X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannel.rs;h=58d35a1a95a4ddfc05b29d7fcfe4db5bdf6e89a7;hb=c01745eec7414a340404398255dcd54580380348;hp=28842b1bf79d2b0f21d2367291338c898c76226f;hpb=e9452c701bd38a343cc44eed3c1f5892e047508e;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs index 28842b1b..58d35a1a 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs @@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts; use crate::io; use crate::prelude::*; use core::{cmp,mem,fmt}; -use core::convert::TryInto; use core::ops::Deref; #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))] use crate::sync::Mutex; @@ -104,10 +103,38 @@ enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason { Fulfill(PaymentPreimage), } +/// Represents the resolution status of an inbound HTLC. +#[derive(Clone)] +enum InboundHTLCResolution { + /// Resolved implies the action we must take with the inbound HTLC has already been determined, + /// i.e., we already know whether it must be failed back or forwarded. + // + // TODO: Once this variant is removed, we should also clean up + // [`MonitorRestoreUpdates::accepted_htlcs`] as the path will be unreachable. + Resolved { + pending_htlc_status: PendingHTLCStatus, + }, + /// Pending implies we will attempt to resolve the inbound HTLC once it has been fully committed + /// to by both sides of the channel, i.e., once a `revoke_and_ack` has been processed by both + /// nodes for the state update in which it was proposed. + Pending { + update_add_htlc: msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, + }, +} + +impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCResolution, + (0, Resolved) => { + (0, pending_htlc_status, required), + }, + (2, Pending) => { + (0, update_add_htlc, required), + }; +); + enum InboundHTLCState { /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC. - RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus), + RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution), /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a @@ -137,13 +164,13 @@ enum InboundHTLCState { /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke. /// /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md - AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus), + AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(InboundHTLCResolution), /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it). /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed). /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke. - AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus), + AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(InboundHTLCResolution), Committed, /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack @@ -158,6 +185,72 @@ enum InboundHTLCState { LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason), } +/// Exposes the state of pending inbound HTLCs. +/// +/// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes +/// through the following states in the state machine: +/// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message. +/// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn +/// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages. +/// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of +/// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages. +/// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn +/// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages. +/// +/// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state. +#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)] +pub enum InboundHTLCStateDetails { + /// We have added this HTLC in our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and + /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote + /// before this HTLC is included on the remote commitment transaction. + AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd, + /// This HTLC has been included in the commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages on both sides + /// and is included in both commitment transactions. + /// + /// This HTLC is now safe to either forward or be claimed as a payment by us. The HTLC will + /// remain in this state until the forwarded upstream HTLC has been resolved and we resolve this + /// HTLC correspondingly, or until we claim it as a payment. If it is part of a multipart + /// payment, it will only be claimed together with other required parts. + Committed, + /// We have received the preimage for this HTLC and it is being removed by fulfilling it with + /// update_fulfill_htlc. This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting + /// the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote + /// commitment transaction after update_fulfill_htlc. + AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill, + /// The HTLC is being removed by failing it with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc. + /// This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting the appropriate + /// revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote commitment + /// transaction. + AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail, +} + +impl From<&InboundHTLCState> for Option { + fn from(state: &InboundHTLCState) -> Option { + match state { + InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => None, + InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => + Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd), + InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => + Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd), + InboundHTLCState::Committed => + Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed), + InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(_)) => + Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail), + InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(_)) => + Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail), + InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) => + Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill), + } + } +} + +impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(InboundHTLCStateDetails, + (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {}, + (2, Committed) => {}, + (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill) => {}, + (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail) => {}; +); + struct InboundHTLCOutput { htlc_id: u64, amount_msat: u64, @@ -166,6 +259,53 @@ struct InboundHTLCOutput { state: InboundHTLCState, } +/// Exposes details around pending inbound HTLCs. +#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)] +pub struct InboundHTLCDetails { + /// The HTLC ID. + /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC. + /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced + /// and not part of any commitment transaction. + pub htlc_id: u64, + /// The amount in msat. + pub amount_msat: u64, + /// The block height at which this HTLC expires. + pub cltv_expiry: u32, + /// The payment hash. + pub payment_hash: PaymentHash, + /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine. + /// + /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is + /// waiting for to advance to the next state. + /// + /// See [`InboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states. + /// + /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new + /// states may result in `None` here. + pub state: Option, + /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed + /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee. + /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC + /// transactions as well. + /// + /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure, + /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction + /// fee. + /// + /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local + /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa. + pub is_dust: bool, +} + +impl_writeable_tlv_based!(InboundHTLCDetails, { + (0, htlc_id, required), + (2, amount_msat, required), + (4, cltv_expiry, required), + (6, payment_hash, required), + (7, state, upgradable_option), + (8, is_dust, required), +}); + #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))] enum OutboundHTLCState { /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we @@ -199,6 +339,72 @@ enum OutboundHTLCState { AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome), } +/// Exposes the state of pending outbound HTLCs. +/// +/// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes +/// through the following states in the state machine: +/// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message. +/// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn +/// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages. +/// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of +/// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages. +/// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn +/// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages. +/// +/// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state. +#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)] +pub enum OutboundHTLCStateDetails { + /// We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before the HTLC is added + /// on the remote's commitment transaction after update_add_htlc. + AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd, + /// The HTLC has been added to the remote's commitment transaction by sending commitment_signed + /// and receiving revoke_and_ack in return. + /// + /// The HTLC will remain in this state until the remote node resolves the HTLC, or until we + /// unilaterally close the channel due to a timeout with an uncooperative remote node. + Committed, + /// The HTLC has been fulfilled successfully by the remote with a preimage in update_fulfill_htlc, + /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and + /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote + /// for the removal from its commitment transaction. + AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess, + /// The HTLC has been failed by the remote with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc, + /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and + /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote + /// for the removal from its commitment transaction. + AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure, +} + +impl From<&OutboundHTLCState> for OutboundHTLCStateDetails { + fn from(state: &OutboundHTLCState) -> OutboundHTLCStateDetails { + match state { + OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => + OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd, + OutboundHTLCState::Committed => + OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed, + // RemoteRemoved states are ignored as the state is transient and the remote has not committed to + // the state yet. + OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => + OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed, + OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => + OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess, + OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) => + OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure, + OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => + OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess, + OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) => + OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure, + } + } +} + +impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OutboundHTLCStateDetails, + (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {}, + (2, Committed) => {}, + (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess) => {}, + (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure) => {}; +); + #[derive(Clone)] #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))] enum OutboundHTLCOutcome { @@ -237,6 +443,58 @@ struct OutboundHTLCOutput { skimmed_fee_msat: Option, } +/// Exposes details around pending outbound HTLCs. +#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)] +pub struct OutboundHTLCDetails { + /// The HTLC ID. + /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC. + /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced + /// and not part of any commitment transaction. + /// + /// Not present when we are awaiting a remote revocation and the HTLC is not added yet. + pub htlc_id: Option, + /// The amount in msat. + pub amount_msat: u64, + /// The block height at which this HTLC expires. + pub cltv_expiry: u32, + /// The payment hash. + pub payment_hash: PaymentHash, + /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine. + /// + /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is + /// waiting for to advance to the next state. + /// + /// See [`OutboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states. + /// + /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new + /// states may result in `None` here. + pub state: Option, + /// The extra fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. + pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option, + /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed + /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee. + /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC + /// transactions as well. + /// + /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure, + /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction + /// fee. + /// + /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local + /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa. + pub is_dust: bool, +} + +impl_writeable_tlv_based!(OutboundHTLCDetails, { + (0, htlc_id, required), + (2, amount_msat, required), + (4, cltv_expiry, required), + (6, payment_hash, required), + (7, state, upgradable_option), + (8, skimmed_fee_msat, required), + (10, is_dust, required), +}); + /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))] enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK { @@ -259,10 +517,15 @@ enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK { htlc_id: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, }, + FailMalformedHTLC { + htlc_id: u64, + failure_code: u16, + sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], + }, } macro_rules! define_state_flags { - ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => { + ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => { #[doc = $flag_type_doc] #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)] struct $flag_type(u32); @@ -291,15 +554,18 @@ macro_rules! define_state_flags { #[allow(unused)] fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 } - #[allow(unused)] fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag } + #[allow(unused)] + fn set(&mut self, flag: Self) { *self |= flag } + #[allow(unused)] + fn clear(&mut self, flag: Self) -> Self { self.0 &= !flag.0; *self } } - impl core::ops::Not for $flag_type { - type Output = Self; - fn not(self) -> Self::Output { Self(!self.0) } - } + $( + define_state_flags!($flag_type, Self::$flag, $get, $set, $clear); + )* + impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type { type Output = Self; fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) } @@ -318,8 +584,28 @@ macro_rules! define_state_flags { ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => { define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0); }; + ($flag_type: ident, $flag: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident) => { + impl $flag_type { + #[allow(unused)] + fn $get(&self) -> bool { self.is_set($flag_type::new() | $flag) } + #[allow(unused)] + fn $set(&mut self) { self.set($flag_type::new() | $flag) } + #[allow(unused)] + fn $clear(&mut self) -> Self { self.clear($flag_type::new() | $flag) } + } + }; ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => { define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0); + + define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED, + is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected); + define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, + is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress); + define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, + is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent); + define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, + is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent); + impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type { type Output = Self; fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) } @@ -366,15 +652,19 @@ define_state_flags!( "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.", FundedStateFlags, [ ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \ - until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED), + until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED, + is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected), ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \ somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \ - complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS), + complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, + is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress), ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \ any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \ - message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT), + message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, + is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent), ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \ - the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT) + the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, + is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent) ] ); @@ -382,9 +672,9 @@ define_state_flags!( "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].", NegotiatingFundingFlags, [ ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.", - OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT), + OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT, is_our_init_sent, set_our_init_sent, clear_our_init_sent), ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.", - THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT) + THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT, is_their_init_sent, set_their_init_sent, clear_their_init_sent) ] ); @@ -393,13 +683,16 @@ define_state_flags!( FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [ ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \ `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.", - THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY), + THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, + is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready), ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \ `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.", - OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY), + OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY, + is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready), ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \ is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \ - their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) + their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH, + is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch) ] ); @@ -410,10 +703,13 @@ define_state_flags!( `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \ messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \ implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.", - AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) + AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, + is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke) ] ); +// Note that the order of this enum is implicitly defined by where each variant is placed. Take this +// into account when introducing new states and update `test_channel_state_order` accordingly. #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)] enum ChannelState { /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it. @@ -434,12 +730,12 @@ enum ChannelState { } macro_rules! impl_state_flag { - ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, [$($state: ident),+]) => { + ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, [$($state: ident),+]) => { #[allow(unused)] fn $get(&self) -> bool { match self { $( - ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.is_set($state_flag.into()), + ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$get(), )* _ => false, } @@ -448,7 +744,7 @@ macro_rules! impl_state_flag { fn $set(&mut self) { match self { $( - ChannelState::$state(flags) => *flags |= $state_flag, + ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$set(), )* _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"), } @@ -457,17 +753,17 @@ macro_rules! impl_state_flag { fn $clear(&mut self) { match self { $( - ChannelState::$state(flags) => *flags &= !($state_flag), + ChannelState::$state(flags) => { let _ = flags.$clear(); }, )* _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"), } } }; - ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, FUNDED_STATES) => { - impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, $state_flag, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]); + ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, FUNDED_STATES) => { + impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]); }; - ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, $state: ident) => { - impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, $state_flag, [$state]); + ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state: ident) => { + impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [$state]); }; } @@ -518,35 +814,27 @@ impl ChannelState { } } - fn should_force_holding_cell(&self) -> bool { + fn can_generate_new_commitment(&self) -> bool { match self { ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => - flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) || - flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) || - flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()), + !flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) && + !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) && + !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()), _ => { - debug_assert!(false, "The holding cell is only valid within ChannelReady"); + debug_assert!(false, "Can only generate new commitment within ChannelReady"); false }, } } - impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected, - FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED, FUNDED_STATES); - impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress, - FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, FUNDED_STATES); - impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent, - FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, FUNDED_STATES); - impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent, - FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, FUNDED_STATES); - impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready, - AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY, AwaitingChannelReady); - impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready, - AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, AwaitingChannelReady); - impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch, - AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH, AwaitingChannelReady); - impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke, - ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, ChannelReady); + impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected, FUNDED_STATES); + impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress, FUNDED_STATES); + impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES); + impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES); + impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady); + impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady); + impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch, AwaitingChannelReady); + impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke, ChannelReady); } pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1; @@ -727,8 +1015,8 @@ struct CommitmentStats<'a> { total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included) htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction - local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits - remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits + local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits + remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment } @@ -783,6 +1071,7 @@ pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates { pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec, + pub pending_update_adds: Vec, pub funding_broadcastable: Option, pub channel_ready: Option, pub announcement_sigs: Option, @@ -809,15 +1098,20 @@ pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses { /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled. #[must_use] pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult { + pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason, /// A channel monitor update to apply. - pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, + pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately. pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>, /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be /// propagated to the remainder of the batch. pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option, pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId, + pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128, + pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64, pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, + pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option, + pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option, } /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just @@ -895,6 +1189,10 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, { pub(super) enum ChannelPhase where SP::Target: SignerProvider { UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel), UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel), + #[cfg(dual_funding)] + UnfundedOutboundV2(OutboundV2Channel), + #[cfg(dual_funding)] + UnfundedInboundV2(InboundV2Channel), Funded(Channel), } @@ -907,6 +1205,10 @@ impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase where ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context, ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context, + #[cfg(dual_funding)] + ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => &chan.context, + #[cfg(dual_funding)] + ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => &chan.context, } } @@ -915,6 +1217,10 @@ impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase where ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context, ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context, + #[cfg(dual_funding)] + ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context, + #[cfg(dual_funding)] + ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context, } } } @@ -1013,6 +1319,7 @@ pub(super) struct ChannelContext where SP::Target: SignerProvider { monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec, + monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec, /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`]) /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in @@ -1221,9 +1528,15 @@ pub(super) struct ChannelContext where SP::Target: SignerProvider { // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event. channel_ready_event_emitted: bool, + /// Some if we initiated to shut down the channel. + local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()>, + /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`]. + #[cfg(not(test))] channel_keys_id: [u8; 32], + #[cfg(test)] + pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32], /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it. @@ -1231,108 +1544,659 @@ pub(super) struct ChannelContext where SP::Target: SignerProvider { } impl ChannelContext where SP::Target: SignerProvider { - /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown) - pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 { - self.update_time_counter - } + fn new_for_inbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>( + fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, + entropy_source: &'a ES, + signer_provider: &'a SP, + counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, + their_features: &'a InitFeatures, + user_id: u128, + config: &'a UserConfig, + current_chain_height: u32, + logger: &'a L, + is_0conf: bool, + our_funding_satoshis: u64, + counterparty_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys, + channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures, + holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64, + msg_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64, + msg_push_msat: u64, + open_channel_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields, + ) -> Result, ChannelError> + where + ES::Target: EntropySource, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, + { + let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id)); + let announced_channel = if (open_channel_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false }; - pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 { - self.latest_monitor_update_id - } + let channel_value_satoshis = our_funding_satoshis.saturating_add(open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis); - pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool { - self.config.announced_channel - } + let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, channel_value_satoshis, user_id); + let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id); + let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone(); - pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool { - self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder - } + if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT))); + } - /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel - /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown) - pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 { - self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat - } + // Check sanity of message fields: + if channel_value_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!( + "Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}. Peer contribution: {}. Our contribution: {}", + config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis, + open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis, our_funding_satoshis))); + } + if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis))); + } + if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be no greater than channel_value_satoshis: {}", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis))); + } + let full_channel_value_msat = (channel_value_satoshis - msg_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; + if msg_push_msat > full_channel_value_msat { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg_push_msat, full_channel_value_msat))); + } + if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than channel_value_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis))); + } + if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat))); + } + Channel::::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, None, &&logger)?; - /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel - pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool { - self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) - } + let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT); + if open_channel_fields.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, open_channel_fields.to_self_delay))); + } + if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 { + return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned())); + } + if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS))); + } - /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing. - /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown) - pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool { - matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && - !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && - !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() && - !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready - } + // Now check against optional parameters as set by config... + if channel_value_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", channel_value_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis))); + } + if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat))); + } + if open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat))); + } + if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis))); + } + if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs))); + } + if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS))); + } + if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS))); + } - /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown - pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState { - match self.channel_state { - ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => - if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() { - ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated - } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() { - ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs - } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() { - ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee - } else { - ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown - }, - ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete, - _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown, + // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state: + + if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference { + if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel { + return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned())); + } } - } - fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool { - let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state { - ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => - flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, - ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => - flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, - _ => false, + if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS { + // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because + // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS` + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS))); + } + if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg_push_msat))); + } + if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS { + log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.", + msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS); + } + if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis))); + } + + // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient + // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful. + let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { + ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 + } else { + 0 }; - self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && - self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() && - self.pending_update_fee.is_none() && - is_ready_to_close - } + let funders_amount_msat = open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat; + let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000; + if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee))); + } - /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of - /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled. - /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown) - pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool { - self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() - } + let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value; + // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't + // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve. + if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis { + return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned())); + } - // Public utilities: + let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() { + match &open_channel_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey { + &Some(ref script) => { + // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything + if script.len() == 0 { + None + } else { + if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script))) + } + Some(script.clone()) + } + }, + // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel + &None => { + return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned())); + } + } + } else { None }; - pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId { - self.channel_id - } + let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { + match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() { + Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey), + Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())), + } + } else { None }; - // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment. - // - // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115. - pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option { - self.temporary_channel_id - } + if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey { + if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey))); + } + } - pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option { - self.minimum_depth - } + let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) { + Ok(script) => script, + Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())), + }; - /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special - /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel. - pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 { - self.user_id - } + let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()); - /// Gets the channel's type - pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures { - &self.channel_type + let minimum_depth = if is_0conf { + Some(0) + } else { + Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)) + }; + + let value_to_self_msat = our_funding_satoshis * 1000 + msg_push_msat; + + // TODO(dual_funding): Checks for `funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`? + + let channel_context = ChannelContext { + user_id, + + config: LegacyChannelConfig { + options: config.channel_config.clone(), + announced_channel, + commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey, + }, + + prev_config: None, + + inbound_handshake_limits_override: None, + + temporary_channel_id: Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id), + channel_id: open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id, + channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding( + NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT + ), + announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent, + secp_ctx, + + latest_monitor_update_id: 0, + + holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer), + shutdown_scriptpubkey, + destination_script, + + cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, + cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, + value_to_self_msat, + + pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(), + pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(), + holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(), + pending_update_fee: None, + holding_cell_update_fee: None, + next_holder_htlc_id: 0, + next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0, + update_time_counter: 1, + + resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, + + monitor_pending_channel_ready: false, + monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false, + monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false, + monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(), + monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(), + monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(), + monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(), + + signer_pending_commitment_update: false, + signer_pending_funding: false, + + + #[cfg(debug_assertions)] + holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))), + #[cfg(debug_assertions)] + counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))), + + last_sent_closing_fee: None, + pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None, + expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false, + closing_fee_limits: None, + target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None, + + funding_tx_confirmed_in: None, + funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0, + short_channel_id: None, + channel_creation_height: current_chain_height, + + feerate_per_kw: open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, + channel_value_satoshis, + counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, + holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS, + counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, channel_value_satoshis * 1000), + holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config), + counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg_channel_reserve_satoshis), + holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, + counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, + holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat }, + counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, + holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS), + minimum_depth, + + counterparty_forwarding_info: None, + + channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters { + holder_pubkeys: pubkeys, + holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, + is_outbound_from_holder: false, + counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { + selected_contest_delay: open_channel_fields.to_self_delay, + pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys, + }), + funding_outpoint: None, + channel_type_features: channel_type.clone() + }, + funding_transaction: None, + is_batch_funding: None, + + counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(open_channel_fields.first_per_commitment_point), + counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None, + counterparty_node_id, + + counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey, + + commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(), + + channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled, + closing_signed_in_flight: false, + + announcement_sigs: None, + + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] + next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None), + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] + next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None), + + workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None, + sent_message_awaiting_response: None, + + latest_inbound_scid_alias: None, + outbound_scid_alias: 0, + + channel_pending_event_emitted: false, + channel_ready_event_emitted: false, + + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] + historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(), + + channel_type, + channel_keys_id, + + local_initiated_shutdown: None, + + blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(), + }; + + Ok(channel_context) + } + + fn new_for_outbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref>( + fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, + entropy_source: &'a ES, + signer_provider: &'a SP, + counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, + their_features: &'a InitFeatures, + funding_satoshis: u64, + push_msat: u64, + user_id: u128, + config: &'a UserConfig, + current_chain_height: u32, + outbound_scid_alias: u64, + temporary_channel_id: Option, + holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64, + channel_keys_id: [u8; 32], + holder_signer: ::EcdsaSigner, + pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys, + ) -> Result, APIError> + where + ES::Target: EntropySource, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, + { + // This will be updated with the counterparty contribution if this is a dual-funded channel + let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis; + + let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay; + + if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO { + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)}); + } + if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)}); + } + let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000; + if push_msat > channel_value_msat { + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) }); + } + if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT { + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)}); + } + + let channel_type = get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features); + debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config))); + + let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { + (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000) + } else { + (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0) + }; + let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target); + + let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat; + let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type); + if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee { + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) }); + } + + let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()); + + let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { + match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() { + Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey), + Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}), + } + } else { None }; + + if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey { + if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) { + return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() }); + } + } + + let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) { + Ok(script) => script, + Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}), + }; + + let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source)); + + Ok(Self { + user_id, + + config: LegacyChannelConfig { + options: config.channel_config.clone(), + announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel, + commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey, + }, + + prev_config: None, + + inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()), + + channel_id: temporary_channel_id, + temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id), + channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT), + announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent, + secp_ctx, + // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we receive `accept_channel2`. + channel_value_satoshis, + + latest_monitor_update_id: 0, + + holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer), + shutdown_scriptpubkey, + destination_script, + + cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, + cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, + value_to_self_msat, + + pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(), + pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(), + holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(), + pending_update_fee: None, + holding_cell_update_fee: None, + next_holder_htlc_id: 0, + next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0, + update_time_counter: 1, + + resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, + + monitor_pending_channel_ready: false, + monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false, + monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false, + monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(), + monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(), + monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(), + monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(), + + signer_pending_commitment_update: false, + signer_pending_funding: false, + + // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` to these max commitment output assertions + // when we receive `accept_channel2`. + #[cfg(debug_assertions)] + holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)), + #[cfg(debug_assertions)] + counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)), + + last_sent_closing_fee: None, + pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None, + expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false, + closing_fee_limits: None, + target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None, + + funding_tx_confirmed_in: None, + funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0, + short_channel_id: None, + channel_creation_height: current_chain_height, + + feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate, + counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0, + holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS, + counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0, + // We'll adjust this to include our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we + // receive `accept_channel2`. + holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config), + counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel + holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, + counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0, + holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat }, + counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0, + holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS), + minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel + + counterparty_forwarding_info: None, + + channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters { + holder_pubkeys: pubkeys, + holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, + is_outbound_from_holder: true, + counterparty_parameters: None, + funding_outpoint: None, + channel_type_features: channel_type.clone() + }, + funding_transaction: None, + is_batch_funding: None, + + counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None, + counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None, + counterparty_node_id, + + counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None, + + commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(), + + channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled, + closing_signed_in_flight: false, + + announcement_sigs: None, + + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] + next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None), + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] + next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None), + + workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None, + sent_message_awaiting_response: None, + + latest_inbound_scid_alias: None, + outbound_scid_alias, + + channel_pending_event_emitted: false, + channel_ready_event_emitted: false, + + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] + historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(), + + channel_type, + channel_keys_id, + + blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(), + local_initiated_shutdown: None, + }) + } + + /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown) + pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 { + self.update_time_counter + } + + pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 { + self.latest_monitor_update_id + } + + pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool { + self.config.announced_channel + } + + pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool { + self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder + } + + /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel + /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown) + pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 { + self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat + } + + /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel + pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool { + self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) + } + + /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing. + /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown) + pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool { + matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && + !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && + !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() && + !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready + } + + /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown + pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState { + match self.channel_state { + ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => + if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() { + ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated + } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() { + ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs + } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() { + ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee + } else { + ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown + }, + ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete, + _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown, + } + } + + fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool { + let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state { + ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => + flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, + ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => + flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, + _ => false, + }; + self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() && + self.pending_update_fee.is_none() && + is_ready_to_close + } + + /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of + /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled. + /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown) + pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool { + self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() + } + + // Public utilities: + + pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId { + self.channel_id + } + + // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment. + // + // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115. + pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option { + self.temporary_channel_id + } + + pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option { + self.minimum_depth + } + + /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special + /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel. + pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 { + self.user_id + } + + /// Gets the channel's type + pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures { + &self.channel_type } /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`. @@ -1723,13 +2587,13 @@ impl ChannelContext where SP::Target: SignerProvider { } } - let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset; + let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset; assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0); // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow. - let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset; + let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset; assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0); #[cfg(debug_assertions)] @@ -1795,10 +2659,6 @@ impl ChannelContext where SP::Target: SignerProvider { htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap()); htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs); - // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly - value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat }; - value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat }; - CommitmentStats { tx, feerate_per_kw, @@ -1832,8 +2692,6 @@ impl ChannelContext where SP::Target: SignerProvider { /// will sign and send to our counterparty. /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created) fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys { - //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we - //may see payments to it! let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint; let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint; let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys(); @@ -1871,7 +2729,8 @@ impl ChannelContext where SP::Target: SignerProvider { if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update { feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate); } - cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000) + let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000); + cmp::max(feerate_per_kw + 2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value())) } /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty. @@ -1961,6 +2820,99 @@ impl ChannelContext where SP::Target: SignerProvider { stats } + /// Returns information on all pending inbound HTLCs. + pub fn get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec { + let mut holding_cell_states = new_hash_map(); + for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() { + match holding_cell_update { + HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => { + holding_cell_states.insert( + htlc_id, + InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill, + ); + }, + HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => { + holding_cell_states.insert( + htlc_id, + InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail, + ); + }, + HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => { + holding_cell_states.insert( + htlc_id, + InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail, + ); + }, + // Outbound HTLC. + HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => {}, + } + } + let mut inbound_details = Vec::new(); + let htlc_success_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { + 0 + } else { + let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64; + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000 + }; + let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis; + for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() { + if let Some(state_details) = (&htlc.state).into() { + inbound_details.push(InboundHTLCDetails{ + htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id, + amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat, + cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry, + payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash, + state: Some(holding_cell_states.remove(&htlc.htlc_id).unwrap_or(state_details)), + is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat, + }); + } + } + inbound_details + } + + /// Returns information on all pending outbound HTLCs. + pub fn get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec { + let mut outbound_details = Vec::new(); + let htlc_timeout_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { + 0 + } else { + let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64; + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000 + }; + let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis; + for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() { + outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{ + htlc_id: Some(htlc.htlc_id), + amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat, + cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry, + payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash, + skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat, + state: Some((&htlc.state).into()), + is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat, + }); + } + for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() { + if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { + amount_msat, + cltv_expiry, + payment_hash, + skimmed_fee_msat, + .. + } = *holding_cell_update { + outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{ + htlc_id: None, + amount_msat: amount_msat, + cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry, + payment_hash: payment_hash, + skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat, + state: Some(OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd), + is_dust: amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat, + }); + } + } + outbound_details + } + /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info. /// Doesn't bother handling the /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC @@ -2311,15 +3263,17 @@ impl ChannelContext where SP::Target: SignerProvider { res } - fn if_unbroadcasted_funding(&self, f: F) -> Option - where F: Fn() -> Option { + fn if_unbroadcasted_funding(&self, f: F) -> Option where F: Fn() -> Option { match self.channel_state { ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(), - ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) { - f() - } else { - None - }, + ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => + if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) || + flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) + { + f() + } else { + None + }, _ => None, } } @@ -2354,7 +3308,7 @@ impl ChannelContext where SP::Target: SignerProvider { /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters). /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out). - pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult { + pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult { // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will @@ -2381,29 +3335,32 @@ impl ChannelContext where SP::Target: SignerProvider { // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the // monitor update to the user, even if we return one). // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more. - let generate_monitor_update = match self.channel_state { - ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => true, - _ => false, - }; - if generate_monitor_update { + if !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() { self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID; - Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate { + Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, self.channel_id(), ChannelMonitorUpdate { update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id), updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }], + channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()), })) } else { None } } else { None }; let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(); + let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding(); self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete; self.update_time_counter += 1; ShutdownResult { + closure_reason, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid, channel_id: self.channel_id, + user_channel_id: self.user_id, + channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis, counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id, + unbroadcasted_funding_tx, + channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(), } } @@ -2430,9 +3387,14 @@ impl ChannelContext where SP::Target: SignerProvider { .ok(); if funding_signed.is_none() { - log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding"); - self.signer_pending_funding = true; - } else if self.signer_pending_funding { + #[cfg(not(async_signing))] { + panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed"); + } + #[cfg(async_signing)] { + log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding"); + self.signer_pending_funding = true; + } + } else if self.signer_pending_funding { log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding"); self.signer_pending_funding = false; } @@ -2445,6 +3407,49 @@ impl ChannelContext where SP::Target: SignerProvider { _ => todo!() } } + + /// If we receive an error message when attempting to open a channel, it may only be a rejection + /// of the channel type we tried, not of our ability to open any channel at all. We can see if a + /// downgrade of channel features would be possible so that we can still open the channel. + pub(crate) fn maybe_downgrade_channel_features( + &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator + ) -> Result<(), ()> + where + F::Target: FeeEstimator + { + if !self.is_outbound() || + !matches!( + self.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) + if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT + ) + { + return Err(()); + } + if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() { + // We've exhausted our options + return Err(()); + } + // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional + // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has + // accepted one. + // + // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the + // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type` + // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the + // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for + // whatever reason. + if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { + self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx(); + self.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee); + assert!(!self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx()); + } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() { + self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy(); + } else { + self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); + } + self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.channel_type.clone(); + Ok(()) + } } // Internal utility functions for channels @@ -2489,6 +3494,20 @@ pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channe cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) } +/// Returns a minimum channel reserve value each party needs to maintain, fixed in the spec to a +/// default of 1% of the total channel value. +/// +/// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis +/// +/// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound +/// of `dust_limit_satoshis`. +#[cfg(dual_funding)] +fn get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, dust_limit_satoshis: u64) -> u64 { + // Fixed at 1% of channel value by spec. + let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100); + cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, dust_limit_satoshis)) +} + // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs. // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs. #[inline] @@ -2504,10 +3523,26 @@ pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_ (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000 } +/// Context for dual-funded channels. +#[cfg(dual_funding)] +pub(super) struct DualFundingChannelContext { + /// The amount in satoshis we will be contributing to the channel. + pub our_funding_satoshis: u64, + /// The amount in satoshis our counterparty will be contributing to the channel. + pub their_funding_satoshis: u64, + /// The funding transaction locktime suggested by the initiator. If set by us, it is always set + /// to the current block height to align incentives against fee-sniping. + pub funding_tx_locktime: u32, + /// The feerate set by the initiator to be used for the funding transaction. + pub funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32, +} + // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client. // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity. pub(super) struct Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { pub context: ChannelContext, + #[cfg(dual_funding)] + pub dual_funding_channel_context: Option, } #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] @@ -2519,6 +3554,62 @@ struct CommitmentTxInfoCached { feerate: u32, } +/// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to +/// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed. +trait FailHTLCContents { + type Message: FailHTLCMessageName; + fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message; + fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState; + fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK; +} +impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket { + type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC; + fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message { + msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self } + } + fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState { + InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self)) + } + fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK { + HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self } + } +} +impl FailHTLCContents for ([u8; 32], u16) { + type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC; + fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message { + msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC { + htlc_id, + channel_id, + sha256_of_onion: self.0, + failure_code: self.1 + } + } + fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState { + InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(self)) + } + fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK { + HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { + htlc_id, + sha256_of_onion: self.0, + failure_code: self.1 + } + } +} + +trait FailHTLCMessageName { + fn name() -> &'static str; +} +impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { + fn name() -> &'static str { + "update_fail_htlc" + } +} +impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC { + fn name() -> &'static str { + "update_fail_malformed_htlc" + } +} + impl Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider, ::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner @@ -2635,7 +3726,7 @@ impl Channel where where L::Target: Logger { // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc` // (see equivalent if condition there). - assert!(self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell()); + assert!(!self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment()); let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger); self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id; @@ -2703,9 +3794,10 @@ impl Channel where updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(), }], + channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()), }; - if self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() { + if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() { // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly - // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we @@ -2721,7 +3813,9 @@ impl Channel where return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {}; } }, - &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => { + &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } | + &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => + { if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id { log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id()); // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its @@ -2818,6 +3912,17 @@ impl Channel where .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?")) } + /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we + /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node. + /// + /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info. + pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc( + &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L + ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger { + self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), true, logger) + .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?")) + } + /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot, /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed @@ -2826,8 +3931,10 @@ impl Channel where /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`]. - fn fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) - -> Result, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger { + fn fail_htlc( + &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_contents: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool, + logger: &L + ) -> Result, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger { if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) { panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state"); } @@ -2864,7 +3971,7 @@ impl Channel where return Ok(None); } - if self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() { + if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() { debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!"); force_holding_cell = true; } @@ -2880,7 +3987,9 @@ impl Channel where return Ok(None); } }, - &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => { + &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } | + &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => + { if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id { debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed"); return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned())); @@ -2890,24 +3999,18 @@ impl Channel where } } log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id()); - self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { - htlc_id: htlc_id_arg, - err_packet, - }); + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_contents.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg)); return Ok(None); } - log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id()); + log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, + E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id()); { let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx]; - htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone())); + htlc.state = err_contents.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state(); } - Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { - channel_id: self.context.channel_id(), - htlc_id: htlc_id_arg, - reason: err_packet - })) + Ok(Some(err_contents.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id()))) } // Message handlers: @@ -2964,12 +4067,12 @@ impl Channel where let mut check_reconnection = false; match &self.context.channel_state { ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => { - let flags = *flags & !FundedStateFlags::ALL; + let flags = flags.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()); debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)); - if flags & !AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY { + if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY { // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs. check_reconnection = true; - } else if (flags & !AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() { + } else if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() { self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready(); } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY { self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into()); @@ -3014,23 +4117,15 @@ impl Channel where log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id()); - Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger)) + Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger)) } - pub fn update_add_htlc( - &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, - create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, logger: &L - ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> - where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, - FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, - { + pub fn update_add_htlc( + &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, + ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> { if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) { return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())); } - // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown. - if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() { - pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8); - } // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec. if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() { return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())); @@ -3049,7 +4144,6 @@ impl Channel where } let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None); - let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None); if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 { return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs))); } @@ -3078,34 +4172,6 @@ impl Channel where } } - let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator); - let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { - (0, 0) - } else { - let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64; - (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000, - dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) - }; - let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis; - if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats { - let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat; - if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat { - log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", - on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat); - pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7); - } - } - - let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis; - if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats { - let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat; - if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat { - log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", - on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat); - pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7); - } - } - let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat; let pending_remote_value_msat = @@ -3139,23 +4205,7 @@ impl Channel where } else { 0 }; - if !self.context.is_outbound() { - // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from - // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's - // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as - // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them. - let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered); - let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(())); - if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { - remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE; - } - if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat { - // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing - // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing. - log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id()); - pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7); - } - } else { + if self.context.is_outbound() { // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC. let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered); let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None); @@ -3183,7 +4233,9 @@ impl Channel where amount_msat: msg.amount_msat, payment_hash: msg.payment_hash, cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry, - state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status), + state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { + pending_htlc_status: pending_forward_status + }), }); Ok(()) } @@ -3219,7 +4271,7 @@ impl Channel where Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned())) } - pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> { + pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64, Option), ChannelError> { if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) { return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())); } @@ -3227,7 +4279,7 @@ impl Channel where return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())); } - self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat)) + self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat, htlc.skimmed_fee_msat)) } pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> { @@ -3389,13 +4441,13 @@ impl Channel where } for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() { - let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state { - Some(forward_info.clone()) + let htlc_resolution = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref resolution) = &htlc.state { + Some(resolution.clone()) } else { None }; - if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward { + if let Some(htlc_resolution) = htlc_resolution { log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id); - htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info); + htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(htlc_resolution); need_commitment = true; } } @@ -3430,7 +4482,8 @@ impl Channel where htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs, claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources, - }] + }], + channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()), }; self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1; @@ -3485,7 +4538,7 @@ impl Channel where ) -> (Option, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger { - if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && !self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() { + if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() { self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) } else { (None, Vec::new()) } } @@ -3506,6 +4559,7 @@ impl Channel where update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet! counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id), updates: Vec::new(), + channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()), }; let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new(); @@ -3520,7 +4574,7 @@ impl Channel where // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting // to rebalance channels. - match &htlc_update { + let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update { &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, .. @@ -3548,6 +4602,7 @@ impl Channel where } } } + None }, &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => { // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via @@ -3561,26 +4616,33 @@ impl Channel where { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() }; update_fulfill_count += 1; monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates); + None }, &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => { - match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) { - Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => { - // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via - // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must - // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail - // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait - // for a full revocation before failing. - debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some()); - update_fail_count += 1; - }, - Err(e) => { - if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} - else { - panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC"); - } - } - } + Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) + .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ()))) }, + &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => { + Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), false, logger) + .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ()))) + } + }; + if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res { + match res { + Ok(fail_msg_opt) => { + // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via + // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must + // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail + // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait + // for a full revocation before failing. + debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some()); + update_fail_count += 1; + }, + Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {}, + Err(_) => { + panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC"); + }, + } } } if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() { @@ -3676,6 +4738,7 @@ impl Channel where idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, secret: msg.per_commitment_secret, }], + channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()), }; // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls... @@ -3694,6 +4757,7 @@ impl Channel where log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id()); let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new(); + let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new(); let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new(); let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new(); let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new(); @@ -3741,29 +4805,37 @@ impl Channel where let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed; mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state); - if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state { + if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution) = state { log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash); - htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info); + htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution); require_commitment = true; - } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state { - match forward_info { - PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => { - log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash); - require_commitment = true; - match fail_msg { - HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => { - htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone())); - update_fail_htlcs.push(msg) - }, - HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => { - htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code))); - update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg) + } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution) = state { + match resolution { + InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } => + match pending_htlc_status { + PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => { + log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash); + require_commitment = true; + match fail_msg { + HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => { + htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone())); + update_fail_htlcs.push(msg) + }, + HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => { + htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code))); + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg) + }, + } }, + PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => { + log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed, attempting to forward", &htlc.payment_hash); + to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id)); + htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed; + } } - }, - PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => { + InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { update_add_htlc } => { log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash); - to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id)); + pending_update_adds.push(update_add_htlc); htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed; } } @@ -3824,6 +4896,8 @@ impl Channel where } } + self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.append(&mut pending_update_adds); + if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() { // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have. @@ -4087,8 +5161,8 @@ impl Channel where // first received the funding_signed. let mut funding_broadcastable = if self.context.is_outbound() && - matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) || - matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) + (matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) || + matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))) { self.context.funding_transaction.take() } else { None }; @@ -4124,13 +5198,16 @@ impl Channel where mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures); let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new(); mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills); + let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new(); + mem::swap(&mut pending_update_adds, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds); if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() { self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false; self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false; return MonitorRestoreUpdates { raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, - accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs + accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, pending_update_adds, + funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs }; } @@ -4152,7 +5229,8 @@ impl Channel where if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" }, match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"}); MonitorRestoreUpdates { - raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs + raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, + pending_update_adds, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs } } @@ -4190,7 +5268,7 @@ impl Channel where /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're /// blocked. - #[allow(unused)] + #[cfg(async_signing)] pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger { let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update { self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok() @@ -4294,11 +5372,16 @@ impl Channel where } update } else { - if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update { - log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update"); - self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true; + #[cfg(not(async_signing))] { + panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state"); + } + #[cfg(async_signing)] { + if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update { + log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update"); + self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true; + } + return Err(()); } - return Err(()); }; Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee, @@ -4387,7 +5470,7 @@ impl Channel where let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown(); - let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger); + let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger); if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) { // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's. @@ -4728,6 +5811,7 @@ impl Channel where updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), }], + channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()), }; self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()); self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) @@ -4834,15 +5918,26 @@ impl Channel where } } + let closure_reason = if self.initiated_shutdown() { + ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure + } else { + ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure + }; + assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some()); if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee { if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis { let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult { + closure_reason, monitor_update: None, dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(), channel_id: self.context.channel_id, + user_channel_id: self.context.user_id, + channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis, counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id, + unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(), + channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(), }; let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig); self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete; @@ -4868,11 +5963,16 @@ impl Channel where .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?; let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis { let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult { + closure_reason, monitor_update: None, dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(), channel_id: self.context.channel_id, + user_channel_id: self.context.user_id, + channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis, counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id, + unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(), + channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(), }; self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete; self.context.update_time_counter += 1; @@ -4994,6 +6094,86 @@ impl Channel where }) } + pub fn can_accept_incoming_htlc( + &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, logger: L + ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> + where + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger + { + if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() { + return Err(("Shutdown was already sent", 0x4000|8)) + } + + let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None); + let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None); + let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator); + let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { + (0, 0) + } else { + let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64; + (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000, + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + }; + let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis; + if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats { + let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat; + if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat { + log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", + on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat); + return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7)) + } + } + + let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis; + if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats { + let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat; + if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat { + log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", + on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat); + return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on holder commitment tx", 0x1000|7)) + } + } + + let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { + ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000 + } else { + 0 + }; + + let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0; + for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() { + if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state { + removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat; + } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state { + removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat; + } + } + + let pending_value_to_self_msat = + self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat; + let pending_remote_value_msat = + self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat; + + if !self.context.is_outbound() { + // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from + // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's + // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as + // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them. + let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered); + let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(())); + if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { + remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE; + } + if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat { + log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id()); + return Err(("Fee spike buffer violation", 0x1000|7)); + } + } + + Ok(()) + } + pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 { self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1 } @@ -5083,7 +6263,7 @@ impl Channel where if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; } if matches!( self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) - if (flags & !(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)).is_empty() + if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() ) { // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready. @@ -5128,6 +6308,11 @@ impl Channel where self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() } + /// Returns true if we initiated to shut down the channel. + pub fn initiated_shutdown(&self) -> bool { + self.context.local_initiated_shutdown.is_some() + } + /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor. @@ -5169,14 +6354,14 @@ impl Channel where // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready. - let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if (f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL).is_empty()) { + let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()).is_empty()) { self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready(); true - } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) { + } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) { self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into()); self.context.update_time_counter += 1; true - } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) { + } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) { // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore. false } else { @@ -5751,7 +6936,7 @@ impl Channel where return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned())); } - let need_holding_cell = self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell(); + let need_holding_cell = !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment(); log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}", payment_hash, amount_msat, if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" } @@ -5857,7 +7042,8 @@ impl Channel where feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()), to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()), to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()), - }] + }], + channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()), }; self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke(); monitor_update @@ -6041,6 +7227,7 @@ impl Channel where // From here on out, we may not fail! self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw; self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent(); + self.context.local_initiated_shutdown = Some(()); self.context.update_time_counter += 1; let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script { @@ -6051,6 +7238,7 @@ impl Channel where updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), }], + channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()), }; self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()); self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) @@ -6108,202 +7296,41 @@ impl OutboundV1Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { where ES::Target: EntropySource, F::Target: FeeEstimator { - let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay; - let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id); - let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id); - let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone(); - - if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO { - return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)}); - } - if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { - return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)}); - } - let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000; - if push_msat > channel_value_msat { - return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) }); - } - if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT { - return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)}); - } let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config); if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS { // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS` - return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) }); + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below \ + implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) }); } - let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features); - debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config))); + let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id); + let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id); + let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone(); - let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { - (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000) - } else { - (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0) + let chan = Self { + context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel( + fee_estimator, + entropy_source, + signer_provider, + counterparty_node_id, + their_features, + channel_value_satoshis, + push_msat, + user_id, + config, + current_chain_height, + outbound_scid_alias, + temporary_channel_id, + holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, + channel_keys_id, + holder_signer, + pubkeys, + )?, + unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 } }; - let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target); - - let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat; - let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type); - if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee { - return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) }); - } - - let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); - secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()); - - let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { - match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() { - Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey), - Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}), - } - } else { None }; - - if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey { - if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) { - return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() }); - } - } - - let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) { - Ok(script) => script, - Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}), - }; - - let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source)); - - Ok(Self { - context: ChannelContext { - user_id, - - config: LegacyChannelConfig { - options: config.channel_config.clone(), - announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel, - commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey, - }, - - prev_config: None, - - inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()), - - channel_id: temporary_channel_id, - temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id), - channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT), - announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent, - secp_ctx, - channel_value_satoshis, - - latest_monitor_update_id: 0, - - holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer), - shutdown_scriptpubkey, - destination_script, - - cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, - cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, - value_to_self_msat, - - pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(), - pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(), - holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(), - pending_update_fee: None, - holding_cell_update_fee: None, - next_holder_htlc_id: 0, - next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0, - update_time_counter: 1, - - resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, - - monitor_pending_channel_ready: false, - monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false, - monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false, - monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(), - monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(), - monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(), - - signer_pending_commitment_update: false, - signer_pending_funding: false, - - #[cfg(debug_assertions)] - holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)), - #[cfg(debug_assertions)] - counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)), - - last_sent_closing_fee: None, - pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None, - expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false, - closing_fee_limits: None, - target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None, - - funding_tx_confirmed_in: None, - funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0, - short_channel_id: None, - channel_creation_height: current_chain_height, - - feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate, - counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0, - holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS, - counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0, - holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config), - counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel - holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, - counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0, - holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat }, - counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0, - holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS), - minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel - - counterparty_forwarding_info: None, - - channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters { - holder_pubkeys: pubkeys, - holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, - is_outbound_from_holder: true, - counterparty_parameters: None, - funding_outpoint: None, - channel_type_features: channel_type.clone() - }, - funding_transaction: None, - is_batch_funding: None, - - counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None, - counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None, - counterparty_node_id, - - counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None, - - commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(), - - channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled, - closing_signed_in_flight: false, - - announcement_sigs: None, - - #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] - next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None), - #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] - next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None), - - workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None, - sent_message_awaiting_response: None, - - latest_inbound_scid_alias: None, - outbound_scid_alias, - - channel_pending_event_emitted: false, - channel_ready_event_emitted: false, - - #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] - historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(), - - channel_type, - channel_keys_id, - - blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(), - }, - unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 } - }) - } + Ok(chan) + } /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set. fn get_funding_created_msg(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option where L::Target: Logger { @@ -6367,7 +7394,7 @@ impl OutboundV1Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state: self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated; - self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id(); + self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo); // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100. // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel. @@ -6382,38 +7409,20 @@ impl OutboundV1Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger); if funding_created.is_none() { - if !self.context.signer_pending_funding { - log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding"); - self.context.signer_pending_funding = true; + #[cfg(not(async_signing))] { + panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation"); + } + #[cfg(async_signing)] { + if !self.context.signer_pending_funding { + log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding"); + self.context.signer_pending_funding = true; + } } } Ok(funding_created) } - fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures { - // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is - // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option - // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy - // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`. - let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); - if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel && - config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy && - their_features.supports_scid_privacy() { - ret.set_scid_privacy_required(); - } - - // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we - // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of - // `only_static_remotekey`. - if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx && - their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { - ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required(); - } - - ret - } - /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried, /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed. @@ -6423,37 +7432,7 @@ impl OutboundV1Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { where F::Target: FeeEstimator { - if !self.context.is_outbound() || - !matches!( - self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) - if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT - ) - { - return Err(()); - } - if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() { - // We've exhausted our options - return Err(()); - } - // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional - // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has - // accepted one. - // - // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the - // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type` - // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the - // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for - // whatever reason. - if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { - self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx(); - self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee); - assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx()); - } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() { - self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy(); - } else { - self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); - } - self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone(); + self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?; Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash)) } @@ -6473,29 +7452,31 @@ impl OutboundV1Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys(); msgs::OpenChannel { - chain_hash, - temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id, - funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis, + common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields { + chain_hash, + temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id, + funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis, + dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis, + max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, + htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, + commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32, + to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), + max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs, + funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey, + revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(), + payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point, + delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(), + htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(), + first_per_commitment_point, + channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0}, + shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey { + Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(), + None => Builder::new().into_script(), + }), + channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()), + }, push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat, - dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis, - max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, - htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, - feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32, - to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), - max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs, - funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey, - revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(), - payment_point: keys.payment_point, - delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(), - htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(), - first_per_commitment_point, - channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0}, - shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey { - Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(), - None => Builder::new().into_script(), - }), - channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()), } } @@ -6510,58 +7491,58 @@ impl OutboundV1Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) { return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned())); } - if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis))); + if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis))); } if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis { return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis))); } - if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis))); + if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis))); } if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis { return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis))); } let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; - if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat))); + if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat))); } let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT); - if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay))); + if msg.common_fields.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.common_fields.to_self_delay))); } - if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 { + if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 { return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned())); } - if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS))); + if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS))); } // Now check against optional parameters as set by config... - if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat))); + if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat))); } - if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat))); + if msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat))); } if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis { return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis))); } - if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs))); + if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs))); } - if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS))); + if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS))); } - if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS))); + if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS))); } - if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth))); + if msg.common_fields.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth))); } - if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type { + if let Some(ty) = &msg.common_fields.channel_type { if *ty != self.context.channel_type { return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned())); } @@ -6577,7 +7558,7 @@ impl OutboundV1Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { } let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() { - match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey { + match &msg.common_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey { &Some(ref script) => { // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything if script.len() == 0 { @@ -6596,32 +7577,32 @@ impl OutboundV1Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { } } else { None }; - self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis; - self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000); + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis; + self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000); self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis); - self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat; - self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs; + self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat; + self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs; if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf { - self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth); + self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.common_fields.minimum_depth); } else { - self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth)); + self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth)); } let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys { - funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey, - revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint), - payment_point: msg.payment_point, - delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint), - htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint) + funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey, + revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint), + payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint, + delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint), + htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint) }; self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { - selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay, + selected_contest_delay: msg.common_fields.to_self_delay, pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys, }); - self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point); + self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.common_fields.first_per_commitment_point); self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey; self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding( @@ -6698,398 +7679,143 @@ impl OutboundV1Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer, shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script), - &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters, - funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis, - obscure_factor, - holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id); - channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx( - counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, - self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), - counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(), - counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(), - counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger); - - assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update! - if self.context.is_batch_funding() { - self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH); - } else { - self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()); - } - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1; - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1; - - log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id()); - - let mut channel = Channel { context: self.context }; - - let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some(); - channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()); - Ok((channel, channel_monitor)) - } - - /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're - /// blocked. - #[allow(unused)] - pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option where L::Target: Logger { - if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() { - log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created"); - self.get_funding_created_msg(logger) - } else { None } - } -} - -/// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment. -pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { - pub context: ChannelContext, - pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext, -} - -impl InboundV1Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { - /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one. - /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect! - pub fn new( - fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, - counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, - their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, - current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool, - ) -> Result, ChannelError> - where ES::Target: EntropySource, - F::Target: FeeEstimator, - L::Target: Logger, - { - let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.temporary_channel_id)); - let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false }; - - // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't - // support this channel type. - let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type { - if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned())); - } - - // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in - // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support - // `static_remote_key`. - if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned())); - } - // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type. - if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned())); - } - if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned())); - } - channel_type.clone() - } else { - let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features); - if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned())); - } - channel_type - }; - - let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id); - let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id); - let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone(); - let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys { - funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey, - revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint), - payment_point: msg.payment_point, - delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint), - htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint) - }; - - if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT))); - } - - // Check sanity of message fields: - if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis))); - } - if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis))); - } - if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis))); - } - let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; - if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat))); - } - if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis))); - } - if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat))); - } - Channel::::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, &&logger)?; - - let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT); - if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay))); - } - if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned())); - } - if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS))); - } - - // Now check against optional parameters as set by config... - if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis))); - } - if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat))); - } - if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat))); - } - if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis))); - } - if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs))); - } - if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS))); - } - if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS))); - } - - // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state: - - if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference { - if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned())); - } - } - - let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config); - if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS { - // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because - // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS` - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS))); - } - if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat))); - } - if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS { - log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.", - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS); - } - if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis))); - } - - // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient - // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful. - let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { - ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 - } else { - 0 - }; - let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat; - let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000; - if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee))); - } - - let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value; - // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't - // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve. - if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned())); - } - - let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() { - match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey { - &Some(ref script) => { - // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything - if script.len() == 0 { - None - } else { - if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script))) - } - Some(script.clone()) - } - }, - // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel - &None => { - return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned())); - } - } - } else { None }; - - let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { - match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() { - Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey), - Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())), - } - } else { None }; - - if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey { - if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) { - return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey))); - } - } - - let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) { - Ok(script) => script, - Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())), - }; - - let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); - secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()); - - let minimum_depth = if is_0conf { - Some(0) - } else { - Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)) - }; - - let chan = Self { - context: ChannelContext { - user_id, - - config: LegacyChannelConfig { - options: config.channel_config.clone(), - announced_channel, - commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey, - }, - - prev_config: None, - - inbound_handshake_limits_override: None, - - temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id), - channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id, - channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding( - NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT - ), - announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent, - secp_ctx, - - latest_monitor_update_id: 0, - - holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer), - shutdown_scriptpubkey, - destination_script, - - cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, - cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, - value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat, - - pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(), - pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(), - holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(), - pending_update_fee: None, - holding_cell_update_fee: None, - next_holder_htlc_id: 0, - next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0, - update_time_counter: 1, - - resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, - - monitor_pending_channel_ready: false, - monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false, - monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false, - monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(), - monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(), - monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(), - - signer_pending_commitment_update: false, - signer_pending_funding: false, - - #[cfg(debug_assertions)] - holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)), - #[cfg(debug_assertions)] - counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)), - - last_sent_closing_fee: None, - pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None, - expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false, - closing_fee_limits: None, - target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None, - - funding_tx_confirmed_in: None, - funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0, - short_channel_id: None, - channel_creation_height: current_chain_height, - - feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw, - channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis, - counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis, - holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS, - counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000), - holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config), - counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis), - holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, - counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat, - holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat }, - counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs, - holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS), - minimum_depth, + &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters, + funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis, + obscure_factor, + holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id()); + channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx( + counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), + self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, + self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), + counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(), + counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(), + counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger); - counterparty_forwarding_info: None, + assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update! + if self.context.is_batch_funding() { + self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH); + } else { + self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()); + } + self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1; + self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1; - channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters { - holder_pubkeys: pubkeys, - holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, - is_outbound_from_holder: false, - counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { - selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay, - pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys, - }), - funding_outpoint: None, - channel_type_features: channel_type.clone() - }, - funding_transaction: None, - is_batch_funding: None, + log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id()); - counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point), - counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None, - counterparty_node_id, + let mut channel = Channel { + context: self.context, + #[cfg(dual_funding)] + dual_funding_channel_context: None, + }; - counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey, + let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some(); + channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()); + Ok((channel, channel_monitor)) + } - commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(), + /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're + /// blocked. + #[cfg(async_signing)] + pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option where L::Target: Logger { + if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() { + log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created"); + self.get_funding_created_msg(logger) + } else { None } + } +} - channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled, - closing_signed_in_flight: false, +/// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment. +pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { + pub context: ChannelContext, + pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext, +} - announcement_sigs: None, +/// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given +/// [`msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields`]. +pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel( + common_fields: &msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields, their_features: &InitFeatures, + our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures +) -> Result { + if let Some(channel_type) = &common_fields.channel_type { + if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() { + return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned())); + } - #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] - next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None), - #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] - next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None), + // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in + // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support + // `static_remote_key`. + if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() { + return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned())); + } + // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type. + if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) { + return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned())); + } + let announced_channel = if (common_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false }; + if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel { + return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned())); + } + Ok(channel_type.clone()) + } else { + let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features); + if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() { + return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned())); + } + Ok(channel_type) + } +} - workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None, - sent_message_awaiting_response: None, +impl InboundV1Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { + /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one. + /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect! + pub fn new( + fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, + counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, + their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, + current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool, + ) -> Result, ChannelError> + where ES::Target: EntropySource, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, + { + let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)); - latest_inbound_scid_alias: None, - outbound_scid_alias: 0, + // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't + // support this channel type. + let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?; - channel_pending_event_emitted: false, - channel_ready_event_emitted: false, + let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis, config); + let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys { + funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey, + revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint), + payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint, + delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint), + htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint) + }; - #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] - historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(), + let chan = Self { + context: ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel( + fee_estimator, + entropy_source, + signer_provider, + counterparty_node_id, + their_features, + user_id, + config, + current_chain_height, + &&logger, + is_0conf, + 0, + counterparty_pubkeys, channel_type, - channel_keys_id, - - blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(), - }, + holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, + msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, + msg.push_msat, + msg.common_fields.clone(), + )?, unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 } }; - Ok(chan) } @@ -7124,25 +7850,27 @@ impl InboundV1Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys(); msgs::AcceptChannel { - temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id, - dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis, - max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, + common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields { + temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id, + dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis, + max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, + htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, + minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), + to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), + max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs, + funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey, + revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(), + payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point, + delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(), + htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(), + first_per_commitment_point, + shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey { + Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(), + None => Builder::new().into_script(), + }), + channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()), + }, channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, - htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, - minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), - to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), - max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs, - funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey, - revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(), - payment_point: keys.payment_point, - delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(), - htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(), - first_per_commitment_point, - shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey { - Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(), - None => Builder::new().into_script(), - }), - channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()), #[cfg(taproot)] next_local_nonce: None, } @@ -7233,7 +7961,7 @@ impl InboundV1Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state: self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()); - self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id(); + self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo); self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1; self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1; @@ -7251,7 +7979,7 @@ impl InboundV1Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters, funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis, obscure_factor, - holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id); + holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id()); channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx( counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, @@ -7266,6 +7994,8 @@ impl InboundV1Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { // `ChannelMonitor`. let mut channel = Channel { context: self.context, + #[cfg(dual_funding)] + dual_funding_channel_context: None, }; let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some(); channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()); @@ -7274,7 +8004,310 @@ impl InboundV1Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { } } -const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3; +// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V2 channel establishment. +#[cfg(dual_funding)] +pub(super) struct OutboundV2Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { + pub context: ChannelContext, + pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext, + #[cfg(dual_funding)] + pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext, +} + +#[cfg(dual_funding)] +impl OutboundV2Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { + pub fn new( + fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, + counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, funding_satoshis: u64, + user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, outbound_scid_alias: u64, + funding_confirmation_target: ConfirmationTarget, + ) -> Result, APIError> + where ES::Target: EntropySource, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + { + let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, funding_satoshis, user_id); + let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id); + let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone(); + + let temporary_channel_id = Some(ChannelId::temporary_v2_from_revocation_basepoint(&pubkeys.revocation_basepoint)); + + let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis( + funding_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS); + + let funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(funding_confirmation_target); + let funding_tx_locktime = current_chain_height; + + let chan = Self { + context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel( + fee_estimator, + entropy_source, + signer_provider, + counterparty_node_id, + their_features, + funding_satoshis, + 0, + user_id, + config, + current_chain_height, + outbound_scid_alias, + temporary_channel_id, + holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, + channel_keys_id, + holder_signer, + pubkeys, + )?, + unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }, + dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext { + our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis, + their_funding_satoshis: 0, + funding_tx_locktime, + funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, + } + }; + Ok(chan) + } + + /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried, + /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this + /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannelV2` message, otherwise the channel is failed. + pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close( + &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator + ) -> Result + where + F::Target: FeeEstimator + { + self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?; + Ok(self.get_open_channel_v2(chain_hash)) + } + + pub fn get_open_channel_v2(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannelV2 { + if self.context.have_received_message() { + debug_assert!(false, "Cannot generate an open_channel2 after we've moved forward"); + } + + if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER { + debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an open_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced"); + } + + let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref() + .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, + &self.context.secp_ctx); + let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref() + .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, + &self.context.secp_ctx); + let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys(); + + msgs::OpenChannelV2 { + common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields { + chain_hash, + temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(), + funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis, + dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis, + max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, + htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, + commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw, + to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), + max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs, + funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey, + revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(), + payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point, + delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(), + htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(), + first_per_commitment_point, + channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0}, + shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey { + Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(), + None => Builder::new().into_script(), + }), + channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()), + }, + funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw, + second_per_commitment_point, + locktime: self.dual_funding_context.funding_tx_locktime, + require_confirmed_inputs: None, + } + } +} + +// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V2 channel establishment. +#[cfg(dual_funding)] +pub(super) struct InboundV2Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { + pub context: ChannelContext, + pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext, + pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext, +} + +#[cfg(dual_funding)] +impl InboundV2Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { + /// Creates a new dual-funded channel from a remote side's request for one. + /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect! + pub fn new( + fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, + counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, + their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2, funding_satoshis: u64, user_id: u128, + config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, + ) -> Result, ChannelError> + where ES::Target: EntropySource, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, + { + let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis.saturating_add(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis); + let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis( + channel_value_satoshis, msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis); + let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis( + channel_value_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS); + + // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't + // support this channel type. + if msg.common_fields.channel_type.is_none() { + return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Rejecting V2 channel {} missing channel_type", + msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))) + } + let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?; + + let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys { + funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey, + revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint), + payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint, + delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint), + htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint) + }; + + let mut context = ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel( + fee_estimator, + entropy_source, + signer_provider, + counterparty_node_id, + their_features, + user_id, + config, + current_chain_height, + logger, + false, + + funding_satoshis, + + counterparty_pubkeys, + channel_type, + holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, + counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, + 0 /* push_msat not used in dual-funding */, + msg.common_fields.clone(), + )?; + let channel_id = ChannelId::v2_from_revocation_basepoints( + &context.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, + &context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint); + context.channel_id = channel_id; + + let chan = Self { + context, + unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }, + dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext { + our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis, + their_funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis, + funding_tx_locktime: msg.locktime, + funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: msg.funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, + } + }; + + Ok(chan) + } + + /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message which + /// should be sent back to the counterparty node. + /// + /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2 + pub fn accept_inbound_dual_funded_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 { + if self.context.is_outbound() { + debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?"); + } + if !matches!( + self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) + if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT) + ) { + debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel2 after channel had moved forward"); + } + if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER { + debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an accept_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced"); + } + + self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message() + } + + /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an + /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use + /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead. + /// + /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2 + fn generate_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 { + let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point( + self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx); + let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point( + self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx); + let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys(); + + msgs::AcceptChannelV2 { + common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields { + temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(), + dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis, + max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, + htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, + minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), + to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), + max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs, + funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey, + revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(), + payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point, + delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(), + htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(), + first_per_commitment_point, + shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey { + Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(), + None => Builder::new().into_script(), + }), + channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()), + }, + funding_satoshis: self.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis, + second_per_commitment_point, + require_confirmed_inputs: None, + } + } + + /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message for an + /// inbound channel without accepting it. + /// + /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2 + #[cfg(test)] + pub fn get_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 { + self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message() + } +} + +// Unfunded channel utilities + +fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures { + // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is + // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option + // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy + // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`. + let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); + if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel && + config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy && + their_features.supports_scid_privacy() { + ret.set_scid_privacy_required(); + } + + // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we + // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of + // `only_static_remotekey`. + if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx && + their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { + ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required(); + } + + ret +} + +const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 4; const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3; impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,; @@ -7336,7 +8369,18 @@ impl Writeable for Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been // called. - write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION); + let version_to_write = if self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().any(|htlc| match htlc.state { + InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution)| + InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => { + matches!(htlc_resolution, InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { .. }) + }, + _ => false, + }) { + SERIALIZATION_VERSION + } else { + MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION + }; + write_ver_prefix!(writer, version_to_write, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION); // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write @@ -7354,6 +8398,8 @@ impl Writeable for Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state; if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) { channel_state.set_peer_disconnected(); + } else { + debug_assert!(false, "Pre-funded/shutdown channels should not be written"); } channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?; } @@ -7390,13 +8436,29 @@ impl Writeable for Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?; match &htlc.state { &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(), - &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => { + &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution) => { 1u8.write(writer)?; - htlc_state.write(writer)?; + if version_to_write <= 3 { + if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution { + pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?; + } else { + panic!(); + } + } else { + htlc_resolution.write(writer)?; + } }, - &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => { + &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => { 2u8.write(writer)?; - htlc_state.write(writer)?; + if version_to_write <= 3 { + if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution { + pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?; + } else { + panic!(); + } + } else { + htlc_resolution.write(writer)?; + } }, &InboundHTLCState::Committed => { 3u8.write(writer)?; @@ -7455,6 +8517,8 @@ impl Writeable for Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec> = Vec::new(); let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec> = Vec::new(); + // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) + let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new(); (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?; for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() { match update { @@ -7482,6 +8546,18 @@ impl Writeable for Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { htlc_id.write(writer)?; err_packet.write(writer)?; } + &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { + htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion + } => { + // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy + // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV. + malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)); + + let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() }; + 2u8.write(writer)?; + htlc_id.write(writer)?; + dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?; + } } } @@ -7608,6 +8684,11 @@ impl Writeable for Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) }; + let mut monitor_pending_update_adds = None; + if !self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.is_empty() { + monitor_pending_update_adds = Some(&self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds); + } + write_tlv_fields!(writer, { (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option), // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a @@ -7625,6 +8706,7 @@ impl Writeable for Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option), (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec), (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option), + (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec), (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required), (15, preimages, required_vec), @@ -7642,6 +8724,9 @@ impl Writeable for Channel where SP::Target: SignerProvider { (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option), (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec), (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec), + (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119 + // 45 and 47 are reserved for async signing + (49, self.context.local_initiated_shutdown, option), // Added in 0.0.122 }); Ok(()) @@ -7717,8 +8802,22 @@ impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c Ch cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?, payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?, state: match ::read(reader)? { - 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?), - 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?), + 1 => { + let resolution = if ver <= 3 { + InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? } + } else { + Readable::read(reader)? + }; + InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution) + }, + 2 => { + let resolution = if ver <= 3 { + InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? } + } else { + Readable::read(reader)? + }; + InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution) + }, 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed, 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?), _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), @@ -7879,7 +8978,7 @@ impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c Ch let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?; #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] - let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new(); + let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = new_hash_set(); #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))] { let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; @@ -7929,9 +9028,14 @@ impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c Ch let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None; + let mut local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()> = None; + let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option>> = None; let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option>> = None; + let mut malformed_htlcs: Option> = None; + let mut monitor_pending_update_adds: Option> = None; + read_tlv_fields!(reader, { (0, announcement_sigs, option), (1, minimum_depth, option), @@ -7943,6 +9047,7 @@ impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c Ch (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option), (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec), (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option), + (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec), (13, channel_creation_height, option), (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec), @@ -7960,6 +9065,9 @@ impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c Ch (38, is_batch_funding, option), (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec), (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec), + (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119 + // 45 and 47 are reserved for async signing + (49, local_initiated_shutdown, option), }); let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id { @@ -8054,6 +9162,22 @@ impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c Ch if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) } } + if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs { + for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs { + let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| { + if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc { + let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id; + if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) } + matches + } else { false } + }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?; + let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { + htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion + }; + let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc); + } + } + Ok(Channel { context: ChannelContext { user_id, @@ -8096,6 +9220,7 @@ impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c Ch monitor_pending_forwards, monitor_pending_failures, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(), + monitor_pending_update_adds: monitor_pending_update_adds.unwrap_or(Vec::new()), signer_pending_commitment_update: false, signer_pending_funding: false, @@ -8174,8 +9299,12 @@ impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c Ch channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(), channel_keys_id, + local_initiated_shutdown, + blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(), - } + }, + #[cfg(dual_funding)] + dual_funding_channel_context: None, }) } } @@ -8188,6 +9317,7 @@ mod tests { use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut}; use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; use bitcoin::network::constants::Network; + use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING; use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage}; use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint}; use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId}; @@ -8220,6 +9350,18 @@ mod tests { use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion}; use crate::prelude::*; + #[test] + fn test_channel_state_order() { + use crate::ln::channel::NegotiatingFundingFlags; + use crate::ln::channel::AwaitingChannelReadyFlags; + use crate::ln::channel::ChannelReadyFlags; + + assert!(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::new()) < ChannelState::FundingNegotiated); + assert!(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated < ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new())); + assert!(ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())); + assert!(ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ShutdownComplete); + } + struct TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: u32 } @@ -8324,7 +9466,7 @@ mod tests { // same as the old fee. fee_est.fee_est = 500; let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)); - assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee); + assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, original_fee); } #[test] @@ -8355,7 +9497,7 @@ mod tests { // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit. let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(); - accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546; + accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546; node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap(); node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560; @@ -8673,7 +9815,7 @@ mod tests { // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit. let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(); - accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546; + accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546; node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap(); node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560; @@ -8724,19 +9866,37 @@ mod tests { } #[test] - fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_ser() { - // Ensure that channel blinding points and skimmed fees are (de)serialized properly. + fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() { + // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized + // properly. + let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new(); let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000}); let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); let seed = [42; 32]; let network = Network::Testnet; + let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network); let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network); let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()); let config = UserConfig::default(); let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config); - let outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); - let mut chan = Channel { context: outbound_chan.context }; + let mut outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new( + &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None + ).unwrap(); + let inbound_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new( + &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), + &features, &outbound_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)), 7, &config, 0, &&logger, false + ).unwrap(); + outbound_chan.accept_channel(&inbound_chan.get_accept_channel_message(), &config.channel_handshake_limits, &features).unwrap(); + let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut { + value: 10000000, script_pubkey: outbound_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript(), + }]}; + let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }; + let funding_created = outbound_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap().unwrap(); + let mut chan = match inbound_chan.funding_created(&funding_created, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger) { + Ok((chan, _, _)) => chan, + Err((_, e)) => panic!("{}", e), + }; let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path: Path { @@ -8790,13 +9950,19 @@ mod tests { payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]), htlc_id: 0, }; - let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(10); - for i in 0..10 { - if i % 3 == 0 { + let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { + htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] } + }; + let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { + htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32], + }; + let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12); + for i in 0..12 { + if i % 5 == 0 { holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone()); - } else if i % 3 == 1 { + } else if i % 5 == 1 { holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone()); - } else { + } else if i % 5 == 2 { let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone(); if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. @@ -8805,6 +9971,10 @@ mod tests { *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42); } else { panic!() } holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add); + } else if i % 5 == 3 { + holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64)); + } else { + holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64)); } } chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone(); @@ -9618,7 +10788,7 @@ mod tests { channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required(); let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)); - open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features); + open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features); let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap()); let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), @@ -9701,7 +10871,7 @@ mod tests { // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation. let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)); - open_channel_msg.channel_type = None; + open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = None; // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel. @@ -9747,7 +10917,7 @@ mod tests { ).unwrap(); let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)); - open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone()); + open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone()); let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new( &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a, @@ -9774,7 +10944,7 @@ mod tests { ).unwrap(); let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message(); - accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone()); + accept_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone()); let res = channel_a.accept_channel( &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init