X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannelmanager.rs;h=292fa26733bcea467d69defe85c5e4e47b7f2804;hb=b58c88430e9229b5b4a58aa87f4c14aca739b0da;hp=80edbacf573a7a545107a7908698fb0bf371cb13;hpb=cc18e8a279fe2957ebc881b77eb358c5c5ccc420;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index 80edbacf..292fa267 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -43,8 +43,9 @@ use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitor use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData}; // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to // construct one themselves. +use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret}; pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo; -use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError}; +use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus}; use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures}; use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop}; use ln::msgs; @@ -53,23 +54,24 @@ use ln::onion_utils; use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField}; use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner}; use util::config::UserConfig; -use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider}; +use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider}; use util::{byte_utils, events}; use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer}; use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader}; use util::logger::Logger; use util::errors::APIError; -use std::{cmp, mem}; +use prelude::*; +use core::{cmp, mem}; +use core::cell::RefCell; use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet}; use std::io::{Cursor, Read}; use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard}; -use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering}; -use std::time::Duration; +use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering}; +use core::time::Duration; #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))] use std::time::Instant; -use std::marker::{Sync, Send}; -use std::ops::Deref; +use core::ops::Deref; use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex; // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself: @@ -96,7 +98,7 @@ enum PendingHTLCRouting { short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero eventually when we bump MSRV }, Receive { - payment_data: Option, + payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData, incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed }, } @@ -156,11 +158,10 @@ pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData { struct ClaimableHTLC { prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, value: u64, - /// Filled in when the HTLC was received with a payment_secret packet, which contains a - /// total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a + /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which /// are part of the same payment. - payment_data: Option, + payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData, cltv_expiry: u32, } @@ -198,19 +199,6 @@ pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason { } } -/// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop -/// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly -#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] -pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]); -/// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop -/// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly -#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] -pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]); -/// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together -/// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly -#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] -pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]); - type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>); /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a @@ -327,12 +315,11 @@ pub(super) struct ChannelHolder { /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo! pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap>, - /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec for tracking HTLCs that - /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user + /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user. /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you /// go to read them! - claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option), Vec>, + claimable_htlcs: HashMap>, /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict). pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec, @@ -353,6 +340,24 @@ struct PeerState { latest_features: InitFeatures, } +/// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is +/// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route. +/// +/// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that +/// here. +struct PendingInboundPayment { + /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment + payment_secret: PaymentSecret, + /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in + /// this payment being removed. + expiry_time: u64, + /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not) + user_payment_id: u64, + // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced: + payment_preimage: Option, + min_value_msat: Option, +} + /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g. /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case @@ -431,6 +436,26 @@ pub struct ChannelManager>, #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))] channel_state: Mutex>, + + /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will + /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements + /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed + /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out. + /// Locked *after* channel_state. + pending_inbound_payments: Mutex>, + + /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution. + /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors + /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative + /// PaymentSent/PaymentFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative + /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice. + /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s) + /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents + /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors. + /// + /// Locked *after* channel_state. + pending_outbound_payments: Mutex>, + our_network_key: SecretKey, our_network_pubkey: PublicKey, @@ -438,6 +463,11 @@ pub struct ChannelManager, persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier, @@ -468,6 +498,7 @@ pub struct ChannelManager u32 { self.height } } +#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)] +enum NotifyOption { + DoPersist, + SkipPersist, +} + /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/ -/// `await_persistable_update` that new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this +/// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope, /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the /// updates are ready for persistence). -struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> { +/// +/// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to +/// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to +/// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`. +struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> { persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, + should_persist: F, // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately. _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>, } -impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> { - fn new(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> Self { +impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused + fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> { + PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist }) + } + + fn optionally_notify NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> { let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap(); - Self { + PersistenceNotifierGuard { persistence_notifier: notifier, + should_persist: persist_check, _read_guard: read_guard, } } } -impl<'a> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> { +impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> { fn drop(&mut self) { - self.persistence_notifier.notify(); + if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { + self.persistence_notifier.notify(); + } } } @@ -547,7 +596,7 @@ pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24; pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7; /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound -/// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly six hours of blocks at six blocks/hour. +/// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour. /// /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`] /// @@ -556,9 +605,17 @@ pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7; // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more). -pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 6; +pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7; pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO? +/// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments. +/// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least +/// this value. +// Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for +// any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while +// a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe. +pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3; + // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain, @@ -569,7 +626,7 @@ pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO? #[allow(dead_code)] const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS; -// Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See +// Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed. #[deny(const_err)] #[allow(dead_code)] @@ -583,6 +640,12 @@ pub struct ChannelDetails { /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the /// lifetime of the channel. pub channel_id: [u8; 32], + /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with + /// our counterparty already. + /// + /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to + /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`. + pub funding_txo: Option, /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened. pub short_channel_id: Option, @@ -607,10 +670,20 @@ pub struct ChannelDetails { /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this. pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64, + /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us. + pub is_outbound: bool, + /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the + /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the + /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some + /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). + pub is_funding_locked: bool, /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b) - /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution. - pub is_live: bool, - + /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown. + /// + /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`. + pub is_usable: bool, + /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced. + pub is_public: bool, /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding /// payments to us through this channel. pub counterparty_forwarding_info: Option, @@ -695,22 +768,44 @@ macro_rules! handle_error { } } +/// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error) +macro_rules! convert_chan_err { + ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => { + match $err { + ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => { + (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone())) + }, + ChannelError::Close(msg) => { + log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg); + if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() { + $short_to_id.remove(&short_id); + } + let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true); + (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&$channel).ok())) + }, + ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => { + log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg); + if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() { + $short_to_id.remove(&short_id); + } + let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false); + (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&$channel).ok())) + } + } + } +} + macro_rules! break_chan_entry { ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => { match $res { Ok(res) => res, - Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => { - break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone())) - }, - Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => { - log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg); - let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry(); - if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() { - $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id); + Err(e) => { + let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key()); + if drop { + $entry.remove_entry(); } - break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok())) - }, - Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); } + break Err(res); + } } } } @@ -719,25 +814,12 @@ macro_rules! try_chan_entry { ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => { match $res { Ok(res) => res, - Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone())) - }, - Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => { - log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg); - let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry(); - if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() { - $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id); - } - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok())) - }, - Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => { - log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg); - let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry(); - if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() { - $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id); + Err(e) => { + let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key()); + if drop { + $entry.remove_entry(); } - let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false); - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok())) + return Err(res); } } } @@ -747,13 +829,12 @@ macro_rules! handle_monitor_err { ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => { handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new()) }; - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { + ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => { match $err { ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => { - log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..])); - let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry(); - if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() { - $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id); + log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..])); + if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() { + $short_to_id.remove(&short_id); } // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which @@ -764,12 +845,12 @@ macro_rules! handle_monitor_err { // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees. - let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok())); - res + let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&$chan).ok())); + (res, true) }, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => { log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails", - log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), + log_bytes!($chan_id[..]), if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa { match $action_type { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" }, @@ -786,11 +867,18 @@ macro_rules! handle_monitor_err { if !$resend_raa { debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment); } - $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails); - Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$entry.key())) + $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails); + (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false) }, } - } + }; + ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { { + let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key()); + if drop { + $entry.remove_entry(); + } + res + } }; } macro_rules! return_monitor_err { @@ -814,6 +902,133 @@ macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err { } } +macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked { + ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr, + $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr, + $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { { + let mut htlc_forwards = None; + let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(); + + let chanmon_update: Option = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve + let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none(); + let res = loop { + let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve + if !forwards.is_empty() { + htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), + $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards)); + } + + if chanmon_update.is_some() { + // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been + // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be + // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed + // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send + // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a + // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below). + assert!($funding_locked.is_none()); + // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a + // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we + // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below. + assert!($commitment_update.is_some()); + } + + if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked { + // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly + // before it should be allowed to. + assert!(chanmon_update.is_none()); + $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { + node_id: counterparty_node_id, + msg, + }); + if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) { + $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { + node_id: counterparty_node_id, + msg: announcement_sigs, + }); + } + $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id()); + } + + let funding_broadcastable: Option = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve + if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update { + // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed + // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish + // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When + // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we + // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug. + assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none()); + // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the + // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also + // have some commitment updates to send as well. + assert!($commitment_update.is_some()); + if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical + // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to + // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane. + let mut order = $order; + if $raa.is_none() { + order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst; + } + break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true); + } + } + + macro_rules! handle_cs { () => { + if let Some(update) = $commitment_update { + $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { + node_id: counterparty_node_id, + updates: update, + }); + } + } } + macro_rules! handle_raa { () => { + if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa { + $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { + node_id: counterparty_node_id, + msg: revoke_and_ack, + }); + } + } } + match $order { + RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { + handle_cs!(); + handle_raa!(); + }, + RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { + handle_raa!(); + handle_cs!(); + }, + } + if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable { + log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid()); + $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx); + } + break Ok(()); + }; + + if chanmon_update_is_none { + // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop + // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which + // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`. + assert!(res.is_ok()); + } + + (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) + } } +} + +macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration { + ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { { + let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res; + + let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id); + + if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards { + $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]); + } + } } +} + impl ChannelManager where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, @@ -853,11 +1068,15 @@ impl ChannelMana claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_msg_events: Vec::new(), }), + pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), + pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()), + our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(), our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), secp_ctx, last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0), + highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0), per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()), @@ -899,7 +1118,7 @@ impl ChannelMana let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?; let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone()); - let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard. debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); @@ -930,6 +1149,7 @@ impl ChannelMana let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(); res.push(ChannelDetails { channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(), + funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(), short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(), remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(), @@ -937,7 +1157,10 @@ impl ChannelMana inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat, user_id: channel.get_user_id(), - is_live: channel.is_live(), + is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(), + is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(), + is_usable: channel.is_live(), + is_public: channel.should_announce(), counterparty_forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(), }); } @@ -960,8 +1183,9 @@ impl ChannelMana /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used. /// - /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for - /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are. + /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the + /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria + /// are. pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec { // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user @@ -975,7 +1199,7 @@ impl ChannelMana /// /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed. pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> { - let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); @@ -1065,7 +1289,7 @@ impl ChannelMana /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager. pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> { - let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) { Ok(counterparty_node_id) => { self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push( @@ -1215,6 +1439,10 @@ impl ChannelMana msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data, }; + if payment_data.is_none() { + return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]); + } + // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a @@ -1222,7 +1450,7 @@ impl ChannelMana PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { - payment_data, + payment_data: payment_data.unwrap(), incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry, }, payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(), @@ -1396,7 +1624,8 @@ impl ChannelMana pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> { log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id); let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); - let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..]).expect("RNG is busted"); + let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); + let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted"); let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv) .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?; @@ -1406,7 +1635,8 @@ impl ChannelMana } let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash); - let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().insert(session_priv_bytes)); let err: Result<(), _> = loop { let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); @@ -1632,8 +1862,10 @@ impl ChannelMana /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead, /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction. + /// + /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> { - let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() { if inp.witness.is_empty() { @@ -1695,33 +1927,42 @@ impl ChannelMana // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB // message... - const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2; + const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2; #[deny(const_err)] #[allow(dead_code)] // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is // smaller than 500: const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500; - /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a - /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have - /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open). + /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given + /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via + /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed + /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node + /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and + /// our network addresses. /// - /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node - /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning. + /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this + /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning. /// - /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts - /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these - /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain - /// only Tor Onion addresses. + /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node + /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly + /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy, + /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses. /// - /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500). - pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec) { - let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500). + /// + /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events + pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); if addresses.len() > 500 { panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!"); } + // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that + // addresses be sorted for future compatibility. + addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id()); + let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement { features: NodeFeatures::known(), timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32, @@ -1731,14 +1972,37 @@ impl ChannelMana excess_data: Vec::new(), }; let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]); + let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key); - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { - msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement { - signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key), - contents: announcement - }, - }); + let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; + + let mut announced_chans = false; + for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() { + if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) { + channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { + msg, + update_msg: match self.get_channel_update(chan) { + Ok(msg) => msg, + Err(_) => continue, + }, + }); + announced_chans = true; + } else { + // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the + // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast + // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first. + } + } + + if announced_chans { + channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { + msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement { + signature: node_announce_sig, + contents: announcement + }, + }); + } } /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay. @@ -1746,7 +2010,7 @@ impl ChannelMana /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event. /// Will likely generate further events. pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) { - let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let mut new_events = Vec::new(); let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new(); @@ -1837,7 +2101,7 @@ impl ChannelMana }, HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => { log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id); - match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) { + match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) { Err(e) => { if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e { log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg); @@ -1916,61 +2180,95 @@ impl ChannelMana routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, prev_funding_outpoint } => { - let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData { - short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, - outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, - htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, - incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, - }; - - let mut total_value = 0; - let payment_secret_opt = - if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None }; - let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, payment_secret_opt)) - .or_insert(Vec::new()); - htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC { - prev_hop, + let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC { + prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData { + short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, + outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, + htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, + incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, + }, value: amt_to_forward, payment_data: payment_data.clone(), cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry, - }); - if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { - for htlc in htlcs.iter() { - total_value += htlc.value; - if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat { - total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT; - } - if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; } - } - if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > data.total_msat { - for htlc in htlcs.iter() { - let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec(); - htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice( - &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()), - ); - failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { - short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id, - outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, - htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, - incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret, - }), payment_hash, - HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data } - )); - } - } else if total_value == data.total_msat { - new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived { - payment_hash, - payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret), - amt: total_value, - }); + }; + + macro_rules! fail_htlc { + ($htlc: expr) => { + let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec(); + htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice( + &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()), + ); + failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { + short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id, + outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, + htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, + incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret, + }), payment_hash, + HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data } + )); } - } else { - new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived { - payment_hash, - payment_secret: None, - amt: amt_to_forward, - }); } + + // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we + // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and + // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose + // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash. + // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs + // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not. + let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); + match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) { + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); + fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc); + }, + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => { + if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); + fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc); + } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).", + log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap()); + fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc); + } else { + let mut total_value = 0; + let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) + .or_insert(Vec::new()); + htlcs.push(claimable_htlc); + for htlc in htlcs.iter() { + total_value += htlc.value; + if htlc.payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})", + log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc.payment_data.total_msat); + total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT; + } + if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; } + } + if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)", + log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat); + for htlc in htlcs.iter() { + fail_htlc!(htlc); + } + } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat { + new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived { + payment_hash, + payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage, + payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret, + amt: total_value, + user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id, + }); + // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived + // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't + // claimed. + inbound_payment.remove_entry(); + } else { + // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total + // payment value yet, wait until we receive more + // MPP parts. + } + } + }, + }; }, HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => { panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive"); @@ -2003,9 +2301,13 @@ impl ChannelMana /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred. /// /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock. - fn process_background_events(&self) { + fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool { let mut background_events = Vec::new(); mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events); + if background_events.is_empty() { + return false; + } + for event in background_events.drain(..) { match event { BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => { @@ -2015,10 +2317,12 @@ impl ChannelMana }, } } + true } #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))] - pub(crate) fn test_process_background_events(&self) { + /// Process background events, for functional testing + pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) { self.process_background_events(); } @@ -2030,25 +2334,42 @@ impl ChannelMana /// /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call. pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) { - let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - self.process_background_events(); + PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || { + let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist; + if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; } - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() { - if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() { - if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { - msg: update - }); + let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; + for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() { + match chan.channel_update_status() { + ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged), + ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged), + ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled), + ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled), + ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => { + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) { + channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; + chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled); + }, + ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => { + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) { + channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; + chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled); + }, + _ => {}, } - chan.to_fresh(); - } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() { - chan.to_fresh(); - } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() { - chan.to_disabled_staged(); } - } + + should_persist + }); } /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect @@ -2056,11 +2377,11 @@ impl ChannelMana /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it). /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the /// HTLC backwards has been started. - pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option) -> bool { - let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); - let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret)); + let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash); if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source { for htlc in sources.drain(..) { if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); } @@ -2097,17 +2418,25 @@ impl ChannelMana self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state, htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data}); }, - HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => { - self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push( - events::Event::PaymentFailed { - payment_hash, - rejected_by_dest: false, + HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => { + if { + let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32]; + session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]); + self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes) + } { + self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push( + events::Event::PaymentFailed { + payment_hash, + rejected_by_dest: false, #[cfg(test)] - error_code: None, + error_code: None, #[cfg(test)] - error_data: None, - } - ) + error_data: None, + } + ) + } else { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); + } }, }; } @@ -2129,7 +2458,15 @@ impl ChannelMana // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more. match source { - HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => { + HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, .. } => { + if { + let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32]; + session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]); + !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes) + } { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); + return; + } log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); mem::drop(channel_state_lock); match &onion_error { @@ -2225,24 +2562,22 @@ impl ChannelMana /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true! /// - /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs - /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several - /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the - /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain - /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to - /// motivated attackers. - /// - /// Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret - /// set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay. + /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or + /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived` + /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide + /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment. /// /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event. - pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option, expected_amount: u64) -> bool { + /// + /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment + /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash + pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool { let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()); - let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); - let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret)); + let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash); if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source { assert!(!sources.is_empty()); @@ -2257,27 +2592,19 @@ impl ChannelMana // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth // it. - - let (is_mpp, mut valid_mpp) = if let &Some(ref data) = &sources[0].payment_data { - assert!(payment_secret.is_some()); - (true, data.total_msat >= expected_amount) - } else { - assert!(payment_secret.is_none()); - (false, false) - }; - + let mut valid_mpp = true; for htlc in sources.iter() { - if !is_mpp || !valid_mpp { break; } if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) { valid_mpp = false; + break; } } let mut errs = Vec::new(); let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false; for htlc in sources.drain(..) { - if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); } - if (is_mpp && !valid_mpp) || (!is_mpp && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2)) { + if !valid_mpp { + if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); } let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec(); htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array( self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())); @@ -2294,10 +2621,7 @@ impl ChannelMana claimed_any_htlcs = true; } else { errs.push(e); } }, - Err(None) if is_mpp => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"), - Err(None) => { - log_warn!(self.logger, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed."); - }, + Err(None) => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"), Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true, } } @@ -2371,12 +2695,20 @@ impl ChannelMana fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) { match source { - HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => { + HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => { mem::drop(channel_state_lock); - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent { - payment_preimage - }); + if { + let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32]; + session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]); + self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes) + } { + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent { + payment_preimage + }); + } else { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0)); + } }, HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => { let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint; @@ -2434,86 +2766,26 @@ impl ChannelMana /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled. pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) { - let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - - let mut close_results = Vec::new(); - let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new(); - let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new(); - let mut pending_events = Vec::new(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - { + let (mut pending_failures, chan_restoration_res) = { let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id; - let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; - let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) { - Some(chan) => chan, - None => return, + let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return, }; - if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id { + if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id { return; } - let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger); - if !pending_forwards.is_empty() { - htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), funding_txo.clone(), pending_forwards)); - } - htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures); - - macro_rules! handle_cs { () => { - if let Some(update) = commitment_update { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), - updates: update, - }); - } - } } - macro_rules! handle_raa { () => { - if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { - node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), - msg: revoke_and_ack, - }); - } - } } - match order { - RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { - handle_cs!(); - handle_raa!(); - }, - RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { - handle_raa!(); - handle_cs!(); - }, - } - if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable { - self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx); - } - if let Some(msg) = funding_locked { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { - node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), - msg, - }); - if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { - node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), - msg: announcement_sigs, - }); - } - short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id()); - } - } - - self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events); - - for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) { + let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger); + (pending_failures, handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked)) + }; + post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res); + for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) { self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2); } - self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]); - - for res in close_results.drain(..) { - self.finish_force_close_channel(res); - } } fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { @@ -2642,6 +2914,7 @@ impl ChannelMana hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } }; + log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid()); self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx); Ok(()) } @@ -2756,7 +3029,7 @@ impl ChannelMana } }; if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx)); + log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx)); self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx); } if let Some(chan) = chan_option { @@ -3058,39 +3331,8 @@ impl ChannelMana return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError})); } - let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id(); - let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = - try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan); - - let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id; - let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]); - { - let their_node_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }; - let their_bitcoin_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }; - match (self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, their_node_key), - self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, their_bitcoin_key)) { - (Err(e), _) => { - let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature: {:?}. Maybe using different node_secret for transport and routing msg? UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", e, &announcement, their_node_key)); - try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan); - }, - (_, Err(e)) => { - let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature: {:?}. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})", e, &announcement, their_bitcoin_key)); - try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan); - }, - _ => {} - } - } - - let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key); - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { - msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement { - node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature }, - node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig }, - bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature }, - bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig }, - contents: announcement, - }, + msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan), update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state }); }, @@ -3123,77 +3365,35 @@ impl ChannelMana } fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; + let (htlcs_failed_forward, chan_restoration_res) = { + let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } - // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer - // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell - // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending - // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here. - let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) = - try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan); - if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt { - if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { - // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical - // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to - // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane. - if revoke_and_ack.is_none() { - order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst; - } - if commitment_update.is_none() { - order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst; - } - return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some()); - //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again - } - } - if let Some(msg) = funding_locked { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { - node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), - msg - }); - } - macro_rules! send_raa { () => { - if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { - node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), - msg - }); + match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } - } } - macro_rules! send_cu { () => { - if let Some(updates) = commitment_update { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { + // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer + // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell + // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending + // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here. + let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) = + try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan); + if let Some(msg) = shutdown { + channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), - updates + msg, }); } - } } - match order { - RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { - send_raa!(); - send_cu!(); - }, - RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { - send_cu!(); - send_raa!(); - }, - } - if let Some(msg) = shutdown { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { - node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), - msg, - }); - } - Ok(()) - }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) - } + (htlcs_failed_forward, handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked)) + }, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + } + }; + post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res); + self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id); + Ok(()) } /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel. @@ -3203,7 +3403,7 @@ impl ChannelMana /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway #[doc(hidden)] pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> { - let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let counterparty_node_id; let err: Result<(), _> = loop { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); @@ -3251,52 +3451,115 @@ impl ChannelMana } } - /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`. - fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) { + /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed. + fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool { let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); + let pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events(); + let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty(); + for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events { + match monitor_event { + MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => { + if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0)); + self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage); + } else { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0)); + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }); + } + }, + MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => { + let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; + let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id; + let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id; + let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; + if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) { + if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() { + short_to_id.remove(&short_id); + } + failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false)); + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { + node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), + action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { + msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() } + }, + }); + } + }, + } + } + + for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) { + self.finish_force_close_channel(failure); + } + + has_pending_monitor_events + } + + /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible. + /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor + /// update was applied. + /// + /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were + /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell + /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user + /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update. + fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool { + let mut has_monitor_update = false; + let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new(); + let mut handle_errors = Vec::new(); { - for monitor_event in self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events() { - match monitor_event { - MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => { - if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0)); - self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage); - } else { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0)); - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }); + let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; + let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id; + let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id; + let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; + + by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| { + match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) { + Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => { + if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() { + failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id)); } - }, - MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id; - let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id; - let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; - if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) { - if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() { - short_to_id.remove(&short_id); - } - failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false)); - if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { - msg: update + if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt { + if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + has_monitor_update = true; + let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id); + handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res)); + if close_channel { return false; } + } else { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { + node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), + updates: commitment_update, }); } - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { - node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), - action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { - msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() } - }, - }); } + true }, + Err(e) => { + let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id); + handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res))); + !close_channel + } } - } + }); } - for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) { - self.finish_force_close_channel(failure); + let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty(); + for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) { + self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id); + } + + for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) { + let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id); } + + has_update } /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call, @@ -3321,6 +3584,114 @@ impl ChannelMana self.finish_force_close_channel(failure); } } + + fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option, min_value_msat: Option, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result { + assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106 + + let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); + + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); + match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) { + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { + e.insert(PendingInboundPayment { + payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage, + // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time - + // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in + // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future. + // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely + // never fail a payment too early. + // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date + // timestamps. + expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200, + }); + }, + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }), + } + Ok(payment_secret) + } + + /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing + /// to pay us. + /// + /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the + /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second. + /// + /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which + /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be + /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`]. + /// + /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements. + /// + /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds + /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived + /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage + /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash + pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) { + let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); + let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()); + + (payment_hash, + self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id) + .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash")) + } + + /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is + /// stored external to LDK. + /// + /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a + /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least + /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided. + /// + /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This + /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending. + /// + /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`] events to + /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and + /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply + /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events + /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere. + /// + /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment + /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat` + /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the + /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount. + /// + /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for + /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice. + /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to + /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for + /// invoices when no timeout is set. + /// + /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin + /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will + /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry. + /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of + /// [`PaymentReceived`]. + /// + /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this + /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and + /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation. + /// + /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year. + /// + /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry` + /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`]. + /// + /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment + /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived + /// [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::user_payment_id + pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result { + self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id) + } + + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))] + pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec { + let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new()); + let event_handler = |event| events.borrow_mut().push(event); + self.process_pending_events(&event_handler); + events.into_inner() + } } impl MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager @@ -3331,33 +3702,71 @@ impl MessageSend L::Target: Logger, { fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec { - //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query - // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events. - self.process_pending_monitor_events(); + let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new()); + PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || { + let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist; + + // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query + // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events. + if self.process_pending_monitor_events() { + result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; + } - let mut ret = Vec::new(); - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events); - ret + if self.check_free_holding_cells() { + result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; + } + + let mut pending_events = Vec::new(); + let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events); + + if !pending_events.is_empty() { + events.replace(pending_events); + } + + result + }); + events.into_inner() } } impl EventsProvider for ChannelManager - where M::Target: chain::Watch, - T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, - F::Target: FeeEstimator, - L::Target: Logger, +where + M::Target: chain::Watch, + T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, { - fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec { - //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query - // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events. - self.process_pending_monitor_events(); + /// Processes events that must be periodically handled. + /// + /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event. + /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock. + /// + /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared + /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when + /// restarting from an old state. + fn process_pending_events(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler { + PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || { + let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist; + + // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query + // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events. + if self.process_pending_monitor_events() { + result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; + } - let mut ret = Vec::new(); - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events); - ret + let mut pending_events = std::mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]); + if !pending_events.is_empty() { + result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; + } + + for event in pending_events.drain(..) { + handler.handle_event(event); + } + + result + }); } } @@ -3384,7 +3793,7 @@ where } fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) { - let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let new_height = height - 1; { let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap(); @@ -3415,7 +3824,7 @@ where let block_hash = header.block_hash(); log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height); - let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new()))); } @@ -3427,24 +3836,34 @@ where let block_hash = header.block_hash(); log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height); - let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height); self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time)); - loop { - // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the - // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on - // having an explicit local time source. - // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully update - // last_node_announcement_serial or decide we don't need to. - let old_serial = self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire); - if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; } - if self.last_node_announcement_serial.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() { - break; + macro_rules! max_time { + ($timestamp: expr) => { + loop { + // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block + // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on + // having an explicit local time source. + // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully + // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to. + let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire); + if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; } + if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() { + break; + } + } } } + max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial); + max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp); + let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); + payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| { + inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64 + }); } fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec { @@ -3459,7 +3878,7 @@ where } fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) { - let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| { if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() { if funding_txo.txid == *txid { @@ -3542,7 +3961,7 @@ where }); if let Some(height) = height_opt { - channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|&(ref payment_hash, _), htlcs| { + channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| { htlcs.retain(|htlc| { // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the @@ -3596,7 +4015,7 @@ where } } -impl +impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, @@ -3605,94 +4024,93 @@ impl(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { - match &self.routing { - &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => { - 0u8.write(writer)?; - onion_packet.write(writer)?; - short_channel_id.write(writer)?; - }, - &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => { - 1u8.write(writer)?; - payment_data.write(writer)?; - incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?; - }, - } - self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?; - self.payment_hash.write(writer)?; - self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?; - self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?; - Ok(()) - } -} - -impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo { - fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result { - Ok(PendingHTLCInfo { - routing: match Readable::read(reader)? { - 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { - onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?, - short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?, - }, - 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { - payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?, - incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?, - }, - _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), - }, - incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?, - payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?, - amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?, - outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?, - }) - } -} - -impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg { - fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { - match self { - &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => { - 0u8.write(writer)?; - fail_msg.write(writer)?; - }, - &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => { - 1u8.write(writer)?; - fail_msg.write(writer)?; - } - } - Ok(()) - } -} - -impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg { - fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result { - match ::read(reader)? { - 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)), - 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)), - _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), - } - } -} - -impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus { - fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { - match self { - &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => { - 0u8.write(writer)?; - forward_info.write(writer)?; - }, - &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => { - 1u8.write(writer)?; - fail_msg.write(writer)?; - } - } - Ok(()) - } -} - -impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus { - fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result { - match ::read(reader)? { - 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)), - 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)), - _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), - } - } -} - -impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, { - short_channel_id, - outpoint, - htlc_id, - incoming_packet_shared_secret -}); - -impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, { - prev_hop, - value, - payment_data, - cltv_expiry -}); - -impl Writeable for HTLCSource { - fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { - match self { - &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => { - 0u8.write(writer)?; - hop_data.write(writer)?; - }, - &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => { - 1u8.write(writer)?; - path.write(writer)?; - session_priv.write(writer)?; - first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?; - } - } - Ok(()) - } -} - -impl Readable for HTLCSource { - fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result { - match ::read(reader)? { - 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)), - 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { - path: Readable::read(reader)?, - session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?, - first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?, - }), - _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), - } - } -} - -impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason { - fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { - match self { - &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => { - 0u8.write(writer)?; - err.write(writer)?; - }, - &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => { - 1u8.write(writer)?; - failure_code.write(writer)?; - data.write(writer)?; - } - } - Ok(()) - } -} - -impl Readable for HTLCFailReason { - fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result { - match ::read(reader)? { - 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }), - 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason { - failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?, - data: Readable::read(reader)?, - }), - _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), - } - } -} - -impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo { - fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { - match self { - &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_funding_outpoint, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => { - 0u8.write(writer)?; - prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?; - prev_funding_outpoint.write(writer)?; - prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?; - forward_info.write(writer)?; - }, - &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => { - 1u8.write(writer)?; - htlc_id.write(writer)?; - err_packet.write(writer)?; - }, - } - Ok(()) - } -} - -impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo { - fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result { - match ::read(reader)? { - 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { - prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?, - prev_funding_outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?, - prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?, - forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?, - }), - 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { - htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?, - err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?, - }), - _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), - } - } -} +impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting, + (0, Forward) => { + (0, onion_packet), + (2, short_channel_id), + }, {}, {}, + (1, Receive) => { + (0, payment_data), + (2, incoming_cltv_expiry), + }, {}, {} +;); + +impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, { + (0, routing), + (2, incoming_shared_secret), + (4, payment_hash), + (6, amt_to_forward), + (8, outgoing_cltv_value) +}, {}, {}); + +impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailureMsg, ; + (0, Relay), + (1, Malformed), +); +impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ; + (0, Forward), + (1, Fail), +); + +impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, { + (0, short_channel_id), + (2, outpoint), + (4, htlc_id), + (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret) +}, {}, {}); + +impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimableHTLC, { + (0, prev_hop), + (2, value), + (4, payment_data), + (6, cltv_expiry), +}, {}, {}); + +impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCSource, + (0, OutboundRoute) => { + (0, session_priv), + (2, first_hop_htlc_msat), + }, {}, { + (4, path), + }; + (1, PreviousHopData) +); + +impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason, + (0, LightningError) => { + (0, err), + }, {}, {}, + (1, Reason) => { + (0, failure_code), + }, {}, { + (2, data), + }, +;); + +impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo, + (0, AddHTLC) => { + (0, forward_info), + (2, prev_short_channel_id), + (4, prev_htlc_id), + (6, prev_funding_outpoint), + }, {}, {}, + (1, FailHTLC) => { + (0, htlc_id), + (2, err_packet), + }, {}, {}, +;); + +impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, { + (0, payment_secret), + (2, expiry_time), + (4, user_payment_id), + (6, payment_preimage), + (8, min_value_msat), +}, {}, {}); impl Writeable for ChannelManager where M::Target: chain::Watch, @@ -4126,8 +4412,7 @@ impl Writeable f fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap(); - writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?; - writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?; + write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION); self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?; { @@ -4195,6 +4480,22 @@ impl Writeable f } (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?; + (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?; + + let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); + (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?; + for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() { + hash.write(writer)?; + pending_payment.write(writer)?; + } + + let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); + (pending_outbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?; + for session_priv in pending_outbound_payments.iter() { + session_priv.write(writer)?; + } + + write_tlv_fields!(writer, {}, {}); Ok(()) } @@ -4319,11 +4620,7 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> L::Target: Logger, { fn read(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result { - let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?; - if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION { - return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion); - } + let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION); let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?; let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; @@ -4425,6 +4722,25 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> } let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; + + let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32))); + for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count { + if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() { + return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); + } + } + + let pending_outbound_payments_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut pending_outbound_payments: HashSet<[u8; 32]> = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32)); + for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count { + if !pending_outbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?) { + return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); + } + } + + read_tlv_fields!(reader, {}, {}); let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); @@ -4444,11 +4760,15 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> claimable_htlcs, pending_msg_events: Vec::new(), }), + pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments), + pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments), + our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(), our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()), secp_ctx, last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize), + highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize), per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state), @@ -4477,9 +4797,9 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> mod tests { use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier; use std::sync::Arc; - use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering}; + use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering}; use std::thread; - use std::time::Duration; + use core::time::Duration; #[test] fn test_wait_timeout() { @@ -4531,20 +4851,20 @@ pub mod bench { use chain::channelmonitor::Persist; use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner}; use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage}; - use ln::features::InitFeatures; + use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures}; use ln::functional_test_utils::*; use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler; use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph; use routing::router::get_route; use util::test_utils; use util::config::UserConfig; - use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider}; + use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider}; use bitcoin::hashes::Hash; use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut}; - use std::sync::Mutex; + use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex}; use test::Bencher; @@ -4570,7 +4890,7 @@ pub mod bench { let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet; let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(); - let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())}; + let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))}; let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }; let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default(); @@ -4625,15 +4945,20 @@ pub mod bench { let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash); + let mut payment_count: u64 = 0; macro_rules! send_payment { ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => { let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels(); - let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), None, Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap(); + let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), + Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap(); - let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]); + let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]); + payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes()); + payment_count += 1; let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()); + let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap(); - $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap(); + $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap(); let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap()); $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]); $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); @@ -4643,8 +4968,8 @@ pub mod bench { $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id())); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }); - expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000); - assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage, &None, 10_000)); + expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000); + assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage)); match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {