X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fchain%2Fkeysinterface.rs;h=a2611e7df87f79fefad954aa3b9133addaeb650e;hb=56a01de61d0eab8c3d343b51e1a500098baa5aea;hp=db1c6e943716c4a6c0cc2060e48f6646a5ef175c;hpb=f4ab077a6938e5a2a28e33c25011cb80ce0a6611;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/keysinterface.rs b/lightning/src/chain/keysinterface.rs index db1c6e94..a2611e7d 100644 --- a/lightning/src/chain/keysinterface.rs +++ b/lightning/src/chain/keysinterface.rs @@ -7,9 +7,10 @@ // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these // licenses. -//! keysinterface provides keys into rust-lightning and defines some useful enums which describe -//! spendable on-chain outputs which the user owns and is responsible for using just as any other -//! on-chain output which is theirs. +//! Provides keys to LDK and defines some useful objects describing spendable on-chain outputs. +//! +//! The provided output descriptors follow a custom LDK data format and are currently not fully +//! compatible with Bitcoin Core output descriptors. use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, EcdsaSighashType}; use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder}; @@ -20,7 +21,6 @@ use bitcoin::util::sighash; use bitcoin::bech32::u5; use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine}; -use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::HashEngine as Sha256State; use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash; use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash; @@ -31,48 +31,53 @@ use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret; use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature; use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, secp256k1, Sequence, Witness}; -use crate::util::{byte_utils, transaction_utils}; +use crate::util::transaction_utils; use crate::util::crypto::{hkdf_extract_expand_twice, sign}; -use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, Readable, ReadableArgs}; - +use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, Readable}; +#[cfg(anchors)] +use crate::util::events::HTLCDescriptor; use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint; use crate::ln::channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI; use crate::ln::{chan_utils, PaymentPreimage}; use crate::ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CommitmentTransaction, ClosingTransaction}; -use crate::ln::msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement; +use crate::ln::msgs::{UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedGossipMessage}; use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript; use crate::prelude::*; +use core::convert::TryInto; use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering}; use crate::io::{self, Error}; use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT}; +use crate::util::atomic_counter::AtomicCounter; +use crate::util::chacha20::ChaCha20; use crate::util::invoice::construct_invoice_preimage; /// Used as initial key material, to be expanded into multiple secret keys (but not to be used /// directly). This is used within LDK to encrypt/decrypt inbound payment data. -/// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly +/// +/// (C-not exported) as we just use `[u8; 32]` directly #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] pub struct KeyMaterial(pub [u8; 32]); -/// Information about a spendable output to a P2WSH script. See -/// SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput for more details on how to spend this. +/// Information about a spendable output to a P2WSH script. +/// +/// See [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] for more details on how to spend this. #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] pub struct DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor { - /// The outpoint which is spendable + /// The outpoint which is spendable. pub outpoint: OutPoint, - /// Per commitment point to derive delayed_payment_key by key holder + /// Per commitment point to derive the delayed payment key by key holder. pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey, - /// The nSequence value which must be set in the spending input to satisfy the OP_CSV in + /// The `nSequence` value which must be set in the spending input to satisfy the `OP_CSV` in /// the witness_script. pub to_self_delay: u16, - /// The output which is referenced by the given outpoint + /// The output which is referenced by the given outpoint. pub output: TxOut, /// The revocation point specific to the commitment transaction which was broadcast. Used to /// derive the witnessScript for this output. pub revocation_pubkey: PublicKey, - /// Arbitrary identification information returned by a call to - /// `Sign::channel_keys_id()`. This may be useful in re-deriving keys used in - /// the channel to spend the output. + /// Arbitrary identification information returned by a call to [`ChannelSigner::channel_keys_id`]. + /// This may be useful in re-deriving keys used in the channel to spend the output. pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32], /// The value of the channel which this output originated from, possibly indirectly. pub channel_value_satoshis: u64, @@ -94,17 +99,17 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based!(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, { (12, channel_value_satoshis, required), }); -/// Information about a spendable output to our "payment key". See -/// SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput for more details on how to spend this. +/// Information about a spendable output to our "payment key". +/// +/// See [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput`] for more details on how to spend this. #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] pub struct StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor { - /// The outpoint which is spendable + /// The outpoint which is spendable. pub outpoint: OutPoint, - /// The output which is referenced by the given outpoint + /// The output which is referenced by the given outpoint. pub output: TxOut, - /// Arbitrary identification information returned by a call to - /// `Sign::channel_keys_id()`. This may be useful in re-deriving keys used in - /// the channel to spend the output. + /// Arbitrary identification information returned by a call to [`ChannelSigner::channel_keys_id`]. + /// This may be useful in re-deriving keys used in the channel to spend the output. pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32], /// The value of the channel which this transactions spends. pub channel_value_satoshis: u64, @@ -122,57 +127,76 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based!(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, { (6, channel_value_satoshis, required), }); -/// When on-chain outputs are created by rust-lightning (which our counterparty is not able to -/// claim at any point in the future) an event is generated which you must track and be able to -/// spend on-chain. The information needed to do this is provided in this enum, including the -/// outpoint describing which txid and output index is available, the full output which exists at -/// that txid/index, and any keys or other information required to sign. +/// Describes the necessary information to spend a spendable output. +/// +/// When on-chain outputs are created by LDK (which our counterparty is not able to claim at any +/// point in the future) a [`SpendableOutputs`] event is generated which you must track and be able +/// to spend on-chain. The information needed to do this is provided in this enum, including the +/// outpoint describing which `txid` and output `index` is available, the full output which exists +/// at that `txid`/`index`, and any keys or other information required to sign. +/// +/// [`SpendableOutputs`]: crate::util::events::Event::SpendableOutputs #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] pub enum SpendableOutputDescriptor { - /// An output to a script which was provided via KeysInterface directly, either from - /// `get_destination_script()` or `get_shutdown_scriptpubkey()`, thus you should already know - /// how to spend it. No secret keys are provided as rust-lightning was never given any key. + /// An output to a script which was provided via [`SignerProvider`] directly, either from + /// [`get_destination_script`] or [`get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`], thus you should already + /// know how to spend it. No secret keys are provided as LDK was never given any key. /// These may include outputs from a transaction punishing our counterparty or claiming an HTLC /// on-chain using the payment preimage or after it has timed out. + /// + /// [`get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]: SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey + /// [`get_destination_script`]: SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey StaticOutput { - /// The outpoint which is spendable + /// The outpoint which is spendable. outpoint: OutPoint, /// The output which is referenced by the given outpoint. output: TxOut, }, - /// An output to a P2WSH script which can be spent with a single signature after a CSV delay. + /// An output to a P2WSH script which can be spent with a single signature after an `OP_CSV` + /// delay. /// /// The witness in the spending input should be: + /// ```bitcoin /// (MINIMALIF standard rule) + /// ``` /// - /// Note that the nSequence field in the spending input must be set to to_self_delay - /// (which means the transaction is not broadcastable until at least to_self_delay - /// blocks after the outpoint confirms). + /// Note that the `nSequence` field in the spending input must be set to + /// [`DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor::to_self_delay`] (which means the transaction is not + /// broadcastable until at least [`DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor::to_self_delay`] blocks after + /// the outpoint confirms, see [BIP + /// 68](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0068.mediawiki)). Also note that LDK + /// won't generate a [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`] until the corresponding block height + /// is reached. /// /// These are generally the result of a "revocable" output to us, spendable only by us unless /// it is an output from an old state which we broadcast (which should never happen). /// - /// To derive the delayed_payment key which is used to sign for this input, you must pass the - /// holder delayed_payment_base_key (ie the private key which corresponds to the pubkey in - /// Sign::pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint) and the provided per_commitment_point to - /// chan_utils::derive_private_key. The public key can be generated without the secret key - /// using chan_utils::derive_public_key and only the delayed_payment_basepoint which appears in - /// Sign::pubkeys(). - /// - /// To derive the revocation_pubkey provided here (which is used in the witness - /// script generation), you must pass the counterparty revocation_basepoint (which appears in the - /// call to Sign::ready_channel) and the provided per_commitment point - /// to chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key. - /// - /// The witness script which is hashed and included in the output script_pubkey may be - /// regenerated by passing the revocation_pubkey (derived as above), our delayed_payment pubkey - /// (derived as above), and the to_self_delay contained here to - /// chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript. + /// To derive the delayed payment key which is used to sign this input, you must pass the + /// holder [`InMemorySigner::delayed_payment_base_key`] (i.e., the private key which corresponds to the + /// [`ChannelPublicKeys::delayed_payment_basepoint`] in [`ChannelSigner::pubkeys`]) and the provided + /// [`DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor::per_commitment_point`] to [`chan_utils::derive_private_key`]. The public key can be + /// generated without the secret key using [`chan_utils::derive_public_key`] and only the + /// [`ChannelPublicKeys::delayed_payment_basepoint`] which appears in [`ChannelSigner::pubkeys`]. + /// + /// To derive the [`DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor::revocation_pubkey`] provided here (which is + /// used in the witness script generation), you must pass the counterparty + /// [`ChannelPublicKeys::revocation_basepoint`] (which appears in the call to + /// [`ChannelSigner::provide_channel_parameters`]) and the provided + /// [`DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor::per_commitment_point`] to + /// [`chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key`]. + /// + /// The witness script which is hashed and included in the output `script_pubkey` may be + /// regenerated by passing the [`DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor::revocation_pubkey`] (derived + /// as explained above), our delayed payment pubkey (derived as explained above), and the + /// [`DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor::to_self_delay`] contained here to + /// [`chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript`]. DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor), - /// An output to a P2WPKH, spendable exclusively by our payment key (ie the private key which - /// corresponds to the public key in Sign::pubkeys().payment_point). - /// The witness in the spending input, is, thus, simply: + /// An output to a P2WPKH, spendable exclusively by our payment key (i.e., the private key + /// which corresponds to the `payment_point` in [`ChannelSigner::pubkeys`]). The witness + /// in the spending input is, thus, simply: + /// ```bitcoin /// + /// ``` /// /// These are generally the result of our counterparty having broadcast the current state, /// allowing us to claim the non-HTLC-encumbered outputs immediately. @@ -189,30 +213,14 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SpendableOutputDescriptor, (2, StaticPaymentOutput), ); -/// A trait to sign lightning channel transactions as described in BOLT 3. -/// -/// Signing services could be implemented on a hardware wallet. In this case, -/// the current Sign would be a front-end on top of a communication -/// channel connected to your secure device and lightning key material wouldn't -/// reside on a hot server. Nevertheless, a this deployment would still need -/// to trust the ChannelManager to avoid loss of funds as this latest component -/// could ask to sign commitment transaction with HTLCs paying to attacker pubkeys. -/// -/// A more secure iteration would be to use hashlock (or payment points) to pair -/// invoice/incoming HTLCs with outgoing HTLCs to implement a no-trust-ChannelManager -/// at the price of more state and computation on the hardware wallet side. In the future, -/// we are looking forward to design such interface. -/// -/// In any case, ChannelMonitor or fallback watchtowers are always going to be trusted -/// to act, as liveness and breach reply correctness are always going to be hard requirements -/// of LN security model, orthogonal of key management issues. -// TODO: We should remove Clone by instead requesting a new Sign copy when we create -// ChannelMonitors instead of expecting to clone the one out of the Channel into the monitors. -pub trait BaseSign { +/// A trait to handle Lightning channel key material without concretizing the channel type or +/// the signature mechanism. +pub trait ChannelSigner { /// Gets the per-commitment point for a specific commitment number /// - /// Note that the commitment number starts at (1 << 48) - 1 and counts backwards. + /// Note that the commitment number starts at `(1 << 48) - 1` and counts backwards. fn get_per_commitment_point(&self, idx: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> PublicKey; + /// Gets the commitment secret for a specific commitment number as part of the revocation process /// /// An external signer implementation should error here if the commitment was already signed @@ -220,9 +228,10 @@ pub trait BaseSign { /// /// May be called more than once for the same index. /// - /// Note that the commitment number starts at (1 << 48) - 1 and counts backwards. + /// Note that the commitment number starts at `(1 << 48) - 1` and counts backwards. // TODO: return a Result so we can signal a validation error fn release_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32]; + /// Validate the counterparty's signatures on the holder commitment transaction and HTLCs. /// /// This is required in order for the signer to make sure that releasing a commitment @@ -234,16 +243,39 @@ pub trait BaseSign { /// A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching /// preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored. /// - /// NOTE: all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional + /// Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional /// irrelevant or duplicate preimages. - fn validate_holder_commitment(&self, holder_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, preimages: Vec) -> Result<(), ()>; - /// Gets the holder's channel public keys and basepoints + fn validate_holder_commitment(&self, holder_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, + preimages: Vec) -> Result<(), ()>; + + /// Returns the holder's channel public keys and basepoints. fn pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys; - /// Gets an arbitrary identifier describing the set of keys which are provided back to you in - /// some SpendableOutputDescriptor types. This should be sufficient to identify this - /// Sign object uniquely and lookup or re-derive its keys. + + /// Returns an arbitrary identifier describing the set of keys which are provided back to you in + /// some [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`] types. This should be sufficient to identify this + /// [`EcdsaChannelSigner`] object uniquely and lookup or re-derive its keys. fn channel_keys_id(&self) -> [u8; 32]; + /// Set the counterparty static channel data, including basepoints, + /// `counterparty_selected`/`holder_selected_contest_delay` and funding outpoint. + /// + /// This data is static, and will never change for a channel once set. For a given [`ChannelSigner`] + /// instance, LDK will call this method exactly once - either immediately after construction + /// (not including if done via [`SignerProvider::read_chan_signer`]) or when the funding + /// information has been generated. + /// + /// channel_parameters.is_populated() MUST be true. + fn provide_channel_parameters(&mut self, channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters); +} + +/// A trait to sign Lightning channel transactions as described in +/// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md). +/// +/// Signing services could be implemented on a hardware wallet and should implement signing +/// policies in order to be secure. Please refer to the [VLS Policy +/// Controls](https://gitlab.com/lightning-signer/validating-lightning-signer/-/blob/main/docs/policy-controls.md) +/// for an example of such policies. +pub trait EcdsaChannelSigner: ChannelSigner { /// Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions. /// /// Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed. @@ -255,40 +287,43 @@ pub trait BaseSign { /// A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching /// preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored. /// - /// NOTE: all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional + /// Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional /// irrelevant or duplicate preimages. // // TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing. - fn sign_counterparty_commitment(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, preimages: Vec, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result<(Signature, Vec), ()>; + fn sign_counterparty_commitment(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, + preimages: Vec, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1 + ) -> Result<(Signature, Vec), ()>; /// Validate the counterparty's revocation. /// /// This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved /// forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment. fn validate_counterparty_revocation(&self, idx: u64, secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<(), ()>; - - /// Create a signatures for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions. - /// This will only ever be called with a non-revoked commitment_tx. This will be called with the - /// latest commitment_tx when we initiate a force-close. - /// This will be called with the previous latest, just to get claiming HTLC signatures, if we are - /// reacting to a ChannelMonitor replica that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to - /// the latest. + /// Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions. + /// + /// This will be called + /// - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`. + /// - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close. + /// - with the previous `commitment_tx`, just to get claiming HTLC + /// signatures, if we are reacting to a [`ChannelMonitor`] + /// [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas) + /// that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest `commitment_tx`. + /// /// This may be called multiple times for the same transaction. /// /// An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked. /// - /// May return Err if key derivation fails. Callers, such as ChannelMonitor, will panic in such a case. - // + /// [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor // TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing. - // TODO: Key derivation failure should panic rather than Err - fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result<(Signature, Vec), ()>; - - /// Same as sign_holder_commitment, but exists only for tests to get access to holder commitment - /// transactions which will be broadcasted later, after the channel has moved on to a newer - /// state. Thus, needs its own method as sign_holder_commitment may enforce that we only ever - /// get called once. + fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, + secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result<(Signature, Vec), ()>; + /// Same as [`sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs`], but exists only for tests to get access to + /// holder commitment transactions which will be broadcasted later, after the channel has moved + /// on to a newer state. Thus, needs its own method as [`sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs`] may + /// enforce that we only ever get called once. #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))] - fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result<(Signature, Vec), ()>; - + fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, + secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result<(Signature, Vec), ()>; /// Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output /// or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state. /// @@ -299,12 +334,13 @@ pub trait BaseSign { /// /// Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature. /// - /// per_commitment_key is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they + /// `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they /// revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does - /// not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do + /// not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do /// so). - fn sign_justice_revoked_output(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result; - + fn sign_justice_revoked_output(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, + per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1 + ) -> Result; /// Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction /// HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state. /// @@ -313,17 +349,30 @@ pub trait BaseSign { /// It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards /// to an upcoming timelock expiration. /// - /// Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature. + /// `amount` is the value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 + /// signature. /// - /// per_commitment_key is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they + /// `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they /// revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does /// not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do /// so). /// - /// htlc holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script + /// `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script /// (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures). - fn sign_justice_revoked_htlc(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result; - + fn sign_justice_revoked_htlc(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, + per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, + secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result; + #[cfg(anchors)] + /// Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's HTLC output used as an input within + /// `htlc_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction at index `input`. The signature returned + /// must be be computed using [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]. Note that this should only be used to + /// sign HTLC transactions from channels supporting anchor outputs after all additional + /// inputs/outputs have been added to the transaction. + /// + /// [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType::All + fn sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, + htlc_descriptor: &HTLCDescriptor, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1 + ) -> Result; /// Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment /// transaction, either offered or received. /// @@ -332,64 +381,56 @@ pub trait BaseSign { /// signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is /// needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration. /// - /// Witness_script is either a offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC + /// `witness_script` is either an offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC /// outputs. /// - /// Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature. + /// `amount` is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature. /// - /// Per_commitment_point is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state + /// `per_commitment_point` is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state /// detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive /// channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the /// BIP 143 signature. - fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result; - + fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, + per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, + secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result; /// Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction. /// /// Note that, due to rounding, there may be one "missing" satoshi, and either party may have /// chosen to forgo their output as dust. - fn sign_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result; - + fn sign_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, + secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result; /// Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an /// input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`. fn sign_holder_anchor_input( &self, anchor_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, ) -> Result; - - /// Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key and our node secret key (aka - /// node_id or network_key), proving it comes from one of the channel participants. + /// Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key proving it comes from one of the + /// channel participants. /// - /// The first returned signature should be from our node secret key, the second from our - /// funding key. + /// Channel announcements also require a signature from each node's network key. Our node + /// signature is computed through [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`]. /// /// Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and /// our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the /// protocol. - fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) - -> Result<(Signature, Signature), ()>; - - /// Set the counterparty static channel data, including basepoints, - /// counterparty_selected/holder_selected_contest_delay and funding outpoint. - /// This is done as soon as the funding outpoint is known. Since these are static channel data, - /// they MUST NOT be allowed to change to different values once set. - /// - /// channel_parameters.is_populated() MUST be true. - /// - /// We bind holder_selected_contest_delay late here for API convenience. - /// - /// Will be called before any signatures are applied. - fn ready_channel(&mut self, channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters); + fn sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key( + &self, msg: &UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1 + ) -> Result; } -/// A cloneable signer. +/// A writeable signer. /// -/// Although we require signers to be cloneable, it may be useful for developers to be able to use -/// signers in an un-sized way, for example as `dyn BaseSign`. Therefore we separate the Clone trait, -/// which implies Sized, into this derived trait. -pub trait Sign: BaseSign + Writeable + Clone { -} +/// There will always be two instances of a signer per channel, one occupied by the +/// [`ChannelManager`] and another by the channel's [`ChannelMonitor`]. +/// +/// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager +/// [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor +pub trait WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner: EcdsaChannelSigner + Writeable {} -/// Specifies the recipient of an invoice, to indicate to [`KeysInterface::sign_invoice`] what node -/// secret key should be used to sign the invoice. +/// Specifies the recipient of an invoice. +/// +/// This indicates to [`NodeSigner::sign_invoice`] what node secret key should be used to sign +/// the invoice. pub enum Recipient { /// The invoice should be signed with the local node secret key. Node, @@ -400,132 +441,151 @@ pub enum Recipient { PhantomNode, } -/// A trait to describe an object which can get user secrets and key material. -pub trait KeysInterface { - /// A type which implements Sign which will be returned by get_channel_signer. - type Signer : Sign; +/// A trait that describes a source of entropy. +pub trait EntropySource { + /// Gets a unique, cryptographically-secure, random 32-byte value. This method must return a + /// different value each time it is called. + fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32]; +} - /// Get node secret key based on the provided [`Recipient`]. +/// A trait that can handle cryptographic operations at the scope level of a node. +pub trait NodeSigner { + /// Get secret key material as bytes for use in encrypting and decrypting inbound payment data. /// - /// The node_id/network_key is the public key that corresponds to this secret key. + /// If the implementor of this trait supports [phantom node payments], then every node that is + /// intended to be included in the phantom invoice route hints must return the same value from + /// this method. + // This is because LDK avoids storing inbound payment data by encrypting payment data in the + // payment hash and/or payment secret, therefore for a payment to be receivable by multiple + // nodes, they must share the key that encrypts this payment data. /// - /// This method must return the same value each time it is called with a given `Recipient` - /// parameter. + /// This method must return the same value each time it is called. /// - /// Errors if the `Recipient` variant is not supported by the implementation. - fn get_node_secret(&self, recipient: Recipient) -> Result; - /// Get node id based on the provided [`Recipient`]. This public key corresponds to the secret in - /// [`get_node_secret`]. + /// [phantom node payments]: PhantomKeysManager + fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial; + + /// Get node id based on the provided [`Recipient`]. /// - /// This method must return the same value each time it is called with a given `Recipient` + /// This method must return the same value each time it is called with a given [`Recipient`] /// parameter. /// - /// Errors if the `Recipient` variant is not supported by the implementation. - /// - /// [`get_node_secret`]: KeysInterface::get_node_secret - fn get_node_id(&self, recipient: Recipient) -> Result { - let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only(); - Ok(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &self.get_node_secret(recipient)?)) - } - /// Gets the ECDH shared secret of our [`node secret`] and `other_key`, multiplying by `tweak` if + /// Errors if the [`Recipient`] variant is not supported by the implementation. + fn get_node_id(&self, recipient: Recipient) -> Result; + + /// Gets the ECDH shared secret of our node secret and `other_key`, multiplying by `tweak` if /// one is provided. Note that this tweak can be applied to `other_key` instead of our node /// secret, though this is less efficient. /// - /// Errors if the `Recipient` variant is not supported by the implementation. + /// Note that if this fails while attempting to forward an HTLC, LDK will panic. The error + /// should be resolved to allow LDK to resume forwarding HTLCs. /// - /// [`node secret`]: Self::get_node_secret + /// Errors if the [`Recipient`] variant is not supported by the implementation. fn ecdh(&self, recipient: Recipient, other_key: &PublicKey, tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result; - /// Get a script pubkey which we send funds to when claiming on-chain contestable outputs. + + /// Sign an invoice. /// - /// This method should return a different value each time it is called, to avoid linking - /// on-chain funds across channels as controlled to the same user. - fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script; - /// Get a script pubkey which we will send funds to when closing a channel. + /// By parameterizing by the raw invoice bytes instead of the hash, we allow implementors of + /// this trait to parse the invoice and make sure they're signing what they expect, rather than + /// blindly signing the hash. /// - /// This method should return a different value each time it is called, to avoid linking - /// on-chain funds across channels as controlled to the same user. - fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript; - /// Get a new set of Sign for per-channel secrets. These MUST be unique even if you - /// restarted with some stale data! + /// The `hrp_bytes` are ASCII bytes, while the `invoice_data` is base32. /// - /// This method must return a different value each time it is called. - fn get_channel_signer(&self, inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Self::Signer; - /// Gets a unique, cryptographically-secure, random 32 byte value. This is used for encrypting - /// onion packets and for temporary channel IDs. There is no requirement that these be - /// persisted anywhere, though they must be unique across restarts. + /// The secret key used to sign the invoice is dependent on the [`Recipient`]. + /// + /// Errors if the [`Recipient`] variant is not supported by the implementation. + fn sign_invoice(&self, hrp_bytes: &[u8], invoice_data: &[u5], recipient: Recipient) -> Result; + + /// Sign a gossip message. + /// + /// Note that if this fails, LDK may panic and the message will not be broadcast to the network + /// or a possible channel counterparty. If LDK panics, the error should be resolved to allow the + /// message to be broadcast, as otherwise it may prevent one from receiving funds over the + /// corresponding channel. + fn sign_gossip_message(&self, msg: UnsignedGossipMessage) -> Result; +} + +/// A trait that can return signer instances for individual channels. +pub trait SignerProvider { + /// A type which implements [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`] which will be returned by [`Self::derive_channel_signer`]. + type Signer : WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner; + + /// Generates a unique `channel_keys_id` that can be used to obtain a [`Self::Signer`] through + /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`]. The `user_channel_id` is provided to allow + /// implementations of [`SignerProvider`] to maintain a mapping between itself and the generated + /// `channel_keys_id`. /// /// This method must return a different value each time it is called. - fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32]; + fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64, user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32]; + + /// Derives the private key material backing a `Signer`. + /// + /// To derive a new `Signer`, a fresh `channel_keys_id` should be obtained through + /// [`SignerProvider::generate_channel_keys_id`]. Otherwise, an existing `Signer` can be + /// re-derived from its `channel_keys_id`, which can be obtained through its trait method + /// [`ChannelSigner::channel_keys_id`]. + fn derive_channel_signer(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer; - /// Reads a `Signer` for this `KeysInterface` from the given input stream. + /// Reads a [`Signer`] for this [`SignerProvider`] from the given input stream. /// This is only called during deserialization of other objects which contain - /// `Sign`-implementing objects (ie `ChannelMonitor`s and `ChannelManager`s). + /// [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`]-implementing objects (i.e., [`ChannelMonitor`]s and [`ChannelManager`]s). /// The bytes are exactly those which `::write()` writes, and /// contain no versioning scheme. You may wish to include your own version prefix and ensure /// you've read all of the provided bytes to ensure no corruption occurred. - fn read_chan_signer(&self, reader: &[u8]) -> Result; - - /// Sign an invoice. - /// By parameterizing by the raw invoice bytes instead of the hash, we allow implementors of - /// this trait to parse the invoice and make sure they're signing what they expect, rather than - /// blindly signing the hash. - /// The hrp is ascii bytes, while the invoice data is base32. /// - /// The secret key used to sign the invoice is dependent on the [`Recipient`]. + /// This method is slowly being phased out -- it will only be called when reading objects + /// written by LDK versions prior to 0.0.113. /// - /// Errors if the `Recipient` variant is not supported by the implementation. - fn sign_invoice(&self, hrp_bytes: &[u8], invoice_data: &[u5], receipient: Recipient) -> Result; + /// [`Signer`]: Self::Signer + /// [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor + /// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager + fn read_chan_signer(&self, reader: &[u8]) -> Result; - /// Get secret key material as bytes for use in encrypting and decrypting inbound payment data. - /// - /// If the implementor of this trait supports [phantom node payments], then every node that is - /// intended to be included in the phantom invoice route hints must return the same value from - /// this method. - // This is because LDK avoids storing inbound payment data by encrypting payment data in the - // payment hash and/or payment secret, therefore for a payment to be receivable by multiple - // nodes, they must share the key that encrypts this payment data. + /// Get a script pubkey which we send funds to when claiming on-chain contestable outputs. /// - /// This method must return the same value each time it is called. + /// This method should return a different value each time it is called, to avoid linking + /// on-chain funds across channels as controlled to the same user. + fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script; + + /// Get a script pubkey which we will send funds to when closing a channel. /// - /// [phantom node payments]: PhantomKeysManager - fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial; + /// This method should return a different value each time it is called, to avoid linking + /// on-chain funds across channels as controlled to the same user. + fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript; } #[derive(Clone)] -/// A simple implementation of Sign that just keeps the private keys in memory. +/// A simple implementation of [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`] that just keeps the private keys in memory. /// /// This implementation performs no policy checks and is insufficient by itself as /// a secure external signer. pub struct InMemorySigner { - /// Private key of anchor tx + /// Holder secret key in the 2-of-2 multisig script of a channel. This key also backs the + /// holder's anchor output in a commitment transaction, if one is present. pub funding_key: SecretKey, - /// Holder secret key for blinded revocation pubkey + /// Holder secret key for blinded revocation pubkey. pub revocation_base_key: SecretKey, - /// Holder secret key used for our balance in counterparty-broadcasted commitment transactions + /// Holder secret key used for our balance in counterparty-broadcasted commitment transactions. pub payment_key: SecretKey, - /// Holder secret key used in HTLC tx + /// Holder secret key used in an HTLC transaction. pub delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey, - /// Holder htlc secret key used in commitment tx htlc outputs + /// Holder HTLC secret key used in commitment transaction HTLC outputs. pub htlc_base_key: SecretKey, - /// Commitment seed + /// Commitment seed. pub commitment_seed: [u8; 32], - /// Holder public keys and basepoints + /// Holder public keys and basepoints. pub(crate) holder_channel_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys, - /// Private key of our node secret, used for signing channel announcements - node_secret: SecretKey, - /// Counterparty public keys and counterparty/holder selected_contest_delay, populated on channel acceptance + /// Counterparty public keys and counterparty/holder `selected_contest_delay`, populated on channel acceptance. channel_parameters: Option, - /// The total value of this channel + /// The total value of this channel. channel_value_satoshis: u64, - /// Key derivation parameters + /// Key derivation parameters. channel_keys_id: [u8; 32], } impl InMemorySigner { - /// Create a new InMemorySigner + /// Creates a new [`InMemorySigner`]. pub fn new( secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, - node_secret: SecretKey, funding_key: SecretKey, revocation_base_key: SecretKey, payment_key: SecretKey, @@ -537,8 +597,8 @@ impl InMemorySigner { ) -> InMemorySigner { let holder_channel_pubkeys = InMemorySigner::make_holder_keys(secp_ctx, &funding_key, &revocation_base_key, - &payment_key, &delayed_payment_base_key, - &htlc_base_key); + &payment_key, &delayed_payment_base_key, + &htlc_base_key); InMemorySigner { funding_key, revocation_base_key, @@ -546,7 +606,6 @@ impl InMemorySigner { delayed_payment_base_key, htlc_base_key, commitment_seed, - node_secret, channel_value_satoshis, holder_channel_pubkeys, channel_parameters: None, @@ -555,11 +614,11 @@ impl InMemorySigner { } fn make_holder_keys(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, - funding_key: &SecretKey, - revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, - payment_key: &SecretKey, - delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, - htlc_base_key: &SecretKey) -> ChannelPublicKeys { + funding_key: &SecretKey, + revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, + payment_key: &SecretKey, + delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, + htlc_base_key: &SecretKey) -> ChannelPublicKeys { let from_secret = |s: &SecretKey| PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, s); ChannelPublicKeys { funding_pubkey: from_secret(&funding_key), @@ -570,50 +629,51 @@ impl InMemorySigner { } } - /// Counterparty pubkeys. - /// Will panic if ready_channel wasn't called. + /// Returns the counterparty's pubkeys. + /// + /// Will panic if [`ChannelSigner::provide_channel_parameters`] has not been called before. pub fn counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { &self.get_channel_parameters().counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys } - - /// The contest_delay value specified by our counterparty and applied on holder-broadcastable - /// transactions, ie the amount of time that we have to wait to recover our funds if we + /// Returns the `contest_delay` value specified by our counterparty and applied on holder-broadcastable + /// transactions, i.e., the amount of time that we have to wait to recover our funds if we /// broadcast a transaction. - /// Will panic if ready_channel wasn't called. + /// + /// Will panic if [`ChannelSigner::provide_channel_parameters`] has not been called before. pub fn counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 { self.get_channel_parameters().counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().selected_contest_delay } - - /// The contest_delay value specified by us and applied on transactions broadcastable - /// by our counterparty, ie the amount of time that they have to wait to recover their funds + /// Returns the `contest_delay` value specified by us and applied on transactions broadcastable + /// by our counterparty, i.e., the amount of time that they have to wait to recover their funds /// if they broadcast a transaction. - /// Will panic if ready_channel wasn't called. + /// + /// Will panic if [`ChannelSigner::provide_channel_parameters`] has not been called before. pub fn holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 { self.get_channel_parameters().holder_selected_contest_delay } - - /// Whether the holder is the initiator - /// Will panic if ready_channel wasn't called. + /// Returns whether the holder is the initiator. + /// + /// Will panic if [`ChannelSigner::provide_channel_parameters`] has not been called before. pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool { self.get_channel_parameters().is_outbound_from_holder } - /// Funding outpoint - /// Will panic if ready_channel wasn't called. + /// + /// Will panic if [`ChannelSigner::provide_channel_parameters`] has not been called before. pub fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> &OutPoint { self.get_channel_parameters().funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap() } - - /// Obtain a ChannelTransactionParameters for this channel, to be used when verifying or + /// Returns a [`ChannelTransactionParameters`] for this channel, to be used when verifying or /// building transactions. /// - /// Will panic if ready_channel wasn't called. + /// Will panic if [`ChannelSigner::provide_channel_parameters`] has not been called before. pub fn get_channel_parameters(&self) -> &ChannelTransactionParameters { self.channel_parameters.as_ref().unwrap() } - - /// Whether anchors should be used. - /// Will panic if ready_channel wasn't called. + /// Returns whether anchors should be used. + /// + /// Will panic if [`ChannelSigner::provide_channel_parameters`] has not been called before. pub fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool { self.get_channel_parameters().opt_anchors.is_some() } - - /// Sign the single input of spend_tx at index `input_idx` which spends the output - /// described by descriptor, returning the witness stack for the input. + /// Sign the single input of `spend_tx` at index `input_idx`, which spends the output described + /// by `descriptor`, returning the witness stack for the input. + /// + /// Returns an error if the input at `input_idx` does not exist, has a non-empty `script_sig`, + /// is not spending the outpoint described by [`descriptor.outpoint`], + /// or if an output descriptor `script_pubkey` does not match the one we can spend. /// - /// Returns an Err if the input at input_idx does not exist, has a non-empty script_sig, - /// is not spending the outpoint described by `descriptor.outpoint`, - /// or if an output descriptor script_pubkey does not match the one we can spend. + /// [`descriptor.outpoint`]: StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor::outpoint pub fn sign_counterparty_payment_input(&self, spend_tx: &Transaction, input_idx: usize, descriptor: &StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result>, ()> { // TODO: We really should be taking the SigHashCache as a parameter here instead of // spend_tx, but ideally the SigHashCache would expose the transaction's inputs read-only @@ -629,7 +689,7 @@ impl InMemorySigner { let remotesig = sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, &self.payment_key); let payment_script = bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: remotepubkey}, Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(); - if payment_script != descriptor.output.script_pubkey { return Err(()); } + if payment_script != descriptor.output.script_pubkey { return Err(()); } let mut witness = Vec::with_capacity(2); witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der().to_vec()); @@ -638,13 +698,16 @@ impl InMemorySigner { Ok(witness) } - /// Sign the single input of spend_tx at index `input_idx` which spends the output - /// described by descriptor, returning the witness stack for the input. + /// Sign the single input of `spend_tx` at index `input_idx` which spends the output + /// described by `descriptor`, returning the witness stack for the input. /// - /// Returns an Err if the input at input_idx does not exist, has a non-empty script_sig, - /// is not spending the outpoint described by `descriptor.outpoint`, does not have a - /// sequence set to `descriptor.to_self_delay`, or if an output descriptor - /// script_pubkey does not match the one we can spend. + /// Returns an error if the input at `input_idx` does not exist, has a non-empty `script_sig`, + /// is not spending the outpoint described by [`descriptor.outpoint`], does not have a + /// sequence set to [`descriptor.to_self_delay`], or if an output descriptor + /// `script_pubkey` does not match the one we can spend. + /// + /// [`descriptor.outpoint`]: DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor::outpoint + /// [`descriptor.to_self_delay`]: DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor::to_self_delay pub fn sign_dynamic_p2wsh_input(&self, spend_tx: &Transaction, input_idx: usize, descriptor: &DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result>, ()> { // TODO: We really should be taking the SigHashCache as a parameter here instead of // spend_tx, but ideally the SigHashCache would expose the transaction's inputs read-only @@ -671,10 +734,9 @@ impl InMemorySigner { witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes()); Ok(witness) } - } -impl BaseSign for InMemorySigner { +impl ChannelSigner for InMemorySigner { fn get_per_commitment_point(&self, idx: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> PublicKey { let commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&self.commitment_seed, idx)).unwrap(); PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &commitment_secret) @@ -689,8 +751,21 @@ impl BaseSign for InMemorySigner { } fn pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { &self.holder_channel_pubkeys } + fn channel_keys_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] { self.channel_keys_id } + fn provide_channel_parameters(&mut self, channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters) { + assert!(self.channel_parameters.is_none() || self.channel_parameters.as_ref().unwrap() == channel_parameters); + if self.channel_parameters.is_some() { + // The channel parameters were already set and they match, return early. + return; + } + assert!(channel_parameters.is_populated(), "Channel parameters must be fully populated"); + self.channel_parameters = Some(channel_parameters.clone()); + } +} + +impl EcdsaChannelSigner for InMemorySigner { fn sign_counterparty_commitment(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, _preimages: Vec, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result<(Signature, Vec), ()> { let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust(); let keys = trusted_tx.keys(); @@ -768,6 +843,24 @@ impl BaseSign for InMemorySigner { return Ok(sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, &revocation_key)) } + #[cfg(anchors)] + fn sign_holder_htlc_transaction( + &self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, htlc_descriptor: &HTLCDescriptor, + secp_ctx: &Secp256k1 + ) -> Result { + let per_commitment_point = self.get_per_commitment_point( + htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp_ctx + ); + let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&per_commitment_point, secp_ctx); + let sighash = &sighash::SighashCache::new(&*htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash( + input, &witness_script, htlc_descriptor.htlc.amount_msat / 1000, EcdsaSighashType::All + ).map_err(|_| ())?; + let our_htlc_private_key = chan_utils::derive_private_key( + &secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.htlc_base_key + ); + Ok(sign(&secp_ctx, &hash_to_message!(sighash), &our_htlc_private_key)) + } + fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result { let htlc_key = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.htlc_base_key); let revocation_pubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint); @@ -795,23 +888,19 @@ impl BaseSign for InMemorySigner { Ok(sign(secp_ctx, &hash_to_message!(&sighash[..]), &self.funding_key)) } - fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) - -> Result<(Signature, Signature), ()> { + fn sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key( + &self, msg: &UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1 + ) -> Result { let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]); - Ok((sign(secp_ctx, &msghash, &self.node_secret), sign(secp_ctx, &msghash, &self.funding_key))) - } - - fn ready_channel(&mut self, channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters) { - assert!(self.channel_parameters.is_none(), "Acceptance already noted"); - assert!(channel_parameters.is_populated(), "Channel parameters must be fully populated"); - self.channel_parameters = Some(channel_parameters.clone()); + Ok(sign(secp_ctx, &msghash, &self.funding_key)) } } const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; + const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; -impl Sign for InMemorySigner {} +impl WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner for InMemorySigner {} impl Writeable for InMemorySigner { fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> { @@ -833,8 +922,8 @@ impl Writeable for InMemorySigner { } } -impl ReadableArgs for InMemorySigner { - fn read(reader: &mut R, node_secret: SecretKey) -> Result { +impl Readable for InMemorySigner { + fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result { let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION); let funding_key = Readable::read(reader)?; @@ -848,8 +937,7 @@ impl ReadableArgs for InMemorySigner { let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only(); let holder_channel_pubkeys = InMemorySigner::make_holder_keys(&secp_ctx, &funding_key, &revocation_base_key, - &payment_key, &delayed_payment_base_key, - &htlc_base_key); + &payment_key, &delayed_payment_base_key, &htlc_base_key); let keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?; read_tlv_fields!(reader, {}); @@ -860,7 +948,6 @@ impl ReadableArgs for InMemorySigner { payment_key, delayed_payment_base_key, htlc_base_key, - node_secret, commitment_seed, channel_value_satoshis, holder_channel_pubkeys, @@ -870,12 +957,12 @@ impl ReadableArgs for InMemorySigner { } } -/// Simple KeysInterface implementor that takes a 32-byte seed for use as a BIP 32 extended key -/// and derives keys from that. +/// Simple implementation of [`EntropySource`], [`NodeSigner`], and [`SignerProvider`] that takes a +/// 32-byte seed for use as a BIP 32 extended key and derives keys from that. /// -/// Your node_id is seed/0' -/// ChannelMonitor closes may use seed/1' -/// Cooperative closes may use seed/2' +/// Your `node_id` is seed/0'. +/// Unilateral closes may use seed/1'. +/// Cooperative closes may use seed/2'. /// The two close keys may be needed to claim on-chain funds! /// /// This struct cannot be used for nodes that wish to support receiving phantom payments; @@ -893,9 +980,8 @@ pub struct KeysManager { channel_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey, channel_child_index: AtomicUsize, - rand_bytes_master_key: ExtendedPrivKey, - rand_bytes_child_index: AtomicUsize, - rand_bytes_unique_start: Sha256State, + rand_bytes_unique_start: [u8; 32], + rand_bytes_index: AtomicCounter, seed: [u8; 32], starting_time_secs: u64, @@ -903,25 +989,23 @@ pub struct KeysManager { } impl KeysManager { - /// Constructs a KeysManager from a 32-byte seed. If the seed is in some way biased (eg your - /// CSRNG is busted) this may panic (but more importantly, you will possibly lose funds). - /// starting_time isn't strictly required to actually be a time, but it must absolutely, + /// Constructs a [`KeysManager`] from a 32-byte seed. If the seed is in some way biased (e.g., + /// your CSRNG is busted) this may panic (but more importantly, you will possibly lose funds). + /// `starting_time` isn't strictly required to actually be a time, but it must absolutely, /// without a doubt, be unique to this instance. ie if you start multiple times with the same - /// seed, starting_time must be unique to each run. Thus, the easiest way to achieve this is to - /// simply use the current time (with very high precision). + /// `seed`, `starting_time` must be unique to each run. Thus, the easiest way to achieve this + /// is to simply use the current time (with very high precision). /// - /// The seed MUST be backed up safely prior to use so that the keys can be re-created, however, - /// obviously, starting_time should be unique every time you reload the library - it is only + /// The `seed` MUST be backed up safely prior to use so that the keys can be re-created, however, + /// obviously, `starting_time` should be unique every time you reload the library - it is only /// used to generate new ephemeral key data (which will be stored by the individual channel if /// necessary). /// /// Note that the seed is required to recover certain on-chain funds independent of - /// ChannelMonitor data, though a current copy of ChannelMonitor data is also required for any - /// channel, and some on-chain during-closing funds. + /// [`ChannelMonitor`] data, though a current copy of [`ChannelMonitor`] data is also required + /// for any channel, and some on-chain during-closing funds. /// - /// Note that until the 0.1 release there is no guarantee of backward compatibility between - /// versions. Once the library is more fully supported, the docs will be updated to include a - /// detailed description of the guarantee. + /// [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor pub fn new(seed: &[u8; 32], starting_time_secs: u64, starting_time_nanos: u32) -> Self { let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); // Note that when we aren't serializing the key, network doesn't matter @@ -933,8 +1017,8 @@ impl KeysManager { Ok(destination_key) => { let wpubkey_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&ExtendedPubKey::from_priv(&secp_ctx, &destination_key).to_pub().to_bytes()); Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0) - .push_slice(&wpubkey_hash.into_inner()) - .into_script() + .push_slice(&wpubkey_hash.into_inner()) + .into_script() }, Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"), }; @@ -943,15 +1027,16 @@ impl KeysManager { Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"), }; let channel_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(3).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted"); - let rand_bytes_master_key = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(4).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted"); let inbound_payment_key: SecretKey = master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(5).unwrap()).expect("Your RNG is busted").private_key; let mut inbound_pmt_key_bytes = [0; 32]; inbound_pmt_key_bytes.copy_from_slice(&inbound_payment_key[..]); - let mut rand_bytes_unique_start = Sha256::engine(); - rand_bytes_unique_start.input(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(starting_time_secs)); - rand_bytes_unique_start.input(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(starting_time_nanos)); - rand_bytes_unique_start.input(seed); + let mut rand_bytes_engine = Sha256::engine(); + rand_bytes_engine.input(&starting_time_secs.to_be_bytes()); + rand_bytes_engine.input(&starting_time_nanos.to_be_bytes()); + rand_bytes_engine.input(seed); + rand_bytes_engine.input(b"LDK PRNG Seed"); + let rand_bytes_unique_start = Sha256::from_engine(rand_bytes_engine).into_inner(); let mut res = KeysManager { secp_ctx, @@ -965,9 +1050,8 @@ impl KeysManager { channel_master_key, channel_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0), - rand_bytes_master_key, - rand_bytes_child_index: AtomicUsize::new(0), rand_bytes_unique_start, + rand_bytes_index: AtomicCounter::new(), seed: *seed, starting_time_secs, @@ -980,14 +1064,9 @@ impl KeysManager { Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"), } } - /// Derive an old Sign containing per-channel secrets based on a key derivation parameters. - /// - /// Key derivation parameters are accessible through a per-channel secrets - /// Sign::channel_keys_id and is provided inside DynamicOuputP2WSH in case of - /// onchain output detection for which a corresponding delayed_payment_key must be derived. + /// Derive an old [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`] containing per-channel secrets based on a key derivation parameters. pub fn derive_channel_keys(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, params: &[u8; 32]) -> InMemorySigner { - let chan_id = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(¶ms[0..8]); - assert!(chan_id <= core::u32::MAX as u64); // Otherwise the params field wasn't created by us + let chan_id = u64::from_be_bytes(params[0..8].try_into().unwrap()); let mut unique_start = Sha256::engine(); unique_start.input(params); unique_start.input(&self.seed); @@ -995,7 +1074,9 @@ impl KeysManager { // We only seriously intend to rely on the channel_master_key for true secure // entropy, everything else just ensures uniqueness. We rely on the unique_start (ie // starting_time provided in the constructor) to be unique. - let child_privkey = self.channel_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(chan_id as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted"); + let child_privkey = self.channel_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, + ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx((chan_id as u32) % (1 << 31)).expect("key space exhausted") + ).expect("Your RNG is busted"); unique_start.input(&child_privkey.private_key[..]); let seed = Sha256::from_engine(unique_start).into_inner(); @@ -1023,7 +1104,6 @@ impl KeysManager { InMemorySigner::new( &self.secp_ctx, - self.node_secret, funding_key, revocation_base_key, payment_key, @@ -1035,7 +1115,7 @@ impl KeysManager { ) } - /// Creates a Transaction which spends the given descriptors to the given outputs, plus an + /// Creates a [`Transaction`] which spends the given descriptors to the given outputs, plus an /// output to the given change destination (if sufficient change value remains). The /// transaction will have a feerate, at least, of the given value. /// @@ -1045,8 +1125,8 @@ impl KeysManager { /// /// We do not enforce that outputs meet the dust limit or that any output scripts are standard. /// - /// May panic if the `SpendableOutputDescriptor`s were not generated by Channels which used - /// this KeysManager or one of the `InMemorySigner` created by this KeysManager. + /// May panic if the [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`]s were not generated by channels which used + /// this [`KeysManager`] or one of the [`InMemorySigner`] created by this [`KeysManager`]. pub fn spend_spendable_outputs(&self, descriptors: &[&SpendableOutputDescriptor], outputs: Vec, change_destination_script: Script, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result { let mut input = Vec::new(); let mut input_value = 0; @@ -1166,16 +1246,16 @@ impl KeysManager { } } -impl KeysInterface for KeysManager { - type Signer = InMemorySigner; - - fn get_node_secret(&self, recipient: Recipient) -> Result { - match recipient { - Recipient::Node => Ok(self.node_secret.clone()), - Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(()) - } +impl EntropySource for KeysManager { + fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { + let index = self.rand_bytes_index.get_increment(); + let mut nonce = [0u8; 16]; + nonce[..8].copy_from_slice(&index.to_be_bytes()); + ChaCha20::get_single_block(&self.rand_bytes_unique_start, &nonce) } +} +impl NodeSigner for KeysManager { fn get_node_id(&self, recipient: Recipient) -> Result { match recipient { Recipient::Node => Ok(self.node_id.clone()), @@ -1184,7 +1264,10 @@ impl KeysInterface for KeysManager { } fn ecdh(&self, recipient: Recipient, other_key: &PublicKey, tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result { - let mut node_secret = self.get_node_secret(recipient)?; + let mut node_secret = match recipient { + Recipient::Node => Ok(self.node_secret.clone()), + Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(()) + }?; if let Some(tweak) = tweak { node_secret = node_secret.mul_tweak(tweak).map_err(|_| ())?; } @@ -1195,46 +1278,54 @@ impl KeysInterface for KeysManager { self.inbound_payment_key.clone() } - fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script { - self.destination_script.clone() + fn sign_invoice(&self, hrp_bytes: &[u8], invoice_data: &[u5], recipient: Recipient) -> Result { + let preimage = construct_invoice_preimage(&hrp_bytes, &invoice_data); + let secret = match recipient { + Recipient::Node => Ok(&self.node_secret), + Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(()) + }?; + Ok(self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa_recoverable(&hash_to_message!(&Sha256::hash(&preimage)), secret)) } - fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript { - ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(self.shutdown_pubkey.clone()) + fn sign_gossip_message(&self, msg: UnsignedGossipMessage) -> Result { + let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]); + Ok(sign(&self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &self.node_secret)) } +} + +impl SignerProvider for KeysManager { + type Signer = InMemorySigner; - fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Self::Signer { - let child_ix = self.channel_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel); - assert!(child_ix <= core::u32::MAX as usize); + fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] { + let child_idx = self.channel_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel); + // `child_idx` is the only thing guaranteed to make each channel unique without a restart + // (though `user_channel_id` should help, depending on user behavior). If it manages to + // roll over, we may generate duplicate keys for two different channels, which could result + // in loss of funds. Because we only support 32-bit+ systems, assert that our `AtomicUsize` + // doesn't reach `u32::MAX`. + assert!(child_idx < core::u32::MAX as usize, "2^32 channels opened without restart"); let mut id = [0; 32]; - id[0..8].copy_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(child_ix as u64)); - id[8..16].copy_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.starting_time_nanos as u64)); - id[16..24].copy_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.starting_time_secs)); - self.derive_channel_keys(channel_value_satoshis, &id) + id[0..4].copy_from_slice(&(child_idx as u32).to_be_bytes()); + id[4..8].copy_from_slice(&self.starting_time_nanos.to_be_bytes()); + id[8..16].copy_from_slice(&self.starting_time_secs.to_be_bytes()); + id[16..32].copy_from_slice(&user_channel_id.to_be_bytes()); + id } - fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { - let mut sha = self.rand_bytes_unique_start.clone(); - - let child_ix = self.rand_bytes_child_index.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel); - let child_privkey = self.rand_bytes_master_key.ckd_priv(&self.secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx(child_ix as u32).expect("key space exhausted")).expect("Your RNG is busted"); - sha.input(&child_privkey.private_key[..]); - - sha.input(b"Unique Secure Random Bytes Salt"); - Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner() + fn derive_channel_signer(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer { + self.derive_channel_keys(channel_value_satoshis, &channel_keys_id) } fn read_chan_signer(&self, reader: &[u8]) -> Result { - InMemorySigner::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(reader), self.node_secret.clone()) + InMemorySigner::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(reader)) } - fn sign_invoice(&self, hrp_bytes: &[u8], invoice_data: &[u5], recipient: Recipient) -> Result { - let preimage = construct_invoice_preimage(&hrp_bytes, &invoice_data); - let secret = match recipient { - Recipient::Node => self.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node)?, - Recipient::PhantomNode => return Err(()), - }; - Ok(self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa_recoverable(&hash_to_message!(&Sha256::hash(&preimage)), &secret)) + fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script { + self.destination_script.clone() + } + + fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript { + ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(self.shutdown_pubkey.clone()) } } @@ -1251,11 +1342,11 @@ impl KeysInterface for KeysManager { /// nodes in the case that one node goes down. /// /// Note that multi-path payments are not supported in phantom invoices for security reasons. -// In the hypothetical case that we did support MPP phantom payments, there would be no way for -// nodes to know when the full payment has been received (and the preimage can be released) without -// significantly compromising on our safety guarantees. I.e., if we expose the ability for the user -// to tell LDK when the preimage can be released, we open ourselves to attacks where the preimage -// is released too early. +// In the hypothetical case that we did support MPP phantom payments, there would be no way for +// nodes to know when the full payment has been received (and the preimage can be released) without +// significantly compromising on our safety guarantees. I.e., if we expose the ability for the user +// to tell LDK when the preimage can be released, we open ourselves to attacks where the preimage +// is released too early. // /// Switching between this struct and [`KeysManager`] will invalidate any previously issued /// invoices and attempts to pay previous invoices will fail. @@ -1266,16 +1357,13 @@ pub struct PhantomKeysManager { phantom_node_id: PublicKey, } -impl KeysInterface for PhantomKeysManager { - type Signer = InMemorySigner; - - fn get_node_secret(&self, recipient: Recipient) -> Result { - match recipient { - Recipient::Node => self.inner.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node), - Recipient::PhantomNode => Ok(self.phantom_secret.clone()), - } +impl EntropySource for PhantomKeysManager { + fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { + self.inner.get_secure_random_bytes() } +} +impl NodeSigner for PhantomKeysManager { fn get_node_id(&self, recipient: Recipient) -> Result { match recipient { Recipient::Node => self.inner.get_node_id(Recipient::Node), @@ -1284,7 +1372,10 @@ impl KeysInterface for PhantomKeysManager { } fn ecdh(&self, recipient: Recipient, other_key: &PublicKey, tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result { - let mut node_secret = self.get_node_secret(recipient)?; + let mut node_secret = match recipient { + Recipient::Node => self.inner.node_secret.clone(), + Recipient::PhantomNode => self.phantom_secret.clone(), + }; if let Some(tweak) = tweak { node_secret = node_secret.mul_tweak(tweak).map_err(|_| ())?; } @@ -1295,36 +1386,48 @@ impl KeysInterface for PhantomKeysManager { self.inbound_payment_key.clone() } - fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script { - self.inner.get_destination_script() + fn sign_invoice(&self, hrp_bytes: &[u8], invoice_data: &[u5], recipient: Recipient) -> Result { + let preimage = construct_invoice_preimage(&hrp_bytes, &invoice_data); + let secret = match recipient { + Recipient::Node => &self.inner.node_secret, + Recipient::PhantomNode => &self.phantom_secret, + }; + Ok(self.inner.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa_recoverable(&hash_to_message!(&Sha256::hash(&preimage)), secret)) } - fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript { - self.inner.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() + fn sign_gossip_message(&self, msg: UnsignedGossipMessage) -> Result { + self.inner.sign_gossip_message(msg) } +} + +impl SignerProvider for PhantomKeysManager { + type Signer = InMemorySigner; - fn get_channel_signer(&self, inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Self::Signer { - self.inner.get_channel_signer(inbound, channel_value_satoshis) + fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64, user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] { + self.inner.generate_channel_keys_id(inbound, channel_value_satoshis, user_channel_id) } - fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { - self.inner.get_secure_random_bytes() + fn derive_channel_signer(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer { + self.inner.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id) } fn read_chan_signer(&self, reader: &[u8]) -> Result { self.inner.read_chan_signer(reader) } - fn sign_invoice(&self, hrp_bytes: &[u8], invoice_data: &[u5], recipient: Recipient) -> Result { - let preimage = construct_invoice_preimage(&hrp_bytes, &invoice_data); - let secret = self.get_node_secret(recipient)?; - Ok(self.inner.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa_recoverable(&hash_to_message!(&Sha256::hash(&preimage)), &secret)) + fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script { + self.inner.get_destination_script() + } + + fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript { + self.inner.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() } } impl PhantomKeysManager { - /// Constructs a `PhantomKeysManager` given a 32-byte seed and an additional `cross_node_seed` - /// that is shared across all nodes that intend to participate in [phantom node payments] together. + /// Constructs a [`PhantomKeysManager`] given a 32-byte seed and an additional `cross_node_seed` + /// that is shared across all nodes that intend to participate in [phantom node payments] + /// together. /// /// See [`KeysManager::new`] for more information on `seed`, `starting_time_secs`, and /// `starting_time_nanos`. @@ -1357,8 +1460,63 @@ impl PhantomKeysManager { } } -// Ensure that BaseSign can have a vtable +// Ensure that EcdsaChannelSigner can have a vtable #[test] pub fn dyn_sign() { - let _signer: Box; + let _signer: Box; +} + +#[cfg(all(test, feature = "_bench_unstable", not(feature = "no-std")))] +mod benches { + use std::sync::{Arc, mpsc}; + use std::sync::mpsc::TryRecvError; + use std::thread; + use std::time::Duration; + use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block; + use bitcoin::Network; + use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager}; + + use test::Bencher; + + #[bench] + fn bench_get_secure_random_bytes(bench: &mut Bencher) { + let seed = [0u8; 32]; + let now = Duration::from_secs(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.time as u64); + let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeysManager::new(&seed, now.as_secs(), now.subsec_micros())); + + let mut handles = Vec::new(); + let mut stops = Vec::new(); + for _ in 1..5 { + let keys_manager_clone = Arc::clone(&keys_manager); + let (stop_sender, stop_receiver) = mpsc::channel(); + let handle = thread::spawn(move || { + loop { + keys_manager_clone.get_secure_random_bytes(); + match stop_receiver.try_recv() { + Ok(_) | Err(TryRecvError::Disconnected) => { + println!("Terminating."); + break; + } + Err(TryRecvError::Empty) => {} + } + } + }); + handles.push(handle); + stops.push(stop_sender); + } + + bench.iter(|| { + for _ in 1..100 { + keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); + } + }); + + for stop in stops { + let _ = stop.send(()); + } + for handle in handles { + handle.join().unwrap(); + } + } + }