X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannelmanager.rs;h=4247d57cbb6ad199ba99842c8dae506ee08f2e25;hb=b767d379c118228994706ba4ef589aee91c87bbd;hp=9340dbbee0381b5243e510532cf1762cf0d96056;hpb=6d85be27d4f499d18f3626d457f91c9e0ca5ff16;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index 9340dbbe..4247d57c 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -17,9 +17,10 @@ //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages). -use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader; +use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header; use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction; -use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash}; +use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash; +use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE; use bitcoin::network::constants::Network; use bitcoin::hashes::Hash; @@ -28,8 +29,10 @@ use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid}; use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey}; use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1; -use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence}; +use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence}; +use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath; +use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs}; use crate::chain; use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock}; use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator}; @@ -41,21 +44,30 @@ use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, Messa // construct one themselves. use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret}; use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel}; -use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures}; +use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures}; #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))] use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures; use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph; use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router}; use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters}; +use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundOnionErr, NextPacketDetails}; use crate::ln::msgs; use crate::ln::onion_utils; -use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason; +use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING}; use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError}; #[cfg(test)] use crate::ln::outbound_payment; -use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs}; +use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration}; use crate::ln::wire::Encode; -use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner}; +use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder}; +use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError; +use crate::offers::merkle::SignError; +use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder}; +use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError; +use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder}; +use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message}; +use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider}; +use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner; use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate}; use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier}; use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid; @@ -97,47 +109,96 @@ use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript; // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent. +/// Routing info for an inbound HTLC onion. #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug -pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting { +pub enum PendingHTLCRouting { + /// A forwarded HTLC. Forward { + /// BOLT 4 onion packet. onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module. short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero eventually when we bump MSRV + /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path. + blinded: Option, }, + /// An HTLC paid to an invoice (supposedly) generated by us. + /// At this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually generated by us, + /// but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours. Receive { + /// Payment secret and total msat received. payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData, + /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info. payment_metadata: Option>, - incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed + /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC. + /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed. + incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, + /// Shared secret derived using a phantom node secret key. If this field is Some, the + /// payment was sent to a phantom node (one hop beyond the current node), but can be + /// settled by this node. phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info. custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec)>, }, + /// Incoming keysend (sender provided the preimage in a TLV). ReceiveKeysend { /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades. payment_data: Option, + /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be + /// used to settle the spontaneous payment. payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, + /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info. payment_metadata: Option>, - incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed + /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC. + /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed. + incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info. custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec)>, }, } +/// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path. +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub struct BlindedForward { + /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound + /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's + /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`]. + pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey, + // Another field will be added here when we support forwarding as a non-intro node. +} + +impl PendingHTLCRouting { + // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded. + fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option { + // TODO: needs update when we support receiving to multi-hop blinded paths + if let Self::Forward { blinded: Some(_), .. } = self { + Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) + } else { + None + } + } +} + +/// Full details of an incoming HTLC, including routing info. #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug -pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo { - pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting, - pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32], - payment_hash: PaymentHash, - /// Amount received - pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option, // Added in 0.0.113 +pub struct PendingHTLCInfo { + /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received. + pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting, + /// Shared secret from the previous hop. + /// Used encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC needs to be failed backwards. + pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32], + /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage. + pub payment_hash: PaymentHash, + /// Amount offered by this HTLC. + pub incoming_amt_msat: Option, // Added in 0.0.113 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received /// may overshoot this in either case) - pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64, - pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32, + pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64, + /// Outgoing timelock expiration blockheight. + pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32, /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed. - pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option, + pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option, } #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug @@ -176,6 +237,13 @@ pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo { }, } +// Used for failing blinded HTLCs backwards correctly. +#[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)] +enum BlindedFailure { + FromIntroductionNode, + // Another variant will be added here for non-intro nodes. +} + /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)] pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData { @@ -185,6 +253,7 @@ pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData { htlc_id: u64, incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32], phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, + blinded_failure: Option, // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel. @@ -229,6 +298,7 @@ impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC { user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0), cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry, value_msat: val.value, + counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0), } } } @@ -287,7 +357,7 @@ impl Readable for InterceptId { /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`]. pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId { PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 }, - OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey }, + OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] }, } impl SentHTLCId { pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self { @@ -297,7 +367,7 @@ impl SentHTLCId { htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id, }, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => - Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv }, + Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() }, } } } @@ -369,12 +439,6 @@ impl HTLCSource { } } -struct InboundOnionErr { - err_code: u16, - err_data: Vec, - msg: &'static str, -} - /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`]. /// @@ -447,16 +511,17 @@ impl MsgHandleErrInternal { } #[inline] fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self { + let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() }; + let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() { + // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we + // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest + // commitment upon reconnecting. + msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) } + } else { + msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg } + }; Self { - err: LightningError { - err: err.clone(), - action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { - msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { - channel_id, - data: err - }, - }, - }, + err: LightningError { err, action }, chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)), shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)), channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity) @@ -563,6 +628,7 @@ struct ClaimablePayments { /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied. +#[derive(Debug)] enum BackgroundEvent { /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel. /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the @@ -615,10 +681,34 @@ pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction { event: events::Event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>, }, + /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is + /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately + /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set. + /// + /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge + /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge + /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant + /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in + /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately. + /// + /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than + /// stored for later processing. + FreeOtherChannelImmediately { + downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, + downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, + blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction, + }, } impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction, (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) }, + // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free + // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here. + (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => { + (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required), + (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required), + (4, blocking_action, required), + }, (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => { (0, event, upgradable_required), // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was @@ -792,7 +882,8 @@ struct PendingInboundPayment { /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`]. /// -/// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings +/// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages. +#[cfg(not(c_bindings))] pub type SimpleArcChannelManager = ChannelManager< Arc, Arc, @@ -820,7 +911,8 @@ pub type SimpleArcChannelManager = ChannelManager< /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`]. /// -/// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings +/// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages. +#[cfg(not(c_bindings))] pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager< &'a M, @@ -863,7 +955,7 @@ pub trait AChannelManager { /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`]. type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized; /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`]. - type SignerProvider: SignerProvider + ?Sized; + type SignerProvider: SignerProvider + ?Sized; /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`]. type SP: Deref; /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`]. @@ -885,7 +977,7 @@ pub trait AChannelManager { impl AChannelManager for ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, ES::Target: EntropySource, NS::Target: NodeSigner, @@ -902,7 +994,7 @@ where type ES = ES; type NodeSigner = NS::Target; type NS = NS; - type Signer = ::Signer; + type Signer = ::EcdsaSigner; type SignerProvider = SP::Target; type SP = SP; type FeeEstimator = F::Target; @@ -978,6 +1070,8 @@ where // // Lock order tree: // +// `pending_offers_messages` +// // `total_consistency_lock` // | // |__`forward_htlcs` @@ -985,30 +1079,30 @@ where // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs` // | // |__`per_peer_state` -// | | -// | |__`pending_inbound_payments` -// | | -// | |__`claimable_payments` -// | | -// | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds -// | | -// | |__`peer_state` -// | | -// | |__`id_to_peer` -// | | -// | |__`short_to_chan_info` -// | | -// | |__`outbound_scid_aliases` -// | | -// | |__`best_block` -// | | -// | |__`pending_events` -// | | -// | |__`pending_background_events` +// | +// |__`pending_inbound_payments` +// | +// |__`claimable_payments` +// | +// |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds +// | +// |__`peer_state` +// | +// |__`id_to_peer` +// | +// |__`short_to_chan_info` +// | +// |__`outbound_scid_aliases` +// | +// |__`best_block` +// | +// |__`pending_events` +// | +// |__`pending_background_events` // pub struct ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, ES::Target: EntropySource, NS::Target: NodeSigner, @@ -1018,7 +1112,7 @@ where L::Target: Logger, { default_configuration: UserConfig, - genesis_hash: BlockHash, + chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, @@ -1216,6 +1310,8 @@ where event_persist_notifier: Notifier, needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool, + pending_offers_messages: Mutex>>, + entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, @@ -2012,7 +2108,7 @@ macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event { macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion { ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { { let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger, - &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration, + &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration, $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()); let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(); let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() { @@ -2221,7 +2317,7 @@ macro_rules! process_events_body { impl ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, ES::Target: EntropySource, NS::Target: NodeSigner, @@ -2258,7 +2354,7 @@ where let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material); ChannelManager { default_configuration: config.clone(), - genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(), + chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network), fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est), chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, @@ -2296,6 +2392,8 @@ where needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false), funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()), + pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), + entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, @@ -2317,7 +2415,7 @@ where if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias outbound_scid_alias += 1; } else { - outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source); + outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source); } if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; @@ -2347,6 +2445,9 @@ where /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload). /// + /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the + /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you. + /// /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after @@ -2357,7 +2458,7 @@ where /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id - pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option) -> Result { + pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option, override_config: Option) -> Result { if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 { return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) }); } @@ -2372,13 +2473,20 @@ where .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?; let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + + if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id { + if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) { + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)}); + } + } + let channel = { let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(); let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features; let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration }; match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, - self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias) + self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id) { Ok(res) => res, Err(e) => { @@ -2387,7 +2495,7 @@ where }, } }; - let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone()); + let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash); let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id(); match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) { @@ -2559,7 +2667,7 @@ where let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self); let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>; - let mut shutdown_result = None; + let shutdown_result; loop { let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); @@ -2574,10 +2682,11 @@ where if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() { let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo(); let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features; - let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(); - let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = + let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs, local_shutdown_result) = chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?; failed_htlcs = htlcs; + shutdown_result = local_shutdown_result; + debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown()); // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor` // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a @@ -2605,7 +2714,6 @@ where }); } self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed); - shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid)); } } break; @@ -2640,11 +2748,11 @@ where /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain. /// - /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and - /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee - /// estimate. + /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and + /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] + /// fee estimate. /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing - /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which + /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however. /// @@ -2656,8 +2764,8 @@ where /// channel. /// /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis - /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background - /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal + /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum + /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> { self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None) @@ -2671,8 +2779,8 @@ where /// the channel being closed or not: /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by - /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee - /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater). + /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] + /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater). /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower). @@ -2690,29 +2798,27 @@ where /// channel. /// /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis - /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background - /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal + /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option, shutdown_script: Option) -> Result<(), APIError> { self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script) } - fn finish_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) { + fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) { debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread); #[cfg(debug_assertions)] for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() { debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread); } - let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid) = shutdown_res; - log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len()); - for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) { + log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len()); + for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) { let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source; let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8); let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id }; self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver); } - if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option { + if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update { // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to @@ -2720,7 +2826,7 @@ where let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update); } let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new(); - if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid { + if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid { let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap(); let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten(); let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); @@ -2814,8 +2920,8 @@ where peer_state.pending_msg_events.push( events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id: counterparty_node_id, - action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { - msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() } + action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { + msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }) }, } ); @@ -2862,236 +2968,45 @@ where } } - fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info( - &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32], - new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32], - next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option> - ) -> Result { - debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some()); - let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket { - version: 0, - public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)), - hop_data: new_packet_bytes, - hmac: hop_hmac, - }; - - let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data { - msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } => - (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value), - msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } => - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", - err_code: 0x4000 | 22, - err_data: Vec::new(), - }), - }; - - Ok(PendingHTLCInfo { - routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { - onion_packet: outgoing_packet, - short_channel_id, - }, - payment_hash: msg.payment_hash, - incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret, - incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat), - outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward, - outgoing_cltv_value, - skimmed_fee_msat: None, - }) - } - - fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info( - &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash, - amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool, - counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option, - ) -> Result { - let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data { - msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { - payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, .. - } => - (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata), - msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { - amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, .. - } => { - let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat }; - (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None) - } - msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 0x4000|22, - err_data: Vec::new(), - msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", - }) - }, - }; - // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry - if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender", - err_code: 18, - err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec() - }) - } - // final_expiry_too_soon - // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure - // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go. - // - // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our - // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a - // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale). - let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); - if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 { - let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12); - err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes()); - err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes()); - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data, - msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", - }); - } - if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) || - (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > - amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0))) - { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 19, - err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(), - msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", - }); - } - - let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage { - // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this - // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X - // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route - // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing - // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X. - let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()); - if hashed_preimage != payment_hash { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 0x4000|22, - err_data: Vec::new(), - msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", - }); - } - if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 0x4000|22, - err_data: Vec::new(), - msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments", - }); - } - PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { - payment_data, - payment_preimage, - payment_metadata, - incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value, - custom_tlvs, - } - } else if let Some(data) = payment_data { - PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { - payment_data: data, - payment_metadata, - incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value, - phantom_shared_secret, - custom_tlvs, - } - } else { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3, - err_data: Vec::new(), - msg: "We require payment_secrets", - }); - }; - Ok(PendingHTLCInfo { - routing, - payment_hash, - incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret, - incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat), - outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat, - outgoing_cltv_value, - skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, - }) - } - fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion( &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC - ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option>), HTLCFailureMsg> { - macro_rules! return_malformed_err { - ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => { - { - log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); - return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC { - channel_id: msg.channel_id, - htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, - sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(), - failure_code: $err_code, - })); - } - } - } - - if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key { - return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6); - } - - let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh( - Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None - ).unwrap().secret_bytes(); + ) -> Result< + (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option>), HTLCFailureMsg + > { + let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion( + msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx + )?; + + let is_blinded = match next_hop { + onion_utils::Hop::Forward { + next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward { .. }, .. + } => true, + _ => false, // TODO: update this when we support receiving to multi-hop blinded paths + }; - if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 { - //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other - //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way, - //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the - //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the - //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the - //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there... - return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4); - } macro_rules! return_err { ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => { { log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); + let (err_code, err_data) = if is_blinded { + (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..]) + } else { ($err_code, $data) }; return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id: msg.channel_id, htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, - reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec()) + reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec()) .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None), })); } } } - let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop( - shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, - msg.payment_hash, &self.node_signer - ) { - Ok(res) => res, - Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => { - return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code); - }, - Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => { - return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]); - }, - }; - let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop { - onion_utils::Hop::Forward { - next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { - short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value - }, .. - } => { - let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, - msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret); - (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk)) - }, - // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the - // inbound channel's state. - onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)), - onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } | - onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } => - { - return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]); - } + let NextPacketDetails { + next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value + } = match next_packet_details_opt { + Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details, + // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks + None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)), }; // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we @@ -3103,8 +3018,8 @@ where // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a // phantom or an intercept. if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs && - fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) || - fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash) + fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) || + fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash) { None } else { @@ -3168,38 +3083,22 @@ where } chan_update_opt } else { - if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { - // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not - // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update - // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure. - break Some(( - "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", - 0x2000 | 2, None, - )); - } None }; let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1; - // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, - // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see - // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale). - if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon - break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt)); - } - if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far - break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None)); - } - // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our - // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with - // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and - // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline. - // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure - // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it, - // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our - // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments. - if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 { - break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt)); + + if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv( + cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry + ) { + if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() { + // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not + // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update + // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure. + break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None)) + } + let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None }; + break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt)); } break None; @@ -3229,7 +3128,7 @@ where } return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]); } - Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) + Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey))) } fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>( @@ -3252,8 +3151,10 @@ where match decoded_hop { onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => { // OUR PAYMENT! - match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, - msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat) + let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, + msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat, + current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend) { Ok(info) => { // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc @@ -3266,7 +3167,7 @@ where } }, onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => { - match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, + match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) { Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info), Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data) @@ -3332,7 +3233,7 @@ where }; let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { - chain_hash: self.genesis_hash, + chain_hash: self.chain_hash, short_channel_id, timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(), flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1), @@ -3378,12 +3279,10 @@ where let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(); let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted"); - let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv) - .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?; - let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?; - - let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash) - .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?; + let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion( + &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, + payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed + )?; let err: Result<(), _> = loop { let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) { @@ -3540,6 +3439,17 @@ where self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata); } + pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> { + let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self); + self.pending_outbound_payments + .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice( + invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), + || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, + best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events, + |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args) + ) + } /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before @@ -3554,10 +3464,20 @@ where /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to /// determine the ultimate status of a payment. /// + /// # Requested Invoices + /// + /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning + /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`] + /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated + /// once the invoice has been received. + /// /// # Restart Behavior /// /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the - /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated. + /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for + /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]. + /// + /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self); self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events); @@ -3740,7 +3660,7 @@ where let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; - let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) { + let (chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) { Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => { let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?; @@ -3779,10 +3699,12 @@ where }), }; - peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { - node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), - msg, - }); + if let Some(msg) = msg_opt { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { + node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), + msg, + }); + } match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?"); @@ -3844,7 +3766,7 @@ where /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to /// each individual channel and transaction output. /// - /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transcaction + /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's /// signature for each channel. /// @@ -3873,7 +3795,10 @@ where // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom. - if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 { + if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && + funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() && + funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1 + { result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned() })); @@ -3898,7 +3823,7 @@ where btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())), } }); - for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels.iter() { + for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels { result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern( temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, @@ -4113,10 +4038,14 @@ where err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.", next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id) }), - None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { - err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", - next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id) - }) + None => { + let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", + next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id); + log_error!(self.logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error); + return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { + err: error + }) + } } }; @@ -4126,8 +4055,10 @@ where })?; let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing { - PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => { - PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid } + PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => { + PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { + onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid + } }, _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted }; @@ -4171,6 +4102,7 @@ where htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret: None, + blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(), }); let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10); @@ -4219,6 +4151,7 @@ where htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss, + blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(), }); let reason = if $next_hop_unknown { @@ -4248,9 +4181,9 @@ where } } } - if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing { + if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing { let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode); - if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) { + if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) { let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes(); let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop( phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, @@ -4258,7 +4191,7 @@ where ) { Ok(res) => res, Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => { - let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner(); + let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array(); // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256 @@ -4271,9 +4204,11 @@ where }; match next_hop { onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => { - match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, + let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, - outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None) + outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None, + current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend) { Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])), Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) @@ -4298,8 +4233,9 @@ where } } } - let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) { - Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()), + let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned(); + let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt { + Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id), None => { forwarding_channel_not_found!(); continue; @@ -4320,7 +4256,9 @@ where prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, - routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, .. + routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { + onion_packet, blinded, .. + }, skimmed_fee_msat, .. }, }) => { log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id); @@ -4332,10 +4270,19 @@ where incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive. phantom_shared_secret: None, + blinded_failure: blinded.map(|_| BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode), + }); + let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| { + let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh( + Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None + ).unwrap().secret_bytes(); + onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey( + &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss + ).ok() }); if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), - onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator, + onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) { if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e { @@ -4386,6 +4333,7 @@ where skimmed_fee_msat, .. } }) => { + let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure(); let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing { PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => { let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone()); @@ -4415,6 +4363,7 @@ where htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, + blinded_failure, }, // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete @@ -4445,6 +4394,7 @@ where htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, + blinded_failure: None, }), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data), HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash }, @@ -4754,8 +4704,8 @@ where PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || { let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; - let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal); - let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum); + let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee); + let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee); let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { @@ -4765,9 +4715,9 @@ where |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None } ) { let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { - min_mempool_feerate + anchor_feerate } else { - normal_feerate + non_anchor_feerate }; let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate); if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; } @@ -4789,6 +4739,10 @@ where /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`]. /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels. /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner. + /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled + /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time. + /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time + /// minus two hours in `no-std`. /// /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate /// estimate fetches. @@ -4799,8 +4753,8 @@ where PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || { let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; - let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal); - let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum); + let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee); + let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee); let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new(); let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new(); @@ -4847,9 +4801,9 @@ where match phase { ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => { let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { - min_mempool_feerate + anchor_feerate } else { - normal_feerate + non_anchor_feerate }; let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate); if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; } @@ -5017,7 +4971,18 @@ where self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res); } - self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(&self.pending_events); + #[cfg(feature = "std")] + let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now() + .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH) + .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH"); + #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))] + let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs( + self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64 + ); + + self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments( + duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events + ); // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task @@ -5193,9 +5158,23 @@ where &self.pending_events, &self.logger) { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); } }, - HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error); - let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret); + HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { + ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, + ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, ref blinded_failure, .. + }) => { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}", + if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error); + let err_packet = match blinded_failure { + Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => { + let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]); + blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet( + incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret + ) + }, + None => { + onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret) + } + }; let mut push_forward_ev = false; let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap(); @@ -5263,7 +5242,7 @@ where } fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) { - let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()); + let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array()); let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self); @@ -5357,8 +5336,11 @@ where for htlc in sources.drain(..) { if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop( htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage, - |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })) - { + |_, definitely_duplicate| { + debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment"); + Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }) + } + ) { if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action { // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain). @@ -5386,7 +5368,7 @@ where } } - fn claim_funds_from_hop) -> Option>(&self, + fn claim_funds_from_hop, bool) -> Option>(&self, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc) -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> { //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay! @@ -5396,6 +5378,11 @@ where // `BackgroundEvent`s. let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire); + // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that + // the required mutexes are not held before we start. + debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread); + debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread); + { let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(); @@ -5417,25 +5404,70 @@ where let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(); let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger); - if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res { - if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}", - chan_id, action); - peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action); + match fulfill_res { + UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => { + if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}", + chan_id, action); + peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action); + } + if !during_init { + handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, + peer_state, per_peer_state, chan); + } else { + // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - + // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the + // monitor update as a background event. + self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push( + BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { + counterparty_node_id, + funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint, + update: monitor_update.clone(), + }); + } } - if !during_init { - handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, - peer_state, per_peer_state, chan); - } else { - // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - - // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the - // monitor update as a background event. - self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push( - BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { - counterparty_node_id, - funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint, - update: monitor_update.clone(), - }); + UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => { + let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) { + action + } else { + return Ok(()); + }; + mem::drop(peer_state_lock); + + log_trace!(self.logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}", + chan_id, action); + let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) = + if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { + downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id, + downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint, + blocking_action: blocker, + } = action { + (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) + } else { + debug_assert!(false, + "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately"); + return Ok(()); + }; + if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) { + let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap(); + if let Some(blockers) = peer_state + .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates + .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) + { + let mut found_blocker = false; + blockers.retain(|iter| { + // Note that we could actually be blocked, in + // which case we need to only remove the one + // blocker which was added duplicatively. + let first_blocker = !found_blocker; + if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; } + *iter != blocker || !first_blocker + }); + debug_assert!(found_blocker); + } + } else { + debug_assert!(false); + } } } } @@ -5483,7 +5515,7 @@ where // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in // `PaymentForwarded`). - self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None)); + self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false)); Ok(()) } @@ -5513,13 +5545,84 @@ where HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => { let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint; let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data); + #[cfg(debug_assertions)] + let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint; let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage, - |htlc_claim_value_msat| { - if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat { - let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat { - Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value) - } else { None }; + |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| { + let chan_to_release = + if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id { + Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker)) + } else { + // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a + // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we + // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream + // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already + // closed. + None + }; + if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay { + // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to + // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't + // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete + // in the background. + #[cfg(debug_assertions)] { + let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(); + // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending... + assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| { + match ev { + // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel, + BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { + funding_txo, update, .. + } => { + if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint { + assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd| + if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { + payment_preimage: update_preimage + } = upd { + payment_preimage == *update_preimage + } else { false } + ), "{:?}", update); + true + } else { false } + }, + // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed, + BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup( + (funding_txo, monitor_update) + ) => { + if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint { + assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1); + assert!(matches!( + monitor_update.updates[0], + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } + )); + true + } else { false } + }, + // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock + // immediately once we get going. + BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { + channel_id, .. + } => + *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), + } + }), "{:?}", *background_events); + } + None + } else if definitely_duplicate { + if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release { + Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { + downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0, + downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1, + blocking_action: other_chan.2, + }) + } else { None } + } else { + let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat { + if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat { + Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value) + } else { None } + } else { None }; Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, @@ -5528,19 +5631,9 @@ where next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()), outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat, }, - downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: - if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id { - Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker)) - } else { - // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a - // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we - // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream - // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already - // closed. - None - }, + downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release, }) - } else { None } + } }); if let Err((pk, err)) = res { let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err); @@ -5556,6 +5649,10 @@ where } fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions>(&self, actions: I) { + debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread); + debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread); + debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread); + for action in actions.into_iter() { match action { MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => { @@ -5585,6 +5682,15 @@ where self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker)); } }, + MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { + downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action, + } => { + self.handle_monitor_update_release( + downstream_counterparty_node_id, + downstream_funding_outpoint, + Some(blocking_action), + ); + }, } } } @@ -5876,7 +5982,7 @@ where fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are // likely to be lost on restart! - if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash { + if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())); } @@ -6024,7 +6130,7 @@ where let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; - let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) = + let (chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) { Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => { match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) { @@ -6047,9 +6153,12 @@ where None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)) }; - match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) { + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { - Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id)) + Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close( + "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), + chan.context.channel_id() + )) }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap(); @@ -6057,7 +6166,7 @@ where hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close( "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(), - funding_msg.channel_id)) + chan.context.channel_id())) }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => { let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor); @@ -6069,10 +6178,12 @@ where // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready // until we have persisted our monitor. - peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { - node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), - msg: funding_msg, - }); + if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), + msg, + }); + } if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) { handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state, @@ -6083,9 +6194,13 @@ where Ok(()) } else { log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated"); + let channel_id = match funding_msg_opt { + Some(msg) => msg.channel_id, + None => chan.context.channel_id(), + }; return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close( "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(), - funding_msg.channel_id)); + channel_id)); } } } @@ -6141,7 +6256,7 @@ where hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => { if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() { let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer, - self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry); + self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry); if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt { log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id()); peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { @@ -6247,22 +6362,20 @@ where } fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let mut shutdown_result = None; - let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid; let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) .ok_or_else(|| { debug_assert!(false); MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) })?; - let (tx, chan_option) = { + let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = { let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => { if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() { - unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(); - let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry); + let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry); + debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown()); if let Some(msg) = closing_signed { peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), @@ -6275,8 +6388,8 @@ where // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to // watch for old state broadcasts)! - (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry))) - } else { (tx, None) } + (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result) + } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) } } else { return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close( "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry); @@ -6298,7 +6411,6 @@ where }); } self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); - shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid)); } mem::drop(per_peer_state); if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result { @@ -6343,8 +6455,12 @@ where // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding. match pending_forward_info { - PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => { - let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 { + PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { + ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, .. + }) => { + let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() { + HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]) + } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 { let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan); HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data) } else { @@ -6521,9 +6637,9 @@ where }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() && - fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash) + fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash) { - let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner()); + let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array()); let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap(); match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) { hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { @@ -6546,6 +6662,7 @@ where htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret: None, + blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(), }); failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, @@ -6714,7 +6831,7 @@ where peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures( - &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), + &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg, &self.default_configuration ), chan_phase_entry), // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced, @@ -6790,7 +6907,10 @@ where let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) .ok_or_else(|| { debug_assert!(false); - MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close( + format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), + msg.channel_id + ) })?; let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; @@ -6802,7 +6922,7 @@ where // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here. let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish( - msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, + msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry); let mut channel_update = None; if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg { @@ -6834,7 +6954,39 @@ where "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry); } }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { + log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure", + log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0)); + // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors + // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119). + // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by + // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They + // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an + // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`. + // + // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we + // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it + // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus + // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to + // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from + // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the + // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction. + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { + node_id: *counterparty_node_id, + msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish { + channel_id: msg.channel_id, + next_local_commitment_number: 0, + next_remote_commitment_number: 0, + your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32], + my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(), + next_funding_txid: None, + }, + }); + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close( + format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", + counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) + ) + } } }; @@ -6898,8 +7050,8 @@ where self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed); pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), - action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { - msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() } + action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { + msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }) }, }); } @@ -6979,6 +7131,66 @@ where has_update } + /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer + /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later. + /// + /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be + /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel. + /// + /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner + #[cfg(test)] // This is only implemented for one signer method, and should be private until we + // actually finish implementing it fully. + pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self); + + let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec| { + let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id(); + if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { + let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger); + if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { + node_id, + updates, + }); + } + if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { + node_id, + msg, + }); + } + if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_created { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { + node_id, + msg, + }); + } + if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready { + send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg); + } + } + }; + + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt { + if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) { + unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events); + } + } + } else { + for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() { + unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events); + } + } + } + } + /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed. /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated. @@ -6996,15 +7208,18 @@ where peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| { match phase { ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => { - let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(); match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) { - Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => { + Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => { if let Some(msg) = msg_opt { has_update = true; pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg, }); } + debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown()); + if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt { + shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result); + } if let Some(tx) = tx_opt { // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast. @@ -7019,7 +7234,6 @@ where log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx)); self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]); update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context); - shutdown_results.push((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid)); false } else { true } }, @@ -7060,7 +7274,7 @@ where // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization, // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally. - if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() { + if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() { assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1); if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] { assert!(should_broadcast); @@ -7074,6 +7288,288 @@ where } } + /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the + /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will + /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder. + /// + /// # Privacy + /// + /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the + /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently, + /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction + /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`]. + /// + /// # Limitations + /// + /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s + /// reply path. + /// + /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics. + /// + /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer + /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest + pub fn create_offer_builder( + &self, description: String + ) -> OfferBuilder { + let node_id = self.get_our_node_id(); + let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key; + let entropy = &*self.entropy_source; + let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx; + let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path(); + + OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx) + .chain_hash(self.chain_hash) + .path(path) + } + + /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the + /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund. + /// + /// # Payment + /// + /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund. + /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent. + /// + /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the + /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen + /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has + /// expired. + /// + /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the + /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail + /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]. + /// + /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from + /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied. + /// + /// # Privacy + /// + /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as + /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the + /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node + /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`]. + /// + /// # Limitations + /// + /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding + /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]. + /// + /// # Errors + /// + /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link + /// or if `amount_msats` is invalid. + /// + /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics. + /// + /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund + /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice + /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths + pub fn create_refund_builder( + &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, + payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option + ) -> Result, Bolt12SemanticError> { + let node_id = self.get_our_node_id(); + let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key; + let entropy = &*self.entropy_source; + let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx; + let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path(); + + let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id( + description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id + )? + .chain_hash(self.chain_hash) + .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry) + .path(path); + + let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry); + self.pending_outbound_payments + .add_new_awaiting_invoice( + payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat, + ) + .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?; + + Ok(builder) + } + + /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and + /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual + /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received. + /// + /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by + /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request. + /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`: + /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if + /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`. + /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and + /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]. + /// + /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from + /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied. + /// + /// # Payment + /// + /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request + /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has + /// been sent. + /// + /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the + /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the + /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]. + /// + /// # Privacy + /// + /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] + /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the + /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node + /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`]. + /// + /// # Limitations + /// + /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to + /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding + /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]. + /// + /// # Errors + /// + /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link + /// or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer. + /// + /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest + /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity + /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note + /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder + /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice + /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths + /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments + pub fn pay_for_offer( + &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option, amount_msats: Option, + payer_note: Option, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, + max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option + ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> { + let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key; + let entropy = &*self.entropy_source; + let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx; + + let builder = offer + .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)? + .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?; + let builder = match quantity { + None => builder, + Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?, + }; + let builder = match amount_msats { + None => builder, + Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?, + }; + let builder = match payer_note { + None => builder, + Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note), + }; + + let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?; + let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path(); + + let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1); + self.pending_outbound_payments + .add_new_awaiting_invoice( + payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat + ) + .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?; + + let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap(); + if offer.paths().is_empty() { + let message = new_pending_onion_message( + OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request), + Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()), + Some(reply_path), + ); + pending_offers_messages.push(message); + } else { + // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound). + // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only + // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received. + const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10; + for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) { + let message = new_pending_onion_message( + OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()), + Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()), + Some(reply_path.clone()), + ); + pending_offers_messages.push(message); + } + } + + Ok(()) + } + + /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion + /// message. + /// + /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a + /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding + /// [`PaymentPreimage`]. + /// + /// # Limitations + /// + /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to + /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each + /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be + /// received and no retries will be made. + /// + /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice + pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> { + let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key; + let entropy = &*self.entropy_source; + let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx; + + let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats(); + let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32; + + match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) { + Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => { + let payment_paths = vec![ + self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret), + ]; + #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))] + let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys( + payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy + )?; + #[cfg(feature = "no-std")] + let created_at = Duration::from_secs( + self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + ); + #[cfg(feature = "no-std")] + let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std( + payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy + )?; + let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?; + let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path(); + + let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap(); + if refund.paths().is_empty() { + let message = new_pending_onion_message( + OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice), + Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()), + Some(reply_path), + ); + pending_offers_messages.push(message); + } else { + for path in refund.paths() { + let message = new_pending_onion_message( + OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()), + Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()), + Some(reply_path.clone()), + ); + pending_offers_messages.push(message); + } + } + + Ok(()) + }, + Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount), + } + } + /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing /// to pay us. /// @@ -7174,6 +7670,37 @@ where inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key) } + /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction + /// node. + fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath { + let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref(); + let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx; + BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap() + } + + /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction + /// node. + fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path( + &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret + ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) { + let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref(); + let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx; + + let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id(); + let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS; + let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs { + payment_secret, + payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints { + max_cltv_expiry, + htlc_minimum_msat: 1, + }, + }; + // TODO: Err for overflow? + BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment( + payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx + ).unwrap() + } + /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints. /// @@ -7182,7 +7709,7 @@ where let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap(); loop { - let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source); + let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source); // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel. match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) { Some(_) => continue, @@ -7212,7 +7739,7 @@ where let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap(); loop { - let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source); + let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source); // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel. if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue } return scid_candidate @@ -7356,7 +7883,7 @@ where impl MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, ES::Target: EntropySource, NS::Target: NodeSigner, @@ -7418,7 +7945,7 @@ where impl EventsProvider for ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, ES::Target: EntropySource, NS::Target: NodeSigner, @@ -7439,7 +7966,7 @@ where impl chain::Listen for ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, ES::Target: EntropySource, NS::Target: NodeSigner, @@ -7448,7 +7975,7 @@ where R::Target: Router, L::Target: Logger, { - fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) { + fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) { { let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap(); assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash, @@ -7461,7 +7988,7 @@ where self.best_block_updated(header, height); } - fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) { + fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events( self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist }); @@ -7475,13 +8002,13 @@ where *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height) } - self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)); + self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)); } } impl chain::Confirm for ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, ES::Target: EntropySource, NS::Target: NodeSigner, @@ -7490,7 +8017,7 @@ where R::Target: Router, L::Target: Logger, { - fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) { + fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) { // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases. // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more. @@ -7501,17 +8028,17 @@ where let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events( self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist }); - self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger) + self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger) .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b))); let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); if height < last_best_block_height { let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire); - self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)); + self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)); } } - fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) { + fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) { // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases. // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more. @@ -7524,7 +8051,7 @@ where self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist }); *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height); - self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)); + self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)); macro_rules! max_time { ($timestamp: expr) => { @@ -7549,14 +8076,17 @@ where }); } - fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option)> { + fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option)> { let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len()); for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() { let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) { - if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) { - res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash))); + let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo(); + let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(); + let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(); + if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) { + res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash))); } } } @@ -7579,7 +8109,7 @@ where impl ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, ES::Target: EntropySource, NS::Target: NodeSigner, @@ -7644,7 +8174,7 @@ where msg: announcement_sigs, }); if let Some(height) = height_opt { - if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) { + if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) { pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: announcement, // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced, @@ -7683,10 +8213,12 @@ where self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason); pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), - action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { - channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(), - data: reason_message, - } }, + action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { + msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { + channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(), + data: reason_message, + }) + }, }); return false; } @@ -7727,6 +8259,7 @@ where incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret: None, outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint, + blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(), }); let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing { @@ -7777,35 +8310,41 @@ where self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone() } - /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by + /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by /// [`ChannelManager`]. pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures { provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration) } - /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by + /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by /// [`ChannelManager`]. /// /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice" /// or not. Thus, this method is not public. #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))] - pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures { - provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration) + pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures { + provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration) + } + + /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by + /// [`ChannelManager`]. + fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures { + provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration) } - /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by + /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by /// [`ChannelManager`]. pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures { provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration) } - /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by + /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by /// [`ChannelManager`]. pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures { provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration) } - /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by + /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by /// [`ChannelManager`]. pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures { provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration) @@ -7815,7 +8354,7 @@ where impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, ES::Target: EntropySource, NS::Target: NodeSigner, @@ -7890,6 +8429,30 @@ where }); } + fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) { + let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close( + "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(), + msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id); + } + + fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) { + let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close( + "Splicing not supported".to_owned(), + msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id); + } + + fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) { + let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close( + "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(), + msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id); + } + + fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) { + let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close( + "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(), + msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id); + } + fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self); let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); @@ -8058,6 +8621,12 @@ where // Common Channel Establishment &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false, &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false, + // Quiescence + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false, + // Splicing + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false, // Interactive Transaction Construction &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false, &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false, @@ -8254,7 +8823,7 @@ where let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { - if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) { + if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) { peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { node_id: *counterparty_node_id, msg, @@ -8277,8 +8846,8 @@ where provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration) } - fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option> { - Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])]) + fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option> { + Some(vec![self.chain_hash]) } fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) { @@ -8336,7 +8905,128 @@ where } } -/// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by +impl +OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager +where + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, + T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + ES::Target: EntropySource, + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + R::Target: Router, + L::Target: Logger, +{ + fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option { + let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx; + let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key; + + match message { + OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => { + let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::::amount_msats( + &invoice_request + ) { + Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats), + Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())), + }; + let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) { + Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request, + Err(()) => { + let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata; + return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())); + }, + }; + let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32; + + match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) { + Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => { + let payment_paths = vec![ + self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret), + ]; + #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))] + let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys( + payment_paths, payment_hash + ); + #[cfg(feature = "no-std")] + let created_at = Duration::from_secs( + self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + ); + #[cfg(feature = "no-std")] + let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std( + payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at + ); + match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) { + Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)), + Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())), + } + }, + Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => { + let payment_paths = vec![ + self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret), + ]; + #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))] + let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash); + #[cfg(feature = "no-std")] + let created_at = Duration::from_secs( + self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + ); + #[cfg(feature = "no-std")] + let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std( + payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at + ); + let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build()) + .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into())) + .and_then(|invoice| + match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) { + Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)), + Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError( + InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string()) + )), + Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError( + InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string()) + )), + }); + match response { + Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice), + Err(error) => Some(error), + } + }, + Err(()) => { + Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into())) + }, + } + }, + OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => { + match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) { + Err(()) => { + Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned()))) + }, + Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => { + Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into())) + }, + Ok(payment_id) => { + if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e); + Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e)))) + } else { + None + } + }, + } + }, + OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error); + None + }, + } + } + + fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec> { + core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap()) + } +} + +/// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by /// [`ChannelManager`]. pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures { let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context(); @@ -8344,29 +9034,35 @@ pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures { node_features } -/// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by +/// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by /// [`ChannelManager`]. /// /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice" /// or not. Thus, this method is not public. #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))] -pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures { +pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures { provided_init_features(config).to_context() } -/// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by +/// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by +/// [`ChannelManager`]. +pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures { + provided_init_features(config).to_context() +} + +/// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by /// [`ChannelManager`]. pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures { provided_init_features(config).to_context() } -/// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by +/// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by /// [`ChannelManager`]. pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures { ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config)) } -/// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by +/// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by /// [`ChannelManager`]. pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures { // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we @@ -8527,9 +9223,14 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, { (6, real_node_pubkey, required), }); +impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, { + (0, inbound_blinding_point, required), +}); + impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting, (0, Forward) => { (0, onion_packet, required), + (1, blinded, option), (2, short_channel_id, required), }, (1, Receive) => { @@ -8631,10 +9332,15 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ; (1, Fail), ); +impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure, + (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {}, ; +); + impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, { (0, short_channel_id, required), (1, phantom_shared_secret, option), (2, outpoint, required), + (3, blinded_failure, option), (4, htlc_id, required), (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required), (7, user_channel_id, option), @@ -8809,7 +9515,7 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, { impl Writeable for ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, ES::Target: EntropySource, NS::Target: NodeSigner, @@ -8823,7 +9529,7 @@ where write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION); - self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?; + self.chain_hash.write(writer)?; { let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap(); best_block.height().write(writer)?; @@ -9113,7 +9819,7 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState, /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, ES::Target: EntropySource, NS::Target: NodeSigner, @@ -9172,13 +9878,13 @@ where /// this struct. /// /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings - pub channel_monitors: HashMap::Signer>>, + pub channel_monitors: HashMap::EcdsaSigner>>, } impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, ES::Target: EntropySource, NS::Target: NodeSigner, @@ -9191,7 +9897,7 @@ where /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to /// populate a HashMap directly from C. pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig, - mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<::Signer>>) -> Self { + mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self { Self { entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config, channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect() @@ -9204,7 +9910,7 @@ where impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ReadableArgs> for (BlockHash, Arc>) where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, ES::Target: EntropySource, NS::Target: NodeSigner, @@ -9222,7 +9928,7 @@ where impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ReadableArgs> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager) where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, ES::Target: EntropySource, NS::Target: NodeSigner, @@ -9234,7 +9940,7 @@ where fn read(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result { let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION); - let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?; + let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?; let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?; @@ -9277,16 +9983,16 @@ where log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.", &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number()); } - let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs, batch_funding_txid) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true); - if batch_funding_txid.is_some() { + let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true); + if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } - if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update { + if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update { close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update }); } - failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs); + failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs); channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(), user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(), @@ -9882,7 +10588,7 @@ where let mut outbound_scid_alias; loop { outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias - .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source); + .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source); if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; } } chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias); @@ -9989,6 +10695,9 @@ where // anymore. } } + if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action { + debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue"); + } } } peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions; @@ -9999,7 +10708,7 @@ where } let channel_manager = ChannelManager { - genesis_hash, + chain_hash, fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator, chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster, @@ -10039,6 +10748,8 @@ where funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()), + pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), + entropy_source: args.entropy_source, node_signer: args.node_signer, signer_provider: args.signer_provider, @@ -10078,7 +10789,7 @@ mod tests { use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason}; use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret}; use crate::ln::ChannelId; - use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId}; + use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId}; use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*; use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction}; use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler; @@ -10458,7 +11169,7 @@ mod tests { let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]); let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value( PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000); - let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone(); + let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph; let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels(); let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new(); let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); @@ -10503,7 +11214,7 @@ mod tests { let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]); let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value( PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000); - let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone(); + let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph; let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels(); let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new(); let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); @@ -10514,7 +11225,7 @@ mod tests { let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]); let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]); - let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner()); + let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array()); let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap(); nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, @@ -10639,14 +11350,14 @@ mod tests { let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); - nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap(); let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel); let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel); let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42); - let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner()); + let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array()); { // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`. @@ -10797,7 +11508,7 @@ mod tests { let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]); // Test the API functions. - check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key); + check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key); check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key); @@ -10852,7 +11563,7 @@ mod tests { // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us - nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap(); let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); let mut funding_tx = None; @@ -10939,7 +11650,7 @@ mod tests { open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id); // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed - nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); + nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap(); get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk); // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now @@ -10966,7 +11677,7 @@ mod tests { // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us - nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap(); let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER { @@ -10982,7 +11693,7 @@ mod tests { open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id); // but we can still open an outbound channel. - nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); + nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap(); get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail. @@ -11004,7 +11715,7 @@ mod tests { // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us - nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap(); let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge @@ -11080,9 +11791,11 @@ mod tests { }; // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender // intended amount, we fail the payment. + let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) = - node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), - sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)) + create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), + sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat), + current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend) { assert_eq!(err_code, 19); } else { panic!(); } @@ -11098,8 +11811,36 @@ mod tests { }), custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), }; - assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), - sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok()); + let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), + sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat), + current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok()); + } + + #[test] + fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){ + let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1); + let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg); + let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]); + let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr); + + let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { + amt_msat: 100, + outgoing_cltv_value: 22, + payment_metadata: None, + keysend_preimage: None, + payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData { + payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100, + }), + custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), + }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height, + node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend); + + // Should not return an error as this condition: + // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334 + // is not satisfied. + assert!(result.is_ok()); } #[test] @@ -11118,7 +11859,7 @@ mod tests { &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]); let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); - nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap(); let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg); @@ -11159,7 +11900,7 @@ mod tests { let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]); let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); - nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap(); let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx()); @@ -11267,6 +12008,67 @@ mod tests { let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]); assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a"); } + + #[test] + fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() { + let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg); + let user_config = test_default_channel_config(); + let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr); + + // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state. + let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1); + check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000); + { + let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); + check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx); + } + + // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them + // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from + // their side. + nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { + features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None + }, true).unwrap(); + nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { + features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None + }, false).unwrap(); + assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); + let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!( + nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() + ); + nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish); + + // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus + // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force + // close even if it was an lnd node. + let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2); + if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] { + assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0); + assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); + nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg); + } else { panic!() }; + check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1); + let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { + err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string() + }; + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000); + { + let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); + check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx); + } + } } #[cfg(ldk_bench)] @@ -11283,9 +12085,10 @@ pub mod bench { use crate::util::test_utils; use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure}; + use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime; use bitcoin::hashes::Hash; use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; - use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut}; + use bitcoin::{Block, Transaction, TxOut}; use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock}; @@ -11356,13 +12159,13 @@ pub mod bench { node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap(); - node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap(); + node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap(); node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id())); node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id())); let tx; if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) { - tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut { + tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut { value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script, }]}; node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap(); @@ -11431,11 +12234,11 @@ pub mod bench { macro_rules! send_payment { ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => { let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV) - .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap(); + .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap(); let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]); payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes()); payment_count += 1; - let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()); + let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array()); let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap(); $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),