X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannel.rs;fp=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannel.rs;h=633652222d11352f64be2f1f13a75d543e07eca4;hb=4894d52d30399c21b7994952a8de0d1d7848c58d;hp=3c8be717f3237edc56297d559c806bdb96d80780;hpb=e0600e5b1edc5be57258a4b28963789dbc69b431;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs index 3c8be717..63365222 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; use bitcoin::util::bip143; use bitcoin::consensus::encode; -use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine}; +use bitcoin::hashes::Hash; use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash}; @@ -26,14 +26,14 @@ use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures}; use ln::msgs; use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect}; use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT}; -use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HolderCommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys}; +use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor}; use ln::chan_utils; use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget}; use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER}; use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData}; -use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface}; +use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface}; use util::transaction_utils; -use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer}; +use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter}; use util::logger::Logger; use util::errors::APIError; use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig}; @@ -42,7 +42,10 @@ use std; use std::default::Default; use std::{cmp,mem,fmt}; use std::ops::Deref; +#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] +use std::sync::Mutex; use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex; +use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0; #[cfg(test)] pub struct ChannelValueStat { @@ -111,7 +114,7 @@ enum InboundHTLCState { /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and - /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info will not include this HTLC. + /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC. LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason), } @@ -242,7 +245,7 @@ enum ChannelState { const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32; const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32; -const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1; +pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1; /// Liveness is called to fluctuate given peer disconnecton/monitor failures/closing. /// If channel is public, network should have a liveness view announced by us on a @@ -258,6 +261,27 @@ enum UpdateStatus { DisabledStaged, } +/// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC. +enum HTLCInitiator { + LocalOffered, + RemoteOffered, +} + +/// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC. +struct HTLCCandidate { + amount_msat: u64, + origin: HTLCInitiator, +} + +impl HTLCCandidate { + fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self { + Self { + amount_msat, + origin, + } + } +} + // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an @@ -265,23 +289,19 @@ enum UpdateStatus { // // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client. // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity. -pub(super) struct Channel { +pub(super) struct Channel { config: ChannelConfig, user_id: u64, channel_id: [u8; 32], channel_state: u32, - channel_outbound: bool, secp_ctx: Secp256k1, channel_value_satoshis: u64, latest_monitor_update_id: u64, - #[cfg(not(test))] - holder_keys: ChanSigner, - #[cfg(test)] - pub(super) holder_keys: ChanSigner, + holder_signer: Signer, shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey, destination_script: Script, @@ -342,8 +362,6 @@ pub(super) struct Channel { last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig) - funding_txo: Option, - /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we @@ -370,8 +388,6 @@ pub(super) struct Channel { // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64, holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64, - counterparty_selected_contest_delay: u16, - holder_selected_contest_delay: u16, #[cfg(test)] pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16, #[cfg(not(test))] @@ -379,7 +395,7 @@ pub(super) struct Channel { //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16, minimum_depth: u32, - counterparty_pubkeys: Option, + pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters, counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option, @@ -391,6 +407,24 @@ pub(super) struct Channel { commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, network_sync: UpdateStatus, + + // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and + // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will + // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by + // `build_commitment_transaction`. + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex>, + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex>, +} + +#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] +struct CommitmentTxInfoCached { + fee: u64, + total_pending_htlcs: usize, + next_holder_htlc_id: u64, + next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64, + feerate: u32, } pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO @@ -442,7 +476,7 @@ macro_rules! secp_check { }; } -impl Channel { +impl Channel { // Convert constants + channel value to limits: fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 { channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO @@ -462,12 +496,13 @@ impl Channel { } // Constructors: - pub fn new_outbound(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result, APIError> - where K::Target: KeysInterface, + pub fn new_outbound(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result, APIError> + where K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, { let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay; - let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false, channel_value_satoshis); + let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis); + let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone(); if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS { return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)}); @@ -480,25 +515,27 @@ impl Channel { return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)}); } let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background); - if Channel::::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) { + if Channel::::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) { return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate}); } let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal); + let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes()); + Ok(Channel { user_id, config: config.channel_options.clone(), channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(), channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32, - channel_outbound: true, - secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(), + secp_ctx, channel_value_satoshis, latest_monitor_update_id: 0, - holder_keys: chan_keys, + holder_signer, shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(), @@ -530,7 +567,6 @@ impl Channel { last_sent_closing_fee: None, - funding_txo: None, funding_tx_confirmed_in: None, short_channel_id: None, last_block_connected: Default::default(), @@ -538,17 +574,21 @@ impl Channel { feerate_per_kw: feerate, counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0, - holder_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate), + holder_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate), counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0, counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0, holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat }, - counterparty_selected_contest_delay: 0, - holder_selected_contest_delay, counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0, minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel - counterparty_pubkeys: None, + channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters { + holder_pubkeys: pubkeys, + holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, + is_outbound_from_holder: true, + counterparty_parameters: None, + funding_outpoint: None + }, counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None, counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None, @@ -559,6 +599,11 @@ impl Channel { commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(), network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh, + + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None), + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None), }) } @@ -578,11 +623,12 @@ impl Channel { /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one. /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect! - pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result, ChannelError> - where K::Target: KeysInterface, + pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result, ChannelError> + where K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator { - let mut chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true, msg.funding_satoshis); + let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis); + let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone(); let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys { funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint, @@ -590,7 +636,6 @@ impl Channel { delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint, htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint }; - chan_keys.on_accept(&counterparty_pubkeys, msg.to_self_delay, config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay); let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone(); if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT { @@ -618,7 +663,7 @@ impl Channel { if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat { return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat))); } - Channel::::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?; + Channel::::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?; let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT); if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay { @@ -627,8 +672,8 @@ impl Channel { if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 { return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned())); } - if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than 483", msg.max_accepted_htlcs))); + if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS))); } // Now check against optional parameters as set by config... @@ -667,8 +712,8 @@ impl Channel { let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background); - let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate); - let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis); + let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate); + let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis); if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis { return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis))); } @@ -696,15 +741,14 @@ impl Channel { let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() { match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey { &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => { - // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg - if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() { - Some(script.clone()) // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything - } else if script.len() == 0 { + if script.len() == 0 { None // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel - } else { + } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) { return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex()))); + } else { + Some(script.clone()) } }, // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel @@ -714,18 +758,20 @@ impl Channel { } } else { None }; + let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes()); + let chan = Channel { user_id, config: local_config, channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id, channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32), - channel_outbound: false, - secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(), + secp_ctx, latest_monitor_update_id: 0, - holder_keys: chan_keys, + holder_signer, shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(), @@ -757,7 +803,6 @@ impl Channel { last_sent_closing_fee: None, - funding_txo: None, funding_tx_confirmed_in: None, short_channel_id: None, last_block_connected: Default::default(), @@ -771,12 +816,19 @@ impl Channel { counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat, holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat }, - counterparty_selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay, - holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs, minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth, - counterparty_pubkeys: Some(counterparty_pubkeys), + channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters { + holder_pubkeys: pubkeys, + holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, + is_outbound_from_holder: false, + counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { + selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay, + pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys, + }), + funding_outpoint: None + }, counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point), counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None, @@ -787,34 +839,16 @@ impl Channel { commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(), network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh, + + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None), + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None), }; Ok(chan) } - // Utilities to build transactions: - - fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self) -> u64 { - let mut sha = Sha256::engine(); - - let counterparty_payment_point = &self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().payment_point.serialize(); - if self.channel_outbound { - sha.input(&self.holder_keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize()); - sha.input(counterparty_payment_point); - } else { - sha.input(counterparty_payment_point); - sha.input(&self.holder_keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize()); - } - let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner(); - - ((res[26] as u64) << 5*8) | - ((res[27] as u64) << 4*8) | - ((res[28] as u64) << 3*8) | - ((res[29] as u64) << 2*8) | - ((res[30] as u64) << 1*8) | - ((res[31] as u64) << 0*8) - } - /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to @@ -828,34 +862,22 @@ impl Channel { /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows. - /// Returns (the transaction built, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the + /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction). /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value. #[inline] - fn build_commitment_transaction(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (Transaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger { - let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number); - - let txins = { - let mut ins: Vec = Vec::new(); - ins.push(TxIn { - previous_output: self.funding_txo.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(), - script_sig: Script::new(), - sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3*8) as u32), - witness: Vec::new(), - }); - ins - }; - - let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() + 2); + fn build_commitment_transaction(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger { let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new(); + let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len(); + let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs); let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis }; let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0; let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0; let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0; - log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw); + log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw); macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment { ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => { @@ -875,10 +897,7 @@ impl Channel { let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true); if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) { log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat); - txouts.push((TxOut { - script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(), - value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source)))); + included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source)); } else { log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat); included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source)); @@ -887,10 +906,7 @@ impl Channel { let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false); if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) { log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat); - txouts.push((TxOut { // "received HTLC output" - script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(), - value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source)))); + included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source)); } else { log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat); included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source)); @@ -974,77 +990,51 @@ impl Channel { }; debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64); broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64); - debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64); + debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64); broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64); } - let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (txouts.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000; - let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.channel_outbound { + let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000; + let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() { (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000) } else { (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64) }; - let value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote }; - let value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self }; + let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote }; + let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self }; if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) { log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a); - txouts.push((TxOut { - script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&keys.revocation_key, - if local { self.counterparty_selected_contest_delay } else { self.holder_selected_contest_delay }, - &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(), - value: value_to_a as u64 - }, None)); + } else { + value_to_a = 0; } if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) { log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b); - let static_payment_pk = if local { - self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().payment_point - } else { - self.holder_keys.pubkeys().payment_point - }.serialize(); - txouts.push((TxOut { - script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0) - .push_slice(&WPubkeyHash::hash(&static_payment_pk)[..]) - .into_script(), - value: value_to_b as u64 - }, None)); - } - - transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |a, b| { - if let &Some(ref a_htlc) = a { - if let &Some(ref b_htlc) = b { - a_htlc.0.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlc.0.cltv_expiry) - // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison - // here for fuzztarget mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency - // may fail)! - .then(a_htlc.0.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlc.0.payment_hash.0)) - // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we - // close the channel due to mismatches - they're doing something dumb: - } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal } - } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal } - }); - - let mut outputs: Vec = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len()); - let mut htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len() + included_dust_htlcs.len()); - for (idx, mut out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() { - outputs.push(out.0); - if let Some((mut htlc, source_option)) = out.1.take() { - htlc.transaction_output_index = Some(idx as u32); - htlcs_included.push((htlc, source_option)); - } + } else { + value_to_b = 0; } - let non_dust_htlc_count = htlcs_included.len(); + + let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len(); + + let channel_parameters = + if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() } + else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() }; + let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number, + value_to_a as u64, + value_to_b as u64, + keys.clone(), + feerate_per_kw, + &mut included_non_dust_htlcs, + &channel_parameters + ); + let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs; + // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index + htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap()); htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs); - (Transaction { - version: 2, - lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32), - input: txins, - output: outputs, - }, non_dust_htlc_count, htlcs_included) + (tx, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included) } #[inline] @@ -1085,7 +1075,7 @@ impl Channel { let txins = { let mut ins: Vec = Vec::new(); ins.push(TxIn { - previous_output: self.funding_txo.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(), + previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(), script_sig: Script::new(), sequence: 0xffffffff, witness: Vec::new(), @@ -1098,14 +1088,14 @@ impl Channel { let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new(); let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis; - let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.channel_outbound { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 }; - let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 }; + let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 }; + let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 }; if value_to_self < 0 { - assert!(self.channel_outbound); + assert!(self.is_outbound()); total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64; } else if value_to_remote < 0 { - assert!(!self.channel_outbound); + assert!(!self.is_outbound()); total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64; } @@ -1138,6 +1128,10 @@ impl Channel { }, total_fee_satoshis) } + fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint { + self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap() + } + #[inline] /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to @@ -1145,10 +1139,10 @@ impl Channel { /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction) /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this? fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result { - let per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx); - let delayed_payment_base = &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint; - let htlc_basepoint = &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint; - let counterparty_pubkeys = self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap(); + let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx); + let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint; + let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint; + let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys(); Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned())) } @@ -1160,9 +1154,9 @@ impl Channel { fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result { //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we //may see payments to it! - let revocation_basepoint = &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint; - let htlc_basepoint = &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint; - let counterparty_pubkeys = self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap(); + let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint; + let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint; + let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys(); Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned())) } @@ -1171,14 +1165,14 @@ impl Channel { /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()). /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script { - make_funding_redeemscript(&self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) + make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) } /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs. fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Transaction { - chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.counterparty_selected_contest_delay } else { self.holder_selected_contest_delay }, htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key) + chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay() } else { self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay() }, htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key) } /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made. @@ -1388,7 +1382,7 @@ impl Channel { pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> { // Check sanity of message fields: - if !self.channel_outbound { + if !self.is_outbound() { return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned())); } if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { @@ -1406,7 +1400,7 @@ impl Channel { if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis { return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis))); } - let remote_reserve = Channel::::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis); + let remote_reserve = Channel::::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis); if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve { return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve))); } @@ -1421,8 +1415,8 @@ impl Channel { if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 { return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned())); } - if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than 483", msg.max_accepted_htlcs))); + if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS))); } // Now check against optional parameters as set by config... @@ -1451,15 +1445,14 @@ impl Channel { let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() { match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey { &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => { - // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg - if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() { - Some(script.clone()) // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything - } else if script.len() == 0 { + if script.len() == 0 { None // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel + } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex()))); } else { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. scriptpubkey: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex()))); + Some(script.clone()) } }, // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel @@ -1473,7 +1466,6 @@ impl Channel { self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000); self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis; self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat; - self.counterparty_selected_contest_delay = msg.to_self_delay; self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs; self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth; @@ -1485,8 +1477,10 @@ impl Channel { htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint }; - self.holder_keys.on_accept(&counterparty_pubkeys, msg.to_self_delay, self.holder_selected_contest_delay); - self.counterparty_pubkeys = Some(counterparty_pubkeys); + self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { + selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay, + pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys, + }); self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point); self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey; @@ -1496,35 +1490,40 @@ impl Channel { Ok(()) } - fn funding_created_signature(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Transaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger { + fn funding_created_signature(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger { let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript(); let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?; let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0; - let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&initial_commitment_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]); - - // They sign the "our" commitment transaction... - log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_tx), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script)); - secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned()); - - let tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_holder_sig(initial_commitment_tx, sig.clone(), &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey(), keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new()); + { + let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust(); + let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction(); + let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis); + // They sign the holder commitment transaction... + log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script)); + secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned()); + } let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?; let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0; - let pre_remote_keys = PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys::new(counterparty_keys); - let counterparty_signature = self.holder_keys.sign_counterparty_commitment(self.feerate_per_kw, &counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &pre_remote_keys, &Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx) + + let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust(); + let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction(); + log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction)); + + let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx) .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0; // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish. - Ok((counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, tx, counterparty_signature)) + Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature)) } fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey { - &self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().expect("funding_pubkey() only allowed after accept_channel").funding_pubkey + &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } - pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger { - if self.channel_outbound { + pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger { + if self.is_outbound() { return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())); } if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) { @@ -1539,38 +1538,47 @@ impl Channel { panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created"); } - let funding_txo = OutPoint{ txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index }; - self.funding_txo = Some(funding_txo.clone()); + let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index }; + self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo); + // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular + // funding_created_signature may fail. + self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters); - let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) { + let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) { Ok(res) => res, + Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => { + self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None; + return Err(ChannelError::Close(e)); + }, Err(e) => { - self.funding_txo = None; - return Err(e); + // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here + // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state. + panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e); } }; + let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new( + initial_commitment_tx, + msg.signature, + Vec::new(), + &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, + self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() + ); + // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state: - let counterparty_pubkeys = self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap(); let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript(); let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(); - macro_rules! create_monitor { - () => { { - let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.holder_keys.clone(), - &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.holder_selected_contest_delay, - &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()), - &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, - self.counterparty_selected_contest_delay, funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, - self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(), - initial_commitment_tx.clone()); - - channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger); - channel_monitor - } } - } + let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()); + let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(), + &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), + &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()), + &self.channel_transaction_parameters, + funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, + obscure_factor, + holder_commitment_tx); - let channel_monitor = create_monitor!(); + channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger); self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32; self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id(); @@ -1585,8 +1593,8 @@ impl Channel { /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end. /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!) - pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, logger: &L) -> Result, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger { - if !self.channel_outbound { + pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, logger: &L) -> Result, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger { + if !self.is_outbound() { return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())); } if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 { @@ -1602,40 +1610,45 @@ impl Channel { let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?; let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0; + let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust(); + let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction(); - let holder_keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?; - let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0; - let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&initial_commitment_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]); - - let counterparty_funding_pubkey = &self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey; + log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction)); - // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish. - if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, counterparty_funding_pubkey) { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())); + let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?; + let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0; + { + let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust(); + let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction(); + let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis); + // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish. + if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) { + return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())); + } } - let counterparty_pubkeys = self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap(); + let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new( + initial_commitment_tx, + msg.signature, + Vec::new(), + &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, + self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() + ); + + let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript(); - let funding_txo = self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap(); + let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap(); let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(); - macro_rules! create_monitor { - () => { { - let commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_holder_sig(initial_commitment_tx.clone(), msg.signature.clone(), &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, counterparty_funding_pubkey, holder_keys.clone(), self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new()); - let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.holder_keys.clone(), - &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.holder_selected_contest_delay, - &self.destination_script, (funding_txo.clone(), funding_txo_script.clone()), - &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, - self.counterparty_selected_contest_delay, funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, - self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(), - commitment_tx); - - channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger); - - channel_monitor - } } - } + let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()); + let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(), + &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), + &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script), + &self.channel_transaction_parameters, + funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, + obscure_factor, + holder_commitment_tx); - let channel_monitor = create_monitor!(); + channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger); assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update! self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32; @@ -1724,63 +1737,172 @@ impl Channel { (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000 } - // Get the commitment tx fee for the local (i.e our) next commitment transaction - // based on the number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next - // commitment tx. `addl_htcs` is an optional parameter allowing the caller - // to add a number of additional HTLCs to the calculation. Note that dust - // HTLCs are excluded. - fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, addl_htlcs: usize) -> u64 { - assert!(self.channel_outbound); + // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the + // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional + // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs + // are excluded. + fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 { + assert!(self.is_outbound()); + + let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis; + let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis; + + let mut addl_htlcs = 0; + if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; } + match htlc.origin { + HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => { + if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat { + addl_htlcs += 1; + } + }, + HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => { + if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat { + addl_htlcs += 1; + } + } + } + + let mut included_htlcs = 0; + for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() { + if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat { + continue + } + // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment + // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA. + included_htlcs += 1; + } - let mut their_acked_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len(); for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() { - if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis { + if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat { continue } match htlc.state { - OutboundHTLCState::Committed => their_acked_htlcs += 1, - OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => their_acked_htlcs += 1, - OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => their_acked_htlcs += 1, + OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1, + OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1, + OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1, + // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment + // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean + // dropping any HTLCs in this state. _ => {}, } } for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() { match htlc { - &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => their_acked_htlcs += 1, - _ => {}, + &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => { + if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat { + continue + } + included_htlcs += 1 + }, + _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the + // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore. } } - self.commit_tx_fee_msat(their_acked_htlcs + addl_htlcs) + let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs; + let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs); + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + { + let mut fee = res; + if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { + fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1); + } + let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() + + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(); + let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached { + fee, + total_pending_htlcs, + next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin { + HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1, + HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id, + }, + next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin { + HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id, + HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1, + }, + feerate: self.feerate_per_kw, + }; + *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info); + } + res } - // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction - // based on the number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their - // next commitment tx. `addl_htcs` is an optional parameter allowing the caller - // to add a number of additional HTLCs to the calculation. Note that dust HTLCs - // are excluded. - fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, addl_htlcs: usize) -> u64 { - assert!(!self.channel_outbound); + // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of + // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if + // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are + // excluded. + fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 { + assert!(!self.is_outbound()); + + let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis; + let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis; + + let mut addl_htlcs = 0; + if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; } + match htlc.origin { + HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => { + if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat { + addl_htlcs += 1; + } + }, + HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => { + if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat { + addl_htlcs += 1; + } + } + } + + // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all + // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only + // committed outbound HTLCs, see below. + let mut included_htlcs = 0; + for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() { + if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat { + continue + } + included_htlcs += 1; + } - // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next - // commitment_signed, all inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be - // included) and only committed outbound HTLCs, see below. - let mut their_acked_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len(); for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() { - if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis { + if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat { continue } - // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next - // commitment_signed, i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement. + // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed, + // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement. match htlc.state { - OutboundHTLCState::Committed => their_acked_htlcs += 1, - OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => their_acked_htlcs += 1, + OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1, + OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1, + OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1, _ => {}, } } - self.commit_tx_fee_msat(their_acked_htlcs + addl_htlcs) + let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs; + let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs); + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + { + let mut fee = res; + if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { + fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1); + } + let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len(); + let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached { + fee, + total_pending_htlcs, + next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin { + HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1, + HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id, + }, + next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin { + HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id, + HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1, + }, + feerate: self.feerate_per_kw, + }; + *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info); + } + res } pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError> @@ -1812,7 +1934,7 @@ impl Channel { if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 { return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS))); } - let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis); + let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis); if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat { return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat))); } @@ -1847,29 +1969,31 @@ impl Channel { // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec). - let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else { - // +1 for this HTLC. - self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(1) + let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { + let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered); + self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations }; if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat { return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned())); }; let chan_reserve_msat = - Channel::::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000; + Channel::::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000; if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat { return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned())); } - if !self.channel_outbound { - // `+1` for this HTLC, `2 *` and `+1` fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from the - // spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's side, - // only on the sender's. - // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output fees, - // we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep the extra +1 - // as we should still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of - // being sensitive to fee spikes. - let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(1 + 1); + if !self.is_outbound() { + // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from + // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the + // receiver's side, only on the sender's. + // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output + // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep + // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should + // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being + // sensitive to fee spikes. + let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered); + let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(())); if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat { // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing. @@ -1878,9 +2002,8 @@ impl Channel { } } else { // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC. - - // +1 for this HTLC. - let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(1); + let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered); + let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None); if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat { return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned())); } @@ -1992,45 +2115,63 @@ impl Channel { let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?; let mut update_fee = false; - let feerate_per_kw = if !self.channel_outbound && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() { + let feerate_per_kw = if !self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() { update_fee = true; self.pending_update_fee.unwrap() } else { self.feerate_per_kw }; - let mut commitment_tx = { - let mut commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger); - let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.drain(..).map(|htlc| (htlc.0, htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect(); - (commitment_tx.0, commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned) + let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid) = { + let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger); + let commitment_txid = { + let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust(); + let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction(); + let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis); + + log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script)); + if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) { + return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()))); + } + bitcoin_tx.txid + }; + let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect(); + (commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid) }; - let commitment_txid = commitment_tx.0.txid(); - let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&commitment_tx.0).signature_hash(0, &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]); - log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_tx.0), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script)); - if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) { - return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()))); - } + let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000; //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction if update_fee { - let num_htlcs = commitment_tx.1; - let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000; - - let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis); + let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis); if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require { return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()))); } } + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + { + if self.is_outbound() { + let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take(); + *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None; + if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info { + let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() + + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(); + if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs + && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id + && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw { + assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000); + } + } + } + } - if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_tx.1 { - return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_tx.1)))); + if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs { + return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs)))); } - // TODO: Merge these two, sadly they are currently both required to be passed separately to - // ChannelMonitor: - let mut htlcs_without_source = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_tx.2.len()); - let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_tx.2.len()); - for (idx, (htlc, source)) in commitment_tx.2.drain(..).enumerate() { + // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update + let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len()); + for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() { if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index { let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &keys, feerate_per_kw); let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys); @@ -2039,20 +2180,26 @@ impl Channel { if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) { return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()))); } - htlcs_without_source.push((htlc.clone(), Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]))); htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source)); } else { - htlcs_without_source.push((htlc.clone(), None)); htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source)); } } - let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx); - let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_keys.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1); + let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new( + commitment_tx, + msg.signature, + msg.htlc_signatures.clone(), + &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, + self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() + ); + + let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx); + let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1); // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls... let mut need_commitment = false; - if !self.channel_outbound { + if !self.is_outbound() { if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee { self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update; // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a @@ -2065,13 +2212,11 @@ impl Channel { } } - let counterparty_funding_pubkey = self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey; - self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1; let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate { update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id, updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { - commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_holder_sig(commitment_tx.0, msg.signature.clone(), &self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, &counterparty_funding_pubkey, keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_without_source), + commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs }] }; @@ -2284,6 +2429,12 @@ impl Channel { return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned())); } + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + { + *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None; + *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None; + } + self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret) .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?; self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1; @@ -2393,7 +2544,7 @@ impl Channel { } self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64; - if self.channel_outbound { + if self.is_outbound() { if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() { self.feerate_per_kw = feerate; } @@ -2477,7 +2628,7 @@ impl Channel { /// further details on the optionness of the return value. /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option { - if !self.channel_outbound { + if !self.is_outbound() { panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel"); } if !self.is_usable() { @@ -2609,7 +2760,7 @@ impl Channel { assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32); self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32); - let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_outbound; + let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound(); // Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in // MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when @@ -2618,9 +2769,9 @@ impl Channel { // monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the // monitor was persisted. let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked { - assert!(!self.channel_outbound, "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!"); + assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!"); self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false; - let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx); + let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx); Some(msgs::FundingLocked { channel_id: self.channel_id(), next_per_commitment_point, @@ -2659,21 +2810,21 @@ impl Channel { pub fn update_fee(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator { - if self.channel_outbound { + if self.is_outbound() { return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned())); } if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 { return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())); } - Channel::::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?; + Channel::::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?; self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw); self.update_time_counter += 1; Ok(()) } fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK { - let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx); - let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_keys.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2); + let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx); + let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2); msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id: self.channel_id, per_commitment_secret, @@ -2756,7 +2907,7 @@ impl Channel { if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 { match msg.data_loss_protect { OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => { - let expected_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx); + let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx); let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret) .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?; if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) { @@ -2795,7 +2946,7 @@ impl Channel { } // We have OurFundingLocked set! - let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx); + let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx); return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked { channel_id: self.channel_id(), next_per_commitment_point, @@ -2825,7 +2976,7 @@ impl Channel { let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 { // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked - let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx); + let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx); Some(msgs::FundingLocked { channel_id: self.channel_id(), next_per_commitment_point, @@ -2892,7 +3043,7 @@ impl Channel { fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option where F::Target: FeeEstimator { - if !self.channel_outbound || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() || + if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() || self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK || self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() { return None; @@ -2906,7 +3057,7 @@ impl Channel { let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000; let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false); - let sig = self.holder_keys + let sig = self.holder_signer .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx) .ok(); assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight); @@ -2920,7 +3071,7 @@ impl Channel { }) } - pub fn shutdown(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option, Option, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> + pub fn shutdown(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option, Option, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator { if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 { @@ -2939,14 +3090,7 @@ impl Channel { } assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0); - // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to - // 34 bytes in length, so don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script. - if self.channel_outbound && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got counterparty shutdown_scriptpubkey ({}) of absurd length from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex()))); - } - - //Check counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey form as BOLT says we must - if !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2pkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2sh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() { + if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, &msg.scriptpubkey) { return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex()))); } @@ -3003,7 +3147,7 @@ impl Channel { tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy - let funding_key = self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize(); + let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize(); let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize(); if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] { tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); @@ -3041,9 +3185,7 @@ impl Channel { } let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]); - let counterparty_funding_pubkey = &self.counterparty_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey; - - match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, counterparty_funding_pubkey) { + match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) { Ok(_) => {}, Err(_e) => { // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust @@ -3072,7 +3214,7 @@ impl Channel { ($new_feerate: expr) => { let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap())); let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false); - let sig = self.holder_keys + let sig = self.holder_signer .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx) .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?; assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight); @@ -3086,7 +3228,7 @@ impl Channel { } let mut min_feerate = 253; - if self.channel_outbound { + if self.is_outbound() { let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal); if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 { if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee { @@ -3108,7 +3250,7 @@ impl Channel { propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate); } - let sig = self.holder_keys + let sig = self.holder_signer .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx) .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?; self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig); @@ -3147,7 +3289,23 @@ impl Channel { /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by /// get_outbound_funding_created. pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option { - self.funding_txo + self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint + } + + fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 { + self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay + } + + fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { + &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys + } + + fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 { + self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().selected_contest_delay + } + + fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { + &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys } /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown) @@ -3169,7 +3327,7 @@ impl Channel { // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS). self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10, - Channel::::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis) + Channel::::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis) ); } @@ -3204,8 +3362,8 @@ impl Channel { } #[cfg(test)] - pub fn get_keys(&self) -> &ChanSigner { - &self.holder_keys + pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer { + &self.holder_signer } #[cfg(test)] @@ -3247,7 +3405,7 @@ impl Channel { } pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool { - self.channel_outbound + self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder } /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel @@ -3261,7 +3419,7 @@ impl Channel { // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction: let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000; - if self.channel_outbound { + if self.is_outbound() { // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction: res += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000; } @@ -3367,11 +3525,12 @@ impl Channel { } if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 { for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() { - if tx.txid() == self.funding_txo.unwrap().txid { - let txo_idx = self.funding_txo.unwrap().index as usize; + let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap(); + if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid { + let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize; if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() || tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis { - if self.channel_outbound { + if self.is_outbound() { // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high @@ -3387,7 +3546,7 @@ impl Channel { data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned() }); } else { - if self.channel_outbound { + if self.is_outbound() { for input in tx.input.iter() { if input.witness.is_empty() { // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've @@ -3440,7 +3599,7 @@ impl Channel { //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something. if need_commitment_update { if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 { - let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx); + let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx); return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked { channel_id: self.channel_id, next_per_commitment_point, @@ -3477,7 +3636,7 @@ impl Channel { // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message): pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel { - if !self.channel_outbound { + if !self.is_outbound() { panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?"); } if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { @@ -3488,8 +3647,8 @@ impl Channel { panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced"); } - let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx); - let keys = self.holder_keys.pubkeys(); + let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx); + let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys(); msgs::OpenChannel { chain_hash, @@ -3497,11 +3656,11 @@ impl Channel { funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis, push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat, dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis, - max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis), - channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis), + max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis), + channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis), htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32, - to_self_delay: self.holder_selected_contest_delay, + to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS, funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint, @@ -3515,7 +3674,7 @@ impl Channel { } pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel { - if self.channel_outbound { + if self.is_outbound() { panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?"); } if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) { @@ -3525,17 +3684,17 @@ impl Channel { panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced"); } - let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx); - let keys = self.holder_keys.pubkeys(); + let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx); + let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys(); msgs::AcceptChannel { temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id, dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis, - max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis), - channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis), + max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis), + channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis), htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth, - to_self_delay: self.holder_selected_contest_delay, + to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS, funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint, @@ -3551,8 +3710,7 @@ impl Channel { fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result where L::Target: Logger { let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?; let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0; - let pre_remote_keys = PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys::new(counterparty_keys); - Ok(self.holder_keys.sign_counterparty_commitment(self.feerate_per_kw, &counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &pre_remote_keys, &Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx) + Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx) .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0) } @@ -3564,7 +3722,7 @@ impl Channel { /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call! /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close. pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result where L::Target: Logger { - if !self.channel_outbound { + if !self.is_outbound() { panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!"); } if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) { @@ -3576,12 +3734,14 @@ impl Channel { panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created"); } - self.funding_txo = Some(funding_txo.clone()); + self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo); + self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters); + let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) { Ok(res) => res, Err(e) => { log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e); - self.funding_txo = None; + self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None; return Err(e); } }; @@ -3628,12 +3788,12 @@ impl Channel { short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() }, node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id }, - bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() }, - bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey }, + bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() }, + bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }, excess_data: Vec::new(), }; - let sig = self.holder_keys.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx) + let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx) .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?; Ok((msg, sig)) @@ -3736,13 +3896,12 @@ impl Channel { return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat))); } - if !self.channel_outbound { + if !self.is_outbound() { // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC. - let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat; - let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis); - // 1 additional HTLC corresponding to this HTLC. - let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(1); + let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis); + let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered); + let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None); if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat { return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned())); } @@ -3753,10 +3912,10 @@ impl Channel { return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat))); } - // The `+1` is for the HTLC currently being added to the commitment tx and - // the `2 *` and `+1` are for the fee spike buffer. - let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.channel_outbound { - 2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(1 + 1) + // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer. + let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { + let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered); + 2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(())) } else { 0 }; if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat { return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat))); @@ -3860,7 +4019,7 @@ impl Channel { } self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst; - let (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) { + let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) { Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => { // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls... let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option>)> = @@ -3874,7 +4033,7 @@ impl Channel { let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate { update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id, updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { - unsigned_commitment_tx: counterparty_commitment_tx.clone(), + commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(), commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap() @@ -3886,40 +4045,58 @@ impl Channel { /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state. - fn send_commitment_no_state_update(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger { + fn send_commitment_no_state_update(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger { let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw; if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee { - if self.channel_outbound { + if self.is_outbound() { feerate_per_kw = feerate; } } let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?; let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger); + let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid(); let (signature, htlc_signatures); + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + { + if !self.is_outbound() { + let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take(); + *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None; + if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info { + let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len(); + if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs + && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id + && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw { + let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.1); + assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee); + } + } + } + } + { let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.2.len()); for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.2.iter() { htlcs.push(htlc); } - let pre_remote_keys = PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys::new(counterparty_keys); - let res = self.holder_keys.sign_counterparty_commitment(feerate_per_kw, &counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &pre_remote_keys, &htlcs, &self.secp_ctx) + let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx) .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?; signature = res.0; htlc_signatures = res.1; - let counterparty_keys = pre_remote_keys.trust_key_derivation(); - log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} with redeemscript {} -> {}", - encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0), + log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {}", + encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction), + &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()), log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..])); for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) { log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}", - encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.txid(), feerate_per_kw, self.holder_selected_contest_delay, htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)), - encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, counterparty_keys)), + encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)), + encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)), log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()), log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..])); } @@ -3929,7 +4106,7 @@ impl Channel { channel_id: self.channel_id, signature, htlc_signatures, - }, (counterparty_commitment_tx.0, counterparty_commitment_tx.2))) + }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.2))) } /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction @@ -4016,7 +4193,7 @@ impl Channel { _ => {} } } - let funding_txo = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.funding_txo { + let funding_txo = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() { // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent), // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid. @@ -4039,6 +4216,24 @@ impl Channel { } } +fn is_unsupported_shutdown_script(their_features: &InitFeatures, script: &Script) -> bool { + // We restrain shutdown scripts to standards forms to avoid transactions not propagating on the p2p tx-relay network + + // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, + // which for a a BIP-141-compliant witness program is at max 42 bytes in length. + // So don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script. + let is_script_too_long = script.len() > 42; + if is_script_too_long { + return true; + } + + if their_features.supports_shutdown_anysegwit() && script.is_witness_program() && script.as_bytes()[0] != OP_PUSHBYTES_0.into_u8() { + return false; + } + + return !script.is_p2pkh() && !script.is_p2sh() && !script.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !script.is_v0_p2wsh() +} + const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; @@ -4074,7 +4269,7 @@ impl Readable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason { } } -impl Writeable for Channel { +impl Writeable for Channel { fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self). @@ -4087,12 +4282,17 @@ impl Writeable for Channel { self.channel_id.write(writer)?; (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?; - self.channel_outbound.write(writer)?; self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?; self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?; - self.holder_keys.write(writer)?; + let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new()); + self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?; + assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::usize::MAX); + assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::u32::MAX as usize); + (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?; + writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?; + self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?; self.destination_script.write(writer)?; @@ -4229,7 +4429,6 @@ impl Writeable for Channel { None => 0u8.write(writer)?, } - self.funding_txo.write(writer)?; self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?; self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?; @@ -4242,12 +4441,10 @@ impl Writeable for Channel { self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?; self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?; self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?; - self.counterparty_selected_contest_delay.write(writer)?; - self.holder_selected_contest_delay.write(writer)?; self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?; self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?; - self.counterparty_pubkeys.write(writer)?; + self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?; self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?; self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?; @@ -4260,8 +4457,10 @@ impl Writeable for Channel { } } -impl Readable for Channel { - fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result { +const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024; +impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel + where K::Target: KeysInterface { + fn read(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result { let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?; let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?; if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION { @@ -4273,12 +4472,21 @@ impl Readable for Channel { let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?; let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?; - let channel_outbound = Readable::read(reader)?; let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?; let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?; - let holder_keys = Readable::read(reader)?; + let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)); + while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize { + // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys + let mut data = [0; 1024]; + let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())]; + reader.read_exact(read_slice)?; + keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice); + } + let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?; + let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?; let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?; @@ -4383,7 +4591,6 @@ impl Readable for Channel { _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), }; - let funding_txo = Readable::read(reader)?; let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?; let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?; @@ -4396,12 +4603,10 @@ impl Readable for Channel { let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?; let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?; let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?; - let counterparty_selected_contest_delay = Readable::read(reader)?; - let holder_selected_contest_delay = Readable::read(reader)?; let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?; let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?; - let counterparty_pubkeys = Readable::read(reader)?; + let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?; let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?; let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?; @@ -4410,19 +4615,21 @@ impl Readable for Channel { let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?; let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes()); + Ok(Channel { user_id, config, channel_id, channel_state, - channel_outbound, - secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(), + secp_ctx, channel_value_satoshis, latest_monitor_update_id, - holder_keys, + holder_signer, shutdown_pubkey, destination_script, @@ -4456,7 +4663,6 @@ impl Readable for Channel { last_sent_closing_fee, - funding_txo, funding_tx_confirmed_in, short_channel_id, last_block_connected, @@ -4468,12 +4674,10 @@ impl Readable for Channel { counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat, holder_htlc_minimum_msat, - counterparty_selected_contest_delay, - holder_selected_contest_delay, counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs, minimum_depth, - counterparty_pubkeys, + channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters, counterparty_cur_commitment_point, counterparty_prev_commitment_point, @@ -4484,6 +4688,11 @@ impl Readable for Channel { commitment_secrets, network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh, + + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None), + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None), }) } } @@ -4500,17 +4709,17 @@ mod tests { use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex; use hex; use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash}; - use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys}; + use ln::channel::{Channel,Sign,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys}; use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; use ln::features::InitFeatures; - use ln::msgs::{OptionalField, DataLossProtect}; + use ln::msgs::{OptionalField, DataLossProtect, DecodeError}; use ln::chan_utils; - use ln::chan_utils::{HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelPublicKeys}; + use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT}; use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget}; - use chain::keysinterface::{InMemoryChannelKeys, KeysInterface}; + use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface}; use chain::transaction::OutPoint; use util::config::UserConfig; - use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingChannelKeys; + use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner; use util::test_utils; use util::logger::Logger; use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All}; @@ -4536,10 +4745,10 @@ mod tests { } struct Keys { - chan_keys: InMemoryChannelKeys, + signer: InMemorySigner, } impl KeysInterface for Keys { - type ChanKeySigner = InMemoryChannelKeys; + type Signer = InMemorySigner; fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); } fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script { @@ -4555,10 +4764,11 @@ mod tests { PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key) } - fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemoryChannelKeys { - self.chan_keys.clone() + fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner { + self.signer.clone() } fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] } + fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result { panic!(); } } fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, hex: &str) -> PublicKey { @@ -4578,7 +4788,7 @@ mod tests { let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()); let config = UserConfig::default(); - let node_a_chan = Channel::::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); + let node_a_chan = Channel::::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the // same as the old fee. @@ -4587,6 +4797,122 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee); } + #[test] + fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() { + // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct + // dust limits are used. + let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000}; + let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + let seed = [42; 32]; + let network = Network::Testnet; + let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network); + + // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure + // they have different dust limits. + + // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey + let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()); + let config = UserConfig::default(); + let mut node_a_chan = Channel::::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); + + // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message + // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect. + let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash()); + assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis, 1560); + let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap()); + let node_b_chan = Channel::::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap(); + + // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit. + let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel(); + accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546; + node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap(); + + // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel. + let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's. + node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput { + htlc_id: 0, + amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, + payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()), + cltv_expiry: 300000000, + state: InboundHTLCState::Committed, + }); + + node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput { + htlc_id: 1, + amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's. + payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()), + cltv_expiry: 200000000, + state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed, + source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { + path: Vec::new(), + session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), + first_hop_htlc_msat: 548, + } + }); + + // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass + // the dust limit check. + let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered); + let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None); + let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0); + assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs); + + // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all + // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit. + node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false; + let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3); + let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered); + let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None); + assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs); + } + + #[test] + fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() { + // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` + // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty + // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for + // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa. + let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 }; + let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + let seed = [42; 32]; + let network = Network::Testnet; + let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network); + + let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()); + let config = UserConfig::default(); + let mut chan = Channel::::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); + + let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0); + let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1); + + // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be + // counted as dust when it shouldn't be. + let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000; + let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered); + let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None); + assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc); + + // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be. + let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000; + let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered); + let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None); + assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs); + + chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false; + + // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be. + let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000; + let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered); + let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None); + assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs); + + // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be. + let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000; + let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered); + let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None); + assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc); + } + #[test] fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() { let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000}; @@ -4601,12 +4927,12 @@ mod tests { // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()); let config = UserConfig::default(); - let mut node_a_chan = Channel::::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); + let mut node_a_chan = Channel::::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash()); let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap()); - let mut node_b_chan = Channel::::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap(); + let mut node_b_chan = Channel::::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap(); // Node B --> Node A: accept channel let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel(); @@ -4658,7 +4984,7 @@ mod tests { let logger : Arc = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()); let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); - let mut chan_keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new( + let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new( &secp_ctx, SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), @@ -4669,22 +4995,20 @@ mod tests { // These aren't set in the test vectors: [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff], 10_000_000, - (0, 0) + [0; 32] ); - assert_eq!(chan_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..], + assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..], hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]); - let keys_provider = Keys { chan_keys: chan_keys.clone() }; + let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() }; let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()); let mut config = UserConfig::default(); config.channel_options.announced_channel = false; - let mut chan = Channel::::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test - chan.counterparty_selected_contest_delay = 144; + let mut chan = Channel::::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546; let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 }; - chan.funding_txo = Some(funding_info); let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys { funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"), @@ -4693,7 +5017,13 @@ mod tests { delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"), htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444") }; - chan_keys.on_accept(&counterparty_pubkeys, chan.counterparty_selected_contest_delay, chan.holder_selected_contest_delay); + chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some( + CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { + pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(), + selected_contest_delay: 144 + }); + chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info); + signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters); assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]); @@ -4707,56 +5037,64 @@ mod tests { // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call // build_commitment_transaction. - let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_keys.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint; + let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint; let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(); let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret); - let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint; + let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint; let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap(); - chan.counterparty_pubkeys = Some(counterparty_pubkeys); - - let mut unsigned_tx: (Transaction, Vec); - - let mut holdertx; macro_rules! test_commitment { ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, { $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), * } ) => { { - unsigned_tx = { + let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec) = { let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw, &logger); + let htlcs = res.2.drain(..) .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None }) .collect(); (res.0, htlcs) }; + let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust(); + let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction(); let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript(); let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(); - let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&unsigned_tx.0).signature_hash(0, &redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap(); + let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis); secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap(); - let mut per_htlc = Vec::new(); + let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option)> = Vec::new(); per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls + let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new(); + counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls $({ let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(); - per_htlc.push((unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature))); + per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature))); + counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature); })* - assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), per_htlc.len()); + assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len()); - holdertx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_holder_sig(unsigned_tx.0.clone(), counterparty_signature.clone(), &chan_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey(), keys.clone(), chan.feerate_per_kw, per_htlc); - let holder_sig = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment(&holdertx, &chan.secp_ctx).unwrap(); - assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig); + let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new( + commitment_tx.clone(), + counterparty_signature, + counterparty_htlc_sigs, + &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, + chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey() + ); + let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig"); - assert_eq!(serialize(&holdertx.add_holder_sig(&redeemscript, holder_sig))[..], - hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]); + let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript(); + let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig); + assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx"); - let htlc_sigs = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions(&holdertx, &chan.secp_ctx).unwrap(); - let mut htlc_sig_iter = holdertx.per_htlc.iter().zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate()); + // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig)) + let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate()); $({ let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(); - let ref htlc = unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx]; - let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.0.txid(), &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw); + let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx]; + let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw); let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys); let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap(); secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap(); @@ -4773,20 +5111,18 @@ mod tests { assert!(preimage.is_some()); } - let mut htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap(); - while (htlc_sig.1).1.is_none() { htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap(); } - assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx)); + let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap(); + assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index"); let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(); - assert_eq!(Some(signature), *(htlc_sig.1).1); - assert_eq!(serialize(&holdertx.get_signed_htlc_tx((htlc_sig.1).0, &(htlc_sig.1).1.unwrap(), &preimage, chan.counterparty_selected_contest_delay))[..], - hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..]); + assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig"); + let index = (htlc_sig.1).0; + let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(); + let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust(); + assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..], + hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx"); })* - loop { - let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next(); - if htlc_sig.is_none() { break; } - assert!((htlc_sig.unwrap().1).1.is_none()); - } + assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none()); } } } @@ -5126,6 +5462,65 @@ mod tests { test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2", "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379", "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", {}); + + // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage + chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000; + chan.feerate_per_kw = 253; + chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear(); + chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({ + let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{ + htlc_id: 1, + amount_msat: 2000000, + cltv_expiry: 501, + payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]), + state: InboundHTLCState::Committed, + }; + out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner(); + out + }); + chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear(); + chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({ + let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{ + htlc_id: 6, + amount_msat: 5000000, + cltv_expiry: 506, + payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]), + state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed, + source: HTLCSource::dummy(), + }; + out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner(); + out + }); + chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({ + let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{ + htlc_id: 5, + amount_msat: 5000000, + cltv_expiry: 505, + payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]), + state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed, + source: HTLCSource::dummy(), + }; + out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner(); + out + }); + + test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9", + "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f", + "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", { + + { 0, + "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6", + "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c", + "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" }, + { 1, + "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5", + "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39", + "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" }, + { 2, + "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f", + "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511", + "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" } + } ); } #[test]