X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchan_utils.rs;h=d53863289bc5807464739f0707fbb390c25f9869;hb=cd327089a8c719844b776601e9ccd0728777ac28;hp=b698558e1b26b5a6c7a18cd142f4c8bce6e341b5;hpb=66784e32fe454e9a5b2080b85fc4d8816ac5e436;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/chan_utils.rs b/lightning/src/ln/chan_utils.rs index b698558e..c002dfae 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/chan_utils.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/chan_utils.rs @@ -7,56 +7,162 @@ // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these // licenses. -//! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are -//! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::Sign message signing by hand. +//! Various utilities for building scripts related to channels. These are +//! largely of interest for those implementing the traits on [`crate::sign`] by hand. -use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder}; +use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder}; use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; -use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, SigHashType}; -use bitcoin::util::bip143; +use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction}; +use bitcoin::sighash; +use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType; +use bitcoin::address::Payload; use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine}; use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160; -use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash}; - -use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage}; -use ln::msgs::DecodeError; -use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer}; -use util::byte_utils; - -use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash; -use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey}; -use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature, Message}; -use bitcoin::secp256k1::Error as SecpError; -use bitcoin::secp256k1; - -use prelude::*; +use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash, WPubkeyHash}; + +use crate::chain::chaininterface::fee_for_weight; +use crate::chain::package::WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT; +use crate::sign::EntropySource; +use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage}; +use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError; +use crate::util::ser::{Readable, RequiredWrapper, Writeable, Writer}; +use crate::util::transaction_utils; + +use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime; +use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey, Scalar}; +use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Message}; +use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence, Witness}; +use bitcoin::PublicKey as BitcoinPublicKey; + +use crate::io; use core::cmp; -use ln::chan_utils; -use util::transaction_utils::sort_outputs; -use ln::channel::INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER; +use crate::ln::chan_utils; +use crate::util::transaction_utils::sort_outputs; +use crate::ln::channel::{INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI}; use core::ops::Deref; -use chain; - -pub(crate) const MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 483; +use crate::chain; +use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures; +use crate::crypto::utils::{sign, sign_with_aux_rand}; +use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, DelayedPaymentKey, HtlcKey, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint}; + +#[allow(unused_imports)] +use crate::prelude::*; + +/// Maximum number of one-way in-flight HTLC (protocol-level value). +pub const MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 483; +/// The weight of a BIP141 witnessScript for a BOLT3's "offered HTLC output" on a commitment transaction, non-anchor variant. +pub const OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 133; +/// The weight of a BIP141 witnessScript for a BOLT3's "offered HTLC output" on a commitment transaction, anchor variant. +pub const OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS: usize = 136; + +/// The weight of a BIP141 witnessScript for a BOLT3's "received HTLC output" can vary in function of its CLTV argument value. +/// We define a range that encompasses both its non-anchors and anchors variants. +pub(crate) const MIN_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 136; +/// The weight of a BIP141 witnessScript for a BOLT3's "received HTLC output" can vary in function of its CLTV argument value. +/// We define a range that encompasses both its non-anchors and anchors variants. +/// This is the maximum post-anchor value. +pub const MAX_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 143; + +/// The upper bound weight of an anchor input. +pub const ANCHOR_INPUT_WITNESS_WEIGHT: u64 = 116; +/// The upper bound weight of an HTLC timeout input from a commitment transaction with anchor +/// outputs. +pub const HTLC_TIMEOUT_INPUT_ANCHOR_WITNESS_WEIGHT: u64 = 288; +/// The upper bound weight of an HTLC success input from a commitment transaction with anchor +/// outputs. +pub const HTLC_SUCCESS_INPUT_ANCHOR_WITNESS_WEIGHT: u64 = 327; + +/// Gets the weight for an HTLC-Success transaction. +#[inline] +pub fn htlc_success_tx_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 { + const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703; + const HTLC_SUCCESS_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 706; + if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { HTLC_SUCCESS_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT } else { HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT } +} -pub(super) const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703; -pub(super) const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663; +/// Gets the weight for an HTLC-Timeout transaction. +#[inline] +pub fn htlc_timeout_tx_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 { + const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663; + const HTLC_TIMEOUT_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 666; + if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { HTLC_TIMEOUT_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT } else { HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT } +} -#[derive(PartialEq)] -pub(crate) enum HTLCType { - AcceptedHTLC, - OfferedHTLC +/// Describes the type of HTLC claim as determined by analyzing the witness. +#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)] +pub enum HTLCClaim { + /// Claims an offered output on a commitment transaction through the timeout path. + OfferedTimeout, + /// Claims an offered output on a commitment transaction through the success path. + OfferedPreimage, + /// Claims an accepted output on a commitment transaction through the timeout path. + AcceptedTimeout, + /// Claims an accepted output on a commitment transaction through the success path. + AcceptedPreimage, + /// Claims an offered/accepted output on a commitment transaction through the revocation path. + Revocation, } -impl HTLCType { - /// Check if a given tx witnessScript len matchs one of a pre-signed HTLC - pub(crate) fn scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script_len: usize) -> Option { - if witness_script_len == 133 { - Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) - } else if witness_script_len >= 136 && witness_script_len <= 139 { - Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) +impl HTLCClaim { + /// Check if a given input witness attempts to claim a HTLC. + pub fn from_witness(witness: &Witness) -> Option { + debug_assert_eq!(OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS, MIN_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + if witness.len() < 2 { + return None; + } + let witness_script = witness.last().unwrap(); + let second_to_last = witness.second_to_last().unwrap(); + if witness_script.len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { + if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 33 { + // + Some(Self::Revocation) + } else if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 32 { + // + Some(Self::OfferedPreimage) + } else if witness.len() == 5 && second_to_last.len() == 0 { + // 0 <> + Some(Self::OfferedTimeout) + } else { + None + } + } else if witness_script.len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS { + // It's possible for the weight of `offered_htlc_script` and `accepted_htlc_script` to + // match so we check for both here. + if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 33 { + // + Some(Self::Revocation) + } else if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 32 { + // + Some(Self::OfferedPreimage) + } else if witness.len() == 5 && second_to_last.len() == 0 { + // 0 <> + Some(Self::OfferedTimeout) + } else if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 0 { + // <> + Some(Self::AcceptedTimeout) + } else if witness.len() == 5 && second_to_last.len() == 32 { + // 0 + Some(Self::AcceptedPreimage) + } else { + None + } + } else if witness_script.len() > MIN_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && + witness_script.len() <= MAX_ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { + // Handle remaining range of ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT. + if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 33 { + // + Some(Self::Revocation) + } else if witness.len() == 3 && second_to_last.len() == 0 { + // <> + Some(Self::AcceptedTimeout) + } else if witness.len() == 5 && second_to_last.len() == 32 { + // 0 + Some(Self::AcceptedPreimage) + } else { + None + } } else { None } @@ -73,22 +179,67 @@ pub fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: &[u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] let bitpos = 47 - i; if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) { res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7); - res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner(); + res = Sha256::hash(&res).to_byte_array(); } } res } +/// Build a closing transaction +pub fn build_closing_transaction(to_holder_value_sat: u64, to_counterparty_value_sat: u64, to_holder_script: ScriptBuf, to_counterparty_script: ScriptBuf, funding_outpoint: OutPoint) -> Transaction { + let txins = { + let mut ins: Vec = Vec::new(); + ins.push(TxIn { + previous_output: funding_outpoint, + script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(), + sequence: Sequence::MAX, + witness: Witness::new(), + }); + ins + }; + + let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new(); + + if to_counterparty_value_sat > 0 { + txouts.push((TxOut { + script_pubkey: to_counterparty_script, + value: to_counterparty_value_sat + }, ())); + } + + if to_holder_value_sat > 0 { + txouts.push((TxOut { + script_pubkey: to_holder_script, + value: to_holder_value_sat + }, ())); + } + + transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey... + + let mut outputs: Vec = Vec::new(); + for out in txouts.drain(..) { + outputs.push(out.0); + } + + Transaction { + version: 2, + lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, + input: txins, + output: outputs, + } +} + /// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from -/// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage). +/// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage). /// -/// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of counterarties in just 50*32 bytes +/// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of our counterparty in just 50*32 bytes /// or so. #[derive(Clone)] -pub(crate) struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets { +pub struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets { old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49], } +impl Eq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {} impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets { fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool { for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) { @@ -101,7 +252,8 @@ impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets { } impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets { - pub(crate) fn new() -> Self { + /// Creates a new empty `CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets` structure. + pub fn new() -> Self { Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], } } @@ -115,7 +267,9 @@ impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets { 48 } - pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 { + /// Returns the minimum index of all stored secrets. Note that indexes start + /// at 1 << 48 and get decremented by one for each new secret. + pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 { //TODO This can be optimized? let mut min = 1 << 48; for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() { @@ -133,13 +287,15 @@ impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets { let bitpos = bits - 1 - i; if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) { res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7); - res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner(); + res = Sha256::hash(&res).to_byte_array(); } } res } - pub(crate) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> { + /// Inserts the `secret` at `idx`. Returns `Ok(())` if the secret + /// was generated in accordance with BOLT 3 and is consistent with previous secrets. + pub fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> { let pos = Self::place_secret(idx); for i in 0..pos { let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize]; @@ -154,8 +310,9 @@ impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets { Ok(()) } - /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret - pub(crate) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> { + /// Returns the secret at `idx`. + /// Returns `None` if `idx` is < [`CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::get_min_seen_secret`]. + pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> { for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() { if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 { return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx)) @@ -167,69 +324,48 @@ impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets { } impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets { - fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { + fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> { for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() { writer.write_all(secret)?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?; + writer.write_all(&idx.to_be_bytes())?; } - write_tlv_fields!(writer, {}, {}); + write_tlv_fields!(writer, {}); Ok(()) } } impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets { - fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result { + fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result { let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49]; for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() { *secret = Readable::read(reader)?; *idx = Readable::read(reader)?; } - read_tlv_fields!(reader, {}, {}); + read_tlv_fields!(reader, {}); Ok(Self { old_secrets }) } } /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key) /// from the base secret and the per_commitment_point. -/// -/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly -/// generated (ie our own). -pub fn derive_private_key(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result { +pub fn derive_private_key(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> SecretKey { let mut sha = Sha256::engine(); sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize()); sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize()); - let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner(); - - let mut key = base_secret.clone(); - key.add_assign(&res)?; - Ok(key) -} - -/// Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key) -/// from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of -/// derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys. -/// -/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly -/// generated (ie our own). -pub fn derive_public_key(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result { - let mut sha = Sha256::engine(); - sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize()); - sha.input(&base_point.serialize()); - let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner(); + let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).to_byte_array(); - let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?); - base_point.combine(&hashkey) + base_secret.clone().add_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(res).unwrap()) + .expect("Addition only fails if the tweak is the inverse of the key. This is not possible when the tweak contains the hash of the key.") } /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts. /// -/// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked +/// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked /// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_secret always come from cheater /// and revocation_base_secret always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster /// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge. -/// -/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly -/// generated (ie our own). -pub fn derive_private_revocation_key(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result { +pub fn derive_private_revocation_key(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, + per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) +-> SecretKey { let countersignatory_revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &countersignatory_revocation_base_secret); let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret); @@ -238,56 +374,22 @@ pub fn derive_private_revocation_key(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize()); sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize()); - Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner() - }; - let commit_append_rev_hash_key = { - let mut sha = Sha256::engine(); - sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize()); - sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize()); - - Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner() - }; - - let mut countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_secret.clone(); - countersignatory_contrib.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?; - let mut broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_secret.clone(); - broadcaster_contrib.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?; - countersignatory_contrib.add_assign(&broadcaster_contrib[..])?; - Ok(countersignatory_contrib) -} - -/// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is -/// the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a -/// public key instead of private keys. -/// -/// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked -/// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_point always come from cheater -/// and revocation_base_point always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster -/// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge. -/// -/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly -/// generated (ie our own). -pub fn derive_public_revocation_key(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result { - let rev_append_commit_hash_key = { - let mut sha = Sha256::engine(); - sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize()); - sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize()); - - Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner() + Sha256::from_engine(sha).to_byte_array() }; let commit_append_rev_hash_key = { let mut sha = Sha256::engine(); sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize()); sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize()); - Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner() + Sha256::from_engine(sha).to_byte_array() }; - let mut countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_point.clone(); - countersignatory_contrib.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?; - let mut broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_point.clone(); - broadcaster_contrib.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?; - countersignatory_contrib.combine(&broadcaster_contrib) + let countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_secret.clone().mul_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(rev_append_commit_hash_key).unwrap()) + .expect("Multiplying a secret key by a hash is expected to never fail per secp256k1 docs"); + let broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_secret.clone().mul_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(commit_append_rev_hash_key).unwrap()) + .expect("Multiplying a secret key by a hash is expected to never fail per secp256k1 docs"); + countersignatory_contrib.add_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(broadcaster_contrib.secret_bytes()).unwrap()) + .expect("Addition only fails if the tweak is the inverse of the key. This is not possible when the tweak commits to the key.") } /// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction. @@ -301,32 +403,32 @@ pub fn derive_public_revocation_key(secp_ctx: &Secp2 /// channel basepoints via the new function, or they were obtained via /// CommitmentTransaction.trust().keys() because we trusted the source of the /// pre-calculated keys. -#[derive(PartialEq, Clone)] +#[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Clone, Debug)] pub struct TxCreationKeys { /// The broadcaster's per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys. pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey, /// The revocation key which is used to allow the broadcaster of the commitment /// transaction to provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast /// an old state. - pub revocation_key: PublicKey, + pub revocation_key: RevocationKey, /// Broadcaster's HTLC Key - pub broadcaster_htlc_key: PublicKey, + pub broadcaster_htlc_key: HtlcKey, /// Countersignatory's HTLC Key - pub countersignatory_htlc_key: PublicKey, + pub countersignatory_htlc_key: HtlcKey, /// Broadcaster's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay) - pub broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey, + pub broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: DelayedPaymentKey, } impl_writeable_tlv_based!(TxCreationKeys, { - (0, per_commitment_point), - (2, revocation_key), - (4, broadcaster_htlc_key), - (6, countersignatory_htlc_key), - (8, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key), -}, {}, {}); + (0, per_commitment_point, required), + (2, revocation_key, required), + (4, broadcaster_htlc_key, required), + (6, countersignatory_htlc_key, required), + (8, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, required), +}); /// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel. -#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] +#[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)] pub struct ChannelPublicKeys { /// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the /// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output. @@ -335,7 +437,7 @@ pub struct ChannelPublicKeys { /// revocation keys. This is combined with the per-commitment-secret generated by the /// counterparty to create a secret which the counterparty can reveal to revoke previous /// states. - pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey, + pub revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint, /// The public key on which the non-broadcaster (ie the countersignatory) receives an immediately /// spendable primary channel balance on the broadcaster's commitment transaction. This key is /// static across every commitment transaction. @@ -343,36 +445,36 @@ pub struct ChannelPublicKeys { /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment /// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending /// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path). - pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey, + pub delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint, /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key /// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs. - pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey, + pub htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint, } impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelPublicKeys, { - (0, funding_pubkey), - (2, revocation_basepoint), - (4, payment_point), - (6, delayed_payment_basepoint), - (8, htlc_basepoint), -}, {}, {}); + (0, funding_pubkey, required), + (2, revocation_basepoint, required), + (4, payment_point, required), + (6, delayed_payment_basepoint, required), + (8, htlc_basepoint, required), +}); impl TxCreationKeys { /// Create per-state keys from channel base points and the per-commitment point. /// Key set is asymmetric and can't be used as part of counter-signatory set of transactions. - pub fn derive_new(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, broadcaster_htlc_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result { - Ok(TxCreationKeys { + pub fn derive_new(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_delayed_payment_base: &DelayedPaymentBasepoint, broadcaster_htlc_base: &HtlcBasepoint, countersignatory_revocation_base: &RevocationBasepoint, countersignatory_htlc_base: &HtlcBasepoint) -> TxCreationKeys { + TxCreationKeys { per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(), - revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_revocation_base)?, - broadcaster_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_htlc_base)?, - countersignatory_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_htlc_base)?, - broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_delayed_payment_base)?, - }) + revocation_key: RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &countersignatory_revocation_base, &per_commitment_point), + broadcaster_htlc_key: HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &broadcaster_htlc_base, &per_commitment_point), + countersignatory_htlc_key: HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &countersignatory_htlc_base, &per_commitment_point), + broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &broadcaster_delayed_payment_base, &per_commitment_point), + } } /// Generate per-state keys from channel static keys. /// Key set is asymmetric and can't be used as part of counter-signatory set of transactions. - pub fn from_channel_static_keys(per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result { + pub fn from_channel_static_keys(per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> TxCreationKeys { TxCreationKeys::derive_new( &secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, @@ -385,21 +487,23 @@ impl TxCreationKeys { } /// The maximum length of a script returned by get_revokeable_redeemscript. -// Calculated as 6 bytes of opcodes, 1 byte push plus 2 bytes for contest_delay, and two public -// keys of 33 bytes (+ 1 push). -pub const REVOKEABLE_REDEEMSCRIPT_MAX_LENGTH: usize = 6 + 3 + 34*2; +// Calculated as 6 bytes of opcodes, 1 byte push plus 3 bytes for contest_delay, and two public +// keys of 33 bytes (+ 1 push). Generally, pushes are only 2 bytes (for values below 0x7fff, i.e. +// around 7 months), however, a 7 month contest delay shouldn't result in being unable to reclaim +// on-chain funds. +pub const REVOKEABLE_REDEEMSCRIPT_MAX_LENGTH: usize = 6 + 4 + 34*2; /// A script either spendable by the revocation /// key or the broadcaster_delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain. /// Encumbering a `to_holder` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions. -pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, contest_delay: u16, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script { +pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &RevocationKey, contest_delay: u16, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &DelayedPaymentKey) -> ScriptBuf { let res = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF) - .push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize()) + .push_slice(&revocation_key.to_public_key().serialize()) .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE) .push_int(contest_delay as i64) .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV) .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP) - .push_slice(&broadcaster_delayed_payment_key.serialize()) + .push_slice(&broadcaster_delayed_payment_key.to_public_key().serialize()) .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF) .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG) .into_script(); @@ -407,8 +511,18 @@ pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, contest_delay: u1 res } -#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] +/// Returns the script for the counterparty's output on a holder's commitment transaction based on +/// the channel type. +pub fn get_counterparty_payment_script(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, payment_key: &PublicKey) -> ScriptBuf { + if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { + get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh() + } else { + ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wpkh(&WPubkeyHash::hash(&payment_key.serialize())) + } +} + /// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction +#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment { /// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction). /// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you @@ -429,26 +543,25 @@ pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment { } impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, { - (0, offered), - (2, amount_msat), - (4, cltv_expiry), - (6, payment_hash), -}, { - (8, transaction_output_index) -}, {}); + (0, offered, required), + (2, amount_msat, required), + (4, cltv_expiry, required), + (6, payment_hash, required), + (8, transaction_output_index, option), +}); #[inline] -pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, broadcaster_htlc_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script { - let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner(); +pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, broadcaster_htlc_key: &HtlcKey, countersignatory_htlc_key: &HtlcKey, revocation_key: &RevocationKey) -> ScriptBuf { + let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).to_byte_array(); if htlc.offered { - Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP) + let mut bldr = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP) .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160) - .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..]) + .push_slice(PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.to_public_key().serialize())) .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL) .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF) .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG) .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE) - .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()[..]) + .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()) .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP) .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE) .push_int(32) @@ -457,7 +570,7 @@ pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommit .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP) .push_int(2) .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP) - .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()[..]) + .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()) .push_int(2) .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG) .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE) @@ -465,18 +578,23 @@ pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommit .push_slice(&payment_hash160) .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY) .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG) - .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF) - .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF) - .into_script() + .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF); + if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { + bldr = bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_1) + .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV) + .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP); + } + bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF) + .into_script() } else { - Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP) + let mut bldr = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP) .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160) - .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..]) + .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.to_public_key().serialize())) .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL) .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF) .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG) .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE) - .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()[..]) + .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()) .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP) .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE) .push_int(32) @@ -487,7 +605,7 @@ pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommit .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY) .push_int(2) .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP) - .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()[..]) + .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()) .push_int(2) .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG) .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE) @@ -496,74 +614,211 @@ pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommit .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV) .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP) .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG) - .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF) - .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF) - .into_script() + .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF); + if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { + bldr = bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_1) + .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV) + .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP); + } + bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF) + .into_script() } } /// Gets the witness redeemscript for an HTLC output in a commitment transaction. Note that htlc /// does not need to have its previous_output_index filled. #[inline] -pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script { - get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key) +pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> ScriptBuf { + get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, channel_type_features, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key) } /// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys. /// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter. -pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(broadcaster: &PublicKey, countersignatory: &PublicKey) -> Script { +pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(broadcaster: &PublicKey, countersignatory: &PublicKey) -> ScriptBuf { let broadcaster_funding_key = broadcaster.serialize(); let countersignatory_funding_key = countersignatory.serialize(); + make_funding_redeemscript_from_slices(&broadcaster_funding_key, &countersignatory_funding_key) +} + +pub(crate) fn make_funding_redeemscript_from_slices(broadcaster_funding_key: &[u8; 33], countersignatory_funding_key: &[u8; 33]) -> ScriptBuf { let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2); if broadcaster_funding_key[..] < countersignatory_funding_key[..] { - builder.push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key) - .push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key) + builder.push_slice(broadcaster_funding_key) + .push_slice(countersignatory_funding_key) } else { - builder.push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key) - .push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key) + builder.push_slice(countersignatory_funding_key) + .push_slice(broadcaster_funding_key) }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script() } -/// panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()! -pub fn build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction { +/// Builds an unsigned HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transaction from the given channel and HTLC +/// parameters. This is used by [`TrustedCommitmentTransaction::get_htlc_sigs`] to fetch the +/// transaction which needs signing, and can be used to construct an HTLC transaction which is +/// broadcastable given a counterparty HTLC signature. +/// +/// Panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() (as such HTLCs do not appear in the +/// commitment transaction). +pub fn build_htlc_transaction(commitment_txid: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &DelayedPaymentKey, revocation_key: &RevocationKey) -> Transaction { let mut txins: Vec = Vec::new(); - txins.push(TxIn { - previous_output: OutPoint { - txid: prev_hash.clone(), - vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"), - }, - script_sig: Script::new(), - sequence: 0, - witness: Vec::new(), - }); - - let total_fee = if htlc.offered { - feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 - } else { - feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 - }; + txins.push(build_htlc_input(commitment_txid, htlc, channel_type_features)); let mut txouts: Vec = Vec::new(); - txouts.push(TxOut { - script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, contest_delay, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(), - value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here) - }); + txouts.push(build_htlc_output( + feerate_per_kw, contest_delay, htlc, channel_type_features, + broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, revocation_key + )); Transaction { version: 2, - lock_time: if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 }, + lock_time: LockTime::from_consensus(if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 }), input: txins, output: txouts, } } +pub(crate) fn build_htlc_input(commitment_txid: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> TxIn { + TxIn { + previous_output: OutPoint { + txid: commitment_txid.clone(), + vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"), + }, + script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(), + sequence: Sequence(if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 1 } else { 0 }), + witness: Witness::new(), + } +} + +pub(crate) fn build_htlc_output( + feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &DelayedPaymentKey, revocation_key: &RevocationKey +) -> TxOut { + let weight = if htlc.offered { + htlc_timeout_tx_weight(channel_type_features) + } else { + htlc_success_tx_weight(channel_type_features) + }; + let output_value = if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() && !channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx() { + htlc.amount_msat / 1000 + } else { + let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * weight / 1000; + htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee + }; + + TxOut { + script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, contest_delay, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(), + value: output_value, + } +} + +/// Returns the witness required to satisfy and spend a HTLC input. +pub fn build_htlc_input_witness( + local_sig: &Signature, remote_sig: &Signature, preimage: &Option, + redeem_script: &Script, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, +) -> Witness { + let remote_sighash_type = if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { + EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay + } else { + EcdsaSighashType::All + }; + + let mut witness = Witness::new(); + // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element. + witness.push(vec![]); + witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&remote_sig.serialize_der(), remote_sighash_type); + witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&local_sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All); + if let Some(preimage) = preimage { + witness.push(preimage.0.to_vec()); + } else { + // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay. + witness.push(vec![]); + } + witness.push(redeem_script.to_bytes()); + witness +} + +/// Pre-anchors channel type features did not use to get serialized in the following six structs: +/// — [`ChannelTransactionParameters`] +/// — [`CommitmentTransaction`] +/// — [`CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput`] +/// — [`CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput`] +/// — [`HolderHTLCOutput`] +/// — [`HolderFundingOutput`] +/// +/// To ensure a forwards-compatible serialization, we use odd TLV fields. However, if new features +/// are used that could break security, where old signers should be prevented from handling the +/// serialized data, an optional even-field TLV will be used as a stand-in to break compatibility. +/// +/// This method determines whether or not that option needs to be set based on the chanenl type +/// features, and returns it. +/// +/// [`CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput`]: crate::chain::package::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput +/// [`CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput`]: crate::chain::package::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput +/// [`HolderHTLCOutput`]: crate::chain::package::HolderHTLCOutput +/// [`HolderFundingOutput`]: crate::chain::package::HolderFundingOutput +pub(crate) fn legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker_for_channel_type_features(features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> Option<()> { + let mut legacy_version_bit_set = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); + legacy_version_bit_set.set_scid_privacy_required(); + legacy_version_bit_set.set_zero_conf_required(); + + if features.is_subset(&legacy_version_bit_set) { + None + } else { + Some(()) + } +} + +/// Gets the witnessScript for the to_remote output when anchors are enabled. +#[inline] +pub fn get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(payment_point: &PublicKey) -> ScriptBuf { + Builder::new() + .push_slice(payment_point.serialize()) + .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY) + .push_int(1) + .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV) + .into_script() +} + +/// Gets the witnessScript for an anchor output from the funding public key. +/// The witness in the spending input must be: +/// +/// After 16 blocks of confirmation, an alternative satisfying witness could be: +/// <> +/// (empty vector required to satisfy compliance with MINIMALIF-standard rule) +#[inline] +pub fn get_anchor_redeemscript(funding_pubkey: &PublicKey) -> ScriptBuf { + Builder::new().push_slice(funding_pubkey.serialize()) + .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG) + .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IFDUP) + .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF) + .push_int(16) + .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV) + .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF) + .into_script() +} + +/// Locates the output with an anchor script paying to `funding_pubkey` within `commitment_tx`. +pub(crate) fn get_anchor_output<'a>(commitment_tx: &'a Transaction, funding_pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<(u32, &'a TxOut)> { + let anchor_script = chan_utils::get_anchor_redeemscript(funding_pubkey).to_v0_p2wsh(); + commitment_tx.output.iter().enumerate() + .find(|(_, txout)| txout.script_pubkey == anchor_script) + .map(|(idx, txout)| (idx as u32, txout)) +} + +/// Returns the witness required to satisfy and spend an anchor input. +pub fn build_anchor_input_witness(funding_key: &PublicKey, funding_sig: &Signature) -> Witness { + let anchor_redeem_script = chan_utils::get_anchor_redeemscript(funding_key); + let mut ret = Witness::new(); + ret.push_bitcoin_signature(&funding_sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All); + ret.push(anchor_redeem_script.as_bytes()); + ret +} + /// Per-channel data used to build transactions in conjunction with the per-commitment data (CommitmentTransaction). /// The fields are organized by holder/counterparty. /// /// Normally, this is converted to the broadcaster/countersignatory-organized DirectedChannelTransactionParameters /// before use, via the as_holder_broadcastable and as_counterparty_broadcastable functions. -#[derive(Clone)] +#[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)] pub struct ChannelTransactionParameters { /// Holder public keys pub holder_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys, @@ -577,10 +832,13 @@ pub struct ChannelTransactionParameters { pub counterparty_parameters: Option, /// The late-bound funding outpoint pub funding_outpoint: Option, + /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open. For old objects where this field + /// wasn't serialized, it will default to static_remote_key at deserialization. + pub channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures } /// Late-bound per-channel counterparty data used to build transactions. -#[derive(Clone)] +#[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)] pub struct CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { /// Counter-party public keys pub pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys, @@ -620,18 +878,60 @@ impl ChannelTransactionParameters { } impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, { - (0, pubkeys), - (2, selected_contest_delay), -}, {}, {}); - -impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelTransactionParameters, { - (0, holder_pubkeys), - (2, holder_selected_contest_delay), - (4, is_outbound_from_holder), -}, { - (6, counterparty_parameters), - (8, funding_outpoint), -}, {}); + (0, pubkeys, required), + (2, selected_contest_delay, required), +}); + +impl Writeable for ChannelTransactionParameters { + fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> { + let legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker = legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker_for_channel_type_features(&self.channel_type_features); + write_tlv_fields!(writer, { + (0, self.holder_pubkeys, required), + (2, self.holder_selected_contest_delay, required), + (4, self.is_outbound_from_holder, required), + (6, self.counterparty_parameters, option), + (8, self.funding_outpoint, option), + (10, legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker, option), + (11, self.channel_type_features, required), + }); + Ok(()) + } +} + +impl Readable for ChannelTransactionParameters { + fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result { + let mut holder_pubkeys = RequiredWrapper(None); + let mut holder_selected_contest_delay = RequiredWrapper(None); + let mut is_outbound_from_holder = RequiredWrapper(None); + let mut counterparty_parameters = None; + let mut funding_outpoint = None; + let mut _legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker: Option<()> = None; + let mut channel_type_features = None; + + read_tlv_fields!(reader, { + (0, holder_pubkeys, required), + (2, holder_selected_contest_delay, required), + (4, is_outbound_from_holder, required), + (6, counterparty_parameters, option), + (8, funding_outpoint, option), + (10, _legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker, option), + (11, channel_type_features, option), + }); + + let mut additional_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty(); + additional_features.set_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx_required(); + chain::package::verify_channel_type_features(&channel_type_features, Some(&additional_features))?; + + Ok(Self { + holder_pubkeys: holder_pubkeys.0.unwrap(), + holder_selected_contest_delay: holder_selected_contest_delay.0.unwrap(), + is_outbound_from_holder: is_outbound_from_holder.0.unwrap(), + counterparty_parameters, + funding_outpoint, + channel_type_features: channel_type_features.unwrap_or(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key()) + }) + } +} /// Static channel fields used to build transactions given per-commitment fields, organized by /// broadcaster/countersignatory. @@ -647,7 +947,7 @@ pub struct DirectedChannelTransactionParameters<'a> { impl<'a> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters<'a> { /// Get the channel pubkeys for the broadcaster - pub fn broadcaster_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { + pub fn broadcaster_pubkeys(&self) -> &'a ChannelPublicKeys { if self.holder_is_broadcaster { &self.inner.holder_pubkeys } else { @@ -656,7 +956,7 @@ impl<'a> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters<'a> { } /// Get the channel pubkeys for the countersignatory - pub fn countersignatory_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { + pub fn countersignatory_pubkeys(&self) -> &'a ChannelPublicKeys { if self.holder_is_broadcaster { &self.inner.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys } else { @@ -683,12 +983,17 @@ impl<'a> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters<'a> { pub fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint { self.inner.funding_outpoint.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint() } + + /// Whether to use anchors for this channel + pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> &'a ChannelTypeFeatures { + &self.inner.channel_type_features + } } /// Information needed to build and sign a holder's commitment transaction. /// /// The transaction is only signed once we are ready to broadcast. -#[derive(Clone)] +#[derive(Clone, Debug)] pub struct HolderCommitmentTransaction { inner: CommitmentTransaction, /// Our counterparty's signature for the transaction @@ -706,6 +1011,7 @@ impl Deref for HolderCommitmentTransaction { fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { &self.inner } } +impl Eq for HolderCommitmentTransaction {} impl PartialEq for HolderCommitmentTransaction { // We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool { @@ -714,47 +1020,51 @@ impl PartialEq for HolderCommitmentTransaction { } impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderCommitmentTransaction, { - (0, inner), - (2, counterparty_sig), - (4, holder_sig_first), -}, {}, { - (6, counterparty_htlc_sigs), + (0, inner, required), + (2, counterparty_sig, required), + (4, holder_sig_first, required), + (6, counterparty_htlc_sigs, required_vec), }); impl HolderCommitmentTransaction { #[cfg(test)] - pub fn dummy() -> Self { + pub fn dummy(htlcs: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())>) -> Self { let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()); - let dummy_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()); + let dummy_sig = sign(&secp_ctx, &secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()); let keys = TxCreationKeys { per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(), - revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(), - broadcaster_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(), - countersignatory_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(), - broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(), + revocation_key: RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(dummy_key), &dummy_key), + broadcaster_htlc_key: HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &HtlcBasepoint::from(dummy_key), &dummy_key), + countersignatory_htlc_key: HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &HtlcBasepoint::from(dummy_key), &dummy_key), + broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(dummy_key), &dummy_key), }; let channel_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys { funding_pubkey: dummy_key.clone(), - revocation_basepoint: dummy_key.clone(), + revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(dummy_key), payment_point: dummy_key.clone(), - delayed_payment_basepoint: dummy_key.clone(), - htlc_basepoint: dummy_key.clone() + delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(dummy_key.clone()), + htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(dummy_key.clone()) }; let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters { holder_pubkeys: channel_pubkeys.clone(), holder_selected_contest_delay: 0, is_outbound_from_holder: false, counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { pubkeys: channel_pubkeys.clone(), selected_contest_delay: 0 }), - funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Default::default(), index: 0 }) + funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: 0 }), + channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), }; - let mut htlcs_with_aux: Vec<(_, ())> = Vec::new(); - let inner = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(0, 0, 0, keys, 0, &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()); + let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new(); + for _ in 0..htlcs.len() { + counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(dummy_sig); + } + let inner = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(0, 0, 0, dummy_key.clone(), dummy_key.clone(), keys, 0, htlcs, &channel_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()); + htlcs.sort_by_key(|htlc| htlc.0.transaction_output_index); HolderCommitmentTransaction { inner, counterparty_sig: dummy_sig, - counterparty_htlc_sigs: Vec::new(), + counterparty_htlc_sigs, holder_sig_first: false } } @@ -776,14 +1086,12 @@ impl HolderCommitmentTransaction { tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); if self.holder_sig_first { - tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); - tx.input[0].witness.push(self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); + tx.input[0].witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&holder_sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All); + tx.input[0].witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All); } else { - tx.input[0].witness.push(self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); - tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); + tx.input[0].witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All); + tx.input[0].witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&holder_sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All); } - tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8); - tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8); tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec()); tx @@ -791,7 +1099,7 @@ impl HolderCommitmentTransaction { } /// A pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction and its txid. -#[derive(Clone)] +#[derive(Clone, Debug)] pub struct BuiltCommitmentTransaction { /// The commitment transaction pub transaction: Transaction, @@ -803,16 +1111,148 @@ pub struct BuiltCommitmentTransaction { } impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BuiltCommitmentTransaction, { - (0, transaction), - (2, txid) -}, {}, {}); + (0, transaction, required), + (2, txid, required), +}); impl BuiltCommitmentTransaction { /// Get the SIGHASH_ALL sighash value of the transaction. /// /// This can be used to verify a signature. pub fn get_sighash_all(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Message { - let sighash = &bip143::SigHashCache::new(&self.transaction).signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]; + let sighash = &sighash::SighashCache::new(&self.transaction).segwit_signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]; + hash_to_message!(sighash) + } + + /// Signs the counterparty's commitment transaction. + pub fn sign_counterparty_commitment(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Signature { + let sighash = self.get_sighash_all(funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis); + sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, funding_key) + } + + /// Signs the holder commitment transaction because we are about to broadcast it. + pub fn sign_holder_commitment( + &self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, + entropy_source: &ES, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1 + ) -> Signature where ES::Target: EntropySource { + let sighash = self.get_sighash_all(funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis); + sign_with_aux_rand(secp_ctx, &sighash, funding_key, entropy_source) + } +} + +/// This class tracks the per-transaction information needed to build a closing transaction and will +/// actually build it and sign. +/// +/// This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature given the relevant +/// secret key. +#[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub struct ClosingTransaction { + to_holder_value_sat: u64, + to_counterparty_value_sat: u64, + to_holder_script: ScriptBuf, + to_counterparty_script: ScriptBuf, + built: Transaction, +} + +impl ClosingTransaction { + /// Construct an object of the class + pub fn new( + to_holder_value_sat: u64, + to_counterparty_value_sat: u64, + to_holder_script: ScriptBuf, + to_counterparty_script: ScriptBuf, + funding_outpoint: OutPoint, + ) -> Self { + let built = build_closing_transaction( + to_holder_value_sat, to_counterparty_value_sat, + to_holder_script.clone(), to_counterparty_script.clone(), + funding_outpoint + ); + ClosingTransaction { + to_holder_value_sat, + to_counterparty_value_sat, + to_holder_script, + to_counterparty_script, + built + } + } + + /// Trust our pre-built transaction. + /// + /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to the transaction. + /// + /// This should only be used if you fully trust the builder of this object. It should not + /// be used by an external signer - instead use the verify function. + pub fn trust(&self) -> TrustedClosingTransaction { + TrustedClosingTransaction { inner: self } + } + + /// Verify our pre-built transaction. + /// + /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to the transaction. + /// + /// An external validating signer must call this method before signing + /// or using the built transaction. + pub fn verify(&self, funding_outpoint: OutPoint) -> Result { + let built = build_closing_transaction( + self.to_holder_value_sat, self.to_counterparty_value_sat, + self.to_holder_script.clone(), self.to_counterparty_script.clone(), + funding_outpoint + ); + if self.built != built { + return Err(()) + } + Ok(TrustedClosingTransaction { inner: self }) + } + + /// The value to be sent to the holder, or zero if the output will be omitted + pub fn to_holder_value_sat(&self) -> u64 { + self.to_holder_value_sat + } + + /// The value to be sent to the counterparty, or zero if the output will be omitted + pub fn to_counterparty_value_sat(&self) -> u64 { + self.to_counterparty_value_sat + } + + /// The destination of the holder's output + pub fn to_holder_script(&self) -> &Script { + &self.to_holder_script + } + + /// The destination of the counterparty's output + pub fn to_counterparty_script(&self) -> &Script { + &self.to_counterparty_script + } +} + +/// A wrapper on ClosingTransaction indicating that the built bitcoin +/// transaction is trusted. +/// +/// See trust() and verify() functions on CommitmentTransaction. +/// +/// This structure implements Deref. +pub struct TrustedClosingTransaction<'a> { + inner: &'a ClosingTransaction, +} + +impl<'a> Deref for TrustedClosingTransaction<'a> { + type Target = ClosingTransaction; + + fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { self.inner } +} + +impl<'a> TrustedClosingTransaction<'a> { + /// The pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction + pub fn built_transaction(&self) -> &'a Transaction { + &self.inner.built + } + + /// Get the SIGHASH_ALL sighash value of the transaction. + /// + /// This can be used to verify a signature. + pub fn get_sighash_all(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Message { + let sighash = &sighash::SighashCache::new(&self.inner.built).segwit_signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]; hash_to_message!(sighash) } @@ -820,29 +1260,33 @@ impl BuiltCommitmentTransaction { /// because we are about to broadcast a holder transaction. pub fn sign(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Signature { let sighash = self.get_sighash_all(funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis); - secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, funding_key) + sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, funding_key) } } -/// This class tracks the per-transaction information needed to build a commitment transaction and to +/// This class tracks the per-transaction information needed to build a commitment transaction and will /// actually build it and sign. It is used for holder transactions that we sign only when needed /// and for transactions we sign for the counterparty. /// /// This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature given the relevant /// secret key. -#[derive(Clone)] +#[derive(Clone, Debug)] pub struct CommitmentTransaction { commitment_number: u64, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, + to_broadcaster_delay: Option, // Added in 0.0.117 feerate_per_kw: u32, htlcs: Vec, + // Note that on upgrades, some features of existing outputs may be missed. + channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures, // A cache of the parties' pubkeys required to construct the transaction, see doc for trust() keys: TxCreationKeys, // For access to the pre-built transaction, see doc for trust() built: BuiltCommitmentTransaction, } +impl Eq for CommitmentTransaction {} impl PartialEq for CommitmentTransaction { fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool { let eq = self.commitment_number == o.commitment_number && @@ -850,6 +1294,7 @@ impl PartialEq for CommitmentTransaction { self.to_countersignatory_value_sat == o.to_countersignatory_value_sat && self.feerate_per_kw == o.feerate_per_kw && self.htlcs == o.htlcs && + self.channel_type_features == o.channel_type_features && self.keys == o.keys; if eq { debug_assert_eq!(self.built.transaction, o.built.transaction); @@ -859,16 +1304,57 @@ impl PartialEq for CommitmentTransaction { } } -impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CommitmentTransaction, { - (0, commitment_number), - (2, to_broadcaster_value_sat), - (4, to_countersignatory_value_sat), - (6, feerate_per_kw), - (8, keys), - (10, built), -}, {}, { - (12, htlcs), -}); +impl Writeable for CommitmentTransaction { + fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> { + let legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker = legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker_for_channel_type_features(&self.channel_type_features); + write_tlv_fields!(writer, { + (0, self.commitment_number, required), + (1, self.to_broadcaster_delay, option), + (2, self.to_broadcaster_value_sat, required), + (4, self.to_countersignatory_value_sat, required), + (6, self.feerate_per_kw, required), + (8, self.keys, required), + (10, self.built, required), + (12, self.htlcs, required_vec), + (14, legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker, option), + (15, self.channel_type_features, required), + }); + Ok(()) + } +} + +impl Readable for CommitmentTransaction { + fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result { + _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, { + (0, commitment_number, required), + (1, to_broadcaster_delay, option), + (2, to_broadcaster_value_sat, required), + (4, to_countersignatory_value_sat, required), + (6, feerate_per_kw, required), + (8, keys, required), + (10, built, required), + (12, htlcs, required_vec), + (14, _legacy_deserialization_prevention_marker, option), + (15, channel_type_features, option), + }); + + let mut additional_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty(); + additional_features.set_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx_required(); + chain::package::verify_channel_type_features(&channel_type_features, Some(&additional_features))?; + + Ok(Self { + commitment_number: commitment_number.0.unwrap(), + to_broadcaster_value_sat: to_broadcaster_value_sat.0.unwrap(), + to_countersignatory_value_sat: to_countersignatory_value_sat.0.unwrap(), + to_broadcaster_delay, + feerate_per_kw: feerate_per_kw.0.unwrap(), + keys: keys.0.unwrap(), + built: built.0.unwrap(), + htlcs, + channel_type_features: channel_type_features.unwrap_or(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key()) + }) + } +} impl CommitmentTransaction { /// Construct an object of the class while assigning transaction output indices to HTLCs. @@ -880,10 +1366,10 @@ impl CommitmentTransaction { /// /// Only include HTLCs that are above the dust limit for the channel. /// - /// (C-not exported) due to the generic though we likely should expose a version without - pub fn new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number: u64, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> CommitmentTransaction { + /// This is not exported to bindings users due to the generic though we likely should expose a version without + pub fn new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number: u64, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, broadcaster_funding_key: PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: PublicKey, keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> CommitmentTransaction { // Sort outputs and populate output indices while keeping track of the auxiliary data - let (outputs, htlcs) = Self::internal_build_outputs(&keys, to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters).unwrap(); + let (outputs, htlcs) = Self::internal_build_outputs(&keys, to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters, &broadcaster_funding_key, &countersignatory_funding_key).unwrap(); let (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins) = Self::internal_build_inputs(commitment_number, channel_parameters); let transaction = Self::make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins, outputs); @@ -892,8 +1378,10 @@ impl CommitmentTransaction { commitment_number, to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, + to_broadcaster_delay: Some(channel_parameters.contest_delay()), feerate_per_kw, htlcs, + channel_type_features: channel_parameters.channel_type_features().clone(), keys, built: BuiltCommitmentTransaction { transaction, @@ -902,11 +1390,19 @@ impl CommitmentTransaction { } } - fn internal_rebuild_transaction(&self, keys: &TxCreationKeys, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> Result { + /// Use non-zero fee anchors + /// + /// This is not exported to bindings users due to move, and also not likely to be useful for binding users + pub fn with_non_zero_fee_anchors(mut self) -> Self { + self.channel_type_features.set_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx_required(); + self + } + + fn internal_rebuild_transaction(&self, keys: &TxCreationKeys, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, broadcaster_funding_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Result { let (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins) = Self::internal_build_inputs(self.commitment_number, channel_parameters); let mut htlcs_with_aux = self.htlcs.iter().map(|h| (h.clone(), ())).collect(); - let (outputs, _) = Self::internal_build_outputs(keys, self.to_broadcaster_value_sat, self.to_countersignatory_value_sat, &mut htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters)?; + let (outputs, _) = Self::internal_build_outputs(keys, self.to_broadcaster_value_sat, self.to_countersignatory_value_sat, &mut htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters, broadcaster_funding_key, countersignatory_funding_key)?; let transaction = Self::make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins, outputs); let txid = transaction.txid(); @@ -920,7 +1416,7 @@ impl CommitmentTransaction { fn make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number: u64, txins: Vec, outputs: Vec) -> Transaction { Transaction { version: 2, - lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8 * 3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32), + lock_time: LockTime::from_consensus(((0x20 as u32) << 8 * 3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32)), input: txins, output: outputs, } @@ -930,14 +1426,18 @@ impl CommitmentTransaction { // - initial sorting of outputs / HTLCs in the constructor, in which case T is auxiliary data the // caller needs to have sorted together with the HTLCs so it can keep track of the output index // - building of a bitcoin transaction during a verify() call, in which case T is just () - fn internal_build_outputs(keys: &TxCreationKeys, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> Result<(Vec, Vec), ()> { + fn internal_build_outputs(keys: &TxCreationKeys, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, broadcaster_funding_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Result<(Vec, Vec), ()> { let countersignatory_pubkeys = channel_parameters.countersignatory_pubkeys(); let contest_delay = channel_parameters.contest_delay(); let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<&mut HTLCOutputInCommitment>)> = Vec::new(); if to_countersignatory_value_sat > 0 { - let script = script_for_p2wpkh(&countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point); + let script = if channel_parameters.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { + get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh() + } else { + Payload::p2wpkh(&BitcoinPublicKey::new(countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point)).unwrap().script_pubkey() + }; txouts.push(( TxOut { script_pubkey: script.clone(), @@ -962,9 +1462,33 @@ impl CommitmentTransaction { )); } + if channel_parameters.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { + if to_broadcaster_value_sat > 0 || !htlcs_with_aux.is_empty() { + let anchor_script = get_anchor_redeemscript(broadcaster_funding_key); + txouts.push(( + TxOut { + script_pubkey: anchor_script.to_v0_p2wsh(), + value: ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI, + }, + None, + )); + } + + if to_countersignatory_value_sat > 0 || !htlcs_with_aux.is_empty() { + let anchor_script = get_anchor_redeemscript(countersignatory_funding_key); + txouts.push(( + TxOut { + script_pubkey: anchor_script.to_v0_p2wsh(), + value: ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI, + }, + None, + )); + } + } + let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_with_aux.len()); for (htlc, _) in htlcs_with_aux { - let script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys); + let script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &channel_parameters.channel_type_features(), &keys); let txout = TxOut { script_pubkey: script.to_v0_p2wsh(), value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, @@ -979,7 +1503,7 @@ impl CommitmentTransaction { if let &Some(ref b_htlcout) = b { a_htlcout.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlcout.cltv_expiry) // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison - // here for fuzztarget mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency + // here for fuzzing mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency // may fail)! .then(a_htlcout.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlcout.payment_hash.0)) // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we @@ -1015,10 +1539,10 @@ impl CommitmentTransaction { let mut ins: Vec = Vec::new(); ins.push(TxIn { previous_output: channel_parameters.funding_outpoint(), - script_sig: Script::new(), - sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8 * 3) - | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3 * 8) as u32), - witness: Vec::new(), + script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(), + sequence: Sequence(((0x80 as u32) << 8 * 3) + | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3 * 8) as u32)), + witness: Witness::new(), }); ins }; @@ -1030,6 +1554,11 @@ impl CommitmentTransaction { self.commitment_number } + /// The per commitment point used by the broadcaster. + pub fn per_commitment_point(&self) -> PublicKey { + self.keys.per_commitment_point + } + /// The value to be sent to the broadcaster pub fn to_broadcaster_value_sat(&self) -> u64 { self.to_broadcaster_value_sat @@ -1049,7 +1578,7 @@ impl CommitmentTransaction { /// which were included in this commitment transaction in output order. /// The transaction index is always populated. /// - /// (C-not exported) as we cannot currently convert Vec references to/from C, though we should + /// This is not exported to bindings users as we cannot currently convert Vec references to/from C, though we should /// expose a less effecient version which creates a Vec of references in the future. pub fn htlcs(&self) -> &Vec { &self.htlcs @@ -1060,7 +1589,7 @@ impl CommitmentTransaction { /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to these fields. /// /// This should only be used if you fully trust the builder of this object. It should not - /// be used by an external signer - instead use the verify function. + /// be used by an external signer - instead use the verify function. pub fn trust(&self) -> TrustedCommitmentTransaction { TrustedCommitmentTransaction { inner: self } } @@ -1074,11 +1603,11 @@ impl CommitmentTransaction { pub fn verify(&self, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result { // This is the only field of the key cache that we trust let per_commitment_point = self.keys.per_commitment_point; - let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&per_commitment_point, broadcaster_keys, countersignatory_keys, secp_ctx).unwrap(); + let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&per_commitment_point, broadcaster_keys, countersignatory_keys, secp_ctx); if keys != self.keys { return Err(()); } - let tx = self.internal_rebuild_transaction(&keys, channel_parameters)?; + let tx = self.internal_rebuild_transaction(&keys, channel_parameters, &broadcaster_keys.funding_pubkey, &countersignatory_keys.funding_pubkey)?; if self.built.transaction != tx.transaction || self.built.txid != tx.txid { return Err(()); } @@ -1109,75 +1638,154 @@ impl<'a> TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> { } /// The pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction - pub fn built_transaction(&self) -> &BuiltCommitmentTransaction { + pub fn built_transaction(&self) -> &'a BuiltCommitmentTransaction { &self.inner.built } /// The pre-calculated transaction creation public keys. - pub fn keys(&self) -> &TxCreationKeys { + pub fn keys(&self) -> &'a TxCreationKeys { &self.inner.keys } + /// Should anchors be used. + pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> &'a ChannelTypeFeatures { + &self.inner.channel_type_features + } + /// Get a signature for each HTLC which was included in the commitment transaction (ie for /// which HTLCOutputInCommitment::transaction_output_index.is_some()). /// /// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order. - pub fn get_htlc_sigs(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result, ()> { + /// + /// This function is only valid in the holder commitment context, it always uses EcdsaSighashType::All. + pub fn get_htlc_sigs( + &self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, + entropy_source: &ES, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, + ) -> Result, ()> where ES::Target: EntropySource { let inner = self.inner; let keys = &inner.keys; let txid = inner.built.txid; let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(inner.htlcs.len()); - let holder_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &inner.keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?; + let holder_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &inner.keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key); for this_htlc in inner.htlcs.iter() { assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some()); - let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key); + let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, &self.channel_type_features, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key); - let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key); + let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, &self.channel_type_features, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key); - let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]); - ret.push(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &holder_htlc_key)); + let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.amount_msat / 1000, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]); + ret.push(sign_with_aux_rand(secp_ctx, &sighash, &holder_htlc_key, entropy_source)); } Ok(ret) } - /// Gets a signed HTLC transaction given a preimage (for !htlc.offered) and the holder HTLC transaction signature. - pub(crate) fn get_signed_htlc_tx(&self, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, htlc_index: usize, counterparty_signature: &Signature, signature: &Signature, preimage: &Option) -> Transaction { - let inner = self.inner; - let keys = &inner.keys; - let txid = inner.built.txid; - let this_htlc = &inner.htlcs[htlc_index]; + /// Builds the second-level holder HTLC transaction for the HTLC with index `htlc_index`. + pub(crate) fn build_unsigned_htlc_tx( + &self, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, htlc_index: usize, + preimage: &Option, + ) -> Transaction { + let keys = &self.inner.keys; + let this_htlc = &self.inner.htlcs[htlc_index]; assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some()); // if we don't have preimage for an HTLC-Success, we can't generate an HTLC transaction. if !this_htlc.offered && preimage.is_none() { unreachable!(); } // Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction. if this_htlc.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); } - let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key); - - let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key); + build_htlc_transaction( + &self.inner.built.txid, self.inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, + &self.channel_type_features, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key + ) + } - // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element. - htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); - htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_signature.serialize_der().to_vec()); - htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(signature.serialize_der().to_vec()); - htlc_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8); - htlc_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8); + /// Builds the witness required to spend the input for the HTLC with index `htlc_index` in a + /// second-level holder HTLC transaction. + pub(crate) fn build_htlc_input_witness( + &self, htlc_index: usize, counterparty_signature: &Signature, signature: &Signature, + preimage: &Option + ) -> Witness { + let keys = &self.inner.keys; + let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys( + &self.inner.htlcs[htlc_index], &self.channel_type_features, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, + &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key + ); + chan_utils::build_htlc_input_witness( + signature, counterparty_signature, preimage, &htlc_redeemscript, &self.channel_type_features, + ) + } - if this_htlc.offered { - // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay. - htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); - } else { - htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec()); - } + /// Returns the index of the revokeable output, i.e. the `to_local` output sending funds to + /// the broadcaster, in the built transaction, if any exists. + /// + /// There are two cases where this may return `None`: + /// - The balance of the revokeable output is below the dust limit (only found on commitments + /// early in the channel's lifetime, i.e. before the channel reserve is met). + /// - This commitment was created before LDK 0.0.117. In this case, the + /// commitment transaction previously didn't contain enough information to locate the + /// revokeable output. + pub fn revokeable_output_index(&self) -> Option { + let revokeable_redeemscript = get_revokeable_redeemscript( + &self.keys.revocation_key, + self.to_broadcaster_delay?, + &self.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, + ); + let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(); + let outputs = &self.inner.built.transaction.output; + outputs.iter().enumerate() + .find(|(_, out)| out.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh) + .map(|(idx, _)| idx) + } - htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec()); - htlc_tx + /// Helper method to build an unsigned justice transaction spending the revokeable + /// `to_local` output to a destination script. Fee estimation accounts for the expected + /// revocation witness data that will be added when signed. + /// + /// This method will error if the given fee rate results in a fee greater than the value + /// of the output being spent, or if there exists no revokeable `to_local` output on this + /// commitment transaction. See [`Self::revokeable_output_index`] for more details. + /// + /// The built transaction will allow fee bumping with RBF, and this method takes + /// `feerate_per_kw` as an input such that multiple copies of a justice transaction at different + /// fee rates may be built. + pub fn build_to_local_justice_tx(&self, feerate_per_kw: u64, destination_script: ScriptBuf) + -> Result { + let output_idx = self.revokeable_output_index().ok_or(())?; + let input = vec![TxIn { + previous_output: OutPoint { + txid: self.trust().txid(), + vout: output_idx as u32, + }, + script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(), + sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME, + witness: Witness::new(), + }]; + let value = self.inner.built.transaction.output[output_idx].value; + let output = vec![TxOut { + script_pubkey: destination_script, + value, + }]; + let mut justice_tx = Transaction { + version: 2, + lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, + input, + output, + }; + let weight = justice_tx.weight().to_wu() + WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT; + let fee = fee_for_weight(feerate_per_kw as u32, weight); + justice_tx.output[0].value = value.checked_sub(fee).ok_or(())?; + Ok(justice_tx) } + } -/// Get the transaction number obscure factor +/// Commitment transaction numbers which appear in the transactions themselves are XOR'd with a +/// shared secret first. This prevents on-chain observers from discovering how many commitment +/// transactions occurred in a channel before it was closed. +/// +/// This function gets the shared secret from relevant channel public keys and can be used to +/// "decrypt" the commitment transaction number given a commitment transaction on-chain. pub fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor( broadcaster_payment_basepoint: &PublicKey, countersignatory_payment_basepoint: &PublicKey, @@ -1192,7 +1800,7 @@ pub fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor( sha.input(&countersignatory_payment_basepoint.serialize()); sha.input(&broadcaster_payment_basepoint.serialize()); } - let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner(); + let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).to_byte_array(); ((res[26] as u64) << 5 * 8) | ((res[27] as u64) << 4 * 8) @@ -1202,17 +1810,203 @@ pub fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor( | ((res[31] as u64) << 0 * 8) } -fn script_for_p2wpkh(key: &PublicKey) -> Script { - Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0) - .push_slice(&WPubkeyHash::hash(&key.serialize())[..]) - .into_script() -} - #[cfg(test)] mod tests { - use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets; - use hex; - use prelude::*; + use super::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, ChannelPublicKeys}; + use crate::chain; + use crate::ln::chan_utils::{get_htlc_redeemscript, get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript, CommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLCOutputInCommitment}; + use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey, Secp256k1}; + use crate::util::test_utils; + use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, SignerProvider}; + use bitcoin::{Network, Txid, ScriptBuf}; + use bitcoin::hashes::Hash; + use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex; + use crate::ln::PaymentHash; + use bitcoin::address::Payload; + use bitcoin::PublicKey as BitcoinPublicKey; + use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures; + + #[allow(unused_imports)] + use crate::prelude::*; + + struct TestCommitmentTxBuilder { + commitment_number: u64, + holder_funding_pubkey: PublicKey, + counterparty_funding_pubkey: PublicKey, + keys: TxCreationKeys, + feerate_per_kw: u32, + htlcs_with_aux: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())>, + channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters, + counterparty_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys, + } + + impl TestCommitmentTxBuilder { + fn new() -> Self { + let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + let seed = [42; 32]; + let network = Network::Testnet; + let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network); + let signer = keys_provider.derive_channel_signer(3000, keys_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, 1_000_000, 0)); + let counterparty_signer = keys_provider.derive_channel_signer(3000, keys_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, 1_000_000, 1)); + let delayed_payment_base = &signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint; + let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(); + let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret); + let htlc_basepoint = &signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint; + let holder_pubkeys = signer.pubkeys(); + let counterparty_pubkeys = counterparty_signer.pubkeys().clone(); + let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint); + let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters { + holder_pubkeys: holder_pubkeys.clone(), + holder_selected_contest_delay: 0, + is_outbound_from_holder: false, + counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(), selected_contest_delay: 0 }), + funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: 0 }), + channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), + }; + let htlcs_with_aux = Vec::new(); + + Self { + commitment_number: 0, + holder_funding_pubkey: holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey, + counterparty_funding_pubkey: counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey, + keys, + feerate_per_kw: 1, + htlcs_with_aux, + channel_parameters, + counterparty_pubkeys, + } + } + + fn build(&mut self, to_broadcaster_sats: u64, to_countersignatory_sats: u64) -> CommitmentTransaction { + CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data( + self.commitment_number, to_broadcaster_sats, to_countersignatory_sats, + self.holder_funding_pubkey.clone(), + self.counterparty_funding_pubkey.clone(), + self.keys.clone(), self.feerate_per_kw, + &mut self.htlcs_with_aux, &self.channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() + ) + } + } + + #[test] + fn test_anchors() { + let mut builder = TestCommitmentTxBuilder::new(); + + // Generate broadcaster and counterparty outputs + let tx = builder.build(1000, 2000); + assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2); + assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[1].script_pubkey, Payload::p2wpkh(&BitcoinPublicKey::new(builder.counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point)).unwrap().script_pubkey()); + + // Generate broadcaster and counterparty outputs as well as two anchors + builder.channel_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(); + let tx = builder.build(1000, 2000); + assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 4); + assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[3].script_pubkey, get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&builder.counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh()); + + // Generate broadcaster output and anchor + let tx = builder.build(3000, 0); + assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2); + + // Generate counterparty output and anchor + let tx = builder.build(0, 3000); + assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2); + + let received_htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment { + offered: false, + amount_msat: 400000, + cltv_expiry: 100, + payment_hash: PaymentHash([42; 32]), + transaction_output_index: None, + }; + + let offered_htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment { + offered: true, + amount_msat: 600000, + cltv_expiry: 100, + payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]), + transaction_output_index: None, + }; + + // Generate broadcaster output and received and offered HTLC outputs, w/o anchors + builder.channel_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); + builder.htlcs_with_aux = vec![(received_htlc.clone(), ()), (offered_htlc.clone(), ())]; + let tx = builder.build(3000, 0); + let keys = &builder.keys.clone(); + assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 3); + assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[0].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh()); + assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[1].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh()); + assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex_string(), + "0020e43a7c068553003fe68fcae424fb7b28ec5ce48cd8b6744b3945631389bad2fb"); + assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex_string(), + "0020215d61bba56b19e9eadb6107f5a85d7f99c40f65992443f69229c290165bc00d"); + + // Generate broadcaster output and received and offered HTLC outputs, with anchors + builder.channel_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(); + builder.htlcs_with_aux = vec![(received_htlc.clone(), ()), (offered_htlc.clone(), ())]; + let tx = builder.build(3000, 0); + assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 5); + assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[2].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh()); + assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[3].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh()); + assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex_string(), + "0020b70d0649c72b38756885c7a30908d912a7898dd5d79457a7280b8e9a20f3f2bc"); + assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex_string(), + "002087a3faeb1950a469c0e2db4a79b093a41b9526e5a6fc6ef5cb949bde3be379c7"); + } + + #[test] + fn test_finding_revokeable_output_index() { + let mut builder = TestCommitmentTxBuilder::new(); + + // Revokeable output present + let tx = builder.build(1000, 2000); + assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2); + assert_eq!(tx.trust().revokeable_output_index(), Some(0)); + + // Revokeable output present (but to_broadcaster_delay missing) + let tx = CommitmentTransaction { to_broadcaster_delay: None, ..tx }; + assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2); + assert_eq!(tx.trust().revokeable_output_index(), None); + + // Revokeable output not present (our balance is dust) + let tx = builder.build(0, 2000); + assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(tx.trust().revokeable_output_index(), None); + } + + #[test] + fn test_building_to_local_justice_tx() { + let mut builder = TestCommitmentTxBuilder::new(); + + // Revokeable output not present (our balance is dust) + let tx = builder.build(0, 2000); + assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 1); + assert!(tx.trust().build_to_local_justice_tx(253, ScriptBuf::new()).is_err()); + + // Revokeable output present + let tx = builder.build(1000, 2000); + assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2); + + // Too high feerate + assert!(tx.trust().build_to_local_justice_tx(100_000, ScriptBuf::new()).is_err()); + + // Generate a random public key for destination script + let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice( + &>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100") + .unwrap()[..]).unwrap(); + let pubkey_hash = BitcoinPublicKey::new( + PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(), &secret_key)).wpubkey_hash().unwrap(); + let destination_script = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wpkh(&pubkey_hash); + + let justice_tx = tx.trust().build_to_local_justice_tx(253, destination_script.clone()).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(justice_tx.input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(justice_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.built.transaction.txid()); + assert_eq!(justice_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, tx.trust().revokeable_output_index().unwrap() as u32); + assert!(justice_tx.input[0].sequence.is_rbf()); + + assert_eq!(justice_tx.output.len(), 1); + assert!(justice_tx.output[0].value < 1000); + assert_eq!(justice_tx.output[0].script_pubkey, destination_script); + } #[test] fn test_per_commitment_storage() { @@ -1238,42 +2032,42 @@ mod tests { secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); } @@ -1284,12 +2078,12 @@ mod tests { secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err()); } @@ -1299,22 +2093,22 @@ mod tests { secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err()); } @@ -1324,22 +2118,22 @@ mod tests { secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err()); } @@ -1349,42 +2143,42 @@ mod tests { secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err()); } @@ -1394,32 +2188,32 @@ mod tests { secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err()); } @@ -1429,42 +2223,42 @@ mod tests { secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err()); } @@ -1474,42 +2268,42 @@ mod tests { secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err()); } @@ -1519,42 +2313,42 @@ mod tests { secrets.clear(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); test_secrets!(); secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap()); + secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&>::from_hex("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap()); assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err()); } }