }
 
+impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
+	fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+		write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
+			(0, self.txid, required),
+			(2, self.height, required),
+			(4, self.event, required),
+		});
+		Ok(())
+	}
+}
+
+impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
+	fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
+		let mut txid = Default::default();
+		let mut height = 0;
+		let mut event = None;
+		read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+			(0, txid, required),
+			(2, height, required),
+			(4, event, ignorable),
+		});
+		if let Some(ev) = event {
+			Ok(Some(Self { txid, height, event: ev }))
+		} else {
+			Ok(None)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
+	(0, HTLCUpdate) => {
+		(0, source, required),
+		(1, onchain_value_satoshis, option),
+		(2, payment_hash, required),
+	},
+	(1, MaturingOutput) => {
+		(0, descriptor, required),
+	},
+);
+
 #[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
 #[derive(Clone)]
 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
@@ -529,100 +463,36 @@ pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
 		/// think we've fallen behind!
 		should_broadcast: bool,
 	},
+	ShutdownScript {
+		scriptpubkey: Script,
+	},
 }
 
-impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
-	fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
-		match self {
-			&ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs } => {
-				0u8.write(w)?;
-				commitment_tx.write(w)?;
-				(htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
-				for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
-					output.write(w)?;
-					signature.write(w)?;
-					source.write(w)?;
-				}
-			}
-			&ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
-				1u8.write(w)?;
-				commitment_txid.write(w)?;
-				commitment_number.write(w)?;
-				their_revocation_point.write(w)?;
-				(htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
-				for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
-					output.write(w)?;
-					source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(w)?;
-				}
-			},
-			&ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => {
-				2u8.write(w)?;
-				payment_preimage.write(w)?;
-			},
-			&ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => {
-				3u8.write(w)?;
-				idx.write(w)?;
-				secret.write(w)?;
-			},
-			&ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { ref should_broadcast } => {
-				4u8.write(w)?;
-				should_broadcast.write(w)?;
-			},
-		}
-		Ok(())
-	}
-}
-impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
-	fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
-		match Readable::read(r)? {
-			0u8 => {
-				Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
-					commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
-					htlc_outputs: {
-						let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
-						let mut res = Vec::new();
-						for _ in 0..len {
-							res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?));
-						}
-						res
-					},
-				})
-			},
-			1u8 => {
-				Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
-					commitment_txid: Readable::read(r)?,
-					commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
-					their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?,
-					htlc_outputs: {
-						let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
-						let mut res = Vec::new();
-						for _ in 0..len {
-							res.push((Readable::read(r)?, <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o))));
-						}
-						res
-					},
-				})
-			},
-			2u8 => {
-				Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
-					payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?,
-				})
-			},
-			3u8 => {
-				Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
-					idx: Readable::read(r)?,
-					secret: Readable::read(r)?,
-				})
-			},
-			4u8 => {
-				Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed {
-					should_broadcast: Readable::read(r)?
-				})
-			},
-			_ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
-		}
-	}
-}
+impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
+	(0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
+		(0, commitment_tx, required),
+		(2, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
+	},
+	(1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
+		(0, commitment_txid, required),
+		(2, commitment_number, required),
+		(4, their_revocation_point, required),
+		(6, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
+	},
+	(2, PaymentPreimage) => {
+		(0, payment_preimage, required),
+	},
+	(3, CommitmentSecret) => {
+		(0, idx, required),
+		(2, secret, required),
+	},
+	(4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
+		(0, should_broadcast, required),
+	},
+	(5, ShutdownScript) => {
+		(0, scriptpubkey, required),
+	},
+);
 
 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
@@ -654,7 +524,7 @@ pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
 	destination_script: Script,
 	broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
 	counterparty_payment_script: Script,
-	shutdown_script: Script,
+	shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
 
 	channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
 	holder_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
@@ -671,6 +541,9 @@ pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
 	on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
 
 	commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
+	/// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
+	/// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
+	/// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
 	counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
 	/// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
 	/// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
@@ -806,6 +679,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 	}
 }
 
+// These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
 
@@ -829,7 +703,10 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		}
 
 		self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
-		self.shutdown_script.write(writer)?;
+		match &self.shutdown_script {
+			Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
+			None => Script::new().write(writer)?,
+		}
 
 		self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
 		self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
@@ -897,38 +774,14 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
 		}
 
-		macro_rules! serialize_holder_tx {
-			($holder_tx: expr) => {
-				$holder_tx.txid.write(writer)?;
-				writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
-				writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
-				writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
-				writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
-				writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
-
-				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($holder_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
-				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
-				for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
-					serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
-					if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
-						1u8.write(writer)?;
-						writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
-					} else {
-						0u8.write(writer)?;
-					}
-					htlc_source.write(writer)?;
-				}
-			}
-		}
-
 		if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
 			writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
-			serialize_holder_tx!(prev_holder_tx);
+			prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
 		} else {
 			writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
 		}
 
-		serialize_holder_tx!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
+		self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;
 
 		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
 		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
@@ -959,19 +812,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 
 		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
 		for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
-			entry.txid.write(writer)?;
-			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(entry.height))?;
-			match entry.event {
-				OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
-					0u8.write(writer)?;
-					htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
-					htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
-				},
-				OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { ref descriptor } => {
-					1u8.write(writer)?;
-					descriptor.write(writer)?;
-				},
-			}
+			entry.write(writer)?;
 		}
 
 		(self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
@@ -988,14 +829,14 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
 		self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
 
-		write_tlv_fields!(writer, {}, {});
+		write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
 
 		Ok(())
 	}
 }
 
 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
-	pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
+	pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
 	                  on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
 	                  channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
 	                  funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
@@ -1004,8 +845,6 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 	                  best_block: BestBlock) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 
 		assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
-		let our_channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
-		let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
 		let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
 		let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
 
@@ -1389,6 +1228,87 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
 		txids.dedup();
 		txids
 	}
+
+	/// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
+	/// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
+	pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
+		self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
+	}
+}
+
+/// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
+/// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
+/// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
+///
+/// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
+/// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
+/// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
+/// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
+/// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
+/// broadcasted commitment transaction.
+///
+/// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
+/// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
+/// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
+/// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
+macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
+	($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
+		macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
+			($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
+				if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
+					for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
+						if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
+							// Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
+							// broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
+							// fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
+							// payment_preimage.
+							// Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
+							// commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
+							// broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
+							// cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
+							// need to here.
+							let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
+							let mut matched_htlc = false;
+							for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
+								if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source {
+									matched_htlc = true;
+									break;
+								}
+							}
+							if matched_htlc { continue; }
+							$self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
+								if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
+								match entry.event {
+									OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
+										*update_source != **source
+									},
+									_ => true,
+								}
+							});
+							let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
+								txid: *$txid,
+								height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
+								event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
+									source: (**source).clone(),
+									payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
+									onchain_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
+								},
+							};
+							log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
+								log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type, entry.confirmation_threshold());
+							$self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
+						}
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
+			check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
+		}
+		if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
+			check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous");
+		}
+	} }
 }
 
 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
@@ -1531,7 +1451,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
 			($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
 				let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs($commitment_number, $txid, None);
-				self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), htlc_claim_reqs, None, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
+				self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
 			}
 		}
 		if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
@@ -1553,11 +1473,14 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		// *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
 		// holder commitment transactions.
 		if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
-			let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
-			self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, None, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
+			// Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
+			// block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
+			// transactions.
+			let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
+			self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
 			if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
-				let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx);
-				self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, None, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
+				let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx, self.best_block.height());
+				self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
 			}
 		}
 	}
@@ -1623,7 +1546,13 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 						// shouldn't print the scary warning above.
 						log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
 					}
-				}
+				},
+				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
+					log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
+					if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
+						panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
+					}
+				},
 			}
 		}
 		self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
@@ -1683,7 +1612,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 	/// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
 	/// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
 	/// revoked counterparty commitment tx
-	fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, TransactionOutputs) where L::Target: Logger {
+	fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs) where L::Target: Logger {
 		// Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
 		// a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
 		let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
@@ -1715,8 +1644,9 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			// First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
 			for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
 				if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
-					let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: outp.value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
-					claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data});
+					let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
+					let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
+					claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
 				}
 			}
 
@@ -1728,8 +1658,9 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 								tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
 							return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
 						}
-						let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc: Some(htlc.clone()), on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
-						claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
+						let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone());
+						let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, true, height);
+						claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
 					}
 				}
 			}
@@ -1737,47 +1668,13 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			// Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
 			if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
 				// We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
-				log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
+				log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
 				for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
 					watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
 				}
 				self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
 
-				macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
-					($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
-						if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
-							for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
-								if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
-									self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
-										if entry.height != height { return true; }
-										match entry.event {
-											 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
-												 htlc_update.0 != **source
-											 },
-											 _ => true,
-										}
-									});
-									let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
-										txid: *$txid,
-										height,
-										event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
-											htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())
-										},
-									};
-									log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, entry.confirmation_threshold());
-									self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
-								}
-							}
-						}
-					}
-				}
-				if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
-					check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
-				}
-				if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
-					check_htlc_fails!(txid, "counterparty");
-				}
-				// No need to check holder commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on counterparty commitment tx
+				fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", height, [].iter().map(|a| *a), logger);
 			}
 		} else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
 			// While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
@@ -1792,55 +1689,8 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			}
 			self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
 
-			log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
-
-			macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
-				($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
-					if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
-						$id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
-							if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
-								// Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
-								// broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
-								// fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
-								// payment_preimage.
-								// Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
-								// commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
-								// broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
-								// cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
-								// need to here.
-								for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
-									if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
-										continue $id;
-									}
-								}
-								log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of counterparty commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
-								self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
-									if entry.height != height { return true; }
-									match entry.event {
-										 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
-											 htlc_update.0 != **source
-										 },
-										 _ => true,
-									}
-								});
-								self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
-									txid: *$txid,
-									height,
-									event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
-										htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())
-									},
-								});
-							}
-						}
-					}
-				}
-			}
-			if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
-				check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
-			}
-			if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
-				check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
-			}
+			log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
+			fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", height, per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(a, b)| (a, b.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()))), logger);
 
 			let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
 			for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
@@ -1851,8 +1701,8 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		(claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
 	}
 
-	fn get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>) -> Vec<ClaimRequest> {
-		let mut claims = Vec::new();
+	fn get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>) -> Vec<PackageTemplate> {
+		let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
 		if let Some(htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
 			if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
 				let revocation_point_option =
@@ -1871,30 +1721,26 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 							if let Some(transaction) = tx {
 								if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
 									transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
-										return claims; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
+										return claimable_outpoints; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
 									}
 							}
-							let preimage =
-								if htlc.offered {
-									if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
-										Some(*p)
-									} else { None }
-								} else { None };
-							let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
+							let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
 							if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
-								let witness_data = InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { per_commitment_point: *revocation_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage, htlc: htlc.clone() };
-								claims.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
+								let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone())) } else { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, htlc.clone())) };
+								let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
+								let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
+								claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
 							}
 						}
 					}
 				}
 			}
 		}
-		claims
+		claimable_outpoints
 	}
 
 	/// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
-	fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
+	fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
 		let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
 		if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
 			return (Vec::new(), None)
@@ -1913,17 +1759,18 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
 		let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
 
-		log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
-		let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key,  per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: tx.output[0].value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv };
-		let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
+		log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
+		let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, tx.output[0].value, self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
+		let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(htlc_txid, 0, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
+		let claimable_outpoints = vec!(justice_package);
 		let outputs = vec![(0, tx.output[0].clone())];
 		(claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs)))
 	}
 
-	// Returns (1) `ClaimRequest`s that can be given to the OnChainTxHandler, so that the handler can
+	// Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnChainTxHandler, so that the handler can
 	// broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
 	// script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
-	fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
+	fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
 		let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
 
 		let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
@@ -1931,18 +1778,19 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 
 		for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 			if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
-				claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::core::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: holder_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 },
-					witness_data: InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
-						preimage: if !htlc.offered {
-								if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
-									Some(preimage.clone())
-								} else {
-									// We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
-									continue;
-								}
-							} else { None },
-						amount: htlc.amount_msat,
-				}});
+				let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
+						HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry)
+					} else {
+						let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
+							preimage.clone()
+						} else {
+							// We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
+							continue;
+						};
+						HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat)
+					};
+				let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output), htlc.cltv_expiry, false, conf_height);
+				claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
 			}
 		}
 
@@ -1963,32 +1811,11 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 	/// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
 	/// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
 	/// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
-	fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, TransactionOutputs) where L::Target: Logger {
+	fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs) where L::Target: Logger {
 		let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
 		let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
 		let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
 
-		macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
-			($source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
-				self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
-					if entry.height != height { return true; }
-					match entry.event {
-						 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
-							 htlc_update.0 != $source
-						 },
-						 _ => true,
-					}
-				});
-				let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
-					txid: commitment_txid,
-					height,
-					event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash) },
-				};
-				log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} holder commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, entry.confirmation_threshold());
-				self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
-			}
-		}
-
 		macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
 			($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
 				claim_requests = $updates.0;
@@ -2002,48 +1829,34 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 
 		if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
 			is_holder_tx = true;
-			log_trace!(logger, "Got latest holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
-			let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
+			log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
+			let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
 			let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
 			append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
+			fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", height, self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, c)| (a, c.as_ref())), logger);
 		} else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
 			if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
 				is_holder_tx = true;
-				log_trace!(logger, "Got previous holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
-				let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx);
+				log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
+				let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
 				let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
 				append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
-			}
-		}
-
-		macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
-			($holder_tx: expr) => {
-				for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$holder_tx.htlc_outputs {
-					if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
-						if let &Some(ref source) = source {
-							wait_threshold_conf!(source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
-						}
-					}
-				}
+				fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", height, holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, c)| (a, c.as_ref())), logger);
 			}
 		}
 
 		if is_holder_tx {
-			fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
-			if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
-				fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(holder_tx);
-			}
 		}
 
 		(claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
 	}
 
 	pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
-		log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
+		log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
 		self.holder_tx_signed = true;
 		let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
 		let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
-		let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
+		let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
 		for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 			if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 				let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
@@ -2051,24 +1864,32 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 						// We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 						continue;
 					}
+				} else if htlc.0.cltv_expiry > self.best_block.height() + 1 {
+					// Don't broadcast HTLC-Timeout transactions immediately as they don't meet the
+					// current locktime requirements on-chain. We will broadcast them in
+					// `block_confirmed` when `should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn` returns true.
+					// Note that we add + 1 as transactions are broadcastable when they can be
+					// confirmed in the next block.
+					continue;
 				} else { None };
 				if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 					&::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
-					res.push(htlc_tx);
+					holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
 				}
 			}
 		}
 		// We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
 		// The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
-		return res;
+		holder_transactions
 	}
 
 	#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
+	/// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
 	fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
-		log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
+		log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
 		let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
 		let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
-		let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
+		let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
 		for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 			if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 				let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
@@ -2079,11 +1900,11 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 				} else { None };
 				if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 					&::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
-					res.push(htlc_tx);
+					holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
 				}
 			}
 		}
-		return res
+		holder_transactions
 	}
 
 	pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
@@ -2092,7 +1913,6 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 					L::Target: Logger,
 	{
 		let block_hash = header.block_hash();
-		log_trace!(logger, "New best block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
 		self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
 
 		self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
@@ -2112,17 +1932,16 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		L::Target: Logger,
 	{
 		let block_hash = header.block_hash();
-		log_trace!(logger, "New best block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
 
 		if height > self.best_block.height() {
 			self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
-			self.block_confirmed(height, vec![], vec![], vec![], broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
-		} else {
+			self.block_confirmed(height, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
+		} else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash() {
 			self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
 			self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
 			self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
 			Vec::new()
-		}
+		} else { Vec::new() }
 	}
 
 	fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
@@ -2150,7 +1969,6 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		}
 
 		let block_hash = header.block_hash();
-		log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
 
 		let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
 		let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
@@ -2194,31 +2012,50 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
 		}
 
-		self.block_confirmed(height, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
+		if height > self.best_block.height() {
+			self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
+		}
+
+		self.block_confirmed(height, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
 	}
 
+	/// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
+	/// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
+	/// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
+	/// complexity especially in `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`.
+	///
+	/// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
+	/// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
 	fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
 		&mut self,
-		height: u32,
+		conf_height: u32,
 		txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
 		mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
-		mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<ClaimRequest>,
-		broadcaster: B,
-		fee_estimator: F,
-		logger: L,
+		mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
+		broadcaster: &B,
+		fee_estimator: &F,
+		logger: &L,
 	) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
 	where
 		B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
 		F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 		L::Target: Logger,
 	{
-		let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(height, &logger);
+		log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
+		debug_assert!(self.best_block.height() >= conf_height);
+
+		let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
 		if should_broadcast {
-			claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), vout: self.funding_info.0.index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::Funding { funding_redeemscript: self.funding_redeemscript.clone() }});
+			let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone());
+			let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), false, self.best_block.height());
+			claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
 			self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
 			let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
 			self.holder_tx_signed = true;
-			let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
+			// Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
+			// assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
+			// "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
+			let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
 			let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
 			if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
 				watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
@@ -2231,7 +2068,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
 		let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
 		for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
-			if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(height) {
+			if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
 				onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
 			} else {
 				self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
@@ -2243,7 +2080,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
 			.iter()
 			.filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
-				OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => Some(htlc_update.0.clone()),
+				OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
 				OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { .. } => None,
 			})
 			.collect();
@@ -2253,32 +2090,33 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		// Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
 		for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
 			match entry.event {
-				OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
+				OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, onchain_value_satoshis } => {
 					// Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
 					#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 					{
 						debug_assert!(
-							unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &htlc_update.0).is_none(),
+							unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
 							"An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
 							 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
 							 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
 						debug_assert!(
-							matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &htlc_update.0).is_none(),
+							matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
 							"A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
 							 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
 							 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
-						matured_htlcs.push(htlc_update.0.clone());
+						matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
 					}
 
-					log_trace!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
+					log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
 					self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
-						payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
+						payment_hash,
 						payment_preimage: None,
-						source: htlc_update.0,
+						source: source.clone(),
+						onchain_value_satoshis,
 					}));
 				},
 				OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
-					log_trace!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
+					log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
 					self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
 						outputs: vec![descriptor]
 					});
@@ -2286,7 +2124,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 			}
 		}
 
-		self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, Some(height), &&*broadcaster, &&*fee_estimator, &&*logger);
+		self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
 
 		// Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
 		// updating the latter in the process.
@@ -2388,7 +2226,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		false
 	}
 
-	fn would_broadcast_at_height<L: Deref>(&self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
+	fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
 		// We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
 		//  * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
 		//    transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
@@ -2399,6 +2237,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 		// to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
 		// updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
 		// easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
+		let height = self.best_block.height();
 		macro_rules! scan_commitment {
 			($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
 				for ref htlc in $htlcs {
@@ -2490,7 +2329,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 							if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
 								if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
 									log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
-									payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
+									payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
 									break;
 								}
 							}
@@ -2510,7 +2349,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 								// transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
 								// has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
 								// resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
-								payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
+								payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
 							} else if !$holder_tx {
 									check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
 								if payment_data.is_none() {
@@ -2543,7 +2382,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 
 			// Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
 			// HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
-			if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
+			if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
 				let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
 				if accepted_preimage_claim {
 					if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
@@ -2552,7 +2391,8 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 						self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
 							source,
 							payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
-							payment_hash
+							payment_hash,
+							onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
 						}));
 					}
 				} else if offered_preimage_claim {
@@ -2564,25 +2404,29 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 						self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
 							source,
 							payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
-							payment_hash
+							payment_hash,
+							onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
 						}));
 					}
 				} else {
 					self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
 						if entry.height != height { return true; }
 						match entry.event {
-							 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
-								 htlc_update.0 != source
-							 },
-							 _ => true,
+							OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
+								*htlc_source != source
+							},
+							_ => true,
 						}
 					});
 					let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
 						txid: tx.txid(),
 						height,
-						event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash) },
+						event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
+							source, payment_hash,
+							onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
+						},
 					};
-					log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
+					log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
 					self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
 				}
 			}
@@ -2613,7 +2457,8 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 					output: outp.clone(),
 				});
 				break;
-			} else if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
+			}
+			if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
 				if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
 					spendable_output =  Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
 						outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
@@ -2626,7 +2471,8 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 					}));
 					break;
 				}
-			} else if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
+			}
+			if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
 				spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
 					outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
 					output: outp.clone(),
@@ -2634,11 +2480,13 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 					channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
 				}));
 				break;
-			} else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script {
+			}
+			if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
 				spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
 					outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
 					output: outp.clone(),
 				});
+				break;
 			}
 		}
 		if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
@@ -2647,7 +2495,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 				height: height,
 				event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
 			};
-			log_trace!(logger, "Maturing {} until {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
+			log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
 			self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
 		}
 	}
@@ -2743,7 +2591,7 @@ const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
 
 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
 		for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<Signer>) {
-	fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+	fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 		macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
 			($key: expr) => {
 				match $key {
@@ -2770,7 +2618,10 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
 			_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
 		};
 		let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
-		let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let shutdown_script = {
+			let script = <Script as Readable>::read(reader)?;
+			if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
+		};
 
 		let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
 		let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
@@ -2857,46 +2708,14 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
 			}
 		}
 
-		macro_rules! read_holder_tx {
-			() => {
-				{
-					let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
-					let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
-					let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
-					let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
-					let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
-					let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
-					let feerate_per_kw: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
-					let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
-					let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
-					for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
-						let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
-						let sigs = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
-							0 => None,
-							1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
-							_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
-						};
-						htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
-					}
-
-					HolderSignedTx {
-						txid,
-						revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
-						htlc_outputs: htlcs
-					}
-				}
-			}
-		}
-
 		let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
 			0 => None,
 			1 => {
-				Some(read_holder_tx!())
+				Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
 			},
 			_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
 		};
-		let current_holder_commitment_tx = read_holder_tx!();
+		let current_holder_commitment_tx = Readable::read(reader)?;
 
 		let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
 		let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
@@ -2935,25 +2754,9 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
 		let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 		let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
 		for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
-			let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
-			let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
-			let event = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
-				0 => {
-					let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
-					let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
-					OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
-						htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
-					}
-				},
-				1 => {
-					let descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
-					OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
-						descriptor
-					}
-				},
-				_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
-			};
-			onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry { txid, height, event });
+			if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
+				onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
+			}
 		}
 
 		let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
@@ -2974,7 +2777,7 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
 		let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
 		let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
 
-		read_tlv_fields!(reader, {}, {});
+		read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
 
 		let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 		secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
@@ -3045,25 +2848,27 @@ mod tests {
 	use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
 	use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
 	use hex;
+	use chain::BestBlock;
 	use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
+	use chain::package::{WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
 	use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
 	use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
-	use ln::channelmanager::BestBlock;
-	use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
 	use ln::chan_utils;
 	use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
+	use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
 	use util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
 	use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
 	use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
-	use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+	use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
 	use chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
+	use prelude::*;
 
 	#[test]
 	fn test_prune_preimages() {
 		let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 		let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
-		let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
-		let fee_estimator = Arc::new(TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
+		let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))});
+		let fee_estimator = Arc::new(TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) });
 
 		let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
 		let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
@@ -3144,9 +2949,10 @@ mod tests {
 		};
 		// Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
 		// old state.
+		let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
 		let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(Network::Testnet);
 		let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
-		                                  &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
+		                                  Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &Script::new(),
 		                                  (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
 		                                  &channel_parameters,
 		                                  Script::new(), 46, 0,
@@ -3205,25 +3011,25 @@ mod tests {
 		let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
 
 		macro_rules! sign_input {
-			($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
+			($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
 				let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
-					offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
+					offered: if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC || *$weight == WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC { true } else { false },
 					amount_msat: 0,
 					cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
 					payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
 					transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
 				};
-				let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
+				let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
 				let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
 				let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
 				$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 				$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 				sum_actual_sigs += $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len();
-				if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
+				if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
 					$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec!(1));
-				} else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
+				} else if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC || *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC {
 					$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
-				} else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
+				} else if *$weight == WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC {
 					$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec![0]);
 				} else {
 					$sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
@@ -3256,14 +3062,16 @@ mod tests {
 			value: 0,
 		});
 		let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
-		let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
+		let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC];
+		let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
 		{
 			let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
-			for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
+			for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
 				sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
+				inputs_total_weight += inp;
 			}
 		}
-		assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemorySigner>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]),  claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+		assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize,  claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
 
 		// Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
 		claim_tx.input.clear();
@@ -3280,14 +3088,16 @@ mod tests {
 			});
 		}
 		let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
-		let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
+		let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC];
+		let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
 		{
 			let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
-			for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
+			for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
 				sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
+				inputs_total_weight += inp;
 			}
 		}
-		assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemorySigner>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]),  claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+		assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize,  claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
 
 		// Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
 		claim_tx.input.clear();
@@ -3302,14 +3112,16 @@ mod tests {
 			witness: Vec::new(),
 		});
 		let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
-		let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
+		let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
+		let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
 		{
 			let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
-			for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
+			for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
 				sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
+				inputs_total_weight += inp;
 			}
 		}
-		assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemorySigner>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+		assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
 	}
 
 	// Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.