X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannelmanager.rs;h=47d705fe625b4889d7d3da19681af0d4272b8807;hb=88a86d126f1bab0af8270a6388843dcc4a354e70;hp=a5f84abfdb3e2865505db43149fbdebde96ee71c;hpb=081ce7c843713a42803097a6d2dcf3631778beda;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index a5f84abf..47d705fe 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -413,6 +413,9 @@ struct PeerState { /// /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that /// here. +/// +/// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data +/// and instead encoding it in the payment secret. struct PendingInboundPayment { /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment payment_secret: PaymentSecret, @@ -449,6 +452,18 @@ pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment { /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled. Fulfilled { session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>, + payment_hash: Option, + }, + /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a + /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race + /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple + /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a + /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed. + /// + /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164 + Abandoned { + session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>, + payment_hash: PaymentHash, }, } @@ -465,6 +480,12 @@ impl PendingOutboundPayment { _ => false, } } + fn abandoned(&self) -> bool { + match self { + PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true, + _ => false, + } + } fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option { match self { PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(), @@ -472,15 +493,43 @@ impl PendingOutboundPayment { } } + fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option { + match self { + PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None, + PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash), + PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash, + PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash), + } + } + fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) { let mut session_privs = HashSet::new(); core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self { PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } | PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } | - PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } - => session_privs + PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } | + PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } + => session_privs, }); - *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs }; + let payment_hash = self.payment_hash(); + *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash }; + } + + fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> { + let mut session_privs = HashSet::new(); + let our_payment_hash; + core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self { + PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } | + PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => + return Err(()), + PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } | + PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => { + our_payment_hash = *payment_hash; + session_privs + }, + }); + *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash }; + Ok(()) } /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled @@ -488,7 +537,8 @@ impl PendingOutboundPayment { let remove_res = match self { PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } | PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } | - PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } => { + PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } | + PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => { session_privs.remove(session_priv) } }; @@ -511,7 +561,8 @@ impl PendingOutboundPayment { PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => { session_privs.insert(session_priv) } - PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false + PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false, + PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false, }; if insert_res { if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self { @@ -529,7 +580,8 @@ impl PendingOutboundPayment { match self { PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } | PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } | - PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } => { + PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } | + PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => { session_privs.len() } } @@ -786,6 +838,10 @@ const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRA #[allow(dead_code)] const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER; +/// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any +/// pending HTLCs in flight. +pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3; + /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel. #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)] pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo { @@ -855,17 +911,30 @@ pub struct ChannelDetails { pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option, /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound. pub user_channel_id: u64, + /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel. + /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this + /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close. + /// + /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose + /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include + /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent. + /// This does not consider any on-chain fees. + /// + /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] + pub balance_msat: u64, /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include - /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not + /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent. /// + /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] + /// /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we /// should be able to spend nearly this amount. pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64, /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not - /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not + /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs). /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this. @@ -1398,7 +1467,8 @@ impl ChannelMana let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap(); let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features; let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration }; - Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config)? + Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, + channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())? }, None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }), } @@ -1435,6 +1505,7 @@ impl ChannelMana res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len()); for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) { let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(); + let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat(); let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) = channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(); res.push(ChannelDetails { @@ -1449,6 +1520,7 @@ impl ChannelMana short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(), channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(), unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis, + balance_msat, inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat, user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(), @@ -1959,17 +2031,24 @@ impl ChannelMana break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap()))); } let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1; - // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty - // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational) + // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, + // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see + // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale). if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap()))); } if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None)); } - // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS. - // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay. - if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 { + // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our + // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with + // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and + // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline. + // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure + // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it, + // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our + // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments. + if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 { break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap()))); } @@ -2085,6 +2164,21 @@ impl ChannelMana Some(id) => id.clone(), }; + macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment { + () => { + let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { + session_privs: HashSet::new(), + pending_amt_msat: 0, + pending_fee_msat: Some(0), + payment_hash: *payment_hash, + payment_secret: *payment_secret, + starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), + total_msat: total_value, + }); + assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path)); + } + } + let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) { match { @@ -2094,7 +2188,7 @@ impl ChannelMana if !chan.get().is_live() { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()}); } - let send_res = break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit( + break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit( htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path: path.clone(), session_priv: session_priv.clone(), @@ -2103,20 +2197,7 @@ impl ChannelMana payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(), payee: payee.clone(), }, onion_packet, &self.logger), - channel_state, chan); - - let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { - session_privs: HashSet::new(), - pending_amt_msat: 0, - pending_fee_msat: Some(0), - payment_hash: *payment_hash, - payment_secret: *payment_secret, - starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), - total_msat: total_value, - }); - assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path)); - - send_res + channel_state, chan) } { Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => { if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { @@ -2126,8 +2207,10 @@ impl ChannelMana // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below. + insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above. return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed); } + insert_outbound_payment!(); log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { @@ -2142,7 +2225,7 @@ impl ChannelMana }, }); }, - None => {}, + None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); }, } } else { unreachable!(); } return Ok(()); @@ -2275,6 +2358,9 @@ impl ChannelMana } else { None }, }) } else if has_err { + // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into + // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all. + debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none()); Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect())) } else { Ok(payment_id) @@ -2285,10 +2371,12 @@ impl ChannelMana /// /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the - /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, or if the payment - /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success). + /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment + /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if + /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`]. /// /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] + /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> { const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10; for path in route.paths.iter() { @@ -2320,8 +2408,13 @@ impl ChannelMana })) }, PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => { - return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError { - err: "Payment already completed" + return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { + err: "Payment already completed".to_owned() + })); + }, + PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => { + return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { + err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned() })); }, } @@ -2334,6 +2427,37 @@ impl ChannelMana return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ()) } + /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur. + /// + /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id` + /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated, + /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining + /// pending HTLCs for this payment. + /// + /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still + /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to + /// determine the ultimate status of a payment. + /// + /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment + /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed + /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent + pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + + let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); + if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) { + if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() { + if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 { + self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed { + payment_id, + payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"), + }); + payment.remove(); + } + } + } + } + /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node @@ -2415,7 +2539,8 @@ impl ChannelMana /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]. /// - /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel. + /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided + /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`]. /// /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction @@ -2430,6 +2555,7 @@ impl ChannelMana /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction. /// /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady + /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); @@ -2633,7 +2759,7 @@ impl ChannelMana htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, }); - match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) { + match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) { Err(e) => { if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e { log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg); @@ -2872,7 +2998,6 @@ impl ChannelMana purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage, payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret, - user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id, }, amt: total_value, }); @@ -3160,22 +3285,28 @@ impl ChannelMana final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta, }) } else { None }; - self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push( - events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { - payment_id: Some(payment_id), - payment_hash, - rejected_by_dest: false, - network_update: None, - all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0, - path: path.clone(), - short_channel_id: None, - retry, - #[cfg(test)] - error_code: None, - #[cfg(test)] - error_data: None, - } - ); + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { + payment_id: Some(payment_id), + payment_hash, + rejected_by_dest: false, + network_update: None, + all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0, + path: path.clone(), + short_channel_id: None, + retry, + #[cfg(test)] + error_code: None, + #[cfg(test)] + error_data: None, + }); + if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 { + pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed { + payment_id, + payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"), + }); + payment.remove(); + } } } else { log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); @@ -3206,6 +3337,7 @@ impl ChannelMana session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]); let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); let mut all_paths_failed = false; + let mut full_failure_ev = None; if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) { if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) { log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); @@ -3217,6 +3349,13 @@ impl ChannelMana } if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 { all_paths_failed = true; + if payment.get().abandoned() { + full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed { + payment_id, + payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"), + }); + payment.remove(); + } } } else { log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); @@ -3232,7 +3371,8 @@ impl ChannelMana }) } else { None }; log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); - match &onion_error { + + let path_failure = match &onion_error { &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => { #[cfg(test)] let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone()); @@ -3241,22 +3381,20 @@ impl ChannelMana // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our // next-hop is needlessly blaming us! - self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push( - events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { - payment_id: Some(payment_id), - payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(), - rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable, - network_update, - all_paths_failed, - path: path.clone(), - short_channel_id, - retry, + events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { + payment_id: Some(payment_id), + payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(), + rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable, + network_update, + all_paths_failed, + path: path.clone(), + short_channel_id, + retry, #[cfg(test)] - error_code: onion_error_code, + error_code: onion_error_code, #[cfg(test)] - error_data: onion_error_data - } - ); + error_data: onion_error_data + } }, &HTLCFailReason::Reason { #[cfg(test)] @@ -3271,24 +3409,25 @@ impl ChannelMana // ChannelDetails. // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway. - self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push( - events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { - payment_id: Some(payment_id), - payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(), - rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1, - network_update: None, - all_paths_failed, - path: path.clone(), - short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id), - retry, + events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { + payment_id: Some(payment_id), + payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(), + rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1, + network_update: None, + all_paths_failed, + path: path.clone(), + short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id), + retry, #[cfg(test)] - error_code: Some(*failure_code), + error_code: Some(*failure_code), #[cfg(test)] - error_data: Some(data.clone()), - } - ); + error_data: Some(data.clone()), + } } - } + }; + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + pending_events.push(path_failure); + if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); } }, HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => { let err_packet = match onion_error { @@ -3326,19 +3465,21 @@ impl ChannelMana } } - /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and - /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you - /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true! + /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any + /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment. /// /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived` /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment. /// - /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event. + /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now + /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]. /// + /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash + /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool { let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()); @@ -3476,14 +3617,23 @@ impl ChannelMana } fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec) { + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); for source in sources.drain(..) { - if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, .. } = source { + if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source { let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32]; session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]); let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) { assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled()); - payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None); + if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) { + pending_events.push( + events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { + payment_id, + payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(), + path, + } + ); + } if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 { payment.remove(); } @@ -3500,9 +3650,21 @@ impl ChannelMana session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]); let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) { - let found_payment = !payment.get().is_fulfilled(); - let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat(); - payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled(); + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() { + let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()); + let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat(); + pending_events.push( + events::Event::PaymentSent { + payment_id: Some(payment_id), + payment_preimage, + payment_hash, + fee_paid_msat, + } + ); + payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled(); + } + if from_onchain { // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain. // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early, @@ -3510,22 +3672,21 @@ impl ChannelMana // restart. // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments // irrevocably fulfilled. - payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)); + if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) { + let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner())); + pending_events.push( + events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { + payment_id, + payment_hash, + path, + } + ); + } + if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 { payment.remove(); } } - if found_payment { - let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()); - self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push( - events::Event::PaymentSent { - payment_id: Some(payment_id), - payment_preimage, - payment_hash: payment_hash, - fee_paid_msat, - } - ); - } } else { log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0)); } @@ -3631,7 +3792,12 @@ impl ChannelMana return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())); } - let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration) + if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())); + } + + let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), + &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger) .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?; let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; @@ -4503,7 +4669,7 @@ impl ChannelMana } } - fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option, min_value_msat: Option, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result { + fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option, min_value_msat: Option, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result { assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); @@ -4513,7 +4679,8 @@ impl ChannelMana match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) { hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(PendingInboundPayment { - payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage, + payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage, + user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time - // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future. @@ -4545,12 +4712,12 @@ impl ChannelMana /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash - pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) { + pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) { let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()); (payment_hash, - self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id) + self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs) .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash")) } @@ -4564,12 +4731,6 @@ impl ChannelMana /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending. /// - /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to - /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and - /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply - /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events - /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere. - /// /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat` /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the @@ -4598,9 +4759,8 @@ impl ChannelMana /// /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived - /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id - pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result { - self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id) + pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result { + self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs) } #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))] @@ -4615,6 +4775,11 @@ impl ChannelMana pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool { !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty() } + + #[cfg(test)] + pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) { + self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear() + } } impl MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager @@ -4791,14 +4956,19 @@ where inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64 }); + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); - outbounds.retain(|_, payment| { - const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3; + outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| { if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true } - if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, .. } = payment { - return *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS > height - } - true + if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment { + if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height { + log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); + pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed { + payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash, + }); + false + } else { true } + } else { true } }); } @@ -4836,7 +5006,7 @@ where /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by /// the function. - fn do_chain_event) -> Result<(Option, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>> + fn do_chain_event) -> Result<(Option, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ClosureReason>> (&self, height_opt: Option, f: FN) { // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases. @@ -4881,7 +5051,7 @@ where } short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id()); } - } else if let Err(e) = res { + } else if let Err(reason) = res { if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { short_to_id.remove(&short_id); } @@ -4893,10 +5063,14 @@ where msg: update }); } - self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed); + let reason_message = format!("{}", reason); + self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason); pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), - action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }, + action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { + channel_id: channel.channel_id(), + data: reason_message, + } }, }); return false; } @@ -5535,6 +5709,7 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment, }, (1, Fulfilled) => { (0, session_privs, required), + (1, payment_hash, option), }, (2, Retryable) => { (0, session_privs, required), @@ -5545,6 +5720,10 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment, (8, pending_amt_msat, required), (10, starting_block_height, required), }, + (3, Abandoned) => { + (0, session_privs, required), + (2, payment_hash, required), + }, ); impl Writeable for ChannelManager @@ -5638,7 +5817,7 @@ impl Writeable f // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length. let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0; for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() { - if !outbound.is_fulfilled() { + if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() { num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64; } } @@ -5652,6 +5831,7 @@ impl Writeable f } } PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {}, + PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {}, } } @@ -5815,7 +5995,7 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); let mut channel_closures = Vec::new(); for _ in 0..channel_count { - let mut channel: Channel = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?; + let mut channel: Channel = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?; let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?; funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone()); if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) { @@ -5850,6 +6030,7 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager }); } else { + log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id()); } @@ -5867,6 +6048,7 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() { if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) { + log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id())); monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger); } } @@ -6301,9 +6483,10 @@ mod tests { nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); - // Note that successful MPP payments will generate 1 event upon the first path's success. No - // further events will be generated for subsequence path successes. + // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first + // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success. let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 3); match events[0] { Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => { assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id); @@ -6312,6 +6495,22 @@ mod tests { }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } + match events[1] { + Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => { + assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id); + assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap()); + assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + match events[2] { + Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => { + assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id); + assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap()); + assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } } #[test] @@ -6538,7 +6737,7 @@ pub mod bench { use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init}; use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph; use routing::router::{Payee, get_route}; - use routing::scorer::Scorer; + use routing::scoring::Scorer; use util::test_utils; use util::config::UserConfig; use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose}; @@ -6656,7 +6855,7 @@ pub mod bench { payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes()); payment_count += 1; let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()); - let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap(); + let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap(); $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap(); let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());