X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannel.rs;h=9455a76140b5b627a21bb0a948caefa85dc3c1c7;hb=6ca81ff2bbddaf946251ce9f15cc69526d228ceb;hp=ef5bf6895a81e2fe2d5e33d47297b579dee15b97;hpb=54f96ef944423eac98d302fbc7cdcdc136d58312;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs index ef5bf689..9455a761 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs @@ -8,9 +8,10 @@ // licenses. use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash; -use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder}; -use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType}; -use bitcoin::util::sighash; +use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder}; +use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction; +use bitcoin::sighash; +use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType; use bitcoin::consensus::encode; use bitcoin::hashes::Hash; @@ -34,13 +35,14 @@ use crate::ln::chan_utils; use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason; use crate::chain::BestBlock; use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator}; -use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID}; +use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, WithChannelMonitor, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID}; use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData}; -use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient}; +use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner}; +use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient}; use crate::events::ClosureReason; use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId; -use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter}; -use crate::util::logger::Logger; +use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer}; +use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext}; use crate::util::errors::APIError; use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure}; use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts; @@ -48,12 +50,14 @@ use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts; use crate::io; use crate::prelude::*; use core::{cmp,mem,fmt}; +use core::convert::TryInto; use core::ops::Deref; #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))] use crate::sync::Mutex; -use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex; use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType; +use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint}; + #[cfg(test)] pub struct ChannelValueStat { pub value_to_self_msat: u64, @@ -162,6 +166,7 @@ struct InboundHTLCOutput { state: InboundHTLCState, } +#[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))] enum OutboundHTLCState { /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack @@ -195,6 +200,7 @@ enum OutboundHTLCState { } #[derive(Clone)] +#[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))] enum OutboundHTLCOutcome { /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here. Success(Option), @@ -219,6 +225,7 @@ impl<'a> Into> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome { } } +#[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))] struct OutboundHTLCOutput { htlc_id: u64, amount_msat: u64, @@ -226,10 +233,12 @@ struct OutboundHTLCOutput { payment_hash: PaymentHash, state: OutboundHTLCState, source: HTLCSource, + blinding_point: Option, skimmed_fee_msat: Option, } /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info +#[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))] enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK { AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry // always outbound @@ -240,6 +249,7 @@ enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK { onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC. skimmed_fee_msat: Option, + blinding_point: Option, }, ClaimHTLC { payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, @@ -404,6 +414,33 @@ impl fmt::Display for ChannelError { } } +pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger { + pub logger: &'a L, + pub peer_id: Option, + pub channel_id: Option, +} + +impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger { + fn log(&self, mut record: Record) { + record.peer_id = self.peer_id; + record.channel_id = self.channel_id; + self.logger.log(record) + } +} + +impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L> +where L::Target: Logger { + pub(super) fn from(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext) -> Self + where S::Target: SignerProvider + { + WithChannelContext { + logger, + peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id), + channel_id: Some(context.channel_id), + } + } +} + macro_rules! secp_check { ($res: expr, $err: expr) => { match $res { @@ -475,7 +512,8 @@ struct CommitmentStats<'a> { htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits - preimages: Vec, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment + outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment + inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment } /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC. @@ -533,6 +571,15 @@ pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates { pub announcement_sigs: Option, } +/// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked` +#[allow(unused)] +pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates { + pub commitment_update: Option, + pub funding_signed: Option, + pub funding_created: Option, + pub channel_ready: Option, +} + /// The return value of `channel_reestablish` pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses { pub channel_ready: Option, @@ -543,18 +590,19 @@ pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses { pub shutdown_msg: Option, } -/// The return type of `force_shutdown` -/// -/// Contains a tuple with the following: -/// - An optional (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple -/// - A list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this channel's -/// counterparty_node_id and channel_id). -/// - An optional transaction id identifying a corresponding batch funding transaction. -pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = ( - Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, - Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>, - Option -); +/// The result of a shutdown that should be handled. +#[must_use] +pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult { + /// A channel monitor update to apply. + pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, + /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately. + pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>, + /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be + /// propagated to the remainder of the batch. + pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option, + pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId, + pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, +} /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the @@ -636,7 +684,7 @@ pub(super) enum ChannelPhase where SP::Target: SignerProvider { impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase where SP::Target: SignerProvider, - ::Signer: ChannelSigner, + ::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner, { pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext { match self { @@ -714,9 +762,9 @@ pub(super) struct ChannelContext where SP::Target: SignerProvider { latest_monitor_update_id: u64, - holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<::Signer>, + holder_signer: ChannelSignerType, shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option, - destination_script: Script, + destination_script: ScriptBuf, // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the @@ -724,7 +772,7 @@ pub(super) struct ChannelContext where SP::Target: SignerProvider { cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64, cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64, - value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees + value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec, pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec, holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec, @@ -750,6 +798,18 @@ pub(super) struct ChannelContext where SP::Target: SignerProvider { monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec, + /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`]) + /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in + /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us. + /// + /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up + /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`]. + signer_pending_commitment_update: bool, + /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a + /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is + /// outbound or inbound. + signer_pending_funding: bool, + // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee. // // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound` @@ -795,6 +855,19 @@ pub(super) struct ChannelContext where SP::Target: SignerProvider { #[cfg(not(test))] closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>, + /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's + /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest + /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee) + /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the + /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`. + /// + /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting + /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so. + /// + /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few + /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare. + expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool, + /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included. funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option, funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32, @@ -848,7 +921,7 @@ pub(super) struct ChannelContext where SP::Target: SignerProvider { counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, - counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option