X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannelmanager.rs;h=10d2a69d20fc2c1d321ef5d45d0497fc8e08a147;hb=30b9d9fbeaa62537beb8d3ea0b2866703d0d7c92;hp=bbecc4b339fa09f5c336bfb45f3053402b3a7ba8;hpb=72416b951e64bb51577f63937eed429a29b563e7;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index bbecc4b3..10d2a69d 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -26,51 +26,58 @@ use bitcoin::network::constants::Network; use bitcoin::hashes::Hash; use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; -use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash; use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid}; use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey}; use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1; -use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret; use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence}; -use chain; -use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock}; -use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator}; -use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID}; -use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData}; +use crate::chain; +use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock}; +use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator}; +use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID}; +use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData}; // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to // construct one themselves. -use ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret}; -use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch}; -use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures}; +use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret}; +use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch}; +use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures}; #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))] -use ln::features::InvoiceFeatures; -use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters}; -use ln::msgs; -use ln::onion_utils; -use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT}; -use ln::wire::Encode; -use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient}; -use util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig}; -use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination}; -use util::{byte_utils, events}; -use util::wakers::{Future, Notifier}; -use util::scid_utils::fake_scid; -use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter}; -use util::logger::{Level, Logger}; -use util::errors::APIError; - -use io; -use prelude::*; +use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures; +use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph; +use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router}; +use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer; +use crate::ln::msgs; +use crate::ln::onion_utils; +use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason; +use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT}; +#[cfg(test)] +use crate::ln::outbound_payment; +use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment}; +use crate::ln::wire::Encode; +use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner}; +use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig}; +use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination}; +use crate::util::events; +use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier}; +use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid; +use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter}; +use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger}; +use crate::util::errors::APIError; + +use crate::io; +use crate::prelude::*; use core::{cmp, mem}; use core::cell::RefCell; -use io::Read; -use sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard}; +use crate::io::Read; +use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock}; use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering}; use core::time::Duration; use core::ops::Deref; +// Re-export this for use in the public API. +pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry}; + // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself: // // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should @@ -92,8 +99,8 @@ use core::ops::Deref; pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting { Forward { onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, - /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an - /// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID. + /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one + /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module. short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero eventually when we bump MSRV }, Receive { @@ -112,7 +119,8 @@ pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo { pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting, pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash, - pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64, + pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option, // Added in 0.0.113 + pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64, pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32, } @@ -129,20 +137,23 @@ pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus { Fail(HTLCFailureMsg), } -pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo { - AddHTLC { - forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo, +pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo { + pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo, - // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in - // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the - // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded - // HTLCs. - // - // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel. - prev_short_channel_id: u64, - prev_htlc_id: u64, - prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, - }, + // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in + // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the + // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded + // HTLCs. + // + // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel. + prev_short_channel_id: u64, + prev_htlc_id: u64, + prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, + prev_user_channel_id: u128, +} + +pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo { + AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo), FailHTLC { htlc_id: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, @@ -203,6 +214,24 @@ impl Readable for PaymentId { Ok(PaymentId(buf)) } } + +/// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK. +/// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly +#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] +pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]); + +impl Writeable for InterceptId { + fn write(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> { + self.0.write(w) + } +} + +impl Readable for InterceptId { + fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result { + let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?; + Ok(InterceptId(buf)) + } +} /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] @@ -216,6 +245,10 @@ pub(crate) enum HTLCSource { first_hop_htlc_msat: u64, payment_id: PaymentId, payment_secret: Option, + /// Note that this is now "deprecated" - we write it for forwards (and read it for + /// backwards) compatibility reasons, but prefer to use the data in the + /// [`super::outbound_payment`] module, which stores per-payment data once instead of in + /// each HTLC. payment_params: Option, }, } @@ -254,42 +287,42 @@ impl HTLCSource { } } -#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug -pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason { - LightningError { - err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, - }, - Reason { - failure_code: u16, - data: Vec, - } -} - struct ReceiveError { err_code: u16, err_data: Vec, msg: &'static str, } -/// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop -enum ClaimFundsFromHop { - PrevHopForceClosed, - MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option), - Success(u64), - DuplicateClaim, +/// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC +/// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`]. +/// +/// For more info on failure codes, see . +#[derive(Clone, Copy)] +pub enum FailureCode { + /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit + /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry. + TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2, + /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require + /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment. + RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3, + /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of + /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling. + /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is + /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`]. + IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15, } type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>); -/// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a +/// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a -/// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in +/// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it. struct MsgHandleErrInternal { err: msgs::LightningError, - chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed + chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option)>, } impl MsgHandleErrInternal { @@ -325,7 +358,7 @@ impl MsgHandleErrInternal { Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None } } #[inline] - fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option) -> Self { + fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option) -> Self { Self { err: LightningError { err: err.clone(), @@ -378,7 +411,7 @@ impl MsgHandleErrInternal { /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited). /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. -const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100; +pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100; /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be @@ -392,35 +425,34 @@ pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder { RevokeAndACKFirst, } -// Note this is only exposed in cfg(test): -pub(super) struct ChannelHolder { - pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>, - /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s. - /// - /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with - /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required - /// confirmation depth. - pub(super) short_to_chan_info: HashMap, - /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received. - /// - /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel, - /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias - /// and via the classic SCID. - /// - /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency - /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short - /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo! - pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap>, +/// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed. +struct ClaimingPayment { + amount_msat: u64, + payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose, + receiver_node_id: PublicKey, +} +impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, { + (0, amount_msat, required), + (2, payment_purpose, required), + (4, receiver_node_id, required), +}); + +/// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments +struct ClaimablePayments { /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be /// failed/claimed by the user. /// - /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency - /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you - /// go to read them! + /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually + /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them! + /// + /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure + /// we don't get a duplicate payment. claimable_htlcs: HashMap)>, - /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except - /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict). - pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec, + + /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which + /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user + /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`]. + pending_claiming_payments: HashMap, } /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site @@ -432,10 +464,45 @@ enum BackgroundEvent { ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)), } -/// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold -/// the latest Init features we heard from the peer. -struct PeerState { +pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction { + /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an + /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for + /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate + /// event can be generated. + PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash }, + /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user. + EmitEvent { event: events::Event }, +} + +/// State we hold per-peer. +pub(super) struct PeerState { + /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`. + /// + /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a + /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the + /// `channel_id`. + pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>, + /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer. latest_features: InitFeatures, + /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except + /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict). + pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec, + /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a + /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding + /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`]. + is_connected: bool, +} + +impl PeerState { + /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage. + /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't + /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`. + fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool { + if require_disconnected && self.is_connected { + return false + } + self.channel_by_id.len() == 0 + } } /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is @@ -459,187 +526,41 @@ struct PendingInboundPayment { min_value_msat: Option, } -/// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102 -/// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment. -pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment { - Legacy { - session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>, - }, - Retryable { - session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>, - payment_hash: PaymentHash, - payment_secret: Option, - pending_amt_msat: u64, - /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+. - pending_fee_msat: Option, - /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying. - total_msat: u64, - /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated. - starting_block_height: u32, - }, - /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have - /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart - /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled. - Fulfilled { - session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>, - payment_hash: Option, - }, - /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a - /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race - /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple - /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a - /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed. - /// - /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164 - Abandoned { - session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>, - payment_hash: PaymentHash, - }, -} - -impl PendingOutboundPayment { - fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool { - match self { - PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true, - _ => false, - } - } - fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool { - match self { - PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true, - _ => false, - } - } - fn abandoned(&self) -> bool { - match self { - PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true, - _ => false, - } - } - fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option { - match self { - PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(), - _ => None, - } - } - - fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option { - match self { - PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None, - PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash), - PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash, - PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash), - } - } - - fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) { - let mut session_privs = HashSet::new(); - core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self { - PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } | - PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } | - PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } | - PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } - => session_privs, - }); - let payment_hash = self.payment_hash(); - *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash }; - } - - fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> { - let mut session_privs = HashSet::new(); - let our_payment_hash; - core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self { - PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } | - PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => - return Err(()), - PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } | - PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => { - our_payment_hash = *payment_hash; - session_privs - }, - }); - *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash }; - Ok(()) - } - - /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled - fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec>) -> bool { - let remove_res = match self { - PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } | - PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } | - PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } | - PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => { - session_privs.remove(session_priv) - } - }; - if remove_res { - if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self { - let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path"); - let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path"); - *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat; - if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() { - *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees(); - } - } - } - remove_res - } - - fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec) -> bool { - let insert_res = match self { - PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } | - PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => { - session_privs.insert(session_priv) - } - PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false, - PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false, - }; - if insert_res { - if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self { - let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path"); - *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat; - if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() { - *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees(); - } - } - } - insert_res - } - - fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize { - match self { - PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } | - PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } | - PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } | - PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => { - session_privs.len() - } - } - } -} - /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g. /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents -/// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any -/// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the -/// concrete type of the KeysManager. +/// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type +/// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this +/// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter. /// /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings -pub type SimpleArcChannelManager = ChannelManager, Arc, Arc, Arc, Arc>; +pub type SimpleArcChannelManager = ChannelManager< + Arc, + Arc, + Arc, + Arc, + Arc, + Arc, + Arc>>, + Arc, + Arc>>, Arc>>> + >>, + Arc +>; /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes). /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases -/// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any -/// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the -/// concrete type of the KeysManager. +/// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type +/// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this +/// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter. /// /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings -pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager; +pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex, &'g L>>>, &'g L>; /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately. @@ -677,35 +598,76 @@ pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManage /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when /// you're using lightning-net-tokio. -pub struct ChannelManager - where M::Target: chain::Watch, - T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, - F::Target: FeeEstimator, - L::Target: Logger, +// +// Lock order: +// The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the +// `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree, +// and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree. +// Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will +// create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken. +// +// Lock order tree: +// +// `total_consistency_lock` +// | +// |__`forward_htlcs` +// | | +// | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs` +// | +// |__`per_peer_state` +// | | +// | |__`pending_inbound_payments` +// | | +// | |__`claimable_payments` +// | | +// | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds +// | | +// | |__`peer_state` +// | | +// | |__`id_to_peer` +// | | +// | |__`short_to_chan_info` +// | | +// | |__`outbound_scid_aliases` +// | | +// | |__`best_block` +// | | +// | |__`pending_events` +// | | +// | |__`pending_background_events` +// +pub struct ChannelManager +where + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + ES::Target: EntropySource, + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + R::Target: Router, + L::Target: Logger, { default_configuration: UserConfig, genesis_hash: BlockHash, fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, + #[allow(unused)] + router: R, + /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements. #[cfg(test)] pub(super) best_block: RwLock, #[cfg(not(test))] best_block: RwLock, secp_ctx: Secp256k1, - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))] - pub(super) channel_state: Mutex>, - #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))] - channel_state: Mutex>, - /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will - /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements + /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed - /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out. - /// Locked *after* channel_state. + /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out. + /// + /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements. pending_inbound_payments: Mutex>, /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution. @@ -719,13 +681,41 @@ pub struct ChannelManager>, + /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements. + pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments, + + /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received. + /// + /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel, + /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias + /// and via the classic SCID. + /// + /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the + /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`! + /// + /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements. + #[cfg(test)] + pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex>>, + #[cfg(not(test))] + forward_htlcs: Mutex>>, + /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here + /// until the user tells us what we should do with them. + /// + /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements. + pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex>, + + /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See + /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info. + /// + /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements. + claimable_payments: Mutex, /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the /// active channel list on load. + /// + /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements. outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex>, /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`. @@ -738,6 +728,9 @@ pub struct ChannelManager>, - our_network_key: SecretKey, + /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s. + /// + /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with + /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required + /// confirmation depth. + /// + /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency + /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a + /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps. + /// + /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements. + #[cfg(test)] + pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock>, + #[cfg(not(test))] + short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock>, + our_network_pubkey: PublicKey, inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey, @@ -769,17 +779,27 @@ pub struct ChannelManager>>, + /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements. + #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))] + per_peer_state: FairRwLock::Signer>>>>, + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))] + pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock::Signer>>>>, + /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements. pending_events: Mutex>, + /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements. pending_background_events: Mutex>, /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent. /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out. @@ -791,7 +811,9 @@ pub struct ChannelManager, - /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound. - pub user_channel_id: u64, + /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was + /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to + /// 0.0.113. + pub user_channel_id: u128, /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel. /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close. @@ -1082,6 +1107,10 @@ pub struct ChannelDetails { /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth pub confirmations_required: Option, + /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction. + /// + /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113. + pub confirmations: Option, /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty @@ -1140,48 +1169,33 @@ impl ChannelDetails { } } -/// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the -/// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum -/// states for more. -#[derive(Clone, Debug)] -pub enum PaymentSendFailure { - /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to - /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and - /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full. - ParameterError(APIError), - /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us - /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages - /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the - /// payment in full. - /// - /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to - /// send_payment. - PathParameterError(Vec>), - /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place. - /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different - /// paths than the ones selected). - AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec), - /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some - /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result - /// in over-/re-payment. - /// - /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to - /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely - /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so). - /// - /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried - /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the - /// case of Ok(())) or will send once a [`MonitorEvent::Completed`] is provided for the - /// next-hop channel with the latest update_id. - PartialFailure { - /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops. - results: Vec>, - /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will - /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that - /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance. - failed_paths_retry: Option, - /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending. - payment_id: PaymentId, +/// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments. +/// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs. +#[derive(Debug, PartialEq)] +pub enum RecentPaymentDetails { + /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery. + Pending { + /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or + /// abandoned. + payment_hash: PaymentHash, + /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment, + /// not just the amount currently inflight. + total_msat: u64, + }, + /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have + /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the + /// payment is removed from tracking. + Fulfilled { + /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`] + /// made before LDK version 0.0.104. + payment_hash: Option, + }, + /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly + /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all + /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated. + Abandoned { + /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send. + payment_hash: PaymentHash, }, } @@ -1204,12 +1218,12 @@ macro_rules! handle_error { match $internal { Ok(msg) => Ok(msg), Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => { - #[cfg(debug_assertions)] + #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))] { // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon // entering the macro. - assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok()); - assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok()); + debug_assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok()); + debug_assert!($self.per_peer_state.try_write().is_ok()); } let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2); @@ -1239,7 +1253,11 @@ macro_rules! handle_error { } if !msg_events.is_empty() { - $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events); + let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) { + let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events); + } } // Return error in case higher-API need one @@ -1250,9 +1268,11 @@ macro_rules! handle_error { } macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal { - ($self: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $channel: expr) => { + ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{ + $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id()); + let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap(); if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() { - $short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id); + short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id); } else { // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we @@ -1263,14 +1283,13 @@ macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal { let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias()); debug_assert!(alias_removed); } - $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id()); - $short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias()); - } + short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias()); + }} } /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error) macro_rules! convert_chan_err { - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => { + ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => { match $err { ChannelError::Warn(msg) => { (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone())) @@ -1280,7 +1299,7 @@ macro_rules! convert_chan_err { }, ChannelError::Close(msg) => { log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg); - update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_chan_info, $channel); + update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel); let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true); (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(), shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok())) @@ -1290,11 +1309,11 @@ macro_rules! convert_chan_err { } macro_rules! break_chan_entry { - ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => { + ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => { match $res { Ok(res) => res, Err(e) => { - let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key()); + let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key()); if drop { $entry.remove_entry(); } @@ -1305,11 +1324,11 @@ macro_rules! break_chan_entry { } macro_rules! try_chan_entry { - ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => { + ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => { match $res { Ok(res) => res, Err(e) => { - let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key()); + let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key()); if drop { $entry.remove_entry(); } @@ -1320,21 +1339,21 @@ macro_rules! try_chan_entry { } macro_rules! remove_channel { - ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => { + ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => { { let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1; - update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel); + update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel); channel } } } -macro_rules! handle_monitor_err { - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => { +macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res { + ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => { match $err { ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => { log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..])); - update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_chan_info, $chan); + update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan); // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain. @@ -1368,7 +1387,7 @@ macro_rules! handle_monitor_err { if !$resend_raa { debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment); } - $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills); + $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills); (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false) }, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => { @@ -1376,182 +1395,78 @@ macro_rules! handle_monitor_err { }, } }; - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { { - let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key()); + ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { { + let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key()); if drop { $entry.remove_entry(); } res } }; - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { { + ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { { debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst); - handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id) + handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id) } }; - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => { - handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id) + ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => { + handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id) }; - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => { - handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()) + ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => { + handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()) }; - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => { - handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()) + ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => { + handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()) }; - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { - handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new()) + ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { + handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new()) }; } macro_rules! send_channel_ready { - ($short_to_chan_info: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => { + ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{ $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg: $channel_ready_msg, }); // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to. - let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id())); + let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap(); + let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id())); assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()), "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels"); if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() { - let scid_insert = $short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id())); + let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id())); assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()), "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels"); } - } + }} } -macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked { - ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr, - $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr, - $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $channel_ready: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { { - let mut htlc_forwards = None; - - let chanmon_update: Option = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve - let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none(); - let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(); - let res = loop { - let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve - if !forwards.is_empty() { - htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or($channel_entry.get().outbound_scid_alias()), - $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards)); - } - - if chanmon_update.is_some() { - // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a channel_ready if there have been - // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be - // associated with a channel_ready would be the funding_created/funding_signed - // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send - // channel_ready until it's been updated, so we can't have a channel_ready and a - // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below). - assert!($channel_ready.is_none()); - // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a channel_ready or a - // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a channel_ready, we - // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below. - assert!($commitment_update.is_some()); - } - - if let Some(msg) = $channel_ready { - // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the channel_ready fly - // before it should be allowed to. - assert!(chanmon_update.is_none()); - send_channel_ready!($channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg); - } - if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs { - $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { - node_id: counterparty_node_id, - msg, +macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event { + ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => { + if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() { + { + let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady { + channel_id: $channel.channel_id(), + user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(), + counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(), }); } - - let funding_broadcastable: Option = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve - if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update { - // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed - // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish - // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When - // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we - // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug. - assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none()); - // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the - // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also - // have some commitment updates to send as well. - assert!($commitment_update.is_some()); - match $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { - ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {}, - e => { - // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical - // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to - // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane. - let mut order = $order; - if $raa.is_none() { - order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst; - } - break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true); - } - } - } - - macro_rules! handle_cs { () => { - if let Some(update) = $commitment_update { - $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: counterparty_node_id, - updates: update, - }); - } - } } - macro_rules! handle_raa { () => { - if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa { - $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { - node_id: counterparty_node_id, - msg: revoke_and_ack, - }); - } - } } - match $order { - RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { - handle_cs!(); - handle_raa!(); - }, - RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { - handle_raa!(); - handle_cs!(); - }, - } - if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable { - log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid()); - $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx); - } - break Ok(()); - }; - - if chanmon_update_is_none { - // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop - // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which - // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`. - assert!(res.is_ok()); - } - - (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) - } } -} - -macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration { - ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { { - let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res; - - let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id); - - if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards { - $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]); + $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted(); } - } } + } } -impl ChannelManager - where M::Target: chain::Watch, - T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, - F::Target: FeeEstimator, - L::Target: Logger, +impl ChannelManager +where + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + ES::Target: EntropySource, + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + R::Target: Router, + L::Target: Logger, { /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. /// @@ -1563,10 +1478,10 @@ impl ChannelMana /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting /// from after `params.latest_hash`. - pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self { + pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self { let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); - secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); - let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material(); + secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()); + let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material(); let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material); ChannelManager { default_configuration: config.clone(), @@ -1574,40 +1489,39 @@ impl ChannelMana fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est), chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, + router, best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block), - channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{ - by_id: HashMap::new(), - short_to_chan_info: HashMap::new(), - forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(), - claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), - pending_msg_events: Vec::new(), - }), outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()), pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), - pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), + pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(), + forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), + claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }), + pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), + short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()), - our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(), - our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()), + our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(), secp_ctx, inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key, - fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(), + fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(), - probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(), + probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(), highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0), - per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()), + per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()), pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()), persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(), - keys_manager, + entropy_source, + node_signer, + signer_provider, logger, } @@ -1626,7 +1540,7 @@ impl ChannelMana if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias outbound_scid_alias += 1; } else { - outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager); + outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source); } if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; @@ -1641,10 +1555,9 @@ impl ChannelMana /// /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events - /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0 - /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here. - /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise - /// ignored. + /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a + /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it + /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored. /// /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`. @@ -1663,42 +1576,40 @@ impl ChannelMana /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id - pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> { + pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> { if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 { return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) }); } + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard. + debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); + + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) + .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?; + + let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); let channel = { - let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); - match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) { - Some(peer_state) => { - let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(); - let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap(); - let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features; - let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration }; - match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, - their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, - self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias) - { - Ok(res) => res, - Err(e) => { - self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias); - return Err(e); - }, - } + let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(); + let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features; + let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration }; + match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key, + their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, + self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias) + { + Ok(res) => res, + Err(e) => { + self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias); + return Err(e); }, - None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }), } }; let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone()); - let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard. - debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); - let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id(); - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) { + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { if cfg!(fuzzing) { return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() }); @@ -1708,68 +1619,74 @@ impl ChannelMana }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); } } - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { + + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { node_id: their_network_key, msg: res, }); Ok(temporary_channel_id) } - fn list_channels_with_filter)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec { - let mut res = Vec::new(); + fn list_channels_with_filter::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec { + // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res` + // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without + // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside + // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is + // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for + // the same channel. + let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len()); { - let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len()); - for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) { - let balance = channel.get_available_balances(); - let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) = - channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(); - res.push(ChannelDetails { - channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(), - counterparty: ChannelCounterparty { - node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), - features: InitFeatures::empty(), - unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis, - forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(), - // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value - // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` - // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty). - // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the - // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`. - outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() { - Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None }, - outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(), - }, - funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(), - // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so - // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed. - channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None }, - short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(), - outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None }, - inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(), - channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(), - unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis, - balance_msat: balance.balance_msat, - inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat, - outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat, - next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, - user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(), - confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(), - force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(), - is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(), - is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(), - is_usable: channel.is_live(), - is_public: channel.should_announce(), - inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()), - inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(), - config: Some(channel.config()), - }); - } - } - let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); - for chan in res.iter_mut() { - if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) { - chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone(); + let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + for (channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) { + let balance = channel.get_available_balances(); + let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) = + channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(); + res.push(ChannelDetails { + channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(), + counterparty: ChannelCounterparty { + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + features: peer_state.latest_features.clone(), + unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis, + forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(), + // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value + // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` + // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty). + // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the + // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`. + outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() { + Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None }, + outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(), + }, + funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(), + // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so + // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed. + channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None }, + short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(), + outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None }, + inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(), + channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(), + unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis, + balance_msat: balance.balance_msat, + inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat, + outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat, + next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, + user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(), + confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(), + confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)), + force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(), + is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(), + is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(), + is_usable: channel.is_live(), + is_public: channel.should_announce(), + inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()), + inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(), + config: Some(channel.config()), + }); + } } } res @@ -1796,8 +1713,36 @@ impl ChannelMana self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live()) } + /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a + /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs. + /// + /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a + /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an + /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment. + /// + /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent + pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec { + self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter() + .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment { + PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => { + Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { + payment_hash: *payment_hash, + total_msat: *total_msat, + }) + }, + PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => { + Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash }) + }, + PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => { + Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash }) + }, + PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None + }) + .collect() + } + /// Helper function that issues the channel close events - fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel, closure_reason: ClosureReason) { + fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) { let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() { Some(transaction) => { @@ -1817,44 +1762,38 @@ impl ChannelMana let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>; let result: Result<(), _> = loop { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => { - if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){ - return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() }); - } - let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); - let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) { - Some(peer_state) => { - let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap(); - let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features; - chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)? - }, - None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }), - }; + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?; + + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => { + let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?; failed_htlcs = htlcs; // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary. if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update { - let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update); + let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update); let (result, is_permanent) = - handle_monitor_err!(self, update_res, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE); + handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE); if is_permanent { - remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry); + remove_channel!(self, chan_entry); break result; } } - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id: *counterparty_node_id, msg: shutdown_msg }); if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() { - let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry); + let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry); if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: channel_update }); } @@ -1862,13 +1801,14 @@ impl ChannelMana } break Ok(()); }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()}) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) } }; for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) { + let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8); let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id }; - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver); + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver); } let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id); @@ -1925,15 +1865,16 @@ impl ChannelMana log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len()); for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) { let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source; - let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_id }; - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver); + let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8); + let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id }; + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver); } if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option { // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to // ignore the result here. - let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update); + let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update); } } @@ -1941,28 +1882,28 @@ impl ChannelMana /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason. fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool) -> Result { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?; let mut chan = { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id { - return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()}); - } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) { if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg { self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() }); } else { self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed); } - remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan) + remove_channel!(self, chan) } else { - return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()}); + return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) }); } }; log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..])); self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast)); if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: update }); } @@ -1974,14 +1915,18 @@ impl ChannelMana let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) { Ok(counterparty_node_id) => { - self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push( - events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { - node_id: counterparty_node_id, - action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { - msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() } - }, - } - ); + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) { + let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push( + events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { + node_id: counterparty_node_id, + action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { + msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() } + }, + } + ); + } Ok(()) }, Err(e) => Err(e) @@ -2032,38 +1977,35 @@ impl ChannelMana return Err(ReceiveError { msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", err_code: 18, - err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec() + err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec() }) } // final_expiry_too_soon // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go. + // // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale). - if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 { + let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 { + let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12); + err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes()); + err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes()); return Err(ReceiveError { - err_code: 17, - err_data: Vec::new(), + err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data, msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", }); } if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat { return Err(ReceiveError { err_code: 19, - err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(), + err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(), msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", }); } let routing = match hop_data.format { - msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => { - return Err(ReceiveError { - err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3, - err_data: Vec::new(), - msg: "We require payment_secrets", - }); - }, msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => { return Err(ReceiveError { err_code: 0x4000|22, @@ -2116,7 +2058,8 @@ impl ChannelMana routing, payment_hash, incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret, - amt_to_forward: amt_msat, + incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat), + outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value, }) } @@ -2140,7 +2083,9 @@ impl ChannelMana return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6); } - let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes(); + let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh( + Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None + ).unwrap().secret_bytes(); if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 { //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other @@ -2158,7 +2103,8 @@ impl ChannelMana return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id: msg.channel_id, htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, - reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data), + reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec()) + .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None), })); } } @@ -2198,7 +2144,6 @@ impl ChannelMana }; let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format { - msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id, msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id, msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => { return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]); @@ -2212,34 +2157,51 @@ impl ChannelMana }, payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(), incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret, - amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward, + incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat), + outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value, }) } }; - if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info { + if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward. if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing { - if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop { - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let id_option = channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&short_channel_id).cloned(); - let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option { + if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop { + let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned(); + let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option { None => { // unknown_next_peer // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a - // phantom. - if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) { + // phantom or an intercept. + if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs && + fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) || + fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash) + { None } else { break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None)); } }, - Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()), + Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())), }; - let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt { - let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap(); + let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id); + if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { + break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None)); + } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) { + None => { + // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps + // have no consistency guarantees. + break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None)); + }, + Some(chan) => chan + }; if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels { // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if @@ -2262,18 +2224,21 @@ impl ChannelMana if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt)); } - if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum + if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt)); } - if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *amt_to_forward, *outgoing_cltv_value) { + if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) { break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt)); } chan_update_opt } else { - if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry + if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { + // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not + // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update + // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure. break Some(( "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", - 0x1000 | 13, None, + 0x2000 | 2, None, )); } None @@ -2319,6 +2284,12 @@ impl ChannelMana (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail"); msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail"); chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail"); + } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 { + // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but + // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot + // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure" + // instead. + code = 0x2000 | 2; } return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]); } @@ -2332,8 +2303,10 @@ impl ChannelMana /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event. /// - /// May be called with channel_state already locked! - fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result { + /// Note that in `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the `peer_state` + /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the + /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped. + fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<::Signer>) -> Result { if !chan.should_announce() { return Err(LightningError { err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(), @@ -2351,8 +2324,11 @@ impl ChannelMana /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id), /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel. - /// May be called with channel_state already locked! - fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result { + /// + /// Note that through `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the + /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been + /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped. + fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<::Signer>) -> Result { log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id())); let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) { None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}), @@ -2361,9 +2337,9 @@ impl ChannelMana self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan) } - fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel) -> Result { + fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<::Signer>) -> Result { log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id())); - let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..]; + let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..]; let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { chain_hash: self.genesis_hash, @@ -2377,9 +2353,11 @@ impl ChannelMana fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(), excess_data: Vec::new(), }; - - let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]); - let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key); + // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`. + // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever + // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding + // channel. + let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap(); Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate { signature: sig, @@ -2388,61 +2366,34 @@ impl ChannelMana } // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly - pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec, payment_params: &Option, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option) -> Result<(), APIError> { + pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec, payment_params: &Option, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> { log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id); - let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); - let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); + let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(); let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted"); let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv) - .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?; + .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?; let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?; if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) { - return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"}); + return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"}); } let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash); let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let err: Result<(), _> = loop { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - - let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); - let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id); - if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry { - if !payment.get().is_retryable() { - return Err(APIError::RouteError { - err: "Payment already completed" - }); - } - } - - let id = match channel_lock.short_to_chan_info.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) { + let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) { None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}), - Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(), + Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()), }; - macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment { - () => { - let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { - session_privs: HashSet::new(), - pending_amt_msat: 0, - pending_fee_msat: Some(0), - payment_hash: *payment_hash, - payment_secret: *payment_secret, - starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), - total_msat: total_value, - }); - assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path)); - } - } - - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!" })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) { match { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey { - return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"}); - } if !chan.get().is_live() { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()}); } @@ -2455,33 +2406,31 @@ impl ChannelMana payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(), payment_params: payment_params.clone(), }, onion_packet, &self.logger), - channel_state, chan) + chan) } { Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => { - let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update); + let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update); let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id(); match (update_err, - handle_monitor_err!(self, update_err, channel_state, chan, + handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)) { (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e), - (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => { - insert_outbound_payment!(); - }, + (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {}, (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => { - // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs) - // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating - // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that - // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the - // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below. - insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above. - return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed); + // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function + // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor + // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error + // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, + // which we do in the send_payment check for + // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below. + return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress); }, _ => unreachable!(), } log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id)); - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add], @@ -2493,9 +2442,15 @@ impl ChannelMana }, }); }, - None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); }, + None => { }, } - } else { unreachable!(); } + } else { + // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the + // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the + // `channel_by_id` map. + // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps. + return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}); + } return Ok(()); }; @@ -2509,215 +2464,120 @@ impl ChannelMana /// Sends a payment along a given route. /// - /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop + /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`] /// fields for more info. /// - /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative - /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided - /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as - /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own - /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of - /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself. + /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via + /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]). + /// + /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments /// - /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed. + /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this + /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment + /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an + /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a + /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`]. + /// + /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own + /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you + /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should + /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the + /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes. + /// + /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash + /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're + /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See + /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information. + /// + /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`] /// /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see - /// PaymentSendFailure for more info. + /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info. /// /// In general, a path may raise: - /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee, + /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee, /// node public key) is specified. - /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates + /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update /// failure). - /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the + /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the /// relevant updates. /// /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a /// different route unless you intend to pay twice! /// - /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate - /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For - /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route - /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided - /// payment_secret. - /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature - /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route, - /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set. - pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option) -> Result { - self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None) - } - - fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option, keysend_preimage: Option, payment_id: Option, recv_value_msat: Option) -> Result { - if route.paths.len() < 1 { - return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"})); - } - if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 { - return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()})); - } - let mut total_value = 0; - let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id(); - let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len()); - let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) }; - 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() { - if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 { - path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"})); - continue 'path_check; - } - for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() { - if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id { - path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"})); - continue 'path_check; - } - } - total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat; - path_errs.push(Ok(())); - } - if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) { - return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs)); - } - if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat { - debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value); - total_value = amt_msat; - } - - let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1; - let mut results = Vec::new(); - for path in route.paths.iter() { - results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage)); - } - let mut has_ok = false; - let mut has_err = false; - let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0; - let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0; - for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) { - if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; } - if res.is_err() { has_err = true; } - if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res { - // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a - // PartialFailure. - has_err = true; - has_ok = true; - } else if res.is_err() { - pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat; - max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta); - } - } - if has_err && has_ok { - Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure { - results, - payment_id, - failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 { - if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params { - Some(RouteParameters { - payment_params: payment_params.clone(), - final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent, - final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta, - }) - } else { None } - } else { None }, - }) - } else if has_err { - // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into - // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all. - debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none()); - Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect())) - } else { - Ok(payment_id) - } - } - - /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`]. + /// # A caution on `payment_secret` /// - /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see - /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the - /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment - /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if - /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`]. + /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to + /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) + /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, + /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a + /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`. /// - /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] - /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] - pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> { - const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10; - for path in route.paths.iter() { - if path.len() == 0 { - return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { - err: "length-0 path in route".to_string() - })) - } - } + /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret + /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the + /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set. + /// + /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent + /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed + /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events + /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress + pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> { + let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + self.pending_outbound_payments + .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, + |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| + self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)) + } + + /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on + /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`. + pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> { + let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + self.pending_outbound_payments + .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, + &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), + &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger, + |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| + self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)) + } - let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = { - let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); - if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) { - match payment { - PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { - total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, .. - } => { - let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum(); - if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 { - return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { - err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string() - })) - } - (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret) - }, - PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => { - return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { - err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string() - })) - }, - PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => { - return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { - err: "Payment already completed".to_owned() - })); - }, - PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => { - return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { - err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned() - })); - }, - } - } else { - return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { - err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)), - })) - } - }; - return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ()) + #[cfg(test)] + fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option, keysend_preimage: Option, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> { + let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, + |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| + self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)) + } + + #[cfg(test)] + pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result, PaymentSendFailure> { + let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height) } - /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur. + + /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a + /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before + /// retries are exhausted. /// - /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id` - /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated, - /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining - /// pending HTLCs for this payment. + /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon + /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment. /// /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to /// determine the ultimate status of a payment. /// - /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment + /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this + /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated. + /// /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - - let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); - if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) { - if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() { - if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 { - self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed { - payment_id, - payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"), - }); - payment.remove(); - } - } - } + self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events); } /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have @@ -2726,7 +2586,8 @@ impl ChannelMana /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will /// never reach the recipient. /// - /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function. + /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function + /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key. /// /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage. @@ -2734,72 +2595,74 @@ impl ChannelMana /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path. /// /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment - pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> { - let preimage = match payment_preimage { - Some(p) => p, - None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()), - }; - let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner()); - match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) { - Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)), - Err(e) => Err(e) - } + pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result { + let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route( + route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, + best_block_height, + |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| + self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)) + } + + /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route + /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`. + /// + /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous + /// payments. + /// + /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend + pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result { + let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id, + retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), + || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, + &self.logger, + |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| + self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)) } /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows /// us to easily discern them from real payments. pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> { - let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); - - let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id); - - if hops.len() < 2 { - return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { - err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string() - })) - } - - let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }; - - match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, Some(payment_id), None) { - Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)), - Err(e) => Err(e) - } + let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, + |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| + self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)) } /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a /// payment probe. + #[cfg(test)] pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool { - let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id); - target_payment_hash == *payment_hash - } - - /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`]. - fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash { - let mut preimage = [0u8; 64]; - preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret); - preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0); - PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner()) + outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret) } /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel. - fn funding_transaction_generated_intern, &Transaction) -> Result>( - &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput + fn funding_transaction_generated_intern::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result>( + &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput ) -> Result<(), APIError> { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?; + + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; let (chan, msg) = { - let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) { - Some(mut chan) => { - let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?; - - (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger) - .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e { - MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None) - } else { unreachable!(); }) - , chan) - }, - None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) }, + let (res, chan) = { + match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) { + Some(mut chan) => { + let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?; + + (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger) + .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e { + MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None) + } else { unreachable!(); }) + , chan) + }, + None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) }, + } }; match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) { Ok(funding_msg) => { @@ -2811,12 +2674,11 @@ impl ChannelMana } }; - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg, }); - match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) { + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?"); }, @@ -2883,7 +2745,6 @@ impl ChannelMana // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom. - // TODO: updated if/when https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-bitcoin/pull/994 landed and rust-bitcoin bumped. if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 { return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned() @@ -2951,39 +2812,138 @@ impl ChannelMana let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop( &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, ); - { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - for channel_id in channel_ids { - let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id) - .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { - err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)), - })? - .get_counterparty_node_id(); - if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { - err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(), - }); - } + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + for channel_id in channel_ids { + if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) { + return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { + err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id), + }); } - for channel_id in channel_ids { - let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap(); - if !channel.update_config(config) { - continue; - } - if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg }); - } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { - node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), - msg, - }); - } + } + for channel_id in channel_ids { + let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap(); + if !channel.update_config(config) { + continue; + } + if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg }); + } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + msg, + }); } } Ok(()) } + /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided + /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. + /// + /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time + /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity. + /// + /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use + /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the + /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an + /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or + /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event. + /// + /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop + /// you from forwarding more than you received. + /// + /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed + /// backwards. + /// + /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs + /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted + // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take + // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id` + pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + + let next_hop_scid = { + let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) { + Some(chan) => { + if !chan.is_usable() { + return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { + err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id)) + }) + } + chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) + }, + None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { + err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id) + }) + } + }; + + let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id) + .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError { + err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0)) + })?; + + let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing { + PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => { + PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid } + }, + _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted + }; + let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo { + outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info + }; + + let mut per_source_pending_forward = [( + payment.prev_short_channel_id, + payment.prev_funding_outpoint, + payment.prev_user_channel_id, + vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)] + )]; + self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward); + Ok(()) + } + + /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to + /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`]. + /// + /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed + /// backwards. + /// + /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted + pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + + let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id) + .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError { + err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0)) + })?; + + if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing { + let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { + short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id, + outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint, + htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id, + incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret, + phantom_shared_secret: None, + }); + + let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10); + let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id }; + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination); + } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted + + Ok(()) + } + /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay. /// /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event. @@ -2993,95 +2953,97 @@ impl ChannelMana let mut new_events = Vec::new(); let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new(); - let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new(); - let mut handle_errors = Vec::new(); + let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new(); { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; + let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new(); + mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap()); - for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() { + for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs { if short_chan_id != 0 { - let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&short_chan_id) { - Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(), - None => { + macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found { + () => { for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) { match forward_info { - HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo { - routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, - prev_funding_outpoint } => { - macro_rules! failure_handler { - ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => { - log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); - - let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { - short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, - outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, - htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, - incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, - phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss, - }); - - let reason = if $next_hop_unknown { - HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id } - } else { - HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash } - }; - - failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash, - HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }, - reason - )); - continue; - } + HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo { + prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, + forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo { + routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, + outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _ + } + }) => { + macro_rules! failure_handler { + ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => { + log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); + + let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { + short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, + outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, + htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, + incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, + phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss, + }); + + let reason = if $next_hop_unknown { + HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id } + } else { + HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash } + }; + + failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash, + HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data), + reason + )); + continue; } - macro_rules! fail_forward { - ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => { - { - failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true); - } + } + macro_rules! fail_forward { + ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => { + { + failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true); } } - macro_rules! failed_payment { - ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => { - { - failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false); - } + } + macro_rules! failed_payment { + ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => { + { + failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false); } } - if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing { - let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode); - if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) { - let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes(); - let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) { - Ok(res) => res, - Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => { - let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner(); - // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an - // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as - // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256 - // of the onion. - failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None); - }, - Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => { - failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret)); - }, - }; - match next_hop { - onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => { - match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) { - Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])), - Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) - } - }, - _ => panic!(), - } - } else { - fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None); + } + if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing { + let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode); + if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) { + let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes(); + let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) { + Ok(res) => res, + Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => { + let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner(); + // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an + // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as + // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256 + // of the onion. + failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None); + }, + Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => { + failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret)); + }, + }; + match next_hop { + onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => { + match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) { + Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])), + Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) + } + }, + _ => panic!(), } } else { fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None); } - }, + } else { + fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None); + } + }, HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => { // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is @@ -3090,30 +3052,51 @@ impl ChannelMana } } } + } + } + let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) { + Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()), + None => { + forwarding_channel_not_found!(); continue; } }; - if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) { - let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new(); - let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new(); - for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) { - match forward_info { - HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo { - routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { - onion_packet, .. - }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, - prev_funding_outpoint } => { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id); - let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { - short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, - outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, - htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, - incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, - // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive. - phantom_shared_secret: None, - }); - match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) { - Err(e) => { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id); + if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { + forwarding_channel_not_found!(); + continue; + } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) { + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { + forwarding_channel_not_found!(); + continue; + }, + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { + for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) { + match forward_info { + HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo { + prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _, + forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo { + incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, + routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _, + }, + }) => { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id); + let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { + short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, + outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, + htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, + incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, + // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive. + phantom_shared_secret: None, + }); + if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat, + payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), + onion_packet, &self.logger) + { if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e { log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg); } else { @@ -3121,112 +3104,44 @@ impl ChannelMana } let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get()); failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash, - HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data }, + HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data), HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id } )); continue; - }, - Ok(update_add) => { - match update_add { - Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); }, - None => { - // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote - // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel - // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and - // commitment_signed messages when we can. - // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live() - // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through - // this channel currently :/. - } - } } - } - }, - HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => { - panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward"); - }, - HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id); - match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) { - Err(e) => { + }, + HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => { + panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward"); + }, + HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id); + if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc( + htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger + ) { if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e { log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg); } else { - panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met"); + panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met"); } // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem. continue; - }, - Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); }, - Ok(None) => { - // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote - // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment - // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle - // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed - // messages when we can. - // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail - // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our - // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem. - } - } - }, - } - } - - if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() { - let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) { - Ok(res) => res, - Err(e) => { - // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case - // close channel and then send error message to peer. - let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(); - let err: Result<(), _> = match e { - ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => { - panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met"); } - ChannelError::Close(msg) => { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg); - let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan); - // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us. - Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok())) - }, - }; - handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err)); - continue; - } - }; - match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { - ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {}, - e => { - handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))); - continue; + }, } } - log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}", - add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), - updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { - update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs, - update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs, - update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fee: None, - commitment_signed: commitment_msg, - }, - }); } - } else { - unreachable!(); } } else { for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) { match forward_info { - HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo { - routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, - prev_funding_outpoint } => { + HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo { + prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, + forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo { + routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, .. + } + }) => { let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing { PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => { let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone()); @@ -3246,18 +3161,18 @@ impl ChannelMana incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, }, - value: amt_to_forward, + value: outgoing_amt_msat, timer_ticks: 0, - total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward }, + total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat }, cltv_expiry, onion_payload, }; macro_rules! fail_htlc { ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => { - let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec(); + let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec(); htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice( - &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()), + &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(), ); failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id, @@ -3266,22 +3181,33 @@ impl ChannelMana incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, }), payment_hash, - HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }, + HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data), HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash }, )); } } + let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret; + let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey; + if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() { + receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode) + .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient"); + } macro_rules! check_total_value { ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{ - let mut payment_received_generated = false; + let mut payment_claimable_generated = false; let purpose = || { events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: $payment_preimage, payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret, } }; - let (_, htlcs) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) + let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap(); + if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) { + fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash); + continue + } + let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new())); if htlcs.len() == 1 { if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload { @@ -3310,20 +3236,24 @@ impl ChannelMana log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat); fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash); } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat { + let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(); htlcs.push(claimable_htlc); - new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived { + new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable { + receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id), payment_hash, purpose: purpose(), amount_msat: total_value, + via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id), + via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id), }); - payment_received_generated = true; + payment_claimable_generated = true; } else { // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total // payment value yet, wait until we receive more // MPP parts. htlcs.push(claimable_htlc); } - payment_received_generated + payment_claimable_generated }} } @@ -3339,24 +3269,43 @@ impl ChannelMana match claimable_htlc.onion_payload { OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => { let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap(); - let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) { - Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage, + let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) { + Ok(result) => result, Err(()) => { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash); continue } }; + if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta { + let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64; + if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})", + log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height); + fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash); + continue; + } + } check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage); }, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => { - match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) { + let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap(); + if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) { + fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash); + continue + } + match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) { hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage); e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc])); - new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived { + let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(); + new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable { + receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id), payment_hash, - amount_msat: amt_to_forward, + amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat, purpose, + via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id), + via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id), }); }, hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { @@ -3382,8 +3331,8 @@ impl ChannelMana log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap()); fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash); } else { - let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage); - if payment_received_generated { + let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage); + if payment_claimable_generated { inbound_payment.remove_entry(); } } @@ -3399,14 +3348,23 @@ impl ChannelMana } } + let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(), + || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, + &self.pending_events, &self.logger, + |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| + self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)); + for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) { - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason, destination); + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination); } self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives); - for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) { - let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id); - } + // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we + // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's + // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the + // network stack. + self.check_free_holding_cells(); if new_events.is_empty() { return } let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); @@ -3431,7 +3389,7 @@ impl ChannelMana BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => { // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the // monitor updating completing. - let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update); + let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update); }, } } @@ -3444,59 +3402,24 @@ impl ChannelMana self.process_background_events(); } - fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_chan_info: &mut HashMap, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) { - if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); } + fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption { + if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; } // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() { log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate); - return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); + return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; } if !chan.is_live() { log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).", log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate); - return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); + return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; } log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate); - let mut retain_channel = true; - let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) { - Ok(res) => Ok(res), - Err(e) => { - let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, chan_id); - if drop { retain_channel = false; } - Err(res) - } - }; - let ret_err = match res { - Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => { - match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { - ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), - updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { - update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fee: Some(update_fee), - commitment_signed, - }, - }); - Ok(()) - }, - e => { - let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY); - if drop { retain_channel = false; } - res - } - } - }, - Ok(None) => Ok(()), - Err(e) => Err(e), - }; - (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err) + chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger); + NotifyOption::DoPersist } #[cfg(fuzzing)] @@ -3510,20 +3433,14 @@ impl ChannelMana let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal); - let mut handle_errors = Vec::new(); - { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; - let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info; - channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| { - let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate); + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() { + let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate); if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; } - if err.is_err() { - handle_errors.push(err); - } - retain_channel - }); + } } should_persist @@ -3539,6 +3456,7 @@ impl ChannelMana /// the channel. /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs /// with the current `ChannelConfig`. + /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels. /// /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate /// estimate fetches. @@ -3549,101 +3467,142 @@ impl ChannelMana let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal); - let mut handle_errors = Vec::new(); + let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new(); let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new(); + let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new(); { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; - let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info; - channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| { - let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id(); - let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate); - if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; } - if err.is_err() { - handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id)); - } - if !retain_channel { return false; } + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events; + let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id; + peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| { + let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate); + if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; } + + if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() { + let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id); + handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id)); + if needs_close { return false; } + } + + match chan.channel_update_status() { + ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged), + ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged), + ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled), + ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled), + ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => { + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; + chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled); + }, + ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => { + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; + chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled); + }, + _ => {}, + } - if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() { - let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, chan_id); - handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id())); - if needs_close { return false; } + chan.maybe_expire_prev_config(); + + true + }); + if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) { + pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id); } + } + } - match chan.channel_update_status() { - ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged), - ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged), - ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled), - ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled), - ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => { - if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { - msg: update - }); - } - should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; - chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled); - }, - ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => { - if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { - msg: update - }); + // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the + // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels + // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed), + // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately. + // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are + // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the + // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible. + if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 { + let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap(); + for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal { + match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => { + // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still + // have no channels to the peer. + let remove_entry = { + let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap(); + peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) + }; + if remove_entry { + entry.remove_entry(); } - should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; - chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled); }, - _ => {}, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ } } + } + } - chan.maybe_expire_prev_config(); - - true - }); - - channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| { - if htlcs.is_empty() { - // This should be unreachable - debug_assert!(false); + self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| { + if htlcs.is_empty() { + // This should be unreachable + debug_assert!(false); + return false; + } + if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload { + // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat). + // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here. + if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) { + return true; + } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| { + htlc.timer_ticks += 1; + return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS + }) { + timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash))); return false; } - if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload { - // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat). - // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here. - if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) { - return true; - } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| { - htlc.timer_ticks += 1; - return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS - }) { - timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone()))); - return false; - } - } - true - }); - } + } + true + }); for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) { + let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone()); + let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23); let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 }; - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone()), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() }, receiver ); + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver); } for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) { let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id); } + + self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events); + + // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a + // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task + // than block the message queueing pipeline. + if self.check_free_holding_cells() { + should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; + } + should_persist }); } /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect - /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources + /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it). /// /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a - /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment + /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time. /// /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling @@ -3651,20 +3610,36 @@ impl ChannelMana /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed. pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) { + self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, &FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails); + } + + /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the + /// reason for the failure. + /// + /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes. + pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: &FailureCode) { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); - let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash); + let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash); if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source { for htlc in sources.drain(..) { - if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); } - let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec(); - htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array( - self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())); - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), - HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash, - HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }, - HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash }); + let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc); + let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop); + let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash }; + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver); + } + } + } + + /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`]. + fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: &FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason { + match failure_code { + FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16), + FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16), + FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => { + let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec(); + htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes()); + HTLCFailReason::reason(*failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data) } } } @@ -3674,7 +3649,7 @@ impl ChannelMana /// /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures /// forwarding - fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel) -> (u16, Vec) { + fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec) { // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use @@ -3694,7 +3669,7 @@ impl ChannelMana /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code /// that we want to return and a channel. - fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel) -> (u16, Vec) { + fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec) { debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000); if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) { let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6)); @@ -3723,28 +3698,43 @@ impl ChannelMana &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey ) { - for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) { - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = - match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) { + let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => { self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get()) }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) - }; + } + } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) } + }; + for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) { + let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone()); let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id }; - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state, htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data }, receiver); + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver); } } /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us. - /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here. - /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes - /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may - /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to - /// still-available channels. - fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) { + /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available. + fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) { + #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))] + { + // Ensure that the peer state channel storage lock is not held when calling this + // function. + // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for + // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling + // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock aquired would. + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + for (_, peer) in per_peer_state.iter() { + debug_assert!(peer.try_lock().is_ok()); + } + } + //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs @@ -3754,168 +3744,27 @@ impl ChannelMana // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more. match source { - HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => { - let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32]; - session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]); - let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); - let mut all_paths_failed = false; - let mut full_failure_ev = None; - if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) { - if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); - return; - } - if payment.get().is_fulfilled() { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); - return; - } - if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 { - all_paths_failed = true; - if payment.get().abandoned() { - full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed { - payment_id, - payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"), - }); - payment.remove(); - } - } - } else { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); - return; - } - mem::drop(channel_state_lock); - let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params { - let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path"); - Some(RouteParameters { - payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(), - final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat, - final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta, - }) - } else { None }; - log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); - - let path_failure = match &onion_error { - &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => { -#[cfg(test)] - let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone()); -#[cfg(not(test))] - let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone()); - - if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) { - if !payment_retryable { - events::Event::ProbeSuccessful { - payment_id, - payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(), - path: path.clone(), - } - } else { - events::Event::ProbeFailed { - payment_id: payment_id, - payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(), - path: path.clone(), - short_channel_id, - } - } - } else { - // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in - // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our - // next-hop is needlessly blaming us! - if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id { - retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid)); - } - events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { - payment_id: Some(payment_id), - payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(), - payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable, - network_update, - all_paths_failed, - path: path.clone(), - short_channel_id, - retry, - #[cfg(test)] - error_code: onion_error_code, - #[cfg(test)] - error_data: onion_error_data - } - } - }, - &HTLCFailReason::Reason { -#[cfg(test)] - ref failure_code, -#[cfg(test)] - ref data, - .. } => { - // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop - // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary - // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route - // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via - // ChannelDetails. - // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the - // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway. - let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id; - retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid)); - - if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) { - events::Event::ProbeFailed { - payment_id: payment_id, - payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(), - path: path.clone(), - short_channel_id: Some(scid), - } - } else { - events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { - payment_id: Some(payment_id), - payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(), - payment_failed_permanently: false, - network_update: None, - all_paths_failed, - path: path.clone(), - short_channel_id: Some(scid), - retry, -#[cfg(test)] - error_code: Some(*failure_code), -#[cfg(test)] - error_data: Some(data.clone()), - } - } - } - }; - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - pending_events.push(path_failure); - if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); } + HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => { + self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx, &self.pending_events, &self.logger); }, - HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, outpoint }) => { - let err_packet = match onion_error { - HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code); - if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret { - let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode(); - let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet); - onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..]) - } else { - let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode(); - onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet) - } - }, - HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); - onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data) - } - }; + HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error); + let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret); let mut forward_event = None; - if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() { + let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap(); + if forward_htlcs.is_empty() { forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS)); } - match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) { + match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { - entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }); + entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }); }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { - entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet })); + entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet })); } } - mem::drop(channel_state_lock); + mem::drop(forward_htlcs); let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); if let Some(time) = forward_event { pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { @@ -3924,13 +3773,13 @@ impl ChannelMana } pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(), - failed_next_destination: destination + failed_next_destination: destination, }); }, } } - /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any + /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment. /// /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You @@ -3938,160 +3787,199 @@ impl ChannelMana /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called. /// /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or - /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived` + /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable` /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment. /// - /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived + /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash - /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) { let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()); let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); - let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash); - if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source { - assert!(!sources.is_empty()); - - // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each - // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock). - // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update - // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement. - // - // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a - // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if - // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where - // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to - // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth - // it. - let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0; - let mut expected_amt_msat = None; - let mut valid_mpp = true; - for htlc in sources.iter() { - if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_chan_info.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) { - valid_mpp = false; - break; + let mut sources = { + let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap(); + if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) { + let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey; + for htlc in sources.iter() { + if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() { + let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode) + .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient"); + receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey; + break; + } } - if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) { - log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!"); - debug_assert!(false); + + let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash, + ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(), + payment_purpose, receiver_node_id, + }); + if dup_purpose.is_some() { + debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever"); + log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug", + log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); + } + sources + } else { return; } + }; + debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty()); + + // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable + // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while + // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes), + // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to + // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment. + // + // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated + // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain. + // + // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a + // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if + // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where + // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to + // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth + // it. + let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0; + let mut expected_amt_msat = None; + let mut valid_mpp = true; + let mut errs = Vec::new(); + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + for htlc in sources.iter() { + let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) { + Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()), + None => { valid_mpp = false; break; } - expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat); - if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload { - // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check - // that there's one payment here and move on. - if sources.len() != 1 { - log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!"); - debug_assert!(false); - valid_mpp = false; - break; - } - } + }; - claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value; + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id); + if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { + valid_mpp = false; + break; } - if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() { - log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!"); - return; + + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + + if peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id).is_none() { + valid_mpp = false; + break; } - if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() { - log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.", - expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat); - return; + + if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) { + log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!"); + debug_assert!(false); + valid_mpp = false; + break; } - let mut errs = Vec::new(); - let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false; - for htlc in sources.drain(..) { - if !valid_mpp { - if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); } - let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec(); - htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array( - self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())); - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), - HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash, - HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }, - HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash } ); - } else { - match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) { - ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => { - if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action { - // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the - // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain). - log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err); - claimed_any_htlcs = true; - } else { errs.push((pk, err)); } - }, - ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"), - ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => { - // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely - // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer - // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set - // `claimed_any_htlcs`. - }, - ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true, - } + expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat); + if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload { + // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check + // that there's one payment here and move on. + if sources.len() != 1 { + log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!"); + debug_assert!(false); + valid_mpp = false; + break; } } - if claimed_any_htlcs { - self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed { - payment_hash, - purpose: payment_purpose, - amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat, - }); + claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value; + } + mem::drop(per_peer_state); + if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() { + self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash); + log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!"); + return; + } + if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() { + self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash); + log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.", + expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat); + return; + } + if valid_mpp { + for htlc in sources.drain(..) { + if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop( + htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage, + |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })) + { + if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action { + // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the + // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain). + log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err); + } else { errs.push((pk, err)); } + } } - - // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors - // which were generated. - channel_state.take(); - - for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) { - let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err); - let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id); + } + if !valid_mpp { + for htlc in sources.drain(..) { + let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec(); + htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes()); + let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop); + let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data); + let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }; + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver); } + self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash); + } + + // Now we can handle any errors which were generated. + for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) { + let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err); + let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id); } } - fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop { + fn claim_funds_from_hop) -> Option>(&self, + prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc) + -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> { //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay! - let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock; - let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) { - Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(), - None => { - return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed - } + + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(); + + let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) { + Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()), + None => None }; - if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) { + let mut peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map( + |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map( + |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap() + ) + ).unwrap_or(None); + + if let Some(hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan)) = peer_state_opt.as_mut().map(|peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id)) + { + let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(); match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) { Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => { if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option { - match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) { ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {}, e => { log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug }, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}", payment_preimage, e); - return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail( - chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), - handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(), - Some(htlc_value_msat) - ); + let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(); + mem::drop(peer_state_opt); + mem::drop(per_peer_state); + self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat))); + return Err((counterparty_node_id, err)); } } if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs { log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), + peer_state_opt.as_mut().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { + node_id: counterparty_node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg], @@ -4102,190 +3990,224 @@ impl ChannelMana } }); } - return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat); + mem::drop(peer_state_opt); + mem::drop(per_peer_state); + self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat))); + Ok(()) } else { - return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim; + Ok(()) } }, Err((e, monitor_update)) => { - match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) { ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {}, e => { + // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update + // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream + // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same update and try + // again on restart. log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info }, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}", payment_preimage, e); }, } - let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(); - let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id); + let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id); if drop { chan.remove_entry(); } - return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None); + mem::drop(peer_state_opt); + mem::drop(per_peer_state); + self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None)); + Err((counterparty_node_id, res)) }, } - } else { unreachable!(); } - } - - fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec) { - let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - for source in sources.drain(..) { - if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source { - let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32]; - session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]); - if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) { - assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled()); - if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) { - pending_events.push( - events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { - payment_id, - payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(), - path, - } - ); - } - if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 { - payment.remove(); - } - } + } else { + let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate { + update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID, + updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { + payment_preimage, + }], + }; + // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after + // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link. + let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update); + if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed { + // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update + // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream + // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try + // again on restart. + log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}", + payment_preimage, update_res); } + mem::drop(peer_state_opt); + mem::drop(per_peer_state); + // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a + // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the + // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are + // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in + // `PaymentForwarded`). + self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None)); + Ok(()) } } - fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) { + fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec) { + self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events); + } + + fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) { match source { HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => { - mem::drop(channel_state_lock); - let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32]; - session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]); - let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); - if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) { - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() { - let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()); - let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat(); - pending_events.push( - events::Event::PaymentSent { - payment_id: Some(payment_id), - payment_preimage, - payment_hash, - fee_paid_msat, - } - ); - payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled(); - } - - if from_onchain { - // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain. - // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early, - // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on - // restart. - // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments - // irrevocably fulfilled. - if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) { - let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner())); - pending_events.push( - events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { - payment_id, - payment_hash, - path, - } - ); - } - - if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 { - payment.remove(); - } - } - } else { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0)); - } + self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger); }, HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => { let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint; - let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage); - let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true }; - let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res { - ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt, - ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt), - _ => None, - }; - if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res { - let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate { - update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID, - updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { - payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(), - }], - }; - // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after - // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the - // event being update_fulfill_htlc). - let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update); - if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed { - // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update - // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream - // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try - // again on restart. - log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}", - payment_preimage, update_res); - } - // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this - // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing - // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above - // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this - // can happen. - } - mem::drop(channel_state_lock); - if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res { + let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage, + |htlc_claim_value_msat| { + if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat { + let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat { + Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value) + } else { None }; + + let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()); + let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id); + + Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded { + fee_earned_msat, + claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain, + prev_channel_id, + next_channel_id, + }}) + } else { None } + }); + if let Err((pk, err)) = res { let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err); let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk); } + }, + } + } + + /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager + pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey { + self.our_network_pubkey.clone() + } - if claimed_htlc { - if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat { - let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat { - Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value) - } else { None }; - - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()); - let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id); - - pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded { - fee_earned_msat, - claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain, - prev_channel_id, - next_channel_id, + fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions>(&self, actions: I) { + for action in actions.into_iter() { + match action { + MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => { + let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash); + if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment { + self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed { + payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id), }); } - } - }, + }, + MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => { + self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event); + }, + } } } - /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager - pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey { - self.our_network_pubkey.clone() + /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor + /// update completion. + fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec, + channel: &mut Channel<::Signer>, raa: Option, + commitment_update: Option, order: RAACommitmentOrder, + pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option, + channel_ready: Option, announcement_sigs: Option) + -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> { + let mut htlc_forwards = None; + + let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id(); + if !pending_forwards.is_empty() { + htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()), + channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards)); + } + + if let Some(msg) = channel_ready { + send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg); + } + if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { + node_id: counterparty_node_id, + msg, + }); + } + + emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel); + + macro_rules! handle_cs { () => { + if let Some(update) = commitment_update { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { + node_id: counterparty_node_id, + updates: update, + }); + } + } } + macro_rules! handle_raa { () => { + if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { + node_id: counterparty_node_id, + msg: revoke_and_ack, + }); + } + } } + match order { + RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { + handle_cs!(); + handle_raa!(); + }, + RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { + handle_raa!(); + handle_cs!(); + }, + } + + if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable { + log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid()); + self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx); + } + + htlc_forwards } - fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) { + fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - let chan_restoration_res; + let htlc_forwards; let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return, + let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id { + Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(), + None => { + // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the + // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed. + let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap(); + match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) { + Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(), + None => return, + } + } + }; + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let mut peer_state_lock; + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id); + if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return } + peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let mut channel = { + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){ + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return, + } }; if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id { return; } - let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(); - let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()); + let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()); let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() { // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a @@ -4299,18 +4221,20 @@ impl ChannelMana }) } else { None } } else { None }; - chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs); + htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs); if let Some(upd) = channel_update { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd); + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd); } (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id) }; - post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res); + if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards { + self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]); + } self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims); for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) { let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() }; - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver); + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver); } } @@ -4330,7 +4254,7 @@ impl ChannelMana /// /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id - pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> { + pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> { self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id) } @@ -4352,23 +4276,23 @@ impl ChannelMana /// /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id - pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> { + pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> { self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id) } - fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> { + fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => { if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() { return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() }); } - if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() { - return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() }); - } if accept_0conf { channel.get_mut().set_0conf(); } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() { @@ -4378,24 +4302,24 @@ impl ChannelMana msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), } } }; - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event); - let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, channel); + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event); + let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel); return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() }); } - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id), }); } hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { - return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() }); + return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }); } } Ok(()) } - fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())); } @@ -4404,9 +4328,21 @@ impl ChannelMana return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())); } + let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16]; + random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]); + let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes); + let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(); - let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, - counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) + })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, + counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias) { Err(e) => { @@ -4415,21 +4351,19 @@ impl ChannelMana }, Ok(res) => res }; - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) { + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias); - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())) + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())) }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels { if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())); } - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), - msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0), + msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id), }); } else { let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); @@ -4450,19 +4384,22 @@ impl ChannelMana Ok(()) } - fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let (value, output_script, user_id) = { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id) + })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id)); - } - try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan); + try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan); (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id()) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)) } }; let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); @@ -4477,21 +4414,24 @@ impl ChannelMana } fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id) + })?; let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = { let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap(); - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id)); - } - (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove()) + (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove()) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)) } }; - // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state + // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the peer_state // lock before watch_channel match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) { ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {}, @@ -4512,13 +4452,16 @@ impl ChannelMana // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready // until we have persisted our monitor. - chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()); + chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()); channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now }, } - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) { + // It's safe to unwrap as we've held the `per_peer_state` read lock since checking that the + // peer exists, despite the inner PeerState potentially having no channels after removing + // the channel above. + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id)) }, @@ -4534,12 +4477,12 @@ impl ChannelMana i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id()); } } - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg: funding_msg, }); if let Some(msg) = channel_ready { - send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg); + send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg); } e.insert(chan); } @@ -4550,21 +4493,25 @@ impl ChannelMana fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let funding_tx = { let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap(); - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) + })?; + + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } - let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) { + let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) { Ok(update) => update, - Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan), + Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan), }; match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) { ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {}, e => { - let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED); + let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED); if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res { // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the @@ -4577,11 +4524,11 @@ impl ChannelMana }, } if let Some(msg) = channel_ready { - send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg); + send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg); } funding_tx }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } }; log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid()); @@ -4590,18 +4537,21 @@ impl ChannelMana } fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) + })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } - let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(), - self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan); + let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer, + self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan); if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt { log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg: announcement_sigs, }); @@ -4613,29 +4563,34 @@ impl ChannelMana // announcement_signatures. log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg, }); } } + + emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut()); + Ok(()) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } } - fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>; let result: Result<(), _> = loop { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) + })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => { - if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() { log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.", @@ -4643,22 +4598,22 @@ impl ChannelMana if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" }); } - let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry); + let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry); dropped_htlcs = htlcs; // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary. if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update { - let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update); + let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update); let (result, is_permanent) = - handle_monitor_err!(self, update_res, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE); + handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE); if is_permanent { - remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry); + remove_channel!(self, chan_entry); break result; } } if let Some(msg) = shutdown { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id: *counterparty_node_id, msg, }); @@ -4666,12 +4621,13 @@ impl ChannelMana break Ok(()); }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } }; for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) { let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id }; - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver); + let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8); + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver); } let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id); @@ -4679,17 +4635,20 @@ impl ChannelMana } fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) + })?; let (tx, chan_option) = { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => { - if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } - let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry); + let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry); if let Some(msg) = closing_signed { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg, }); @@ -4700,10 +4659,10 @@ impl ChannelMana // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to // watch for old state broadcasts)! - (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry))) + (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry))) } else { (tx, None) } }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } }; if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx { @@ -4712,8 +4671,9 @@ impl ChannelMana } if let Some(chan) = chan_option { if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: update }); } @@ -4733,16 +4693,18 @@ impl ChannelMana //but we should prevent it anyway. let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg); - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) + })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } - let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| { + let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| { // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close, // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding. @@ -4750,10 +4712,10 @@ impl ChannelMana PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => { let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 { let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan); - onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data) + HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data) } else { - onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[]) - }; + HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code) + }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None); let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id: msg.channel_id, htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, @@ -4764,95 +4726,107 @@ impl ChannelMana _ => pending_forward_info } }; - try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan); + try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan); }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } Ok(()) } fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = { - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) + })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } - try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan) + try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } }; - self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id); + self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id); Ok(()) } fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) + })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } - try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan); + try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan); }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } Ok(()) } fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) + })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 { let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned()); - try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan); + try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan); } - try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan); + try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan); Ok(()) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } } fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) + })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) { - Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan), + Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan), Err((Some(update), e)) => { assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update()); - let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update); - try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan); + let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &update); + try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan); unreachable!(); }, Ok(res) => res }; - let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update); - if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, update_res, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) { + let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update); + if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) { return Err(e); } - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg: revoke_and_ack, }); if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), @@ -4866,36 +4840,90 @@ impl ChannelMana } Ok(()) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } } #[inline] - fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) { - for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards { + fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) { + for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards { let mut forward_event = None; + let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new(); + let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new(); if !pending_forwards.is_empty() { - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() { - forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS)) - } for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) { - match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing { - PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id, - PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0, - PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0, - }) { + let scid = match forward_info.routing { + PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id, + PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0, + PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0, + }; + // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`. + let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid); + + let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap(); + let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty(); + match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { - entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, - prev_htlc_id, forward_info }); + entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo { + prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })); }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { - entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, - prev_htlc_id, forward_info })); + if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() && + fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash) + { + let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner()); + let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap(); + match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) { + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { + new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted { + requested_next_hop_scid: scid, + payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash, + inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(), + expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat, + intercept_id + }); + entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo { + prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }); + }, + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { + log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid); + let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { + short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, + outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, + htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, + incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret, + phantom_shared_secret: None, + }); + + failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, + HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10), + HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid }, + )); + } + } + } else { + // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted + // payments are being processed. + if forward_htlcs_empty { + forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS)); + } + entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo { + prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }))); + } } } } } + + for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) { + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination); + } + + if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() { + let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + events.append(&mut new_intercept_events); + } + match forward_event { Some(time) => { let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); @@ -4911,18 +4939,21 @@ impl ChannelMana fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new(); let res = loop { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) + })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update(); let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self, - chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan); + chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan); htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs; - let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update); + let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &raa_updates.monitor_update); if was_paused_for_mon_update { assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed); assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none()); @@ -4932,7 +4963,7 @@ impl ChannelMana break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned())); } if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed { - if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, update_res, channel_state, chan, + if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false, raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs, @@ -4941,7 +4972,7 @@ impl ChannelMana } else { unreachable!(); } } if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), updates, }); @@ -4950,21 +4981,22 @@ impl ChannelMana raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, chan.get().get_short_channel_id() .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()), - chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap())) + chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), + chan.get().get_user_id())) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } }; self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id); match res { Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs, - short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => + short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) => { for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) { let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() }; - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver); + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver); } - self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]); + self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]); self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs); Ok(()) }, @@ -4973,58 +5005,70 @@ impl ChannelMana } fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) + })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } - try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan); + try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan); }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } Ok(()) } fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) + })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } if !chan.get().is_usable() { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError})); } - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures( - self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan), + &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), + msg, &self.default_configuration + ), chan), // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced, // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here. - update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(), + update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()), }); }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } Ok(()) } /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err. fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) { - Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(), + let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) { + Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()), None => { // It's not a local channel return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist) } }; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id); + if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { + return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist) + } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { if chan.get().should_announce() { @@ -5041,35 +5085,38 @@ impl ChannelMana return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist); } else { log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id)); - try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan); + try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan); } }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!() + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist) } Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist) } fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let chan_restoration_res; - let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; + let htlc_forwards; + let need_lnd_workaround = { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) + })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here. let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish( - msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash, - &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan); + msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, + &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan); let mut channel_update = None; if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg, }); @@ -5085,19 +5132,21 @@ impl ChannelMana } } let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take(); - chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!( - self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order, - responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs); + htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption( + &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order, + Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs); if let Some(upd) = channel_update { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd); + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd); } - (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround) + need_lnd_workaround }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } }; - post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res); - self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id); + + if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards { + self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]); + } if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround { self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?; @@ -5116,43 +5165,57 @@ impl ChannelMana MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => { if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage { log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0)); - self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()); + self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()); } else { log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0)); let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() }; - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver); + let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8); + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver); } }, MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) | MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id; - let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; - if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) { - let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry); - failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false)); - if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { - msg: update - }); + let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id { + Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id), + None => { + // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the + // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed. + let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap(); + id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned() + } + }; + if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events; + if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) { + let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry); + failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false)); + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event { + ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() } + } else { + ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed + }; + self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason); + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { + node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), + action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { + msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() } + }, + }); + } } - let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event { - ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() } - } else { - ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed - }; - self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason); - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { - node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), - action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { - msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() } - }, - }); } }, MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => { - self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id); + self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref()); }, } } @@ -5176,58 +5239,54 @@ impl ChannelMana /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible. /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor /// update was applied. - /// - /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were - /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell - /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user - /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update. fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool { let mut has_monitor_update = false; let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new(); let mut handle_errors = Vec::new(); { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id; - let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info; - let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; - - by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| { - match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) { - Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => { - if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() { - failed_htlcs.push(( - holding_cell_failed_htlcs, - *channel_id, - chan.get_counterparty_node_id() - )); - } - if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt { - match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { - ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), - updates: commitment_update, - }); - }, - e => { - has_monitor_update = true; - let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY); - handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res)); - if close_channel { return false; } - }, + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + + for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events; + peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| { + match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) { + Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => { + if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() { + failed_htlcs.push(( + holding_cell_failed_htlcs, + *channel_id, + chan.get_counterparty_node_id() + )); + } + if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt { + match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) { + ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { + node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), + updates: commitment_update, + }); + }, + e => { + has_monitor_update = true; + let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY); + handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res)); + if close_channel { return false; } + }, + } } + true + }, + Err(e) => { + let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id); + handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res))); + // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us + !close_channel } - true - }, - Err(e) => { - let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, channel_id); - handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res))); - // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us - !close_channel } - } - }); + }); + } } let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty(); @@ -5249,46 +5308,47 @@ impl ChannelMana let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new(); let mut has_update = false; { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id; - let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info; - let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; - - by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| { - match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) { - Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => { - if let Some(msg) = msg_opt { - has_update = true; - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { - node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg, - }); - } - if let Some(tx) = tx_opt { - // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back - // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast. - if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { - msg: update + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + + for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events; + peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| { + match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) { + Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => { + if let Some(msg) = msg_opt { + has_update = true; + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { + node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg, }); } + if let Some(tx) = tx_opt { + // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back + // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast. + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } - self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); + self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); - log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx)); - self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx); - update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, chan); - false - } else { true } - }, - Err(e) => { - has_update = true; - let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, channel_id); - handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res))); - !close_channel + log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx)); + self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx); + update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan); + false + } else { true } + }, + Err(e) => { + has_update = true; + let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id); + handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res))); + !close_channel + } } - } - }); + }); + } } for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) { @@ -5328,7 +5388,7 @@ impl ChannelMana return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) }); } - let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); + let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()); let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); @@ -5358,8 +5418,9 @@ impl ChannelMana /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you. /// - /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which - /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be + /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which + /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with + /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`]. /// /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements. @@ -5374,12 +5435,20 @@ impl ChannelMana /// /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply. /// + /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable + /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114. + /// /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds - /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived - /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage + /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable + /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose + /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment + /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash - pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> { - inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64) + pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> { + inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, + &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) } /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share @@ -5393,7 +5462,7 @@ impl ChannelMana /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment #[deprecated] pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> { - let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); + let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()); let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()); let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?; Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) @@ -5402,7 +5471,7 @@ impl ChannelMana /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is /// stored external to LDK. /// - /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a + /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided. /// @@ -5412,7 +5481,7 @@ impl ChannelMana /// /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat` - /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the + /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount. /// /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for @@ -5423,12 +5492,12 @@ impl ChannelMana /// /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will - /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry. + /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry. /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of - /// [`PaymentReceived`]. + /// [`PaymentClaimable`]. /// - /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry` - /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`]. + /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` + /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]. /// /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime. @@ -5440,10 +5509,16 @@ impl ChannelMana /// /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply. /// + /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable + /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114. + /// /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment - /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived - pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result { - inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64) + /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable + pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option, + invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option) -> Result { + inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, + invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, + min_final_cltv_expiry) } /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share @@ -5473,14 +5548,14 @@ impl ChannelMana /// /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 { - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap(); + let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap(); loop { - let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager); + let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source); // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel. - match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.entry(scid_candidate) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate + match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) { + Some(_) => continue, + None => return scid_candidate } } } @@ -5496,32 +5571,132 @@ impl ChannelMana } } + /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are + /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See + /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`]. + /// + /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few + /// times to get a unique scid. + pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 { + let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap(); + loop { + let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source); + // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel. + if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue } + return scid_candidate + } + } + + /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in + /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity. + pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs { + let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new(); + + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() { + for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() { + if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source { + inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id()); + } + } + } + } + + inflight_htlcs + } + #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))] pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec { let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new()); - let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone()); + let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event); self.process_pending_events(&event_handler); events.into_inner() } + #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")] + pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) { + let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + events.push(event); + } + + #[cfg(test)] + pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option { + let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) } + } + #[cfg(test)] pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool { - !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty() + self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments() } #[cfg(test)] pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) { - self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear() + self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments() + } + + /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call + /// using the given event handler. + /// + /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements. + pub async fn process_pending_events_async Future>( + &self, handler: H + ) { + // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that + // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events. + let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + + let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist; + + // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query + // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events. + if self.process_pending_monitor_events() { + result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; + } + + let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]); + if !pending_events.is_empty() { + result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; + } + + for event in pending_events { + handler(event).await; + } + + if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist { + self.persistence_notifier.notify(); + } } } -impl MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager - where M::Target: chain::Watch, - T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, - F::Target: FeeEstimator, - L::Target: Logger, +impl MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager +where + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + ES::Target: EntropySource, + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + R::Target: Router, + L::Target: Logger, { + /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated. + /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if + /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer + /// is always placed next to each other. + /// + /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for + /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains + /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a` + /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array. + /// + /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate` + /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among + /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under. fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec { let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new()); PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || { @@ -5541,8 +5716,14 @@ impl MessageSend } let mut pending_events = Vec::new(); - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events); + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 { + pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events); + } + } if !pending_events.is_empty() { events.replace(pending_events); @@ -5554,12 +5735,15 @@ impl MessageSend } } -impl EventsProvider for ChannelManager +impl EventsProvider for ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + ES::Target: EntropySource, + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, F::Target: FeeEstimator, + R::Target: Router, L::Target: Logger, { /// Processes events that must be periodically handled. @@ -5576,13 +5760,13 @@ where result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; } - let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]); + let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]); if !pending_events.is_empty() { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; } - for event in pending_events.drain(..) { - handler.handle_event(&event); + for event in pending_events { + handler.handle_event(event); } result @@ -5590,12 +5774,15 @@ where } } -impl chain::Listen for ChannelManager +impl chain::Listen for ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + ES::Target: EntropySource, + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, F::Target: FeeEstimator, + R::Target: Router, L::Target: Logger, { fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) { @@ -5623,16 +5810,19 @@ where *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height) } - self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)); + self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)); } } -impl chain::Confirm for ChannelManager +impl chain::Confirm for ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + ES::Target: EntropySource, + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, F::Target: FeeEstimator, + R::Target: Router, L::Target: Logger, { fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) { @@ -5644,13 +5834,13 @@ where log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height); let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger) + self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger) .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b))); let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); if height < last_best_block_height { let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire); - self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)); + self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)); } } @@ -5666,7 +5856,7 @@ where *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height); - self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)); + self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)); macro_rules! max_time { ($timestamp: expr) => { @@ -5689,29 +5879,17 @@ where payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| { inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64 }); - - let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| { - if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true } - if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment { - if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height { - log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); - pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed { - payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash, - }); - false - } else { true } - } else { true } - }); } - fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec { - let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_chan_info.len()); - for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() { - if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() { - res.push(funding_txo.txid); + fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option)> { + let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len()); + for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() { + if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) { + res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash))); + } } } res @@ -5729,18 +5907,21 @@ where } } -impl ChannelManager +impl ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + ES::Target: EntropySource, + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, F::Target: FeeEstimator, + R::Target: Router, L::Target: Logger, { /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by /// the function. - fn do_chain_event) -> Result<(Option, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option), ClosureReason>> + fn do_chain_event::Signer>) -> Result<(Option, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option), ClosureReason>> (&self, height_opt: Option, f: FN) { // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases. @@ -5749,132 +5930,166 @@ where let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new(); { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info; - let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; - channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| { - let res = f(channel); - if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res { - for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) { - let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel); - timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { - failure_code, data, - }, HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() })); - } - if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt { - send_channel_ready!(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready); - if channel.is_usable() { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); - if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { - node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), - msg, - }); + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events; + peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| { + let res = f(channel); + if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res { + for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) { + let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel); + timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data), + HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() })); + } + if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt { + send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready); + if channel.is_usable() { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); + if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + msg, + }); + } + } else { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); } - } else { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); } - } - if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { - node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), - msg: announcement_sigs, - }); - if let Some(height) = height_opt { - if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { - msg: announcement, - // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced, - // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here. - update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(), - }); + + emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel); + + if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + msg: announcement_sigs, + }); + if let Some(height) = height_opt { + if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { + msg: announcement, + // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced, + // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here. + update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()), + }); + } } } - } - if channel.is_our_channel_ready() { - if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { - // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it - // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we - // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e. - // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever - // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info - // is always consistent. - let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id())); - assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()), - "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels", - fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW); + if channel.is_our_channel_ready() { + if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { + // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it + // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we + // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e. + // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever + // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info + // is always consistent. + let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap(); + let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id())); + assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()), + "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels", + fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW); + } } - } - } else if let Err(reason) = res { - update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, channel); - // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was - // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel. - failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true)); - if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { - msg: update + } else if let Err(reason) = res { + update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel); + // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was + // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel. + failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true)); + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + let reason_message = format!("{}", reason); + self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason); + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { + channel_id: channel.channel_id(), + data: reason_message, + } }, }); + return false; } - let reason_message = format!("{}", reason); - self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason); - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { - node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), - action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { - channel_id: channel.channel_id(), - data: reason_message, - } }, - }); - return false; - } - true + true + }); + } + } + + if let Some(height) = height_opt { + self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| { + htlcs.retain(|htlc| { + // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get + // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the + // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update, + // just give up on it and fail the HTLC. + if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER { + let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec(); + htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes()); + + timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), + HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data), + HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() })); + false + } else { true } + }); + !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry. }); - if let Some(height) = height_opt { - channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| { - htlcs.retain(|htlc| { - // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get - // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the - // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update, - // just give up on it and fail the HTLC. - if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER { - let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec(); - htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height)); - - timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason { - failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, - data: htlc_msat_height_data - }, HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() })); - false - } else { true } + let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap(); + intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| { + if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER { + let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { + short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id, + htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id, + incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret, + phantom_shared_secret: None, + outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint, }); - !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry. - }); - } + + let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing { + PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id, + _ => unreachable!(), + }; + timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash, + HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2), + HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid })); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid); + false + } else { true } + }); } self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels); for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) { - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason, destination); + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination); } } /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on - /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken - /// up. + /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by + /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up. /// /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature. + /// + /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update + /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout + /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))] pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool { self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait) } /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on - /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken - /// up. + /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by + /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up. + /// + /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update + /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) { self.persistence_notifier.wait() } @@ -5896,24 +6111,62 @@ where pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock { self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone() } + + /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by + /// [`ChannelManager`]. + pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures { + provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration) + } + + /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by + /// [`ChannelManager`]. + /// + /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice" + /// or not. Thus, this method is not public. + #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))] + pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures { + provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration) + } + + /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by + /// [`ChannelManager`]. + pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures { + provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration) + } + + /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by + /// [`ChannelManager`]. + pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures { + provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration) + } + + /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by + /// [`ChannelManager`]. + pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures { + provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration) + } } -impl - ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager - where M::Target: chain::Watch, - T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, - F::Target: FeeEstimator, - L::Target: Logger, +impl + ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager +where + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + ES::Target: EntropySource, + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + R::Target: Router, + L::Target: Logger, { - fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) { + fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) { + fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) { @@ -5931,9 +6184,9 @@ impl let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) { + fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) { @@ -5999,55 +6252,57 @@ impl fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); - let mut no_channels_remain = true; - { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; - let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info; + let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap(); + let remove_peer = { log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" }); - channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| { - if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id { + if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events; + peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| { chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger); if chan.is_shutdown() { - update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, chan); + update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan); self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer); return false; - } else { - no_channels_remain = false; } - } - true - }); - pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| { - match msg { - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true, - &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false, - } - }); - } - if no_channels_remain { - self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id); + true + }); + pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| { + match msg { + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true, + &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true, + &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false, + } + }); + debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect"); + peer_state.is_connected = false; + peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) + } else { true } + }; + if remove_peer { + per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id); } + mem::drop(per_peer_state); for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) { self.finish_force_close_channel(failure); @@ -6069,46 +6324,56 @@ impl match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState { + channel_by_id: HashMap::new(), latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(), + pending_msg_events: Vec::new(), + is_connected: true, })); }, hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => { - e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone(); + let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap(); + peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone(); + debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice"); + peer_state.is_connected = true; }, } } - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; - channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| { - let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id { - if !chan.have_received_message() { - // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the - // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now - // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just - // drop it. - false - } else { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { - node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), - msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger), - }); - true - } - } else { true }; - if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) { - if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { - node_id: *counterparty_node_id, - msg, update_msg, + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + + for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events; + peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| { + let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id { + if !chan.have_received_message() { + // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the + // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now + // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just + // drop it. + false + } else { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { + node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), + msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger), }); + true + } + } else { true }; + if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) { + if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { + node_id: *counterparty_node_id, + msg, update_msg, + }); + } } } - } - retain - }); + retain + }); + } //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures Ok(()) } @@ -6117,22 +6382,29 @@ impl let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] { - for chan in self.list_channels() { - if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id { - // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel - let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true); - } + let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id); + if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect() + }; + for channel_id in channel_ids { + // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel + let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true); } } else { { // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again. - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { - if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return; - } + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id); + if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { node_id: *counterparty_node_id, msg, }); @@ -6147,18 +6419,18 @@ impl } fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures { - provided_node_features() + provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration) } fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures { - provided_init_features() + provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration) } } /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by /// [`ChannelManager`]. -pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures { - provided_init_features().to_context() +pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures { + provided_init_features(config).to_context() } /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by @@ -6167,19 +6439,25 @@ pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures { /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice" /// or not. Thus, this method is not public. #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))] -pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures { - provided_init_features().to_context() +pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures { + provided_init_features(config).to_context() } /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by /// [`ChannelManager`]. -pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures { - provided_init_features().to_context() +pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures { + provided_init_features(config).to_context() +} + +/// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by +/// [`ChannelManager`]. +pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures { + ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config)) } /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by /// [`ChannelManager`]. -pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures { +pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures { // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for // ErroringMessageHandler. @@ -6195,6 +6473,12 @@ pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures { features.set_channel_type_optional(); features.set_scid_privacy_optional(); features.set_zero_conf_optional(); + #[cfg(anchors)] + { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41. + if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx { + features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional(); + } + } features } @@ -6216,33 +6500,111 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, { (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option), }); -impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, { - (1, inbound_scid_alias, option), - (2, channel_id, required), - (3, channel_type, option), - (4, counterparty, required), - (5, outbound_scid_alias, option), - (6, funding_txo, option), - (7, config, option), - (8, short_channel_id, option), - (10, channel_value_satoshis, required), - (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option), - (14, user_channel_id, required), - (16, balance_msat, required), - (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required), - // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be - // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here. - (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)), - (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required), - (22, confirmations_required, option), - (24, force_close_spend_delay, option), - (26, is_outbound, required), - (28, is_channel_ready, required), - (30, is_usable, required), - (32, is_public, required), - (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option), - (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option), -}); +impl Writeable for ChannelDetails { + fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> { + // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with + // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. + let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64; + let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64); + write_tlv_fields!(writer, { + (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option), + (2, self.channel_id, required), + (3, self.channel_type, option), + (4, self.counterparty, required), + (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option), + (6, self.funding_txo, option), + (7, self.config, option), + (8, self.short_channel_id, option), + (9, self.confirmations, option), + (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required), + (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option), + (14, user_channel_id_low, required), + (16, self.balance_msat, required), + (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required), + // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be + // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here. + (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)), + (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required), + (22, self.confirmations_required, option), + (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option), + (26, self.is_outbound, required), + (28, self.is_channel_ready, required), + (30, self.is_usable, required), + (32, self.is_public, required), + (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option), + (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option), + (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option), + }); + Ok(()) + } +} + +impl Readable for ChannelDetails { + fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result { + _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, { + (1, inbound_scid_alias, option), + (2, channel_id, required), + (3, channel_type, option), + (4, counterparty, required), + (5, outbound_scid_alias, option), + (6, funding_txo, option), + (7, config, option), + (8, short_channel_id, option), + (9, confirmations, option), + (10, channel_value_satoshis, required), + (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option), + (14, user_channel_id_low, required), + (16, balance_msat, required), + (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required), + // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be + // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here. + (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)), + (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required), + (22, confirmations_required, option), + (24, force_close_spend_delay, option), + (26, is_outbound, required), + (28, is_channel_ready, required), + (30, is_usable, required), + (32, is_public, required), + (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option), + (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option), + (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option), + }); + + // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with + // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. + let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap(); + let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 + + ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64); + + Ok(Self { + inbound_scid_alias, + channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(), + channel_type, + counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(), + outbound_scid_alias, + funding_txo, + config, + short_channel_id, + channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(), + unspendable_punishment_reserve, + user_channel_id, + balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(), + outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(), + next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(), + inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(), + confirmations_required, + confirmations, + force_close_spend_delay, + is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(), + is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(), + is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(), + is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(), + inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, + inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, + }) + } +} impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, { (2, channels, vec_type), @@ -6270,8 +6632,9 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, { (0, routing, required), (2, incoming_shared_secret, required), (4, payment_hash, required), - (6, amt_to_forward, required), - (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required) + (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required), + (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required), + (9, incoming_amt_msat, option), }); @@ -6375,7 +6738,7 @@ impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC { impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC { fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result { - let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None); + let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None); let mut value = 0; let mut payment_data: Option = None; let mut cltv_expiry = 0; @@ -6425,7 +6788,7 @@ impl Readable for HTLCSource { let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?; match id { 0 => { - let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None); + let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None); let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0; let mut path = Some(Vec::new()); let mut payment_id = None; @@ -6446,7 +6809,7 @@ impl Readable for HTLCSource { } Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(), - first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat, + first_hop_htlc_msat, path: path.unwrap(), payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(), payment_secret, @@ -6460,7 +6823,7 @@ impl Readable for HTLCSource { } impl Writeable for HTLCSource { - fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> { + fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> { match self { HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => { 0u8.write(writer)?; @@ -6470,7 +6833,7 @@ impl Writeable for HTLCSource { (1, payment_id_opt, option), (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required), (3, payment_secret, option), - (4, path, vec_type), + (4, *path, vec_type), (5, payment_params, option), }); } @@ -6483,28 +6846,21 @@ impl Writeable for HTLCSource { } } -impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason, - (0, LightningError) => { - (0, err, required), - }, - (1, Reason) => { - (0, failure_code, required), - (2, data, vec_type), - }, -;); +impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, { + (0, forward_info, required), + (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)), + (2, prev_short_channel_id, required), + (4, prev_htlc_id, required), + (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required), +}); impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo, - (0, AddHTLC) => { - (0, forward_info, required), - (2, prev_short_channel_id, required), - (4, prev_htlc_id, required), - (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required), - }, (1, FailHTLC) => { (0, htlc_id, required), (2, err_packet, required), - }, -;); + }; + (0, AddHTLC) +); impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, { (0, payment_secret, required), @@ -6514,35 +6870,16 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, { (8, min_value_msat, required), }); -impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment, - (0, Legacy) => { - (0, session_privs, required), - }, - (1, Fulfilled) => { - (0, session_privs, required), - (1, payment_hash, option), - }, - (2, Retryable) => { - (0, session_privs, required), - (1, pending_fee_msat, option), - (2, payment_hash, required), - (4, payment_secret, option), - (6, total_msat, required), - (8, pending_amt_msat, required), - (10, starting_block_height, required), - }, - (3, Abandoned) => { - (0, session_privs, required), - (2, payment_hash, required), - }, -); - -impl Writeable for ChannelManager - where M::Target: chain::Watch, - T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, - F::Target: FeeEstimator, - L::Target: Logger, +impl Writeable for ChannelManager +where + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + ES::Target: EntropySource, + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + R::Target: Router, + L::Target: Logger, { fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> { let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap(); @@ -6556,32 +6893,59 @@ impl Writeable f best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?; } - let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let mut unfunded_channels = 0; - for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() { - if !channel.is_funding_initiated() { - unfunded_channels += 1; + let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0; + { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let mut unfunded_channels = 0; + let mut number_of_channels = 0; + for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) { + serializable_peer_count += 1; + } + number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len(); + for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() { + if !channel.is_funding_initiated() { + unfunded_channels += 1; + } + } } - } - ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?; - for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() { - if channel.is_funding_initiated() { - channel.write(writer)?; + + ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?; + + for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() { + if channel.is_funding_initiated() { + channel.write(writer)?; + } + } } } - (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?; - for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() { - short_channel_id.write(writer)?; - (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?; - for forward in pending_forwards { - forward.write(writer)?; + { + let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap(); + (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?; + for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() { + short_channel_id.write(writer)?; + (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?; + for forward in pending_forwards { + forward.write(writer)?; + } } } + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap(); + + let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); + let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap(); + let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); + let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new(); - (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?; - for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() { + (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?; + for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() { payment_hash.write(writer)?; (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?; for htlc in previous_hops.iter() { @@ -6590,16 +6954,20 @@ impl Writeable f htlc_purposes.push(purpose); } - let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap(); - (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?; + (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?; for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { - peer_pubkey.write(writer)?; - let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); - peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?; + let peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &*peer_state_lock; + // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we + // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we + // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with + // no channels. + if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) { + peer_pubkey.write(writer)?; + peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?; + } } - let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); - let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?; for event in events.iter() { @@ -6662,9 +7030,27 @@ impl Writeable f _ => {}, } } + + let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None; + let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap(); + if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 { + pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts); + } + + let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments); + if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() { + // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments + // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it. + pending_claiming_payments = None; + } else { + debug_assert!(false, "While we have code to serialize pending_claiming_payments, the map should always be empty until a later PR"); + } + write_tlv_fields!(writer, { (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required), + (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option), (3, pending_outbound_payments, required), + (4, pending_claiming_payments, option), (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required), (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required), (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type), @@ -6707,17 +7093,27 @@ impl Writeable f /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction. /// /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor -pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> - where M::Target: chain::Watch, - T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, - F::Target: FeeEstimator, - L::Target: Logger, +pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> +where + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + ES::Target: EntropySource, + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + R::Target: Router, + L::Target: Logger, { + /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy. + pub entropy_source: ES, + + /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations. + pub node_signer: NS, + /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel /// signing data. - pub keys_manager: K, + pub signer_provider: SP, /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future. /// @@ -6734,6 +7130,11 @@ pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be /// force-closed during deserialization. pub tx_broadcaster: T, + /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes + /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding. + /// + /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization. + pub router: R, /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during /// deserialization. pub logger: L, @@ -6753,24 +7154,28 @@ pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: /// this struct. /// /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings - pub channel_monitors: HashMap>, + pub channel_monitors: HashMap::Signer>>, } -impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> - ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L> - where M::Target: chain::Watch, - T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, - F::Target: FeeEstimator, - L::Target: Logger, - { +impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> + ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> +where + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + ES::Target: EntropySource, + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + R::Target: Router, + L::Target: Logger, +{ /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to /// populate a HashMap directly from C. - pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig, - mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor>) -> Self { + pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig, + mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<::Signer>>) -> Self { Self { - keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config, + entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config, channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect() } } @@ -6778,29 +7183,37 @@ impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the // SipmleArcChannelManager type: -impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> - ReadableArgs> for (BlockHash, Arc>) - where M::Target: chain::Watch, - T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, - F::Target: FeeEstimator, - L::Target: Logger, +impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> + ReadableArgs> for (BlockHash, Arc>) +where + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + ES::Target: EntropySource, + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + R::Target: Router, + L::Target: Logger, { - fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result { - let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)?; + fn read(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result { + let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)?; Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager))) } } -impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> - ReadableArgs> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager) - where M::Target: chain::Watch, - T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, - F::Target: FeeEstimator, - L::Target: Logger, +impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> + ReadableArgs> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager) +where + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + ES::Target: EntropySource, + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + R::Target: Router, + L::Target: Logger, { - fn read(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result { + fn read(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result { let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION); let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?; @@ -6811,12 +7224,14 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); - let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); + let mut peer_channels: HashMap::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); let mut channel_closures = Vec::new(); for _ in 0..channel_count { - let mut channel: Channel = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?; + let mut channel: Channel<::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, ( + &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config) + ))?; let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?; funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone()); if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) { @@ -6850,6 +7265,25 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(), reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager }); + for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() { + let mut found_htlc = false; + for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() { + if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; } + } + if !found_htlc { + // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer + // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to + // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s) + // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop + // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising + // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the + // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected. + log_info!(args.logger, + "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager", + log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); + failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id())); + } + } } else { log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { @@ -6858,8 +7292,28 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> if channel.is_funding_initiated() { id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id()); } - by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel); + match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { + let by_id_map = entry.get_mut(); + by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel); + }, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { + let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new(); + by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel); + entry.insert(by_id_map); + } + } } + } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() { + // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence + // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still + // safely discard the channel. + let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false); + channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { + channel_id: channel.channel_id(), + user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(), + reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, + }); } else { log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,"); @@ -6870,7 +7324,7 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> } } - for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() { + for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() { if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) { log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id())); monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger); @@ -6903,11 +7357,14 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> } let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex)>())); + let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex::Signer>>)>())); for _ in 0..peer_count { let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?; let peer_state = PeerState { + channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()), latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?, + pending_msg_events: Vec::new(), + is_connected: false, }; per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state)); } @@ -6920,16 +7377,6 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> None => continue, } } - if forward_htlcs_count > 0 { - // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a - // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they - // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small - // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards - // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers. - pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { - time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2), - }); - } let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::())); @@ -6967,24 +7414,28 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients. let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option>> = None; let mut pending_outbound_payments = None; + let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option> = Some(HashMap::new()); let mut received_network_pubkey: Option = None; let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None; let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None; let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None; + let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new()); read_tlv_fields!(reader, { (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option), + (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option), (3, pending_outbound_payments, option), + (4, pending_claiming_payments, option), (5, received_network_pubkey, option), (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option), (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type), (11, probing_cookie_secret, option), }); if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() { - fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); + fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()); } if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() { - probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); + probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()); } if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() { @@ -7005,7 +7456,7 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by // 0.0.102+ for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() { - if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() { + if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() { for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() { if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source { if path.is_empty() { @@ -7024,9 +7475,13 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { let path_fee = path.get_path_fees(); entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { + retry_strategy: None, + attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(), + payment_params: None, session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(), payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash, payment_secret, + keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup pending_amt_msat: path_amt, pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee), total_msat: path_amt, @@ -7038,11 +7493,59 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> } } } + for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() { + if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source { + let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| { + info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint && + info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id + }; + // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's + // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we + // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or + // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after + // the monitor was when forwarding the payment. + forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| { + forwards.retain(|forward| { + if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward { + if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) { + log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}", + log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id())); + false + } else { true } + } else { true } + }); + !forwards.is_empty() + }); + pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| { + if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) { + log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}", + log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id())); + pending_events_read.retain(|event| { + if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event { + intercepted_id != ev_id + } else { true } + }); + false + } else { true } + }); + } + } } } } - let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material(); + if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() { + // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a + // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they + // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small + // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards + // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers. + pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { + time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2), + }); + } + + let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material(); let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material); let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len()); @@ -7067,7 +7570,7 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) { Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage, None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) { - Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage, + Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage, Err(()) => { log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); @@ -7086,17 +7589,16 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> } let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); - secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); + secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()); if !channel_closures.is_empty() { pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures); } - let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) { + let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) { Ok(key) => key, Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }; - let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key); if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey { if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey { log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key."); @@ -7105,28 +7607,32 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> } let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new(); - for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() { - if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 { - let mut outbound_scid_alias; - loop { - outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias - .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager); - if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; } - } - chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias); - } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) { - // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older - // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above. - log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias()); - return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); - } - if chan.is_usable() { - if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() { + for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() { + if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 { + let mut outbound_scid_alias; + loop { + outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias + .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source); + if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; } + } + chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias); + } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) { // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above. log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias()); return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } + if chan.is_usable() { + if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() { + // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older + // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above. + log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias()); + return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); + } + } } } @@ -7137,6 +7643,13 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) { log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0; + let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey); + let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret; + if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() { + let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode) + .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient"); + receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey) + } for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs { claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value; @@ -7156,14 +7669,20 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on // restart. let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(); - if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) { - channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger); + if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){ + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap(); + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) { + channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger); + } } if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) { previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger); } } pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed { + receiver_node_id, payment_hash, purpose: payment_purpose, amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat, @@ -7177,40 +7696,40 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator, chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster, + router: args.router, best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)), - channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder { - by_id, - short_to_chan_info, - forward_htlcs, - claimable_htlcs, - pending_msg_events: Vec::new(), - }), inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key, pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments), - pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()), + pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments { pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()) }, + pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()), + forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs), + claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }), outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases), id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer), + short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info), fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(), probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(), - our_network_key, our_network_pubkey, secp_ctx, highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize), - per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state), + per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state), pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read), pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read), total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()), persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(), - keys_manager: args.keys_manager, + entropy_source: args.entropy_source, + node_signer: args.node_signer, + signer_provider: args.signer_provider, + logger: args.logger, default_configuration: args.default_config, }; @@ -7218,7 +7737,8 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) { let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source; let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id }; - channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver); + let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8); + channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver); } //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a @@ -7232,18 +7752,20 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> mod tests { use bitcoin::hashes::Hash; use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; + use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey}; use core::time::Duration; use core::sync::atomic::Ordering; - use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret}; - use ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure}; - use ln::functional_test_utils::*; - use ln::msgs; - use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler; - use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route}; - use util::errors::APIError; - use util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason}; - use util::test_utils; - use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface; + use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret}; + use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId}; + use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*; + use crate::ln::msgs; + use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler; + use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route}; + use crate::util::errors::APIError; + use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason}; + use crate::util::test_utils; + use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig; + use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource; #[test] fn test_notify_limits() { @@ -7260,7 +7782,7 @@ mod tests { assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1))); assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1))); - let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); + let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try // to connect messages with new values @@ -7331,22 +7853,26 @@ mod tests { let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); - create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); // First, send a partial MPP payment. let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000); + let mut mpp_route = route.clone(); + mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone()); + let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]); // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which // indicates there are more HTLCs coming. let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match. - nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap(); + let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None); // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails. - nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); @@ -7369,7 +7895,7 @@ mod tests { expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true); // Send the second half of the original MPP payment. - nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); @@ -7449,8 +7975,8 @@ mod tests { let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); - create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); - let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new(); let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it. @@ -7459,7 +7985,7 @@ mod tests { // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails. let route_params = RouteParameters { - payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()), + payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV), final_value_msat: 100_000, final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV, }; @@ -7467,7 +7993,7 @@ mod tests { &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes ).unwrap(); - nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); @@ -7500,7 +8026,7 @@ mod tests { &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes ).unwrap(); - let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap(); + let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); @@ -7510,7 +8036,7 @@ mod tests { // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails. let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]); - nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); @@ -7547,18 +8073,16 @@ mod tests { let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); - nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap(); - nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap(); - let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); + let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]); let route_params = RouteParameters { - payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey), - final_value_msat: 10000, + payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40), + final_value_msat: 10_000, final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40, }; - let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph; + let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone(); let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels(); - let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0); + let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new(); let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); let route = find_route( &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::>()), @@ -7567,7 +8091,8 @@ mod tests { let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]); let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]); - let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap(); + let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); @@ -7591,18 +8116,16 @@ mod tests { let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); - nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap(); - nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap(); - let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); + let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]); let route_params = RouteParameters { - payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey), - final_value_msat: 10000, + payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40), + final_value_msat: 10_000, final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40, }; - let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph; + let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone(); let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels(); - let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0); + let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new(); let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); let route = find_route( &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::>()), @@ -7612,7 +8135,8 @@ mod tests { let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]); let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]); let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner()); - let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap(); + let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); @@ -7633,10 +8157,10 @@ mod tests { let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]); let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); - let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id; - let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id; - let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id; - let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id; + let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id; + let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id; + let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id; + let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id; // Marshall an MPP route. let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000); @@ -7649,13 +8173,47 @@ mod tests { route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id; route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id; - match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() { + match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() { PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) }, _ => panic!("unexpected error") } } + #[test] + fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() { + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + + nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + + nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed); + + { + // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been + // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed. + let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed. + assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1); + assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some()); + } + + nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); + + { + // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed. + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0); + } + } + #[test] fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() { // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret. @@ -7697,9 +8255,9 @@ mod tests { nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap(); let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); - nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel); + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel); let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); - nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel); + nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel); let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42); let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner(); @@ -7744,9 +8302,9 @@ mod tests { update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update); nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); - nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())); + nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())); let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); - nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown); + nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown); let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0); @@ -7797,38 +8355,128 @@ mod tests { check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); } + + fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error(res_err: Result, expected_public_key: PublicKey) { + let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key); + check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err) + } + + fn check_unkown_peer_error(res_err: Result, expected_public_key: PublicKey) { + let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key); + check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err) + } + + fn check_api_error_message(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result) { + match res_err { + Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => { + assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message); + }, + Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => { + assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message); + }, + Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"), + Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"), + } + } + + #[test] + fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() { + // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as + // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the + // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map. + let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg); + let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr); + + // Dummy values + let channel_id = [4; 32]; + let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()); + let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]); + + // Test the API functions. + check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key); + + check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key); + + check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key); + + check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key); + + check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key); + + check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key); + + check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key); + } + + #[cfg(anchors)] + #[test] + fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() { + // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept + // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry + // the channel without the anchors feature. + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config(); + anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true; + anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true; + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap(); + let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx()); + + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg); + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + match events[0] { + Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => { + nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + } + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + + let error_msg = get_err_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg); + + let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx()); + + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed); + } } #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))] pub mod bench { - use chain::Listen; - use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist}; - use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner}; - use ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage}; - use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures}; - use ln::functional_test_utils::*; - use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init}; - use routing::gossip::NetworkGraph; - use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route}; - use util::test_utils; - use util::config::UserConfig; - use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider}; + use crate::chain::Listen; + use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist}; + use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner}; + use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId}; + use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*; + use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init}; + use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph; + use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route}; + use crate::util::test_utils; + use crate::util::config::UserConfig; + use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider}; use bitcoin::hashes::Hash; use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut}; - use sync::{Arc, Mutex}; + use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex}; use test::Bencher; struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist> { - node: &'a ChannelManager, - &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, - &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger> + &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, + &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>, + &'a test_utils::TestLogger>, } #[cfg(test)] @@ -7846,15 +8494,17 @@ pub mod bench { let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))}; let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }; + let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned()); + let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new()); + let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a)), &scorer); let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default(); config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1; - let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned()); let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a); let seed_a = [1u8; 32]; let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42); - let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters { + let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters { network, best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network), }); @@ -7864,17 +8514,17 @@ pub mod bench { let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b); let seed_b = [2u8; 32]; let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42); - let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters { + let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters { network, best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network), }); let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b }; - node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap(); - node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap(); + node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap(); + node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap(); node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap(); - node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id())); - node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id())); + node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id())); + node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id())); let tx; if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) { @@ -7911,15 +8561,33 @@ pub mod bench { _ => panic!(), } + let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1); + match events_a[0] { + Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => { + assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id()); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + + let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1); + match events_b[0] { + Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => { + assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id()); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a); let mut payment_count: u64 = 0; macro_rules! send_payment { ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => { let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels(); - let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id()) - .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()); - let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0); + let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV) + .with_features($node_b.invoice_features()); + let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new(); let seed = [3u8; 32]; let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42); let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); @@ -7930,9 +8598,9 @@ pub mod bench { payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes()); payment_count += 1; let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()); - let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap(); + let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap(); - $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap(); + $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap(); let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap()); $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]); $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); @@ -7942,7 +8610,7 @@ pub mod bench { $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id())); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }); - expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000); + expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000); $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage); expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);