X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannelmanager.rs;h=31c8dccae637e6c93a9ae41affa3f94da129ea3e;hb=47ad3d6bd87affc14281ac8dbf62d69b6c066072;hp=b43c98c840392c7b983de276e0867ba5e3baf795;hpb=23a1d7aab5c2cc6f00636815fa126716456dfcfd;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index b43c98c8..31c8dcca 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages). //! -use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader; +use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader}; use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block; use bitcoin::network::constants::Network; @@ -37,8 +37,11 @@ use bitcoin::secp256k1; use chain; use chain::Watch; use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator}; -use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent}; +use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID}; use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData}; +// Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to +// construct one themselves. +pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo; use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError}; use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures}; use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop}; @@ -46,7 +49,7 @@ use ln::msgs; use ln::msgs::NetAddress; use ln::onion_utils; use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField}; -use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemoryChannelKeys}; +use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner}; use util::config::UserConfig; use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider}; use util::{byte_utils, events}; @@ -58,9 +61,11 @@ use util::errors::APIError; use std::{cmp, mem}; use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet}; use std::io::{Cursor, Read}; -use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock}; +use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard}; use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering}; use std::time::Duration; +#[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))] +use std::time::Instant; use std::marker::{Sync, Send}; use std::ops::Deref; use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex; @@ -118,9 +123,15 @@ pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus { pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo { AddHTLC { + forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo, + + // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in + // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the + // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded + // HTLCs. prev_short_channel_id: u64, prev_htlc_id: u64, - forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo, + prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, }, FailHTLC { htlc_id: u64, @@ -134,6 +145,10 @@ pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64, incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32], + + // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards + // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel. + outpoint: OutPoint, } struct ClaimableHTLC { @@ -194,7 +209,7 @@ pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]); #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]); -type ShutdownResult = (Option, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>); +type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>); /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel @@ -302,8 +317,8 @@ pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder { } // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test): -pub(super) struct ChannelHolder { - pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>, +pub(super) struct ChannelHolder { + pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>, pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap, /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency @@ -321,6 +336,15 @@ pub(super) struct ChannelHolder { pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec, } +/// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site +/// for some reason. They are handled in timer_chan_freshness_every_min, so may be processed with +/// quite some time lag. +enum BackgroundEvent { + /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder + /// commitment transaction. + ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)), +} + /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer. struct PeerState { @@ -337,7 +361,7 @@ const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assum /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the /// concrete type of the KeysManager. -pub type SimpleArcChannelManager = Arc, Arc, Arc, Arc, Arc>>; +pub type SimpleArcChannelManager = ChannelManager, Arc, Arc, Arc, Arc>; /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't @@ -347,7 +371,7 @@ pub type SimpleArcChannelManager = Arc = ChannelManager; +pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager; /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately. @@ -368,7 +392,7 @@ pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManage /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees). /// -/// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which +/// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the @@ -385,10 +409,10 @@ pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManage /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when /// you're using lightning-net-tokio. -pub struct ChannelManager - where M::Target: chain::Watch, +pub struct ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { @@ -402,13 +426,13 @@ pub struct ChannelManager, + last_block_hash: RwLock, secp_ctx: Secp256k1, #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))] - pub(super) channel_state: Mutex>, + pub(super) channel_state: Mutex>, #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))] - channel_state: Mutex>, + channel_state: Mutex>, our_network_key: SecretKey, /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this @@ -424,28 +448,91 @@ pub struct ChannelManager>>, pending_events: Mutex>, + pending_background_events: Mutex>, /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent. /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out. /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks. + /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call + /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the PersistenceNotifier + /// the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released. total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>, + persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier, + keys_manager: K, logger: L, } -/// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when -/// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction). -pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24; -/// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us -pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7; +/// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`. +/// +/// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network, +/// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters +/// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`. +pub struct ChainParameters { + /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages. + pub network: Network, + + /// The hash of the latest block successfully connected. + pub latest_hash: BlockHash, + + /// The height of the latest block successfully connected. + /// + /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks. + pub latest_height: usize, +} + +/// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is +/// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/ +/// `await_persistable_update` that new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this +/// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope, +/// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the +/// updates are ready for persistence). +struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> { + persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, + // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately. + _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>, +} + +impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> { + fn new(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> Self { + let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap(); + + Self { + persistence_notifier: notifier, + _read_guard: read_guard, + } + } +} + +impl<'a> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> { + fn drop(&mut self) { + self.persistence_notifier.notify(); + } +} + +/// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time +/// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction). +/// +/// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] +/// +/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay +pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24; +/// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches +/// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021. +pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7; /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound -/// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, -/// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out -/// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the -/// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more). -const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO? +/// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly six hours of blocks at six blocks/hour. +/// +/// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`] +/// +/// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta +// This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, +// i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out +// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the +// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more). +pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 6; pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO? // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, @@ -456,15 +543,16 @@ pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO? // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS. #[deny(const_err)] #[allow(dead_code)] -const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS; +const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS; // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed. #[deny(const_err)] #[allow(dead_code)] -const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER; +const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER; /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels +#[derive(Clone)] pub struct ChannelDetails { /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes, /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output). @@ -498,12 +586,16 @@ pub struct ChannelDetails { /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b) /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution. pub is_live: bool, + + /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding + /// payments to us through this channel. + pub counterparty_forwarding_info: Option, } /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum /// states for more. -#[derive(Debug)] +#[derive(Clone, Debug)] pub enum PaymentSendFailure { /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and @@ -698,10 +790,10 @@ macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err { } } -impl ChannelManager - where M::Target: chain::Watch, +impl ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { @@ -714,23 +806,22 @@ impl /// /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`! /// - /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel - /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks. - /// /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or - /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. - pub fn new(network: Network, fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Self { - let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting + /// from after `params.latest_hash`. + pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self { + let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); ChannelManager { default_configuration: config.clone(), - genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(), + genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(), fee_estimator: fee_est, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, - latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height), - last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()), + latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(params.latest_height), + last_block_hash: RwLock::new(params.latest_hash), secp_ctx, channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{ @@ -747,7 +838,9 @@ impl per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()), pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), + pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()), + persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(), keys_manager, @@ -776,7 +869,10 @@ impl let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?; let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone()); - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard. + debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); + let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { @@ -795,7 +891,7 @@ impl Ok(()) } - fn list_channels_with_filter)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec { + fn list_channels_with_filter)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec { let mut res = Vec::new(); { let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); @@ -812,6 +908,7 @@ impl outbound_capacity_msat, user_id: channel.get_user_id(), is_live: channel.is_live(), + counterparty_forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(), }); } } @@ -848,7 +945,7 @@ impl /// /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed. pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> { - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); @@ -891,12 +988,12 @@ impl #[inline] fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) { - let (funding_txo_option, monitor_update, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res; + let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res; log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len()); for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) { self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }); } - if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_option { + if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option { // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to @@ -905,21 +1002,22 @@ impl } } - /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to - /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. - pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) { - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - + fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result { let mut chan = { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) { - if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() { + if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) { + if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id { + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id { + return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()}); + } + } + if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() { channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id); } - chan + chan.remove_entry().1 } else { - return; + return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()}); } }; log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..])); @@ -930,17 +1028,39 @@ impl msg: update }); } + + Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) + } + + /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to + /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager. + pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) { + Ok(counterparty_node_id) => { + self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push( + events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { + node_id: counterparty_node_id, + action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { + msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() } + }, + } + ); + Ok(()) + }, + Err(e) => Err(e) + } } /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each. pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) { for chan in self.list_channels() { - self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id); + let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id); } } - fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard>) { + fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard>) { macro_rules! return_malformed_err { ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => { { @@ -1167,7 +1287,7 @@ impl if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))); } - if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry + if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))); } let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1; @@ -1212,7 +1332,7 @@ impl /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id /// May be called with channel_state already locked! - fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result { + fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result { let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() { None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}), Some(id) => id, @@ -1225,7 +1345,7 @@ impl short_channel_id, timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(), flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1), - cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, + cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(), htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(), htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()), fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator), @@ -1256,7 +1376,7 @@ impl } let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash); - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let err: Result<(), _> = loop { let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); @@ -1424,7 +1544,7 @@ impl /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel). pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) { - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let (chan, msg) = { let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) { @@ -1460,7 +1580,7 @@ impl } } - fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option { + fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option { if !chan.should_announce() { log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id())); return None @@ -1507,7 +1627,7 @@ impl /// /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500). pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec) { - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); if addresses.len() > 500 { panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!"); @@ -1537,7 +1657,7 @@ impl /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event. /// Will likely generate further events. pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) { - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let mut new_events = Vec::new(); let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new(); @@ -1554,9 +1674,11 @@ impl failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len()); for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) { match forward_info { - HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => { + HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info, + prev_funding_outpoint } => { let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, + outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret, }); @@ -1583,10 +1705,12 @@ impl HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo { routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. - }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, } => { + }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, + prev_funding_outpoint } => { log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id); let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, + outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, }); @@ -1701,9 +1825,11 @@ impl match forward_info { HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo { routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry }, - incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, } => { + incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, + prev_funding_outpoint } => { let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, + outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, }; @@ -1738,6 +1864,7 @@ impl ); failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id, + outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret, }), payment_hash, @@ -1784,13 +1911,42 @@ impl events.append(&mut new_events); } + /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_chan_freshness_every_min. + /// + /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental + /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_chan_freshness_every_min. + /// + /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock. + fn process_background_events(&self) { + let mut background_events = Vec::new(); + mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events); + for event in background_events.drain(..) { + match event { + BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => { + // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the + // monitor updating completing. + let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update); + }, + } + } + } + + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))] + pub(crate) fn test_process_background_events(&self) { + self.process_background_events(); + } + /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'. /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels. /// /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute. + /// + /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call. pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) { - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + self.process_background_events(); + let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() { @@ -1815,7 +1971,7 @@ impl /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the /// HTLC backwards has been started. pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option) -> bool { - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret)); @@ -1878,11 +2034,15 @@ impl /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to /// still-available channels. - fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) { + fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) { //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs //timer handling. + + // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called + // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor + // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more. match source { HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => { log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); @@ -1940,7 +2100,7 @@ impl } } }, - HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => { + HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => { let err_packet = match onion_error { HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => { log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code); @@ -1994,7 +2154,7 @@ impl pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option, expected_amount: u64) -> bool { let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()); - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret)); @@ -2072,7 +2232,7 @@ impl } else { false } } - fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> { + fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> { //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay! let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock; let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) { @@ -2125,7 +2285,7 @@ impl } else { unreachable!(); } } - fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) { + fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) { match source { HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => { mem::drop(channel_state_lock); @@ -2135,12 +2295,23 @@ impl }); }, HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => { + let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint; if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) { Ok(()) => Ok(()), Err(None) => { - // TODO: There is probably a channel monitor somewhere that needs to - // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's - // why it's missing. + let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate { + update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID, + updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { + payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(), + }], + }; + // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after + // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the + // event being update_fulfill_htlc). + if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) { + log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}", + payment_preimage, e); + } Ok(()) }, Err(Some(res)) => Err(res), @@ -2179,7 +2350,7 @@ impl /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled. pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) { - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let mut close_results = Vec::new(); let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new(); @@ -2201,7 +2372,7 @@ impl let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger); if !pending_forwards.is_empty() { - htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards)); + htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), funding_txo.clone(), pending_forwards)); } htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures); @@ -2313,6 +2484,7 @@ impl fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = { + let last_block_hash = *self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap(); let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) { @@ -2320,7 +2492,7 @@ impl if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id)); } - (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove()) + (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, last_block_hash, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove()) }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id)) } @@ -2334,7 +2506,12 @@ impl // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway. - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), None)); + // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for + // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we + // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain). + let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true); + assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty()); + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id)); }, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => { // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor @@ -2364,6 +2541,7 @@ impl fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let (funding_txo, user_id) = { + let last_block_hash = *self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap(); let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { @@ -2371,7 +2549,7 @@ impl if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } - let monitor = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, &self.logger) { + let monitor = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, last_block_hash, &self.logger) { Ok(update) => update, Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan), }; @@ -2422,7 +2600,7 @@ impl } } - fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; @@ -2432,7 +2610,7 @@ impl if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } - let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry); + let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry); if let Some(msg) = shutdown { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), @@ -2534,7 +2712,7 @@ impl return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } - let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| { + let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| { // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC. assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0); @@ -2685,8 +2863,8 @@ impl } #[inline] - fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) { - for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards { + fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) { + for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards { let mut forward_event = None; if !pending_forwards.is_empty() { let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); @@ -2699,10 +2877,12 @@ impl PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0, }) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { - entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }); + entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, + prev_htlc_id, forward_info }); }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { - entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info })); + entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, + prev_htlc_id, forward_info })); } } } @@ -2755,18 +2935,18 @@ impl msg, }); } - break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))) + break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap())) }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } }; self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id); match res { - Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id)) => { + Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => { for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) { self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2); } - self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]); + self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]); Ok(()) }, Err(e) => Err(e) @@ -2842,6 +3022,29 @@ impl Ok(()) } + fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; + let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) { + Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(), + None => { + // It's not a local channel + return Ok(()) + } + }; + match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + // TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), chan_id)); + } + try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan); + }, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!() + } + Ok(()) + } + fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; @@ -2923,7 +3126,7 @@ impl /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway #[doc(hidden)] pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> { - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let counterparty_node_id; let err: Result<(), _> = loop { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); @@ -3002,6 +3205,12 @@ impl msg: update }); } + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { + node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), + action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { + msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() } + }, + }); } }, } @@ -3012,12 +3221,35 @@ impl self.finish_force_close_channel(failure); } } + + /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call, + /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the + /// Channel object. + fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec) { + for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) { + // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or + // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been + // reorganized out of the main chain. + // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as + // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization, + // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls + // timer_chan_freshness_every_min, guaranteeing we're running normally. + if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() { + assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1); + if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] { + assert!(should_broadcast); + } else { unreachable!(); } + self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update))); + } + self.finish_force_close_channel(failure); + } + } } -impl MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager - where M::Target: chain::Watch, +impl MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { @@ -3033,10 +3265,10 @@ impl } } -impl EventsProvider for ChannelManager - where M::Target: chain::Watch, +impl EventsProvider for ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { @@ -3052,18 +3284,51 @@ impl } } -impl ChannelManager - where M::Target: chain::Watch, +impl chain::Listen for ChannelManager +where + M::Target: chain::Watch, + T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, +{ + fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) { + assert_eq!(*self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap(), block.header.prev_blockhash, + "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header"); + assert_eq!(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, height as u64 - 1, + "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height"); + let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect(); + self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, height, &txdata); + self.update_best_block(&block.header, height); + } + + fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) { + assert_eq!(*self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap(), header.block_hash(), + "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header"); + + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let new_height = self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32 - 1; + assert_eq!(new_height, height - 1, + "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height"); + *self.last_block_hash.write().unwrap() = header.prev_blockhash; + + self.do_chain_event(new_height, |channel| channel.update_best_block(new_height, header.time)); + } +} + +impl ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { - /// Updates channel state based on transactions seen in a connected block. - pub fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) { - let header_hash = header.block_hash(); - log_trace!(self.logger, "Block {} at height {} connected", header_hash, height); - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + fn do_chain_event) -> Result<(Option, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>> + (&self, height: u32, f: FN) { + // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called + // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases. + // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more. + let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new(); { @@ -3072,7 +3337,7 @@ impl let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id; let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| { - let res = channel.block_connected(header, txdata, height); + let res = f(channel); if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res { for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) { let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe @@ -3098,34 +3363,23 @@ impl short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id()); } } else if let Err(e) = res { + if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { + short_to_id.remove(&short_id); + } + // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was + // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel. + failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true)); + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }, }); return false; } - if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() { - for &(_, tx) in txdata.iter() { - for inp in tx.input.iter() { - if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); - if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { - short_to_id.remove(&short_id); - } - // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and - // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its - // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped. - failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true)); - if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { - msg: update - }); - } - return false; - } - } - } - } true }); @@ -3148,15 +3402,71 @@ impl !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry. }); } - for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) { - self.finish_force_close_channel(failure); - } + + self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels); for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) { self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason); } + } + + /// Updates channel state to take note of transactions which were confirmed in the given block + /// at the given height. + /// + /// Note that you must still call (or have called) [`update_best_block`] with the block + /// information which is included here. + /// + /// This method may be called before or after [`update_best_block`] for a given block's + /// transaction data and may be called multiple times with additional transaction data for a + /// given block. + /// + /// This method may be called for a previous block after an [`update_best_block`] call has + /// been made for a later block, however it must *not* be called with transaction data from a + /// block which is no longer in the best chain (ie where [`update_best_block`] has already + /// been informed about a blockchain reorganization which no longer includes the block which + /// corresponds to `header`). + /// + /// [`update_best_block`]: `Self::update_best_block` + pub fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData) { + // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called + // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases. + // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more. + + let block_hash = header.block_hash(); + log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height); + + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + self.do_chain_event(height, |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new()))); + } + + /// Updates channel state with the current best blockchain tip. You should attempt to call this + /// quickly after a new block becomes available, however if multiple new blocks become + /// available at the same time, only a single `update_best_block()` call needs to be made. + /// + /// This method should also be called immediately after any block disconnections, once at the + /// reorganization fork point, and once with the new chain tip. Calling this method at the + /// blockchain reorganization fork point ensures we learn when a funding transaction which was + /// previously confirmed is reorganized out of the blockchain, ensuring we do not continue to + /// accept payments which cannot be enforced on-chain. + /// + /// In both the block-connection and block-disconnection case, this method may be called either + /// once per block connected or disconnected, or simply at the fork point and new tip(s), + /// skipping any intermediary blocks. + pub fn update_best_block(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) { + // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called + // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases. + // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more. + + let block_hash = header.block_hash(); + log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height); + + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release); - *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash; + *self.last_block_hash.write().unwrap() = block_hash; + + self.do_chain_event(height, |channel| channel.update_best_block(height, header.time)); + loop { // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on @@ -3171,133 +3481,127 @@ impl } } - /// Updates channel state based on a disconnected block. - /// - /// If necessary, the channel may be force-closed without letting the counterparty participate - /// in the shutdown. - pub fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) { - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); - { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id; - let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; - channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| { - if v.block_disconnected(header) { - if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() { - short_to_id.remove(&short_id); - } - failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown(true)); - if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { - msg: update - }); - } - false - } else { - true - } - }); - } - for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) { - self.finish_force_close_channel(failure); - } - self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel); - *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.block_hash(); + /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool + /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on + /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken + /// up. + /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function. + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))] + pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool { + self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait) + } + + /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on + /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken + /// up. + pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) { + self.persistence_notifier.wait() + } + + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))] + pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool { + let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock; + let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond; + let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap(); + *guard } } -impl - ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager - where M::Target: chain::Watch, +impl + ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) { - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) { - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) { - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) { - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) { - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) { - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); + fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) { - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) { - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) { - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) { - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) { - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) { - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) { - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) { - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) { - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } + fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); + } + fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) { - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) { - let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); let mut failed_payments = Vec::new(); let mut no_channels_remain = true; @@ -3368,6 +3672,9 @@ impl true, &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false, } }); } @@ -3388,7 +3695,7 @@ impl, Condvar), +} + +impl PersistenceNotifier { + fn new() -> Self { + Self { + persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()), + } + } + + fn wait(&self) { + loop { + let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock; + let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap(); + guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap(); + let result = *guard; + if result { + *guard = false; + return + } + } + } + + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))] + fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool { + let current_time = Instant::now(); + loop { + let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock; + let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap(); + guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0; + // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the + // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait + // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of + // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to + // 1.42.0. + let elapsed = current_time.elapsed(); + let result = *guard; + if result || elapsed >= max_wait { + *guard = false; + return result; + } + match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) { + None => return result, + Some(_) => continue + } } } + + // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk. + fn notify(&self) { + let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock; + let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap(); + *persistence_lock = true; + mem::drop(persistence_lock); + cnd.notify_all(); + } } const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; @@ -3543,6 +3915,7 @@ impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus { impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, { short_channel_id, + outpoint, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }); @@ -3619,9 +3992,10 @@ impl Readable for HTLCFailReason { impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo { fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { match self { - &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => { + &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_funding_outpoint, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => { 0u8.write(writer)?; prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?; + prev_funding_outpoint.write(writer)?; prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?; forward_info.write(writer)?; }, @@ -3640,6 +4014,7 @@ impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo { match ::read(reader)? { 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?, + prev_funding_outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?, prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?, forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?, }), @@ -3652,10 +4027,10 @@ impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo { } } -impl Writeable for ChannelManager - where M::Target: chain::Watch, +impl Writeable for ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { @@ -3667,7 +4042,7 @@ impl { + 0u8.write(writer)?; + funding_txo.write(writer)?; + monitor_update.write(writer)?; + }, + } + } + (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?; Ok(()) @@ -3726,24 +4113,36 @@ impl::read(reader, args). +/// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling: +/// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args) /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted. -/// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using -/// ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo(). +/// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same +/// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and +/// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo(). /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors. -/// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch. -/// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager. -pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> - where M::Target: chain::Watch, +/// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager. +/// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch. +/// +/// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you +/// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager. +/// +/// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you +/// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to +/// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be +/// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will +/// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for +/// which you've already broadcasted the transaction. +pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during - /// deserialization. + /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel + /// signing data. pub keys_manager: K, /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future. @@ -3780,14 +4179,14 @@ pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: /// this struct. /// /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings - pub channel_monitors: HashMap>, + pub channel_monitors: HashMap>, } -impl<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> - ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L> - where M::Target: chain::Watch, +impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> + ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L> + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { @@ -3795,7 +4194,7 @@ impl<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to /// populate a HashMap directly from C. pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig, - mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor>) -> Self { + mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor>) -> Self { Self { keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config, channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect() @@ -3805,29 +4204,29 @@ impl<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the // SipmleArcChannelManager type: -impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> - ReadableArgs> for (BlockHash, Arc>) - where M::Target: chain::Watch, +impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> + ReadableArgs> for (BlockHash, Arc>) + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { - fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result { - let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)?; + fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result { + let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)?; Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager))) } } -impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> - ReadableArgs> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager) - where M::Target: chain::Watch, +impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> + ReadableArgs> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager) + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { - fn read(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result { + fn read(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result { let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?; let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?; if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION { @@ -3845,11 +4244,7 @@ impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: De let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); for _ in 0..channel_count { - let mut channel: Channel = Readable::read(reader)?; - if channel.last_block_connected != Default::default() && channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash { - return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); - } - + let mut channel: Channel = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?; let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?; funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone()); if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) { @@ -3864,7 +4259,7 @@ impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: De channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() { // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel: - let (_, _, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true); + let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true); failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs); monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger); } else { @@ -3928,8 +4323,20 @@ impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: De } } + let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::())); + for _ in 0..background_event_count { + match ::read(reader)? { + 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))), + _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), + } + } + let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); + let channel_manager = ChannelManager { genesis_hash, fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator, @@ -3937,8 +4344,8 @@ impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: De tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster, latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize), - last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash), - secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(), + last_block_hash: RwLock::new(last_block_hash), + secp_ctx, channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder { by_id, @@ -3954,7 +4361,10 @@ impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: De per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state), pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read), + pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read), total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()), + persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(), + keys_manager: args.keys_manager, logger: args.logger, default_configuration: args.default_config, @@ -3970,3 +4380,54 @@ impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: De Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager)) } } + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier; + use std::sync::Arc; + use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering}; + use std::thread; + use std::time::Duration; + + #[test] + fn test_wait_timeout() { + let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new()); + let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier); + + let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)); + let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone(); + thread::spawn(move || { + loop { + let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock; + let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap(); + *persistence_lock = true; + cnd.notify_all(); + + if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) { + break + } + } + }); + + // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available. + let _ = persistence_notifier.wait(); + + // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are + // available. + loop { + if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) { + break + } + } + + exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst); + + // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates + // are available. + loop { + if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) { + break + } + } + } +}