X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannel.rs;h=13b2dbb1a1c6a7b9f54b996e03ab6acc6bdcbf11;hb=8799a2a0440603bb10b7cf121f60e41f0ef1a6fa;hp=a5f4b16e6a1a1b5b05bc1b0c49a1fac1cdfd8438;hpb=d4810087c111da74a80b85117c62fd6d012e697d;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs index a5f4b16e..13b2dbb1 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs @@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter}; use util::logger::Logger; use util::errors::APIError; use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig}; +use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts; use std; -use std::default::Default; use std::{cmp,mem,fmt}; use std::ops::Deref; #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] @@ -368,9 +368,6 @@ pub(super) struct Channel { /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback. funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option, short_channel_id: Option, - /// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks, also used to verify consistency during - /// ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super)) - pub(super) last_block_connected: BlockHash, funding_tx_confirmations: u64, counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64, @@ -569,7 +566,6 @@ impl Channel { funding_tx_confirmed_in: None, short_channel_id: None, - last_block_connected: Default::default(), funding_tx_confirmations: 0, feerate_per_kw: feerate, @@ -805,7 +801,6 @@ impl Channel { funding_tx_confirmed_in: None, short_channel_id: None, - last_block_connected: Default::default(), funding_tx_confirmations: 0, feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw, @@ -1522,7 +1517,7 @@ impl Channel { &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } - pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger { + pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, last_block_hash: BlockHash, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger { if self.is_outbound() { return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())); } @@ -1576,7 +1571,7 @@ impl Channel { &self.channel_transaction_parameters, funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, obscure_factor, - holder_commitment_tx); + holder_commitment_tx, last_block_hash); channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger); @@ -1593,7 +1588,7 @@ impl Channel { /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end. /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!) - pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, logger: &L) -> Result, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger { + pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, last_block_hash: BlockHash, logger: &L) -> Result, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger { if !self.is_outbound() { return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())); } @@ -1646,7 +1641,7 @@ impl Channel { &self.channel_transaction_parameters, funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, obscure_factor, - holder_commitment_tx); + holder_commitment_tx, last_block_hash); channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger); @@ -3517,12 +3512,12 @@ impl Channel { _ => true } }); - let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS); - if header.block_hash() != self.last_block_connected { - if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 { - self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1; - } + + if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 { + self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1; } + + let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS); if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 { for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() { let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap(); @@ -3556,58 +3551,53 @@ impl Channel { } } } - if height > 0xff_ff_ff || (index_in_block) > 0xff_ff_ff { - panic!("Block was bogus - either height 16 million or had > 16 million transactions"); - } - assert!(txo_idx <= 0xffff); // txo_idx is a (u16 as usize), so this is just listed here for completeness self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1; - self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) | - ((index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) | - ((txo_idx as u64) << (0*8))); + self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) { + Ok(scid) => Some(scid), + Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"), + } } } } } - if header.block_hash() != self.last_block_connected { - self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash(); - self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, header.time); - if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 { - if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 { - let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 { - self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32; - true - } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) { - self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS); - self.update_time_counter += 1; - true - } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) { - // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update - // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return. - false - } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 { - panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state); + + self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, header.time); + if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 { + if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 { + let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 { + self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32; + true + } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) { + self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS); + self.update_time_counter += 1; + true + } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) { + // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update + // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return. + false + } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 { + panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state); + } else { + // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update + // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return. + false + }; + self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.block_hash()); + + //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us, + //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda, + //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be + //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something. + if need_commitment_update { + if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 { + let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx); + return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked { + channel_id: self.channel_id, + next_per_commitment_point, + }), timed_out_htlcs)); } else { - // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update - // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return. - false - }; - self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(self.last_block_connected); - - //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us, - //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda, - //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be - //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something. - if need_commitment_update { - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 { - let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx); - return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked { - channel_id: self.channel_id, - next_per_commitment_point, - }), timed_out_htlcs)); - } else { - self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true; - return Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs)); - } + self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true; + return Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs)); } } } @@ -3625,8 +3615,7 @@ impl Channel { return true; } } - self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash(); - if Some(self.last_block_connected) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in { + if Some(header.block_hash()) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in { self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1; } false @@ -4435,8 +4424,6 @@ impl Writeable for Channel { self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?; self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?; - - self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?; self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?; self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?; @@ -4597,8 +4584,6 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?; let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?; - - let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?; let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?; let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?; @@ -4669,7 +4654,6 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel funding_tx_confirmed_in, short_channel_id, - last_block_connected, funding_tx_confirmations, counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, @@ -4924,6 +4908,8 @@ mod tests { let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); let seed = [42; 32]; let network = Network::Testnet; + let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(); + let last_block_hash = chain_hash; let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network); // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes. @@ -4934,7 +4920,7 @@ mod tests { let mut node_a_chan = Channel::::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message - let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash()); + let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash); let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap()); let mut node_b_chan = Channel::::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap(); @@ -4949,10 +4935,10 @@ mod tests { }]}; let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }; let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap(); - let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, &&logger).unwrap(); + let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, last_block_hash, &&logger).unwrap(); // Node B --> Node A: funding signed - let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, &&logger); + let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, last_block_hash, &&logger); // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.