X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannelmanager.rs;h=52ea21f07591e86eaff4436c1d4dc515c9a9725c;hb=d2955be5cf7fa96057c416a7899e7db6a0c5e622;hp=7b8b2a258705eaa3f8339696f7b3a57ef67731e1;hpb=c9b12e18f2c1f7e22c3d0a7eef351ca5ab6215db;p=rust-lightning

diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
index 7b8b2a25..52ea21f0 100644
--- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
@@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
 
 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
-/// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly six hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
+/// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
 ///
 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
 ///
@@ -572,13 +572,16 @@ pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
-pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 6;
+pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
 
 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
 /// this value.
-pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
+// Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
+// any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
+// a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
+pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
 
 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
@@ -590,7 +593,7 @@ pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
 #[allow(dead_code)]
 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
 
-// Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
+// Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
 #[deny(const_err)]
 #[allow(dead_code)]
@@ -2540,6 +2543,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
 				},
 			}
 			if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
+				log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
 				self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
 			}
 			if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
@@ -2695,6 +2699,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
 				hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
 			}
 		};
+		log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
 		self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
 		Ok(())
 	}
@@ -2809,7 +2814,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
 			}
 		};
 		if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
-			log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
+			log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
 			self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
 		}
 		if let Some(chan) = chan_option {