X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fchain%2Fkeysinterface.rs;h=5599bfbb9fd763e88c58dd475735ace5a86a0079;hb=98bc46beb9d364915c7c43c96b154b0d5efa0ba3;hp=fbc6c9bc6e6c673ca4d8f2555bd41d630b312cd7;hpb=1d2d39325872a553335bee4a71ac89f7512db4fb;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/keysinterface.rs b/lightning/src/chain/keysinterface.rs index fbc6c9bc..5599bfbb 100644 --- a/lightning/src/chain/keysinterface.rs +++ b/lightning/src/chain/keysinterface.rs @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ //! spendable on-chain outputs which the user owns and is responsible for using just as any other //! on-chain output which is theirs. -use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, OutPoint, TxOut}; +use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType}; use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder}; use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; use bitcoin::network::constants::Network; @@ -31,9 +31,10 @@ use bitcoin::secp256k1; use util::byte_utils; use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, Readable}; +use chain::transaction::OutPoint; use ln::chan_utils; -use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, LocalCommitmentTransaction, PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys}; -use ln::msgs; +use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys}; +use ln::msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement; use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering}; use std::io::Error; @@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ use ln::msgs::DecodeError; /// spend on-chain. The information needed to do this is provided in this enum, including the /// outpoint describing which txid and output index is available, the full output which exists at /// that txid/index, and any keys or other information required to sign. -#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] +#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)] pub enum SpendableOutputDescriptor { /// An output to a script which was provided via KeysInterface, thus you should already know /// how to spend it. No keys are provided as rust-lightning was never given any keys - only the @@ -70,14 +71,14 @@ pub enum SpendableOutputDescriptor { /// it is an output from an old state which we broadcast (which should never happen). /// /// To derive the delayed_payment key which is used to sign for this input, you must pass the - /// local delayed_payment_base_key (ie the private key which corresponds to the pubkey in + /// holder delayed_payment_base_key (ie the private key which corresponds to the pubkey in /// ChannelKeys::pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint) and the provided per_commitment_point to /// chan_utils::derive_private_key. The public key can be generated without the secret key /// using chan_utils::derive_public_key and only the delayed_payment_basepoint which appears in /// ChannelKeys::pubkeys(). /// - /// To derive the remote_revocation_pubkey provided here (which is used in the witness - /// script generation), you must pass the remote revocation_basepoint (which appears in the + /// To derive the revocation_pubkey provided here (which is used in the witness + /// script generation), you must pass the counterparty revocation_basepoint (which appears in the /// call to ChannelKeys::on_accept) and the provided per_commitment point /// to chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key. /// @@ -100,8 +101,8 @@ pub enum SpendableOutputDescriptor { /// The channel keys state used to proceed to derivation of signing key. Must /// be pass to KeysInterface::derive_channel_keys. key_derivation_params: (u64, u64), - /// The remote_revocation_pubkey used to derive witnessScript - remote_revocation_pubkey: PublicKey + /// The revocation_pubkey used to derive witnessScript + revocation_pubkey: PublicKey }, /// An output to a P2WPKH, spendable exclusively by our payment key (ie the private key which /// corresponds to the public key in ChannelKeys::pubkeys().payment_point). @@ -110,7 +111,7 @@ pub enum SpendableOutputDescriptor { /// /// These are generally the result of our counterparty having broadcast the current state, /// allowing us to claim the non-HTLC-encumbered outputs immediately. - StaticOutputRemotePayment { + StaticOutputCounterpartyPayment { /// The outpoint which is spendable outpoint: OutPoint, /// The output which is reference by the given outpoint @@ -129,7 +130,7 @@ impl Writeable for SpendableOutputDescriptor { outpoint.write(writer)?; output.write(writer)?; }, - &SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref per_commitment_point, ref to_self_delay, ref output, ref key_derivation_params, ref remote_revocation_pubkey } => { + &SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref per_commitment_point, ref to_self_delay, ref output, ref key_derivation_params, ref revocation_pubkey } => { 1u8.write(writer)?; outpoint.write(writer)?; per_commitment_point.write(writer)?; @@ -137,9 +138,9 @@ impl Writeable for SpendableOutputDescriptor { output.write(writer)?; key_derivation_params.0.write(writer)?; key_derivation_params.1.write(writer)?; - remote_revocation_pubkey.write(writer)?; + revocation_pubkey.write(writer)?; }, - &SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputRemotePayment { ref outpoint, ref output, ref key_derivation_params } => { + &SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputCounterpartyPayment { ref outpoint, ref output, ref key_derivation_params } => { 2u8.write(writer)?; outpoint.write(writer)?; output.write(writer)?; @@ -164,9 +165,9 @@ impl Readable for SpendableOutputDescriptor { to_self_delay: Readable::read(reader)?, output: Readable::read(reader)?, key_derivation_params: (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?), - remote_revocation_pubkey: Readable::read(reader)?, + revocation_pubkey: Readable::read(reader)?, }), - 2u8 => Ok(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputRemotePayment { + 2u8 => Ok(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputCounterpartyPayment { outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?, output: Readable::read(reader)?, key_derivation_params: (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?), @@ -218,52 +219,52 @@ pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone { /// Note that the commitment number starts at (1 << 48) - 1 and counts backwards. /// TODO: return a Result so we can signal a validation error fn release_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32]; - /// Gets the local channel public keys and basepoints + /// Gets the holder's channel public keys and basepoints fn pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys; /// Gets arbitrary identifiers describing the set of keys which are provided back to you in /// some SpendableOutputDescriptor types. These should be sufficient to identify this /// ChannelKeys object uniquely and lookup or re-derive its keys. fn key_derivation_params(&self) -> (u64, u64); - /// Create a signature for a remote commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions. + /// Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions. /// /// Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed. // // TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing. // TODO: Add more input vars to enable better checking (preferably removing commitment_tx and // making the callee generate it via some util function we expose)! - fn sign_remote_commitment(&self, feerate_per_kw: u32, commitment_tx: &Transaction, keys: &PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys, htlcs: &[&HTLCOutputInCommitment], secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result<(Signature, Vec), ()>; + fn sign_counterparty_commitment(&self, feerate_per_kw: u32, commitment_tx: &Transaction, keys: &PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys, htlcs: &[&HTLCOutputInCommitment], secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result<(Signature, Vec), ()>; - /// Create a signature for a local commitment transaction. This will only ever be called with - /// the same local_commitment_tx (or a copy thereof), though there are currently no guarantees + /// Create a signature for a holder's commitment transaction. This will only ever be called with + /// the same holder_commitment_tx (or a copy thereof), though there are currently no guarantees /// that it will not be called multiple times. /// An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked. // // TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing. // TODO: Add more input vars to enable better checking (preferably removing commitment_tx and - fn sign_local_commitment(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result; + fn sign_holder_commitment(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result; - /// Same as sign_local_commitment, but exists only for tests to get access to local commitment + /// Same as sign_holder_commitment, but exists only for tests to get access to holder commitment /// transactions which will be broadcasted later, after the channel has moved on to a newer - /// state. Thus, needs its own method as sign_local_commitment may enforce that we only ever + /// state. Thus, needs its own method as sign_holder_commitment may enforce that we only ever /// get called once. #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))] - fn unsafe_sign_local_commitment(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result; + fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result; - /// Create a signature for each HTLC transaction spending a local commitment transaction. + /// Create a signature for each HTLC transaction spending a holder's commitment transaction. /// - /// Unlike sign_local_commitment, this may be called multiple times with *different* - /// local_commitment_tx values. While this will never be called with a revoked - /// local_commitment_tx, it is possible that it is called with the second-latest - /// local_commitment_tx (only if we haven't yet revoked it) if some watchtower/secondary + /// Unlike sign_holder_commitment, this may be called multiple times with *different* + /// holder_commitment_tx values. While this will never be called with a revoked + /// holder_commitment_tx, it is possible that it is called with the second-latest + /// holder_commitment_tx (only if we haven't yet revoked it) if some watchtower/secondary /// ChannelMonitor decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest. /// /// Either an Err should be returned, or a Vec with one entry for each HTLC which exists in - /// local_commitment_tx. For those HTLCs which have transaction_output_index set to None + /// holder_commitment_tx. For those HTLCs which have transaction_output_index set to None /// (implying they were considered dust at the time the commitment transaction was negotiated), /// a corresponding None should be included in the return value. All other positions in the /// return value must contain a signature. - fn sign_local_commitment_htlc_transactions(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result>, ()>; + fn sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result>, ()>; /// Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC or commitment /// transaction output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state. @@ -276,8 +277,8 @@ pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone { /// Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature. /// /// per_commitment_key is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they - /// revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _local_ secret key and does - /// not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our local revocation_secret to do + /// revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does + /// not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do /// so). /// /// htlc holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock) if the output being spent is a HTLC output, thus @@ -285,7 +286,7 @@ pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone { /// signatures). fn sign_justice_transaction(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result; - /// Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a remote commitment + /// Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment /// transaction, either offered or received. /// /// Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the @@ -302,7 +303,7 @@ pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone { /// detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive /// channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the /// BIP 143 signature. - fn sign_remote_htlc_transaction(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result; + fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result; /// Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction. /// @@ -316,15 +317,15 @@ pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone { /// Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and /// our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the /// protocol. - fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result; + fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result; - /// Set the remote channel basepoints and remote/local to_self_delay. + /// Set the counterparty channel basepoints and counterparty_selected/holder_selected_contest_delay. /// This is done immediately on incoming channels and as soon as the channel is accepted on outgoing channels. /// - /// We bind local_to_self_delay late here for API convenience. + /// We bind holder_selected_contest_delay late here for API convenience. /// /// Will be called before any signatures are applied. - fn on_accept(&mut self, channel_points: &ChannelPublicKeys, remote_to_self_delay: u16, local_to_self_delay: u16); + fn on_accept(&mut self, channel_points: &ChannelPublicKeys, counterparty_selected_contest_delay: u16, holder_selected_contest_delay: u16); } /// A trait to describe an object which can get user secrets and key material. @@ -341,12 +342,10 @@ pub trait KeysInterface: Send + Sync { /// Get a new set of ChannelKeys for per-channel secrets. These MUST be unique even if you /// restarted with some stale data! fn get_channel_keys(&self, inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Self::ChanKeySigner; - /// Get a secret and PRNG seed for constructing an onion packet - fn get_onion_rand(&self) -> (SecretKey, [u8; 32]); - /// Get a unique temporary channel id. Channels will be referred to by this until the funding - /// transaction is created, at which point they will use the outpoint in the funding - /// transaction. - fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32]; + /// Gets a unique, cryptographically-secure, random 32 byte value. This is used for encrypting + /// onion packets and for temporary channel IDs. There is no requirement that these be + /// persisted anywhere, though they must be unique across restarts. + fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32]; } #[derive(Clone)] @@ -355,17 +354,17 @@ pub trait KeysInterface: Send + Sync { /// when receiving an open_channel for an inbound channel or when /// receiving accept_channel for an outbound channel. struct AcceptedChannelData { - /// Remote public keys and base points - remote_channel_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys, - /// The to_self_delay value specified by our counterparty and applied on locally-broadcastable + /// Counterparty public keys and base points + counterparty_channel_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys, + /// The contest_delay value specified by our counterparty and applied on holder-broadcastable /// transactions, ie the amount of time that we have to wait to recover our funds if we /// broadcast a transaction. You'll likely want to pass this to the - /// ln::chan_utils::build*_transaction functions when signing local transactions. - remote_to_self_delay: u16, - /// The to_self_delay value specified by us and applied on transactions broadcastable + /// ln::chan_utils::build*_transaction functions when signing holder's transactions. + counterparty_selected_contest_delay: u16, + /// The contest_delay value specified by us and applied on transactions broadcastable /// by our counterparty, ie the amount of time that they have to wait to recover their funds /// if they broadcast a transaction. - local_to_self_delay: u16, + holder_selected_contest_delay: u16, } #[derive(Clone)] @@ -373,19 +372,19 @@ struct AcceptedChannelData { pub struct InMemoryChannelKeys { /// Private key of anchor tx pub funding_key: SecretKey, - /// Local secret key for blinded revocation pubkey + /// Holder secret key for blinded revocation pubkey pub revocation_base_key: SecretKey, - /// Local secret key used for our balance in remote-broadcasted commitment transactions + /// Holder secret key used for our balance in counterparty-broadcasted commitment transactions pub payment_key: SecretKey, - /// Local secret key used in HTLC tx + /// Holder secret key used in HTLC tx pub delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey, - /// Local htlc secret key used in commitment tx htlc outputs + /// Holder htlc secret key used in commitment tx htlc outputs pub htlc_base_key: SecretKey, /// Commitment seed pub commitment_seed: [u8; 32], - /// Local public keys and basepoints - pub(crate) local_channel_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys, - /// Remote public keys and remote/local to_self_delay, populated on channel acceptance + /// Holder public keys and basepoints + pub(crate) holder_channel_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys, + /// Counterparty public keys and counterparty/holder selected_contest_delay, populated on channel acceptance accepted_channel_data: Option, /// The total value of this channel channel_value_satoshis: u64, @@ -405,8 +404,8 @@ impl InMemoryChannelKeys { commitment_seed: [u8; 32], channel_value_satoshis: u64, key_derivation_params: (u64, u64)) -> InMemoryChannelKeys { - let local_channel_pubkeys = - InMemoryChannelKeys::make_local_keys(secp_ctx, &funding_key, &revocation_base_key, + let holder_channel_pubkeys = + InMemoryChannelKeys::make_holder_keys(secp_ctx, &funding_key, &revocation_base_key, &payment_key, &delayed_payment_base_key, &htlc_base_key); InMemoryChannelKeys { @@ -417,13 +416,13 @@ impl InMemoryChannelKeys { htlc_base_key, commitment_seed, channel_value_satoshis, - local_channel_pubkeys, + holder_channel_pubkeys, accepted_channel_data: None, key_derivation_params, } } - fn make_local_keys(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, + fn make_holder_keys(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, funding_key: &SecretKey, revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_key: &SecretKey, @@ -439,22 +438,22 @@ impl InMemoryChannelKeys { } } - /// Remote pubkeys. + /// Counterparty pubkeys. /// Will panic if on_accept wasn't called. - pub fn remote_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { &self.accepted_channel_data.as_ref().unwrap().remote_channel_pubkeys } + pub fn counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { &self.accepted_channel_data.as_ref().unwrap().counterparty_channel_pubkeys } - /// The to_self_delay value specified by our counterparty and applied on locally-broadcastable + /// The contest_delay value specified by our counterparty and applied on holder-broadcastable /// transactions, ie the amount of time that we have to wait to recover our funds if we /// broadcast a transaction. You'll likely want to pass this to the - /// ln::chan_utils::build*_transaction functions when signing local transactions. + /// ln::chan_utils::build*_transaction functions when signing holder's transactions. /// Will panic if on_accept wasn't called. - pub fn remote_to_self_delay(&self) -> u16 { self.accepted_channel_data.as_ref().unwrap().remote_to_self_delay } + pub fn counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 { self.accepted_channel_data.as_ref().unwrap().counterparty_selected_contest_delay } - /// The to_self_delay value specified by us and applied on transactions broadcastable + /// The contest_delay value specified by us and applied on transactions broadcastable /// by our counterparty, ie the amount of time that they have to wait to recover their funds /// if they broadcast a transaction. /// Will panic if on_accept wasn't called. - pub fn local_to_self_delay(&self) -> u16 { self.accepted_channel_data.as_ref().unwrap().local_to_self_delay } + pub fn holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 { self.accepted_channel_data.as_ref().unwrap().holder_selected_contest_delay } } impl ChannelKeys for InMemoryChannelKeys { @@ -467,18 +466,18 @@ impl ChannelKeys for InMemoryChannelKeys { chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&self.commitment_seed, idx) } - fn pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { &self.local_channel_pubkeys } + fn pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { &self.holder_channel_pubkeys } fn key_derivation_params(&self) -> (u64, u64) { self.key_derivation_params } - fn sign_remote_commitment(&self, feerate_per_kw: u32, commitment_tx: &Transaction, pre_keys: &PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys, htlcs: &[&HTLCOutputInCommitment], secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result<(Signature, Vec), ()> { + fn sign_counterparty_commitment(&self, feerate_per_kw: u32, commitment_tx: &Transaction, pre_keys: &PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys, htlcs: &[&HTLCOutputInCommitment], secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result<(Signature, Vec), ()> { if commitment_tx.input.len() != 1 { return Err(()); } let keys = pre_keys.trust_key_derivation(); let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key); let accepted_data = self.accepted_channel_data.as_ref().expect("must accept before signing"); - let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &accepted_data.remote_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey); + let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &accepted_data.counterparty_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey); - let commitment_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&commitment_tx).sighash_all(&commitment_tx.input[0], &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]); + let commitment_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(commitment_tx).signature_hash(0, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]); let commitment_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&commitment_sighash, &self.funding_key); let commitment_txid = commitment_tx.txid(); @@ -486,9 +485,9 @@ impl ChannelKeys for InMemoryChannelKeys { let mut htlc_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs.len()); for ref htlc in htlcs { if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index { - let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, accepted_data.local_to_self_delay, htlc, &keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key); + let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, accepted_data.holder_selected_contest_delay, htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key); let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys); - let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]); + let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]); let our_htlc_key = match chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.htlc_base_key) { Ok(s) => s, Err(_) => return Err(()), @@ -500,26 +499,26 @@ impl ChannelKeys for InMemoryChannelKeys { Ok((commitment_sig, htlc_sigs)) } - fn sign_local_commitment(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result { + fn sign_holder_commitment(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result { let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key); - let remote_channel_data = self.accepted_channel_data.as_ref().expect("must accept before signing"); - let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &remote_channel_data.remote_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey); + let counterparty_channel_data = self.accepted_channel_data.as_ref().expect("must accept before signing"); + let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &counterparty_channel_data.counterparty_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey); - Ok(local_commitment_tx.get_local_sig(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx)) + Ok(holder_commitment_tx.get_holder_sig(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx)) } #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))] - fn unsafe_sign_local_commitment(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result { + fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result { let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key); - let remote_channel_pubkeys = &self.accepted_channel_data.as_ref().expect("must accept before signing").remote_channel_pubkeys; - let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &remote_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey); + let counterparty_channel_pubkeys = &self.accepted_channel_data.as_ref().expect("must accept before signing").counterparty_channel_pubkeys; + let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &counterparty_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey); - Ok(local_commitment_tx.get_local_sig(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx)) + Ok(holder_commitment_tx.get_holder_sig(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx)) } - fn sign_local_commitment_htlc_transactions(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result>, ()> { - let local_csv = self.accepted_channel_data.as_ref().unwrap().remote_to_self_delay; - local_commitment_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, local_csv, secp_ctx) + fn sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions(&self, holder_commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result>, ()> { + let counterparty_selected_contest_delay = self.accepted_channel_data.as_ref().unwrap().counterparty_selected_contest_delay; + holder_commitment_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, counterparty_selected_contest_delay, secp_ctx) } fn sign_justice_transaction(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result { @@ -533,38 +532,38 @@ impl ChannelKeys for InMemoryChannelKeys { Err(_) => return Err(()) }; let witness_script = if let &Some(ref htlc) = htlc { - let remote_htlcpubkey = match chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.remote_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) { - Ok(remote_htlcpubkey) => remote_htlcpubkey, + let counterparty_htlcpubkey = match chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) { + Ok(counterparty_htlcpubkey) => counterparty_htlcpubkey, Err(_) => return Err(()) }; - let local_htlcpubkey = match chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) { - Ok(local_htlcpubkey) => local_htlcpubkey, + let holder_htlcpubkey = match chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) { + Ok(holder_htlcpubkey) => holder_htlcpubkey, Err(_) => return Err(()) }; - chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &remote_htlcpubkey, &local_htlcpubkey, &revocation_pubkey) + chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &counterparty_htlcpubkey, &holder_htlcpubkey, &revocation_pubkey) } else { - let remote_delayedpubkey = match chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.remote_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint) { - Ok(remote_delayedpubkey) => remote_delayedpubkey, + let counterparty_delayedpubkey = match chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint) { + Ok(counterparty_delayedpubkey) => counterparty_delayedpubkey, Err(_) => return Err(()) }; - chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.local_to_self_delay(), &remote_delayedpubkey) + chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.holder_selected_contest_delay(), &counterparty_delayedpubkey) }; - let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&justice_tx); - let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&justice_tx.input[input], &witness_script, amount)[..]); + let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(justice_tx); + let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.signature_hash(input, &witness_script, amount, SigHashType::All)[..]); return Ok(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)) } - fn sign_remote_htlc_transaction(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result { + fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result { if let Ok(htlc_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.htlc_base_key) { let witness_script = if let Ok(revocation_pubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint) { - if let Ok(remote_htlcpubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.remote_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) { - if let Ok(local_htlcpubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) { - chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &remote_htlcpubkey, &local_htlcpubkey, &revocation_pubkey) + if let Ok(counterparty_htlcpubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) { + if let Ok(htlcpubkey) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) { + chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &counterparty_htlcpubkey, &htlcpubkey, &revocation_pubkey) } else { return Err(()) } } else { return Err(()) } } else { return Err(()) }; - let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx); - let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[input], &witness_script, amount)[..]); + let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(htlc_tx); + let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.signature_hash(input, &witness_script, amount, SigHashType::All)[..]); return Ok(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key)) } Err(()) @@ -576,31 +575,31 @@ impl ChannelKeys for InMemoryChannelKeys { if closing_tx.output.len() > 2 { return Err(()); } let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key); - let remote_channel_data = self.accepted_channel_data.as_ref().expect("must accept before signing"); - let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &remote_channel_data.remote_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey); + let counterparty_channel_data = self.accepted_channel_data.as_ref().expect("must accept before signing"); + let channel_funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &counterparty_channel_data.counterparty_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey); - let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(closing_tx) - .sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]); + let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(closing_tx) + .signature_hash(0, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]); Ok(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.funding_key)) } - fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result { + fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result { let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]); Ok(secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.funding_key)) } - fn on_accept(&mut self, channel_pubkeys: &ChannelPublicKeys, remote_to_self_delay: u16, local_to_self_delay: u16) { + fn on_accept(&mut self, channel_pubkeys: &ChannelPublicKeys, counterparty_selected_contest_delay: u16, holder_selected_contest_delay: u16) { assert!(self.accepted_channel_data.is_none(), "Already accepted"); self.accepted_channel_data = Some(AcceptedChannelData { - remote_channel_pubkeys: channel_pubkeys.clone(), - remote_to_self_delay, - local_to_self_delay, + counterparty_channel_pubkeys: channel_pubkeys.clone(), + counterparty_selected_contest_delay, + holder_selected_contest_delay, }); } } impl_writeable!(AcceptedChannelData, 0, - { remote_channel_pubkeys, remote_to_self_delay, local_to_self_delay }); + { counterparty_channel_pubkeys, counterparty_selected_contest_delay, holder_selected_contest_delay }); impl Writeable for InMemoryChannelKeys { fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> { @@ -627,11 +626,11 @@ impl Readable for InMemoryChannelKeys { let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?; let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?; let commitment_seed = Readable::read(reader)?; - let remote_channel_data = Readable::read(reader)?; + let counterparty_channel_data = Readable::read(reader)?; let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?; let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only(); - let local_channel_pubkeys = - InMemoryChannelKeys::make_local_keys(&secp_ctx, &funding_key, &revocation_base_key, + let holder_channel_pubkeys = + InMemoryChannelKeys::make_holder_keys(&secp_ctx, &funding_key, &revocation_base_key, &payment_key, &delayed_payment_base_key, &htlc_base_key); let params_1 = Readable::read(reader)?; @@ -645,8 +644,8 @@ impl Readable for InMemoryChannelKeys { htlc_base_key, commitment_seed, channel_value_satoshis, - local_channel_pubkeys, - accepted_channel_data: remote_channel_data, + holder_channel_pubkeys, + accepted_channel_data: counterparty_channel_data, key_derivation_params: (params_1, params_2), }) } @@ -666,10 +665,8 @@ pub struct KeysManager { shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey, channel_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey, channel_child_index: AtomicUsize, - session_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey, - session_child_index: AtomicUsize, - channel_id_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey, - channel_id_child_index: AtomicUsize, + rand_bytes_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey, + rand_bytes_child_index: AtomicUsize, seed: [u8; 32], starting_time_secs: u64, @@ -678,7 +675,7 @@ pub struct KeysManager { impl KeysManager { /// Constructs a KeysManager from a 32-byte seed. If the seed is in some way biased (eg your - /// RNG is busted) this may panic (but more importantly, you will possibly lose funds). + /// CSRNG is busted) this may panic (but more importantly, you will possibly lose funds). /// starting_time isn't strictly required to actually be a time, but it must absolutely, /// without a doubt, be unique to this instance. ie if you start multiple times with the same /// seed, starting_time must be unique to each run. Thus, the easiest way to achieve this is to @@ -715,8 +712,7 @@ impl KeysManager { Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"), }; let channel_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(3).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted"); - let session_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(4).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted"); - let channel_id_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(5).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted"); + let rand_bytes_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(4).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted"); KeysManager { secp_ctx, @@ -725,10 +721,8 @@ impl KeysManager { shutdown_pubkey, channel_master_key, channel_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0), - session_master_key, - session_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0), - channel_id_master_key, - channel_id_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0), + rand_bytes_master_key, + rand_bytes_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0), seed: *seed, starting_time_secs, @@ -815,35 +809,20 @@ impl KeysInterface for KeysManager { self.shutdown_pubkey.clone() } - fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemoryChannelKeys { + fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Self::ChanKeySigner { let child_ix = self.channel_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel); let ix_and_nanos: u64 = (child_ix as u64) << 32 | (self.starting_time_nanos as u64); self.derive_channel_keys(channel_value_satoshis, ix_and_nanos, self.starting_time_secs) } - fn get_onion_rand(&self) -> (SecretKey, [u8; 32]) { + fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { let mut sha = self.derive_unique_start(); - let child_ix = self.session_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel); - let child_privkey = self.session_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(child_ix as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted"); - sha.input(&child_privkey.private_key.key[..]); - - let mut rng_seed = sha.clone(); - // Not exactly the most ideal construction, but the second value will get fed into - // ChaCha so it is another step harder to break. - rng_seed.input(b"RNG Seed Salt"); - sha.input(b"Session Key Salt"); - (SecretKey::from_slice(&Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()).expect("Your RNG is busted"), - Sha256::from_engine(rng_seed).into_inner()) - } - - fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] { - let mut sha = self.derive_unique_start(); - - let child_ix = self.channel_id_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel); - let child_privkey = self.channel_id_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(child_ix as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted"); + let child_ix = self.rand_bytes_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel); + let child_privkey = self.rand_bytes_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(child_ix as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted"); sha.input(&child_privkey.private_key.key[..]); + sha.input(b"Unique Secure Random Bytes Salt"); Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner() } }