X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannel.rs;h=17f1976364859cdc973f5ec17f6ba4cafe835651;hb=edd4babb1cf886654259ecad8594661e829a0680;hp=c9d54a048310e19a68b829f2a335d7b3b508ea5e;hpb=a6ddb973ea8ac173c700435e57a897bafc420fbb;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs index c9d54a04..17f19763 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs @@ -39,14 +39,14 @@ use util::events::ClosureReason; use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter}; use util::logger::Logger; use util::errors::APIError; -use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig}; +use util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits}; use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts; use io; use prelude::*; use core::{cmp,mem,fmt}; use core::ops::Deref; -#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", debug_assertions))] +#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))] use sync::Mutex; use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex; @@ -305,6 +305,26 @@ pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus { Disabled, } +/// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here. +#[derive(PartialEq)] +pub enum AnnouncementSigsState { + /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since + /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`. + NotSent, + /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected. + /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`. + MessageSent, + /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we + /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending + /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if + /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`. + /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`. + Committed, + /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this + /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect. + PeerReceived, +} + /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC. enum HTLCInitiator { LocalOffered, @@ -399,6 +419,7 @@ pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates { pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec, pub funding_broadcastable: Option, pub funding_locked: Option, + pub announcement_sigs: Option, } /// The return value of `channel_reestablish` @@ -409,6 +430,7 @@ pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses { pub order: RAACommitmentOrder, pub mon_update: Option, pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, + pub announcement_sigs: Option, pub shutdown_msg: Option, } @@ -462,10 +484,25 @@ pub(super) struct Channel { #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))] config: ChannelConfig, + inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option, + user_id: u64, channel_id: [u8; 32], channel_state: u32, + + // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to + // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we + // next connect. + // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s). + // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits + // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in + // many tests. + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))] + pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState, + #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))] + announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState, + secp_ctx: Secp256k1, channel_value_satoshis: u64, @@ -547,6 +584,19 @@ pub(super) struct Channel { #[cfg(not(test))] closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>, + /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created` + /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the + /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels + /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel` + /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel` + /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`. + /// + /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a + /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound + /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before + /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully. + inbound_awaiting_accept: bool, + /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included. funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option, funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32, @@ -620,9 +670,9 @@ pub(super) struct Channel { // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by // `build_commitment_transaction`. - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex>, - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex>, /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed @@ -634,7 +684,7 @@ pub(super) struct Channel { /// See-also pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option, - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack @@ -645,9 +695,22 @@ pub(super) struct Channel { /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures, + + // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing + // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing + // the channel's funding UTXO. + // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has + // to store all of them. + latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option, + + // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel + // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we + // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with + // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases. + outbound_scid_alias: u64, } -#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] +#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] struct CommitmentTxInfoCached { fee: u64, total_pending_htlcs: usize, @@ -750,7 +813,8 @@ impl Channel { // Constructors: pub fn new_outbound( fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, - channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32 + channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, + outbound_scid_alias: u64 ) -> Result, APIError> where K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, @@ -800,9 +864,11 @@ impl Channel { Ok(Channel { user_id, config: config.channel_options.clone(), + inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.peer_channel_config_limits.clone()), channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(), channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32, + announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent, secp_ctx, channel_value_satoshis, @@ -844,6 +910,8 @@ impl Channel { closing_fee_limits: None, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None, + inbound_awaiting_accept: false, + funding_tx_confirmed_in: None, funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0, short_channel_id: None, @@ -886,14 +954,17 @@ impl Channel { announcement_sigs: None, - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None), - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None), workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None, - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + latest_inbound_scid_alias: None, + outbound_scid_alias, + + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(), // We currently only actually support one channel type, so don't retry with new types @@ -906,14 +977,6 @@ impl Channel { fn check_remote_fee(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator { - let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background); - // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing - // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate - // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250 - // sat/kw before the comparison here. - if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit))); - } // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates, // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee. // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it @@ -923,6 +986,14 @@ impl Channel { if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit { return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit))); } + let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background); + // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing + // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate + // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250 + // sat/kw before the comparison here. + if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit))); + } Ok(()) } @@ -930,7 +1001,8 @@ impl Channel { /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect! pub fn new_from_req( fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, - msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L + msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, + outbound_scid_alias: u64 ) -> Result, ChannelError> where K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, @@ -1098,9 +1170,11 @@ impl Channel { let chan = Channel { user_id, config: local_config, + inbound_handshake_limits_override: None, channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id, channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32), + announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent, secp_ctx, latest_monitor_update_id: 0, @@ -1141,6 +1215,8 @@ impl Channel { closing_fee_limits: None, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None, + inbound_awaiting_accept: true, + funding_tx_confirmed_in: None, funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0, short_channel_id: None, @@ -1187,14 +1263,17 @@ impl Channel { announcement_sigs: None, - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None), - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None), workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None, - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + latest_inbound_scid_alias: None, + outbound_scid_alias, + + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(), channel_type, @@ -1592,7 +1671,7 @@ impl Channel { } } if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX { - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds. debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg)); @@ -1618,7 +1697,7 @@ impl Channel { if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id { // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here: self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1; - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg)); return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {}; } @@ -1639,11 +1718,11 @@ impl Channel { self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg, }); - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg); return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None }; } - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg); { @@ -1724,7 +1803,7 @@ impl Channel { } } if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX { - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early. debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg)); @@ -1737,7 +1816,7 @@ impl Channel { match pending_update { &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => { if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id { - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg)); return Ok(None); } @@ -1774,7 +1853,9 @@ impl Channel { // Message handlers: - pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> { + pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> { + let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits }; + // Check sanity of message fields: if !self.is_outbound() { return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned())); @@ -1795,7 +1876,7 @@ impl Channel { if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat { return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat))); } - let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT); + let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT); if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable { return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay))); } @@ -1807,17 +1888,17 @@ impl Channel { } // Now check against optional parameters as set by config... - if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat))); + if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat))); } - if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat))); + if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat))); } - if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis))); + if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis))); } - if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs))); + if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs))); } if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS { return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS))); @@ -1825,8 +1906,8 @@ impl Channel { if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS { return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS))); } - if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth))); + if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth))); } if msg.minimum_depth == 0 { // Note that if this changes we should update the serialization minimum version to @@ -1835,6 +1916,16 @@ impl Channel { return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum confirmation depth must be at least 1".to_owned())); } + if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type { + if *ty != self.channel_type { + return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned())); + } + } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() { + // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it. + } else { + self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features) + } + let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() { match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey { &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => { @@ -1879,6 +1970,7 @@ impl Channel { self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey; self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32; + self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now. Ok(()) } @@ -1929,6 +2021,9 @@ impl Channel { // channel. return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())); } + if self.inbound_awaiting_accept { + return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned())); + } if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) || self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER { @@ -2068,12 +2163,24 @@ impl Channel { Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap())) } - pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger { + /// Handles a funding_locked message from our peer. If we've already sent our funding_locked + /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to + /// reply with. + pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger { if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 { self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone()); return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned())); } + if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias { + if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id { + // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty, + // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used + // when routing outbound payments. + self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias); + } + } + let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS); if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 { @@ -2081,18 +2188,29 @@ impl Channel { } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) { self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS); self.update_time_counter += 1; - } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 && - // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1! - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 && - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) || - // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs: - (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == - (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) { - if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) { + } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 || + // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs: + (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == + (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) + { + // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is + // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias. + let expected_point = + if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 { + // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match + // the current one. + self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point + } else { + // If they have sent updated points, funding_locked is always supposed to match + // their "first" point, which we re-derive here. + Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice( + &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available") + ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already"))) + }; + if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) { return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned())); } - // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required - return Ok(()); + return Ok(None); } else { return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned())); } @@ -2102,16 +2220,16 @@ impl Channel { log_info!(logger, "Received funding_locked from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); - Ok(()) + Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger)) } /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option { - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 { - self.funding_transaction.clone() - } else { - None - } + if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 { + self.funding_transaction.clone() + } else { + None + } } /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs @@ -2205,8 +2323,15 @@ impl Channel { /// This is the amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees. /// See also [`Channel::get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat`] pub fn get_balance_msat(&self) -> u64 { - self.value_to_self_msat - - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat + // Include our local balance, plus any inbound HTLCs we know the preimage for, minus any + // HTLCs sent or which will be sent after commitment signed's are exchanged. + let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat; + for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() { + if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state { + balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat; + } + } + balance_msat - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat } pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option) { @@ -2293,7 +2418,7 @@ impl Channel { let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs; let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors()); - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] { let mut fee = res; if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { @@ -2371,7 +2496,7 @@ impl Channel { let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs; let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors()); - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] { let mut fee = res; if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { @@ -2654,7 +2779,7 @@ impl Channel { return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()))); } } - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] { if self.is_outbound() { let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take(); @@ -2961,7 +3086,7 @@ impl Channel { return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned())); } - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] { *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None; *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None; @@ -2992,6 +3117,10 @@ impl Channel { self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point); self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1; + if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed { + self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived; + } + log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new(); let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new(); @@ -3268,6 +3397,11 @@ impl Channel { self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32; return; } + + if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed { + self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent; + } + // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages // will be retransmitted. self.last_sent_closing_fee = None; @@ -3344,7 +3478,7 @@ impl Channel { /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent /// to the remote side. - pub fn monitor_updating_restored(&mut self, logger: &L) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates where L::Target: Logger { + pub fn monitor_updating_restored(&mut self, logger: &L, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates where L::Target: Logger { assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32); self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32); @@ -3364,9 +3498,12 @@ impl Channel { Some(msgs::FundingLocked { channel_id: self.channel_id(), next_per_commitment_point, + short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias), }) } else { None }; + let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block_height, logger); + let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new(); mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards); let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new(); @@ -3379,7 +3516,7 @@ impl Channel { self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false; return MonitorRestoreUpdates { raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, - accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked + accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked, announcement_sigs }; } @@ -3398,7 +3535,7 @@ impl Channel { if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" }, match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"}); MonitorRestoreUpdates { - raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked + raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked, announcement_sigs } } @@ -3512,7 +3649,9 @@ impl Channel { /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately) /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call. - pub fn channel_reestablish(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result where L::Target: Logger { + pub fn channel_reestablish(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, + node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock) + -> Result where L::Target: Logger { if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 { // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we @@ -3556,6 +3695,8 @@ impl Channel { }) } else { None }; + let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger); + if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 { // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's. if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 || @@ -3569,7 +3710,7 @@ impl Channel { raa: None, commitment_update: None, mon_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(), - shutdown_msg + shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs, }); } @@ -3579,11 +3720,12 @@ impl Channel { funding_locked: Some(msgs::FundingLocked { channel_id: self.channel_id(), next_per_commitment_point, + short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias), }), raa: None, commitment_update: None, mon_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(), - shutdown_msg + shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs, }); } @@ -3614,6 +3756,7 @@ impl Channel { Some(msgs::FundingLocked { channel_id: self.channel_id(), next_per_commitment_point, + short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias), }) } else { None }; @@ -3635,7 +3778,7 @@ impl Channel { panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"), Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => { Ok(ReestablishResponses { - funding_locked, shutdown_msg, + funding_locked, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs, raa: required_revoke, commitment_update: Some(commitment_update), order: self.resend_order.clone(), @@ -3645,7 +3788,7 @@ impl Channel { }, Ok((None, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => { Ok(ReestablishResponses { - funding_locked, shutdown_msg, + funding_locked, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs, raa: required_revoke, commitment_update: None, order: self.resend_order.clone(), @@ -3656,7 +3799,7 @@ impl Channel { } } else { Ok(ReestablishResponses { - funding_locked, shutdown_msg, + funding_locked, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs, raa: required_revoke, commitment_update: None, order: self.resend_order.clone(), @@ -3674,14 +3817,14 @@ impl Channel { if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 { self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true; Ok(ReestablishResponses { - funding_locked, shutdown_msg, + funding_locked, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs, commitment_update: None, raa: None, mon_update: None, order: self.resend_order.clone(), holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(), }) } else { Ok(ReestablishResponses { - funding_locked, shutdown_msg, + funding_locked, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs, raa: required_revoke, commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), order: self.resend_order.clone(), @@ -4096,6 +4239,22 @@ impl Channel { self.short_channel_id } + /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown) + pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option { + self.latest_inbound_scid_alias + } + + /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown) + pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 { + self.outbound_scid_alias + } + /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0, + /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases. + pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) { + assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0); + self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias; + } + /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by /// get_outbound_funding_created. pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option { @@ -4259,7 +4418,7 @@ impl Channel { /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown) pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool { let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK; - (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) + (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_funding_locked } /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of @@ -4343,11 +4502,15 @@ impl Channel { if need_commitment_update { if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 { - let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx); - return Some(msgs::FundingLocked { - channel_id: self.channel_id, - next_per_commitment_point, - }); + if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 { + let next_per_commitment_point = + self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx); + return Some(msgs::FundingLocked { + channel_id: self.channel_id, + next_per_commitment_point, + short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias), + }); + } } else { self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true; } @@ -4358,11 +4521,12 @@ impl Channel { /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id. /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now. - pub fn transactions_confirmed(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData, logger: &L) - -> Result, ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger { + pub fn transactions_confirmed(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, + txdata: &TransactionData, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L) + -> Result<(Option, Option), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger { let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS); - for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() { - if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() { + if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() { + for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() { // If we haven't yet sent a funding_locked, but are in FundingSent (ignoring // whether they've sent a funding_locked or not), check if we should send one. if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 { @@ -4374,9 +4538,9 @@ impl Channel { // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high - // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the + // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the // channel and move on. - #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))] + #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!"); } self.update_time_counter += 1; @@ -4388,7 +4552,7 @@ impl Channel { if input.witness.is_empty() { // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty. - #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))] + #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!"); } } @@ -4406,7 +4570,8 @@ impl Channel { // may have already happened for this block). if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) { log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id)); - return Ok(Some(funding_locked)); + let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger); + return Ok((Some(funding_locked), announcement_sigs)); } } for inp in tx.input.iter() { @@ -4417,7 +4582,7 @@ impl Channel { } } } - Ok(None) + Ok((None, None)) } /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding @@ -4431,8 +4596,13 @@ impl Channel { /// /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed /// back. - pub fn best_block_updated(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, logger: &L) - -> Result<(Option, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger { + pub fn best_block_updated(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L) + -> Result<(Option, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger { + self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)), logger) + } + + fn do_best_block_updated(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_node_pk: Option<(BlockHash, PublicKey)>, logger: &L) + -> Result<(Option, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger { let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new(); // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring @@ -4453,8 +4623,11 @@ impl Channel { self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time); if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) { + let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk { + self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger) + } else { None }; log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id)); - return Ok((Some(funding_locked), timed_out_htlcs)); + return Ok((Some(funding_locked), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)); } let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS); @@ -4486,7 +4659,10 @@ impl Channel { return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut); } - Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs)) + let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk { + self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger) + } else { None }; + Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) } /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may @@ -4501,10 +4677,11 @@ impl Channel { // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last // time we saw and it will be ignored. let best_time = self.update_time_counter; - match self.best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, logger) { - Ok((funding_locked, timed_out_htlcs)) => { + match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None, logger) { + Ok((funding_locked, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => { assert!(funding_locked.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?"); assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?"); + assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?"); Ok(()) }, Err(e) => Err(e) @@ -4560,7 +4737,15 @@ impl Channel { } } - pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel { + pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool { + self.inbound_awaiting_accept + } + + /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which + /// should be sent back to the counterparty node. + /// + /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel + pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u64) -> msgs::AcceptChannel { if self.is_outbound() { panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?"); } @@ -4570,7 +4755,22 @@ impl Channel { if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER { panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced"); } + if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept { + panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted"); + } + self.user_id = user_id; + self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false; + + self.generate_accept_channel_message() + } + + /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an + /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use + /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead. + /// + /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel + fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel { let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx); let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys(); @@ -4593,9 +4793,19 @@ impl Channel { Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(), None => Builder::new().into_script(), }), + channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()), } } + /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an + /// inbound channel without accepting it. + /// + /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel + #[cfg(test)] + pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel { + self.generate_accept_channel_message() + } + /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created) fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result where L::Target: Logger { let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?; @@ -4654,25 +4864,19 @@ impl Channel { /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both - /// directions). Should be used for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures - /// message from the remote peer. + /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an + /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer. /// /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including /// closing). /// - /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see - /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468 - /// /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure. fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result { if !self.config.announced_channel { return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned())); } - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 { - return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned())); - } - if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 { - return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned())); + if !self.is_usable() { + return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned())); } let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..]; @@ -4691,12 +4895,43 @@ impl Channel { Ok(msg) } - pub fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash) -> Result { - let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_pk, genesis_block_hash)?; - let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) - .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?; + fn get_announcement_sigs(&mut self, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, logger: &L) + -> Option where L::Target: Logger { + if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height { + return None; + } + + if !self.is_usable() { + return None; + } + + if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 { + log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected"); + return None; + } - Ok(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures { + if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent { + return None; + } + + log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id())); + let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_pk, genesis_block_hash) { + Ok(a) => a, + Err(_) => { + log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as channel is not public."); + return None; + } + }; + let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) { + Err(_) => { + log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!"); + return None; + }, + Ok(v) => v + }; + self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent; + + Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures { channel_id: self.channel_id(), short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), node_signature: our_node_sig, @@ -4727,7 +4962,7 @@ impl Channel { /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement. - pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result { + pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result { let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?; let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]); @@ -4744,13 +4979,20 @@ impl Channel { } self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature)); + if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height { + return Err(ChannelError::Ignore( + "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned())); + } self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement) } /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty. - pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Option { + pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> Option { + if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height { + return None; + } let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) { Ok(res) => res, Err(_) => return None, @@ -4769,9 +5011,9 @@ impl Channel { // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key. - // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey" + // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey" // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both - // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria: + // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria: let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff; let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap(); let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER { @@ -5031,6 +5273,10 @@ impl Channel { Err(e) => return Err(e), }; + if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent { + self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed; + } + self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1; let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate { update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id, @@ -5053,7 +5299,7 @@ impl Channel { let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid(); let (signature, htlc_signatures); - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] { if !self.is_outbound() { let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take(); @@ -5290,6 +5536,29 @@ impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus { } } +impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState { + fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> { + // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at + // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent. + match self { + AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer), + AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer), + AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer), + AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer), + } + } +} + +impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState { + fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result { + Ok(match ::read(reader)? { + 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent, + 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived, + _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), + }) + } +} + impl Writeable for Channel { fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> { // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been @@ -5516,9 +5785,9 @@ impl Writeable for Channel { self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?; - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?; - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() { htlc.write(writer)?; } @@ -5558,6 +5827,9 @@ impl Writeable for Channel { (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type), (13, self.channel_creation_height, required), (15, preimages, vec_type), + (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required), + (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option), + (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required), }); Ok(()) @@ -5779,9 +6051,9 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a K, u32)> for Channel let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?; - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new(); - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] { let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len { @@ -5810,6 +6082,12 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a K, u32)> for Channel let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height); let mut preimages_opt: Option>> = None; + // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an + // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine. + let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent); + let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None; + let mut outbound_scid_alias = None; + read_tlv_fields!(reader, { (0, announcement_sigs, option), (1, minimum_depth, option), @@ -5823,6 +6101,9 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a K, u32)> for Channel (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type), (13, channel_creation_height, option), (15, preimages_opt, vec_type), + (17, announcement_sigs_state, option), + (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option), + (21, outbound_scid_alias, option), }); if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt { @@ -5863,8 +6144,14 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a K, u32)> for Channel user_id, config: config.unwrap(), + + // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize + // channel data after the handshake has completed. + inbound_handshake_limits_override: None, + channel_id, channel_state, + announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(), secp_ctx, channel_value_satoshis, @@ -5908,6 +6195,8 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a K, u32)> for Channel closing_fee_limits: None, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, + inbound_awaiting_accept: false, + funding_tx_confirmed_in, funding_tx_confirmation_height, short_channel_id, @@ -5942,14 +6231,18 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a K, u32)> for Channel announcement_sigs, - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None), - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None), workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None, - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] + latest_inbound_scid_alias, + // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing + outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0), + + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills, channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(), @@ -5979,7 +6272,7 @@ mod tests { use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight}; use chain::BestBlock; use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget}; - use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeyMaterial, KeysInterface, BaseSign}; + use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial, KeysInterface, BaseSign}; use chain::transaction::OutPoint; use util::config::UserConfig; use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner; @@ -6014,13 +6307,20 @@ mod tests { "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence"); } + #[test] + fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() { + // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in + // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled. + assert!(Channel::::check_remote_fee(&&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 }, u32::max_value()).is_err()); + } + struct Keys { signer: InMemorySigner, } impl KeysInterface for Keys { type Signer = InMemorySigner; - fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); } + fn get_node_secret(&self, _recipient: Recipient) -> Result { panic!(); } fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial { panic!(); } fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script { let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only(); @@ -6040,7 +6340,7 @@ mod tests { } fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] } fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result { panic!(); } - fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5]) -> Result { panic!(); } + fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result { panic!(); } } fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, hex: &str) -> PublicKey { @@ -6064,7 +6364,7 @@ mod tests { let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()); let config = UserConfig::default(); - match Channel::::new_outbound(&&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0) { + match Channel::::new_outbound(&&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) { Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => { assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner()); }, @@ -6086,7 +6386,7 @@ mod tests { let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()); let config = UserConfig::default(); - let node_a_chan = Channel::::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0).unwrap(); + let node_a_chan = Channel::::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the // same as the old fee. @@ -6112,18 +6412,18 @@ mod tests { // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()); let config = UserConfig::default(); - let mut node_a_chan = Channel::::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0).unwrap(); + let mut node_a_chan = Channel::::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect. let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash()); let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap()); - let node_b_chan = Channel::::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger).unwrap(); + let mut node_b_chan = Channel::::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap(); // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit. - let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel(); + let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0); accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546; - node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap(); + node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.peer_channel_config_limits, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap(); node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560; // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel. @@ -6182,7 +6482,7 @@ mod tests { let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()); let config = UserConfig::default(); - let mut chan = Channel::::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0).unwrap(); + let mut chan = Channel::::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors()); let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors()); @@ -6231,16 +6531,16 @@ mod tests { // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()); let config = UserConfig::default(); - let mut node_a_chan = Channel::::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0).unwrap(); + let mut node_a_chan = Channel::::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash); let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap()); - let mut node_b_chan = Channel::::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger).unwrap(); + let mut node_b_chan = Channel::::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap(); // Node B --> Node A: accept channel - let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel(); - node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap(); + let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0); + node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.peer_channel_config_limits, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap(); // Node A --> Node B: funding created let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript(); @@ -6293,7 +6593,7 @@ mod tests { // Create a channel. let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()); let config = UserConfig::default(); - let mut node_a_chan = Channel::::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0).unwrap(); + let mut node_a_chan = Channel::::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none()); assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none()); @@ -6358,7 +6658,7 @@ mod tests { let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()); let mut config = UserConfig::default(); config.channel_options.announced_channel = false; - let mut chan = Channel::::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test + let mut chan = Channel::::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546; chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel