X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannelmanager.rs;h=570f04b628a7a5590d93de0b37edc43b5a5af32f;hb=c82a65a1f695c76dfd78f2a07ee120f8a84b8dc7;hp=40218089e3e576a649a6f524a0b3db2c06ae7f73;hpb=bf007ea7632b7b95c280440bc50713e55784e315;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index 40218089..570f04b6 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -32,47 +32,45 @@ use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid}; use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey}; use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1; use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret; -use bitcoin::secp256k1; +use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence}; -use chain; -use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock}; -use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator}; -use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID}; -use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData}; +use crate::chain; +use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock}; +use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator}; +use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID}; +use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData}; // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to // construct one themselves. -use ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret}; -use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch}; -use ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures}; -use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters}; -use ln::msgs; -use ln::msgs::NetAddress; -use ln::onion_utils; -use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField}; -use ln::wire::Encode; -use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient}; -use util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig}; -use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason}; -use util::{byte_utils, events}; -use util::scid_utils::fake_scid; -use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter}; -use util::logger::{Level, Logger}; -use util::errors::APIError; - -use io; -use prelude::*; +use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret}; +use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch}; +use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures}; +#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))] +use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures; +use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters}; +use crate::ln::msgs; +use crate::ln::onion_utils; +use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT}; +use crate::ln::wire::Encode; +use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, Recipient}; +use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig}; +use crate::util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination}; +use crate::util::{byte_utils, events}; +use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier}; +use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid; +use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter}; +use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger}; +use crate::util::errors::APIError; + +use crate::io; +use crate::prelude::*; use core::{cmp, mem}; use core::cell::RefCell; -use io::Read; -use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard}; +use crate::io::Read; +use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock}; use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering}; use core::time::Duration; use core::ops::Deref; -#[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))] -use std::time::Instant; -use util::crypto::sign; - // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself: // // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should @@ -281,7 +279,7 @@ enum ClaimFundsFromHop { DuplicateClaim, } -type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>); +type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>); /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel @@ -397,20 +395,6 @@ pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder { // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test): pub(super) struct ChannelHolder { pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>, - /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) to the real channel id. Outbound SCID aliases are added - /// here once the channel is available for normal use, with SCIDs being added once the funding - /// transaction is confirmed at the channel's required confirmation depth. - pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap, - /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received. - /// - /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel, - /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias - /// and via the classic SCID. - /// - /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency - /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short - /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo! - pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap>, /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be /// failed/claimed by the user. /// @@ -483,6 +467,7 @@ pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment { Fulfilled { session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>, payment_hash: Option, + timer_ticks_without_htlcs: u8, }, /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race @@ -498,12 +483,6 @@ pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment { } impl PendingOutboundPayment { - fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool { - match self { - PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true, - _ => false, - } - } fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool { match self { PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true, @@ -542,7 +521,7 @@ impl PendingOutboundPayment { => session_privs, }); let payment_hash = self.payment_hash(); - *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash }; + *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash, timer_ticks_without_htlcs: 0 }; } fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> { @@ -627,7 +606,7 @@ impl PendingOutboundPayment { /// concrete type of the KeysManager. /// /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings -pub type SimpleArcChannelManager = ChannelManager, Arc, Arc, Arc, Arc>; +pub type SimpleArcChannelManager = ChannelManager, Arc, Arc, Arc, Arc>; /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't @@ -639,7 +618,7 @@ pub type SimpleArcChannelManager = ChannelManager = ChannelManager; +pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>; /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately. @@ -677,35 +656,72 @@ pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManage /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when /// you're using lightning-net-tokio. -pub struct ChannelManager - where M::Target: chain::Watch, +// +// Lock order: +// The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the +// `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree, +// and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree. +// Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will +// create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken. +// +// Lock order tree: +// +// `total_consistency_lock` +// | +// |__`forward_htlcs` +// | +// |__`channel_state` +// | | +// | |__`id_to_peer` +// | | +// | |__`short_to_chan_info` +// | | +// | |__`per_peer_state` +// | | +// | |__`outbound_scid_aliases` +// | | +// | |__`pending_inbound_payments` +// | | +// | |__`pending_outbound_payments` +// | | +// | |__`best_block` +// | | +// | |__`pending_events` +// | | +// | |__`pending_background_events` +// +pub struct ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { default_configuration: UserConfig, genesis_hash: BlockHash, - fee_estimator: F, + fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, + /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements. #[cfg(test)] pub(super) best_block: RwLock, #[cfg(not(test))] best_block: RwLock, secp_ctx: Secp256k1, + /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements. #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))] - pub(super) channel_state: Mutex>, + pub(super) channel_state: Mutex::Signer>>, #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))] - channel_state: Mutex>, + channel_state: Mutex::Signer>>, /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out. - /// Locked *after* channel_state. + /// + /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements. pending_inbound_payments: Mutex>, /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution. @@ -719,15 +735,69 @@ pub struct ChannelManager>, + /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received. + /// + /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel, + /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias + /// and via the classic SCID. + /// + /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the + /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`! + /// + /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements. + #[cfg(test)] + pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex>>, + #[cfg(not(test))] + forward_htlcs: Mutex>>, + /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the /// active channel list on load. + /// + /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements. outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex>, + /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`. + /// + /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As + /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist, + /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels. + /// + /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access + /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during + /// the handling of the events. + /// + /// TODO: + /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need + /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately + /// would break backwards compatability. + /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the + /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is + /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`. + /// + /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements. + id_to_peer: Mutex>, + + /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s. + /// + /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with + /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required + /// confirmation depth. + /// + /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency + /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a + /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps. + /// + /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements. + #[cfg(test)] + pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock>, + #[cfg(not(test))] + short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock>, + our_network_key: SecretKey, our_network_pubkey: PublicKey, @@ -740,9 +810,10 @@ pub struct ChannelManager>>, + /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements. pending_events: Mutex>, + /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements. pending_background_events: Mutex>, /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent. /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out. /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks. /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the - /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released. + /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released. total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>, - persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier, + persistence_notifier: Notifier, keys_manager: K, @@ -809,18 +882,18 @@ enum NotifyOption { /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`. struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> { - persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, + persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier, should_persist: F, // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately. _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>, } impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused - fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> { + fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> { PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist }) } - fn optionally_notify NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> { + fn optionally_notify NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> { let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap(); PersistenceNotifierGuard { @@ -893,13 +966,14 @@ const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRA #[allow(dead_code)] const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER; -/// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any -/// pending HTLCs in flight. -pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3; - /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3; +/// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the +/// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See +/// [`ChannelManager::remove_stale_resolved_payments`]. +pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7; + /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel. #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)] pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo { @@ -1140,19 +1214,22 @@ pub enum PaymentSendFailure { /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place. /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different /// paths than the ones selected). + /// + /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] does *not* need to be called for this payment and + /// [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work for this payment. AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec), /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result /// in over-/re-payment. /// /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to - /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely - /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so). + /// send_payment, and any `Err`s which are not [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] can be + /// safely retried via [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`]. /// - /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried - /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the - /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel - /// with the latest update_id. + /// Any entries which contain `Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInprogress)` or `Ok(())` MUST NOT be + /// retried as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent + /// (in the case of `Ok(())`) or will send once a [`MonitorEvent::Completed`] is provided for + /// the next-hop channel with the latest update_id. PartialFailure { /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops. results: Vec>, @@ -1230,9 +1307,11 @@ macro_rules! handle_error { } macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal { - ($self: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr) => { + ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{ + $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id()); + let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap(); if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() { - $short_to_id.remove(&short_id); + short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id); } else { // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we @@ -1243,13 +1322,13 @@ macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal { let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias()); debug_assert!(alias_removed); } - $short_to_id.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias()); - } + short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias()); + }} } /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error) macro_rules! convert_chan_err { - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => { + ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => { match $err { ChannelError::Warn(msg) => { (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone())) @@ -1259,7 +1338,7 @@ macro_rules! convert_chan_err { }, ChannelError::Close(msg) => { log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg); - update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel); + update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel); let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true); (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(), shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok())) @@ -1273,7 +1352,7 @@ macro_rules! break_chan_entry { match $res { Ok(res) => res, Err(e) => { - let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key()); + let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key()); if drop { $entry.remove_entry(); } @@ -1288,7 +1367,7 @@ macro_rules! try_chan_entry { match $res { Ok(res) => res, Err(e) => { - let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key()); + let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key()); if drop { $entry.remove_entry(); } @@ -1302,18 +1381,18 @@ macro_rules! remove_channel { ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => { { let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1; - update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_id, channel); + update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel); channel } } } -macro_rules! handle_monitor_err { - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => { +macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res { + ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => { match $err { - ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => { - log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..])); - update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $chan); + ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => { + log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..])); + update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan); // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain. @@ -1324,11 +1403,11 @@ macro_rules! handle_monitor_err { // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees. let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(), - $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() )); + $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() )); (res, true) }, - ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => { - log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations", + ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => { + log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]), if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa { match $action_type { @@ -1347,73 +1426,73 @@ macro_rules! handle_monitor_err { if !$resend_raa { debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment); } - $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills); + $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills); (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false) }, + ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => { + (Ok(()), false) + }, } }; - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { { - let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key()); + ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { { + let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key()); if drop { $entry.remove_entry(); } res } }; - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { { + ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { { debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst); - handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id) + handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id) } }; - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => { - handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id) + ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => { + handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id) }; - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => { - handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()) + ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => { + handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()) }; - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => { - handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()) + ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => { + handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()) }; - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { - handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new()) + ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { + handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new()) }; } -macro_rules! return_monitor_err { - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => { - return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment); - }; - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { - return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails); - } -} - -// Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure! -macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err { - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => { - match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) { - (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => { - break e; - }, - (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { }, - } - } -} - macro_rules! send_channel_ready { - ($short_to_id: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => { + ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{ $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg: $channel_ready_msg, }); // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to. - let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_id.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), $channel.channel_id()); - assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(), + let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap(); + let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id())); + assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()), "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels"); if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() { - let scid_insert = $short_to_id.insert(real_scid, $channel.channel_id()); - assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(), + let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id())); + assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()), "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels"); } + }} +} + +macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event { + ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => { + if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() { + { + let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady { + channel_id: $channel.channel_id(), + user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(), + counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(), + }); + } + $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted(); + } } } @@ -1451,7 +1530,7 @@ macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked { // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the channel_ready fly // before it should be allowed to. assert!(chanmon_update.is_none()); - send_channel_ready!($channel_state.short_to_id, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg); + send_channel_ready!($self, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg); } if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs { $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { @@ -1460,6 +1539,8 @@ macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked { }); } + emit_channel_ready_event!($self, $channel_entry.get_mut()); + let funding_broadcastable: Option = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update { // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed @@ -1472,15 +1553,18 @@ macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked { // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also // have some commitment updates to send as well. assert!($commitment_update.is_some()); - if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { - // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical - // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to - // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane. - let mut order = $order; - if $raa.is_none() { - order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst; + match $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {}, + e => { + // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical + // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to + // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane. + let mut order = $order; + if $raa.is_none() { + order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst; + } + break handle_monitor_update_res!($self, e, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true); } - break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true); } } @@ -1540,10 +1624,10 @@ macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration { } } } -impl ChannelManager - where M::Target: chain::Watch, +impl ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { @@ -1565,7 +1649,7 @@ impl ChannelMana ChannelManager { default_configuration: config.clone(), genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(), - fee_estimator: fee_est, + fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est), chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, @@ -1573,14 +1657,15 @@ impl ChannelMana channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{ by_id: HashMap::new(), - short_to_id: HashMap::new(), - forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(), claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_msg_events: Vec::new(), }), outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()), pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), + forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), + id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), + short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()), our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(), our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()), @@ -1589,7 +1674,8 @@ impl ChannelMana inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key, fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(), - last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0), + probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(), + highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0), per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()), @@ -1597,7 +1683,7 @@ impl ChannelMana pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()), - persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(), + persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(), keys_manager, @@ -1605,7 +1691,7 @@ impl ChannelMana } } - /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as + /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels. pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig { &self.default_configuration } @@ -1707,7 +1793,7 @@ impl ChannelMana Ok(temporary_channel_id) } - fn list_channels_with_filter)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec { + fn list_channels_with_filter::Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec { let mut res = Vec::new(); { let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); @@ -1789,7 +1875,7 @@ impl ChannelMana } /// Helper function that issues the channel close events - fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel, closure_reason: ClosureReason) { + fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) { let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() { Some(transaction) => { @@ -1829,13 +1915,12 @@ impl ChannelMana // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary. if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update { - if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { - let (result, is_permanent) = - handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE); - if is_permanent { - remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry); - break result; - } + let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update); + let (result, is_permanent) = + handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE); + if is_permanent { + remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry); + break result; } } @@ -1860,7 +1945,8 @@ impl ChannelMana }; for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) { - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }); + let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id }; + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver); } let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id); @@ -1916,7 +2002,9 @@ impl ChannelMana let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res; log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len()); for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) { - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }); + let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source; + let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id }; + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver); } if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option { // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already @@ -2111,17 +2199,17 @@ impl ChannelMana }) } - fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard>) { + fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus { macro_rules! return_malformed_err { ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => { { log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); - return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC { + return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC { channel_id: msg.channel_id, htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(), failure_code: $err_code, - })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); + })); } } } @@ -2141,20 +2229,15 @@ impl ChannelMana //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there... return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4); } - - let mut channel_state = None; macro_rules! return_err { ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => { { log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); - if channel_state.is_none() { - channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); - } - return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { + return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id: msg.channel_id, htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data), - })), channel_state.unwrap()); + })); } } } @@ -2213,14 +2296,14 @@ impl ChannelMana } }; - channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward. if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing { - let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned(); if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop { + let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned(); + let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option { None => { // unknown_next_peer // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a @@ -2231,10 +2314,10 @@ impl ChannelMana break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None)); } }, - Some(id) => Some(id.clone()), + Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()), }; let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt { - let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap(); + let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap(); if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels { // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if @@ -2320,7 +2403,7 @@ impl ChannelMana } } - (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap()) + pending_forward_info } /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is @@ -2328,7 +2411,7 @@ impl ChannelMana /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event. /// /// May be called with channel_state already locked! - fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result { + fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<::Signer>) -> Result { if !chan.should_announce() { return Err(LightningError { err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(), @@ -2347,7 +2430,7 @@ impl ChannelMana /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel. /// May be called with channel_state already locked! - fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result { + fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<::Signer>) -> Result { log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id())); let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) { None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}), @@ -2356,7 +2439,7 @@ impl ChannelMana self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan) } - fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel) -> Result { + fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<::Signer>) -> Result { log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id())); let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..]; @@ -2367,7 +2450,7 @@ impl ChannelMana flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1), cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(), htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(), - htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()), + htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(), fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(), fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(), excess_data: Vec::new(), @@ -2383,10 +2466,9 @@ impl ChannelMana } // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly - pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec, payment_params: &Option, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option) -> Result<(), APIError> { + pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec, payment_params: &Option, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> { log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id); let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); - let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted"); let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv) @@ -2400,38 +2482,12 @@ impl ChannelMana let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let err: Result<(), _> = loop { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - - let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); - let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id); - if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry { - if !payment.get().is_retryable() { - return Err(APIError::RouteError { - err: "Payment already completed" - }); - } - } - - let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) { + let id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) { None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}), - Some(id) => id.clone(), + Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(), }; - macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment { - () => { - let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { - session_privs: HashSet::new(), - pending_amt_msat: 0, - pending_fee_msat: Some(0), - payment_hash: *payment_hash, - payment_secret: *payment_secret, - starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), - total_msat: total_value, - }); - assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path)); - } - } - + let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) { match { @@ -2453,19 +2509,27 @@ impl ChannelMana channel_state, chan) } { Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => { - if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { - maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true); - // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs) - // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating - // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that - // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the - // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below. - insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above. - return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed); + let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update); + let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id(); + match (update_err, + handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan, + RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)) + { + (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e), + (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {}, + (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => { + // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function + // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor + // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error + // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, + // which we do in the send_payment check for + // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below. + return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress); + }, + _ => unreachable!(), } - insert_outbound_payment!(); - log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); + log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id)); channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { @@ -2478,7 +2542,7 @@ impl ChannelMana }, }); }, - None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); }, + None => { }, } } else { unreachable!(); } return Ok(()); @@ -2497,26 +2561,32 @@ impl ChannelMana /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop /// fields for more info. /// - /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative - /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided - /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as - /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own - /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of - /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself. + /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this + /// method will error with an [`APIError::RouteError`]. Note, however, that once a payment + /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an + /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same + /// [`PaymentId`]. /// - /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed. + /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own + /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you + /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should + /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the + /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes. + /// + /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via + /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]). /// /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see /// PaymentSendFailure for more info. /// /// In general, a path may raise: - /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee, + /// * [`APIError::RouteError`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee, /// node public key) is specified. - /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates + /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update /// failure). - /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the + /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the /// relevant updates. /// /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been @@ -2528,14 +2598,55 @@ impl ChannelMana /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided /// payment_secret. + /// /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route, /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set. - pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option) -> Result { - self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None) + /// + /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent + /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events + pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> { + let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, *payment_secret, payment_id, route)?; + self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) } - fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option, keysend_preimage: Option, payment_id: Option, recv_value_msat: Option) -> Result { + #[cfg(test)] + pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result, PaymentSendFailure> { + self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route) + } + + fn add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result, PaymentSendFailure> { + let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len()); + for _ in 0..route.paths.len() { + onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); + } + + let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); + match pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError { + err: "Payment already in progress" + })), + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { + let payment = entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { + session_privs: HashSet::new(), + pending_amt_msat: 0, + pending_fee_msat: Some(0), + payment_hash, + payment_secret, + starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), + total_msat: route.get_total_amount(), + }); + + for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) { + assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path)); + } + + Ok(onion_session_privs) + }, + } + } + + fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option, keysend_preimage: Option, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> { if route.paths.len() < 1 { return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"})); } @@ -2545,7 +2656,6 @@ impl ChannelMana let mut total_value = 0; let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id(); let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len()); - let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) }; 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() { if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 { path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"})); @@ -2570,8 +2680,28 @@ impl ChannelMana let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1; let mut results = Vec::new(); - for path in route.paths.iter() { - results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage)); + debug_assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), onion_session_privs.len()); + for (path, session_priv) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.into_iter()) { + let mut path_res = self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage, session_priv); + match path_res { + Ok(_) => {}, + Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) => { + // While a MonitorUpdateInProgress is an Err(_), the payment is still + // considered "in flight" and we shouldn't remove it from the + // PendingOutboundPayment set. + }, + Err(_) => { + let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); + if let Some(payment) = pending_outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) { + let removed = payment.remove(&session_priv, Some(path)); + debug_assert!(removed, "This can't happen as the payment has an entry for this path added by callers"); + } else { + debug_assert!(false, "This can't happen as the payment was added by callers"); + path_res = Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Internal error: payment disappeared during processing. Please report this bug!".to_owned() }); + } + } + } + results.push(path_res); } let mut has_ok = false; let mut has_err = false; @@ -2580,8 +2710,8 @@ impl ChannelMana for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) { if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; } if res.is_err() { has_err = true; } - if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res { - // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a + if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) = res { + // MonitorUpdateInProgress is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a // PartialFailure. has_err = true; has_ok = true; @@ -2605,12 +2735,13 @@ impl ChannelMana } else { None }, }) } else if has_err { - // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into - // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all. - debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none()); + // If we failed to send any paths, we should remove the new PaymentId from the + // `pending_outbound_payments` map, as the user isn't expected to `abandon_payment`. + let removed = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_id).is_some(); + debug_assert!(removed, "We should always have a pending payment to remove here"); Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect())) } else { - Ok(payment_id) + Ok(()) } } @@ -2634,44 +2765,55 @@ impl ChannelMana } } + let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len()); + for _ in 0..route.paths.len() { + onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); + } + let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = { - let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); - if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) { - match payment { - PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { - total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, .. - } => { - let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum(); - if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 { + let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); + match outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) { + Some(payment) => { + let res = match payment { + PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { + total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, .. + } => { + let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum(); + if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 { + return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { + err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string() + })) + } + (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret) + }, + PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => { return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { - err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string() + err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string() })) - } - (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret) - }, - PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => { - return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { - err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string() - })) - }, - PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => { - return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { - err: "Payment already completed".to_owned() - })); - }, - PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => { - return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { - err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned() - })); - }, - } - } else { - return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { - err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)), - })) + }, + PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => { + return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { + err: "Payment already completed".to_owned() + })); + }, + PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => { + return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { + err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned() + })); + }, + }; + for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) { + assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path)); + } + res + }, + None => + return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { + err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)), + })), } }; - return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ()) + self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs) } /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur. @@ -2711,7 +2853,8 @@ impl ChannelMana /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will /// never reach the recipient. /// - /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function. + /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function + /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key. /// /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage. @@ -2719,21 +2862,61 @@ impl ChannelMana /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path. /// /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment - pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> { + pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result { let preimage = match payment_preimage { Some(p) => p, None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()), }; let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner()); - match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) { - Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)), + let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?; + + match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) { + Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash), Err(e) => Err(e) } } + /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the + /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows + /// us to easily discern them from real payments. + pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> { + let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); + + let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id); + + if hops.len() < 2 { + return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { + err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string() + })) + } + + let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }; + let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?; + + match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) { + Ok(()) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)), + Err(e) => Err(e) + } + } + + /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a + /// payment probe. + pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool { + let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id); + target_payment_hash == *payment_hash + } + + /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`]. + fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash { + let mut preimage = [0u8; 64]; + preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret); + preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0); + PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner()) + } + /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel. - fn funding_transaction_generated_intern, &Transaction) -> Result>( + fn funding_transaction_generated_intern::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result>( &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput ) -> Result<(), APIError> { let (chan, msg) = { @@ -2769,6 +2952,10 @@ impl ChannelMana panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?"); }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { + let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap(); + if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() { + panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible"); + } e.insert(chan); } } @@ -2827,8 +3014,7 @@ impl ChannelMana // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom. - // TODO: updated if/when https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-bitcoin/pull/994 landed and rust-bitcoin bumped. - if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == 0xffffffff) && funding_transaction.lock_time < 500_000_000 && funding_transaction.lock_time > height + 2 { + if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 { return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned() }); @@ -2861,89 +3047,6 @@ impl ChannelMana }) } - #[allow(dead_code)] - // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would - // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 100 (our stated public contract on when - // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB - // message... - const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2; - #[deny(const_err)] - #[allow(dead_code)] - // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is - // smaller than 100: - const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 100; - - /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given - /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via - /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed - /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node - /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and - /// our network addresses. - /// - /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this - /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning. - /// - /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node - /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly - /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy, - /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses. - /// - /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 100). - /// - /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events - pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec) { - let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - - if addresses.len() > 100 { - panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!"); - } - - // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that - // addresses be sorted for future compatibility. - addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id()); - - let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement { - features: NodeFeatures::known(), - timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32, - node_id: self.get_our_node_id(), - rgb, alias, addresses, - excess_address_data: Vec::new(), - excess_data: Vec::new(), - }; - let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]); - let node_announce_sig = sign(&self.secp_ctx, &msghash, &self.our_network_key); - - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - - let mut announced_chans = false; - for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() { - if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { - msg, - update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) { - Ok(msg) => msg, - Err(_) => continue, - }, - }); - announced_chans = true; - } else { - // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached channel_ready, check the - // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast - // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first. - } - } - - if announced_chans { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { - msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement { - signature: node_announce_sig, - contents: announcement - }, - }); - } - } - /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels. /// /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel @@ -3023,34 +3126,57 @@ impl ChannelMana let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new(); let mut handle_errors = Vec::new(); { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; + let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new(); + mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap()); - for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() { + for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs { + let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; if short_chan_id != 0 { - let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) { - Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(), + let forward_chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) { + Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(), None => { for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) { match forward_info { HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo { routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, prev_funding_outpoint } => { + macro_rules! failure_handler { + ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => { + log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); + + let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { + short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, + outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, + htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, + incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, + phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss, + }); + + let reason = if $next_hop_unknown { + HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id } + } else { + HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash } + }; + + failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash, + HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }, + reason + )); + continue; + } + } macro_rules! fail_forward { ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => { { - log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); - let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { - short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, - outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, - htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, - incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, - phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss, - }); - failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash, - HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data } - )); - continue; + failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true); + } + } + } + macro_rules! failed_payment { + ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => { + { + failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false); } } } @@ -3066,17 +3192,17 @@ impl ChannelMana // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256 // of the onion. - fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None); + failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None); }, Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => { - fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret)); + failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret)); }, }; match next_hop { onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => { match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) { Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])), - Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) + Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) } }, _ => panic!(), @@ -3127,7 +3253,8 @@ impl ChannelMana } let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get()); failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash, - HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } + HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data }, + HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id } )); continue; }, @@ -3202,9 +3329,12 @@ impl ChannelMana continue; } }; - if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { - handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))); - continue; + match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {}, + e => { + handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))); + continue; + } } log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}", add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); @@ -3256,7 +3386,7 @@ impl ChannelMana }; macro_rules! fail_htlc { - ($htlc: expr) => { + ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => { let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec(); htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice( &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()), @@ -3268,7 +3398,8 @@ impl ChannelMana incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, }), payment_hash, - HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data } + HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }, + HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash }, )); } } @@ -3287,7 +3418,7 @@ impl ChannelMana if htlcs.len() == 1 { if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload { log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); - fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc); + fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash); continue } } @@ -3309,7 +3440,7 @@ impl ChannelMana if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat { log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat); - fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc); + fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash); } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat { htlcs.push(claimable_htlc); new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived { @@ -3343,7 +3474,7 @@ impl ChannelMana let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) { Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage, Err(()) => { - fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc); + fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash); continue } }; @@ -3362,7 +3493,7 @@ impl ChannelMana }, hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); - fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc); + fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash); } } } @@ -3371,17 +3502,17 @@ impl ChannelMana hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => { if payment_data.is_none() { log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); - fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc); + fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash); continue }; let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap(); if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret { log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); - fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc); + fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash); } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() { log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap()); - fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc); + fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash); } else { let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage); if payment_received_generated { @@ -3400,8 +3531,8 @@ impl ChannelMana } } - for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) { - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason); + for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) { + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason, destination); } self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives); @@ -3445,7 +3576,7 @@ impl ChannelMana self.process_background_events(); } - fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) { + fn update_channel_fee(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) { if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); } // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() { @@ -3465,30 +3596,33 @@ impl ChannelMana let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) { Ok(res) => Ok(res), Err(e) => { - let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id); + let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id); if drop { retain_channel = false; } Err(res) } }; let ret_err = match res { Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => { - if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { - let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY); - if drop { retain_channel = false; } - res - } else { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), - updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { - update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fee: Some(update_fee), - commitment_signed, - }, - }); - Ok(()) + match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { + node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), + updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { + update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fee: Some(update_fee), + commitment_signed, + }, + }); + Ok(()) + }, + e => { + let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY); + if drop { retain_channel = false; } + res + } } }, Ok(None) => Ok(()), @@ -3506,16 +3640,15 @@ impl ChannelMana PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || { let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist; - let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal); + let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal); let mut handle_errors = Vec::new(); { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; - let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id; channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| { - let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate); + let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate); if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; } if err.is_err() { handle_errors.push(err); @@ -3528,6 +3661,45 @@ impl ChannelMana }); } + fn remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self) { + // If an outbound payment was completed, and no pending HTLCs remain, we should remove it + // from the map. However, if we did that immediately when the last payment HTLC is claimed, + // this could race the user making a duplicate send_payment call and our idempotency + // guarantees would be violated. Instead, we wait a few timer ticks to do the actual + // removal. This should be more than sufficient to ensure the idempotency of any + // `send_payment` calls that were made at the same time the `PaymentSent` event was being + // processed. + let mut pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); + let pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + pending_outbound_payments.retain(|payment_id, payment| { + if let PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, .. } = payment { + let mut no_remaining_entries = session_privs.is_empty(); + if no_remaining_entries { + for ev in pending_events.iter() { + match ev { + events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } | + events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ev_payment_id, .. } | + events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } => { + if payment_id == ev_payment_id { + no_remaining_entries = false; + break; + } + }, + _ => {}, + } + } + } + if no_remaining_entries { + *timer_ticks_without_htlcs += 1; + *timer_ticks_without_htlcs <= IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS + } else { + *timer_ticks_without_htlcs = 0; + true + } + } else { true } + }); + } + /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter. /// /// This currently includes: @@ -3545,7 +3717,7 @@ impl ChannelMana let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist; if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; } - let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal); + let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal); let mut handle_errors = Vec::new(); let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new(); @@ -3553,10 +3725,9 @@ impl ChannelMana let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; - let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id; channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| { let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id(); - let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate); + let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate); if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; } if err.is_err() { handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id)); @@ -3564,7 +3735,7 @@ impl ChannelMana if !retain_channel { return false; } if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() { - let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id); + let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id); handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id())); if needs_close { return false; } } @@ -3624,12 +3795,16 @@ impl ChannelMana } for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) { - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() }); + let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 }; + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone()), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() }, receiver ); } for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) { let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id); } + + self.remove_stale_resolved_payments(); + should_persist }); } @@ -3650,17 +3825,19 @@ impl ChannelMana pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); - let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash); + let removed_source = { + let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash) + }; if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source { for htlc in sources.drain(..) { - if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); } let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec(); htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array( self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())); - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal( HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash, - HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }); + HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }, + HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash }); } } } @@ -3670,7 +3847,7 @@ impl ChannelMana /// /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures /// forwarding - fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel) -> (u16, Vec) { + fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec) { // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use @@ -3690,12 +3867,13 @@ impl ChannelMana /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code /// that we want to return and a channel. - fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel) -> (u16, Vec) { + fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec) { debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000); if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) { let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6)); if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 { - // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791 + // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes. + // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail"); } (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail"); @@ -3716,74 +3894,34 @@ impl ChannelMana // be surfaced to the user. fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs( &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32], - _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey + counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey ) { for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) { - match htlc_src { - HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => { - let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = - match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => { - self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get()) - }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) - }; - let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state, - htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data}); - }, - HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => { - let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32]; - session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]); - let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); - if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) { - if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() { - let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params { - let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path"); - Some(RouteParameters { - payment_params: payment_params_data, - final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat, - final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta, - }) - } else { None }; - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { - payment_id: Some(payment_id), - payment_hash, - rejected_by_dest: false, - network_update: None, - all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0, - path: path.clone(), - short_channel_id: None, - retry, - #[cfg(test)] - error_code: None, - #[cfg(test)] - error_data: None, - }); - if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 { - pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed { - payment_id, - payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"), - }); - payment.remove(); - } - } - } else { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); - } - }, - }; + let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = + match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => { + self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get()) + }, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) + }; + + let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id }; + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data }, receiver); } } /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us. - /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here. - /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes - /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may - /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to - /// still-available channels. - fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) { + /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available. + fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason,destination: HTLCDestination) { + #[cfg(debug_assertions)] + { + // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function. + // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for + // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this + // function with the `channel_state` locked would. + assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok()); + } + //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs @@ -3822,8 +3960,7 @@ impl ChannelMana log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); return; } - mem::drop(channel_state_lock); - let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params { + let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params { let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path"); Some(RouteParameters { payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(), @@ -3839,22 +3976,43 @@ impl ChannelMana let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone()); #[cfg(not(test))] let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone()); - // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in - // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our - // next-hop is needlessly blaming us! - events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { - payment_id: Some(payment_id), - payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(), - rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable, - network_update, - all_paths_failed, - path: path.clone(), - short_channel_id, - retry, -#[cfg(test)] - error_code: onion_error_code, -#[cfg(test)] - error_data: onion_error_data + + if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) { + if !payment_retryable { + events::Event::ProbeSuccessful { + payment_id, + payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(), + path: path.clone(), + } + } else { + events::Event::ProbeFailed { + payment_id, + payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(), + path: path.clone(), + short_channel_id, + } + } + } else { + // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in + // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our + // next-hop is needlessly blaming us! + if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id { + retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid)); + } + events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { + payment_id: Some(payment_id), + payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(), + payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable, + network_update, + all_paths_failed, + path: path.clone(), + short_channel_id, + retry, + #[cfg(test)] + error_code: onion_error_code, + #[cfg(test)] + error_data: onion_error_data + } } }, &HTLCFailReason::Reason { @@ -3870,19 +4028,31 @@ impl ChannelMana // ChannelDetails. // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway. - events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { - payment_id: Some(payment_id), - payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(), - rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1, - network_update: None, - all_paths_failed, - path: path.clone(), - short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id), - retry, + let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id; + retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid)); + + if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) { + events::Event::ProbeFailed { + payment_id, + payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(), + path: path.clone(), + short_channel_id: Some(scid), + } + } else { + events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { + payment_id: Some(payment_id), + payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(), + payment_failed_permanently: false, + network_update: None, + all_paths_failed, + path: path.clone(), + short_channel_id: Some(scid), + retry, #[cfg(test)] - error_code: Some(*failure_code), + error_code: Some(*failure_code), #[cfg(test)] - error_data: Some(data.clone()), + error_data: Some(data.clone()), + } } } }; @@ -3890,7 +4060,7 @@ impl ChannelMana pending_events.push(path_failure); if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); } }, - HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, .. }) => { + HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, outpoint }) => { let err_packet = match onion_error { HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => { log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code); @@ -3910,10 +4080,11 @@ impl ChannelMana }; let mut forward_event = None; - if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() { + let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap(); + if forward_htlcs.is_empty() { forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS)); } - match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) { + match forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }); }, @@ -3921,13 +4092,17 @@ impl ChannelMana entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet })); } } - mem::drop(channel_state_lock); + mem::drop(forward_htlcs); + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); if let Some(time) = forward_event { - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { time_forwardable: time }); } + pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { + prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(), + failed_next_destination: destination + }); }, } } @@ -3955,8 +4130,7 @@ impl ChannelMana let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); - let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash); + let removed_source = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash); if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source { assert!(!sources.is_empty()); @@ -3974,11 +4148,24 @@ impl ChannelMana let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0; let mut expected_amt_msat = None; let mut valid_mpp = true; + let mut errs = Vec::new(); + let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false; + let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; for htlc in sources.iter() { - if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) { + let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) { + Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(), + None => { + valid_mpp = false; + break; + } + }; + + if let None = channel_state.by_id.get(&chan_id) { valid_mpp = false; break; } + if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) { log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!"); debug_assert!(false); @@ -4008,20 +4195,9 @@ impl ChannelMana expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat); return; } - - let mut errs = Vec::new(); - let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false; - for htlc in sources.drain(..) { - if !valid_mpp { - if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); } - let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec(); - htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array( - self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())); - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), - HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash, - HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }); - } else { - match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) { + if valid_mpp { + for htlc in sources.drain(..) { + match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) { ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => { if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action { // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the @@ -4041,6 +4217,18 @@ impl ChannelMana } } } + mem::drop(channel_state_lock); + if !valid_mpp { + for htlc in sources.drain(..) { + let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec(); + htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array( + self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())); + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal( + HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash, + HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }, + HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash } ); + } + } if claimed_any_htlcs { self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed { @@ -4050,10 +4238,7 @@ impl ChannelMana }); } - // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors - // which were generated. - channel_state.take(); - + // Now we can handle any errors which were generated. for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) { let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err); let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id); @@ -4061,11 +4246,11 @@ impl ChannelMana } } - fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop { + fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard::Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop { //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay! let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock; - let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) { - Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(), + let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) { + Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(), None => { return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed } @@ -4075,15 +4260,18 @@ impl ChannelMana match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) { Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => { if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option { - if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { - log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug }, - "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}", - payment_preimage, e); - return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail( - chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), - handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(), - Some(htlc_value_msat) - ); + match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {}, + e => { + log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug }, + "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}", + payment_preimage, e); + return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail( + chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), + handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(), + Some(htlc_value_msat) + ); + } } if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs { log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", @@ -4106,13 +4294,16 @@ impl ChannelMana } }, Err((e, monitor_update)) => { - if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { - log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info }, - "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}", - payment_preimage, e); + match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {}, + e => { + log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info }, + "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}", + payment_preimage, e); + }, } let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(); - let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id); + let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id); if drop { chan.remove_entry(); } @@ -4140,15 +4331,12 @@ impl ChannelMana } ); } - if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 { - payment.remove(); - } } } } } - fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) { + fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) { match source { HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => { mem::drop(channel_state_lock); @@ -4188,10 +4376,6 @@ impl ChannelMana } ); } - - if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 { - payment.remove(); - } } } else { log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0)); @@ -4216,9 +4400,14 @@ impl ChannelMana // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the // event being update_fulfill_htlc). - if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) { + let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update); + if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed { + // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update + // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream + // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try + // again on restart. log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}", - payment_preimage, e); + payment_preimage, update_res); } // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing @@ -4263,7 +4452,7 @@ impl ChannelMana let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let chan_restoration_res; - let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = { + let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = { let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) { @@ -4274,6 +4463,7 @@ impl ChannelMana return; } + let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(); let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()); let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() { // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a @@ -4292,12 +4482,14 @@ impl ChannelMana if let Some(upd) = channel_update { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd); } - (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) + + (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id) }; post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res); self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims); for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) { - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2); + let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() }; + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver); } } @@ -4480,29 +4672,28 @@ impl ChannelMana }; // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state // lock before watch_channel - if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) { - match e { - ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => { - // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the - // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the - // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for - // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway. - // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for - // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we - // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain). - let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true); - assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty()); - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id)); - }, - ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => { - // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor - // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't - // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready - // until we have persisted our monitor. - chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()); - channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now - }, - } + match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) { + ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {}, + ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => { + // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the + // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the + // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for + // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway. + // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor + // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond + // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain). + let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false); + assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty()); + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id)); + }, + ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => { + // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor + // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't + // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready + // until we have persisted our monitor. + chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()); + channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now + }, } let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; @@ -4511,12 +4702,23 @@ impl ChannelMana return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id)) }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { + let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap(); + match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close( + "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(), + funding_msg.channel_id)) + }, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => { + i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id()); + } + } channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg: funding_msg, }); if let Some(msg) = channel_ready { - send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_id, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg); + send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg); } e.insert(chan); } @@ -4538,20 +4740,23 @@ impl ChannelMana Ok(update) => update, Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan), }; - if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) { - let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED); - if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res { - // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on - // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the - // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied. - if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish { - shutdown_finish.0.take(); + match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) { + ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {}, + e => { + let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED); + if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res { + // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on + // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the + // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied. + if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish { + shutdown_finish.0.take(); + } } - } - return res + return res + }, } if let Some(msg) = channel_ready { - send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_id, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg); + send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg); } funding_tx }, @@ -4593,6 +4798,9 @@ impl ChannelMana }); } } + + emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut()); + Ok(()) }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) @@ -4622,13 +4830,12 @@ impl ChannelMana // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary. if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update { - if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { - let (result, is_permanent) = - handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE); - if is_permanent { - remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry); - break result; - } + let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update); + let (result, is_permanent) = + handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE); + if is_permanent { + remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry); + break result; } } @@ -4645,7 +4852,8 @@ impl ChannelMana } }; for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) { - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }); + let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id }; + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver); } let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id); @@ -4706,7 +4914,8 @@ impl ChannelMana //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that, //but we should prevent it anyway. - let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg); + let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg); + let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { @@ -4715,7 +4924,7 @@ impl ChannelMana return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } - let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| { + let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| { // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close, // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding. @@ -4815,9 +5024,11 @@ impl ChannelMana }, Ok(res) => res }; - if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { - return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()); + let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update); + if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) { + return Err(e); } + channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg: revoke_and_ack, @@ -4846,12 +5057,12 @@ impl ChannelMana for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards { let mut forward_event = None; if !pending_forwards.is_empty() { - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() { + let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap(); + if forward_htlcs.is_empty() { forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS)) } for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) { - match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing { + match forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing { PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id, PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0, PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0, @@ -4889,26 +5100,27 @@ impl ChannelMana if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } - let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update(); + let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update(); let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan); htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs; - if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) { - if was_frozen_for_monitor { - assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none()); - assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty()); - assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty()); - assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty()); - break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned())); - } else { - if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, - RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, - raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false, - raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs, - raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) { - break Err(e); - } else { unreachable!(); } - } + let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update); + if was_paused_for_mon_update { + assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed); + assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none()); + assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty()); + break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned())); + } + if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed { + if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, + RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, + raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false, + raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs, + raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) { + break Err(e); + } else { unreachable!(); } } if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { @@ -4931,7 +5143,8 @@ impl ChannelMana short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => { for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) { - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2); + let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() }; + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver); } self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]); self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs); @@ -4984,15 +5197,15 @@ impl ChannelMana /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err. fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) { - Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(), + let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) { + Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(), None => { // It's not a local channel return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist) } }; + let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { @@ -5009,6 +5222,7 @@ impl ChannelMana if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one { return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist); } else { + log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id)); try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan); } }, @@ -5078,7 +5292,7 @@ impl ChannelMana let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events(); let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty(); - for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) { + for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) { for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) { match monitor_event { MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => { @@ -5087,7 +5301,8 @@ impl ChannelMana self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()); } else { log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0)); - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }); + let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() }; + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver); } }, MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) | @@ -5118,7 +5333,7 @@ impl ChannelMana }); } }, - MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => { + MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => { self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id); }, } @@ -5156,7 +5371,6 @@ impl ChannelMana let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id; - let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id; let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| { @@ -5170,22 +5384,25 @@ impl ChannelMana )); } if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt { - if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { - has_monitor_update = true; - let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY); - handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res)); - if close_channel { return false; } - } else { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), - updates: commitment_update, - }); + match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { + node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), + updates: commitment_update, + }); + }, + e => { + has_monitor_update = true; + let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY); + handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res)); + if close_channel { return false; } + }, } } true }, Err(e) => { - let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id); + let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id); handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res))); // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us !close_channel @@ -5216,7 +5433,6 @@ impl ChannelMana let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id; - let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id; let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| { @@ -5241,13 +5457,13 @@ impl ChannelMana log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx)); self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx); - update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan); + update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan); false } else { true } }, Err(e) => { has_update = true; - let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id); + let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id); handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res))); !close_channel } @@ -5437,14 +5653,14 @@ impl ChannelMana /// /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 { - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap(); + let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap(); loop { - let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager); + let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager); // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel. - match channel_state.short_to_id.entry(scid_candidate) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate + match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) { + Some(_) => continue, + None => return scid_candidate } } } @@ -5479,10 +5695,10 @@ impl ChannelMana } } -impl MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager - where M::Target: chain::Watch, +impl MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { @@ -5518,11 +5734,11 @@ impl MessageSend } } -impl EventsProvider for ChannelManager +impl EventsProvider for ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { @@ -5530,10 +5746,6 @@ where /// /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event. /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock. - /// - /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared - /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when - /// restarting from an old state. fn process_pending_events(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler { PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || { let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist; @@ -5558,11 +5770,11 @@ where } } -impl chain::Listen for ChannelManager +impl chain::Listen for ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { @@ -5595,11 +5807,11 @@ where } } -impl chain::Confirm for ChannelManager +impl chain::Confirm for ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { @@ -5652,32 +5864,16 @@ where } } } - max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial); max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp); let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| { inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64 }); - - let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| { - if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true } - if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment { - if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height { - log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); - pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed { - payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash, - }); - false - } else { true } - } else { true } - }); } fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec { let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len()); + let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len()); for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() { if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() { res.push(funding_txo.txid); @@ -5698,18 +5894,18 @@ where } } -impl ChannelManager +impl ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by /// the function. - fn do_chain_event) -> Result<(Option, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option), ClosureReason>> + fn do_chain_event::Signer>) -> Result<(Option, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option), ClosureReason>> (&self, height_opt: Option, f: FN) { // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases. @@ -5720,7 +5916,6 @@ where { let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id; let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| { let res = f(channel); @@ -5729,10 +5924,10 @@ where let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel); timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data, - })); + }, HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() })); } if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt { - send_channel_ready!(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready); + send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready); if channel.is_usable() { log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) { @@ -5745,6 +5940,9 @@ where log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); } } + + emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel); + if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs { log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { @@ -5765,18 +5963,20 @@ where if channel.is_our_channel_ready() { if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it - // to the short_to_id map here. Note that we check whether we can relay - // using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e. enforce option_scid_alias - // then), and if the funding tx is ever un-confirmed we force-close the - // channel, ensuring short_to_id is always consistent. - let scid_insert = short_to_id.insert(real_scid, channel.channel_id()); - assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == channel.channel_id(), + // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we + // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e. + // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever + // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info + // is always consistent. + let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap(); + let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id())); + assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()), "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels", fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW); } } } else if let Err(reason) = res { - update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, channel); + update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel); // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel. failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true)); @@ -5809,10 +6009,11 @@ where if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER { let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec(); htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height)); + timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data - })); + }, HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() })); false } else { true } }); @@ -5823,8 +6024,8 @@ where self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels); - for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) { - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason); + for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) { + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, reason, destination); } } @@ -5846,12 +6047,16 @@ where self.persistence_notifier.wait() } + /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that + /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and + /// should instead register actions to be taken later. + pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future { + self.persistence_notifier.get_future() + } + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))] pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool { - let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock; - let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond; - let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap(); - *guard + self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending() } /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or @@ -5861,11 +6066,11 @@ where } } -impl - ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager - where M::Target: chain::Watch, +impl + ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { @@ -5967,14 +6172,13 @@ impl let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; - let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id; log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" }); channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| { if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id { chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger); if chan.is_shutdown() { - update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan); + update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan); self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer); return false; } else { @@ -5996,8 +6200,8 @@ impl &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true, - &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true, &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true, &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, @@ -6017,7 +6221,12 @@ impl } } - fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) { + fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> { + if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() { + log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)); + return Err(()); + } + log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)); let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); @@ -6040,7 +6249,7 @@ impl let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| { - if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id { + let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id { if !chan.have_received_message() { // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now @@ -6054,9 +6263,21 @@ impl }); true } - } else { true } + } else { true }; + if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) { + if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { + node_id: *counterparty_node_id, + msg, update_msg, + }); + } + } + } + retain }); //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures + Ok(()) } fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) { @@ -6091,77 +6312,57 @@ impl let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true); } } -} - -/// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to -/// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`. -struct PersistenceNotifier { - /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using - /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`. - persistence_lock: (Mutex, Condvar), -} -impl PersistenceNotifier { - fn new() -> Self { - Self { - persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()), - } + fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures { + provided_node_features() } - fn wait(&self) { - loop { - let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock; - let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap(); - if *guard { - *guard = false; - return; - } - guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap(); - let result = *guard; - if result { - *guard = false; - return - } - } + fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures { + provided_init_features() } +} - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))] - fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool { - let current_time = Instant::now(); - loop { - let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock; - let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap(); - if *guard { - *guard = false; - return true; - } - guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0; - // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the - // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait - // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of - // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to - // 1.42.0. - let elapsed = current_time.elapsed(); - let result = *guard; - if result || elapsed >= max_wait { - *guard = false; - return result; - } - match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) { - None => return result, - Some(_) => continue - } - } - } +/// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by +/// [`ChannelManager`]. +pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures { + provided_init_features().to_context() +} - // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk. - fn notify(&self) { - let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock; - let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap(); - *persistence_lock = true; - mem::drop(persistence_lock); - cnd.notify_all(); - } +/// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by +/// [`ChannelManager`]. +/// +/// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice" +/// or not. Thus, this method is not public. +#[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))] +pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures { + provided_init_features().to_context() +} + +/// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by +/// [`ChannelManager`]. +pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures { + provided_init_features().to_context() +} + +/// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by +/// [`ChannelManager`]. +pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures { + // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we + // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for + // ErroringMessageHandler. + let mut features = InitFeatures::empty(); + features.set_data_loss_protect_optional(); + features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional(); + features.set_variable_length_onion_required(); + features.set_static_remote_key_required(); + features.set_payment_secret_required(); + features.set_basic_mpp_optional(); + features.set_wumbo_optional(); + features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional(); + features.set_channel_type_optional(); + features.set_scid_privacy_optional(); + features.set_zero_conf_optional(); + features } const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; @@ -6341,7 +6542,7 @@ impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC { impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC { fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result { - let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None); + let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None); let mut value = 0; let mut payment_data: Option = None; let mut cltv_expiry = 0; @@ -6391,7 +6592,7 @@ impl Readable for HTLCSource { let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?; match id { 0 => { - let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None); + let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None); let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0; let mut path = Some(Vec::new()); let mut payment_id = None; @@ -6412,7 +6613,7 @@ impl Readable for HTLCSource { } Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(), - first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat, + first_hop_htlc_msat, path: path.unwrap(), payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(), payment_secret, @@ -6426,7 +6627,7 @@ impl Readable for HTLCSource { } impl Writeable for HTLCSource { - fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> { + fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> { match self { HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => { 0u8.write(writer)?; @@ -6487,6 +6688,7 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment, (1, Fulfilled) => { (0, session_privs, required), (1, payment_hash, option), + (3, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, (default_value, 0)), }, (2, Retryable) => { (0, session_privs, required), @@ -6503,10 +6705,10 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment, }, ); -impl Writeable for ChannelManager - where M::Target: chain::Watch, +impl Writeable for ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { @@ -6522,29 +6724,37 @@ impl Writeable f best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?; } - let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let mut unfunded_channels = 0; - for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() { - if !channel.is_funding_initiated() { - unfunded_channels += 1; + { + // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires + // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state` + let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let mut unfunded_channels = 0; + for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() { + if !channel.is_funding_initiated() { + unfunded_channels += 1; + } } - } - ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?; - for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() { - if channel.is_funding_initiated() { - channel.write(writer)?; + ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?; + for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() { + if channel.is_funding_initiated() { + channel.write(writer)?; + } } } - (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?; - for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() { - short_channel_id.write(writer)?; - (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?; - for forward in pending_forwards { - forward.write(writer)?; + { + let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap(); + (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?; + for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() { + short_channel_id.write(writer)?; + (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?; + for forward in pending_forwards { + forward.write(writer)?; + } } } + let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new(); (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?; for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() { @@ -6584,7 +6794,10 @@ impl Writeable f } } - (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?; + // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in + // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is + // likely to be identical. + (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?; (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?; (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?; @@ -6631,6 +6844,7 @@ impl Writeable f (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required), (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required), (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type), + (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required), }); Ok(()) @@ -6740,29 +6954,29 @@ impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the // SipmleArcChannelManager type: -impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> - ReadableArgs> for (BlockHash, Arc>) - where M::Target: chain::Watch, +impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> + ReadableArgs::Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc>) + where M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { - fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result { - let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)?; + fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ::Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result { + let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)?; Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager))) } } -impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> - ReadableArgs> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager) - where M::Target: chain::Watch, +impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> + ReadableArgs::Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager) + where M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { - fn read(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result { + fn read(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ::Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result { let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION); let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?; @@ -6774,10 +6988,11 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); - let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); + let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); + let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); let mut channel_closures = Vec::new(); for _ in 0..channel_count { - let mut channel: Channel = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?; + let mut channel: Channel<::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?; let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?; funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone()); if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) { @@ -6814,10 +7029,23 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> } else { log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { - short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id()); + short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id())); + } + if channel.is_funding_initiated() { + id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id()); } by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel); } + } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() { + // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence + // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still + // safely discard the channel. + let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false); + channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { + channel_id: channel.channel_id(), + user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(), + reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, + }); } else { log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,"); @@ -6898,7 +7126,7 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> } } - let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; @@ -6927,6 +7155,7 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> let mut pending_outbound_payments = None; let mut received_network_pubkey: Option = None; let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None; + let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None; let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None; read_tlv_fields!(reader, { (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option), @@ -6934,11 +7163,16 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> (5, received_network_pubkey, option), (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option), (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type), + (11, probing_cookie_secret, option), }); if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() { fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); } + if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() { + probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); + } + if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() { pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat); } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() { @@ -7073,7 +7307,7 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } if chan.is_usable() { - if short_to_id.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), *chan_id).is_some() { + if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() { // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above. log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias()); @@ -7082,6 +7316,8 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> } } + let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator); + for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() { for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() { if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) { @@ -7110,7 +7346,7 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger); } if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) { - previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &args.fee_estimator, &args.logger); + previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger); } } pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed { @@ -7124,7 +7360,7 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> let channel_manager = ChannelManager { genesis_hash, - fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator, + fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator, chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster, @@ -7132,8 +7368,6 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder { by_id, - short_to_id, - forward_htlcs, claimable_htlcs, pending_msg_events: Vec::new(), }), @@ -7141,14 +7375,18 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments), pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()), + forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs), outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases), + id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer), + short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info), fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(), + probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(), + our_network_key, our_network_pubkey, secp_ctx, - last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize), highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize), per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state), @@ -7156,7 +7394,7 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read), pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read), total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()), - persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(), + persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(), keys_manager: args.keys_manager, logger: args.logger, @@ -7164,7 +7402,9 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> }; for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) { - channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }); + let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source; + let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id }; + channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver); } //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a @@ -7180,66 +7420,16 @@ mod tests { use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; use core::time::Duration; use core::sync::atomic::Ordering; - use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret}; - use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure}; - use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment; - use ln::features::InitFeatures; - use ln::functional_test_utils::*; - use ln::msgs; - use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler; - use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route}; - use util::errors::APIError; - use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider}; - use util::test_utils; - use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface; - - #[cfg(feature = "std")] - #[test] - fn test_wait_timeout() { - use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier; - use sync::Arc; - use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool; - use std::thread; - - let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new()); - let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier); - - let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)); - let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone(); - thread::spawn(move || { - loop { - let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock; - let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap(); - *persistence_lock = true; - cnd.notify_all(); - - if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) { - break - } - } - }); - - // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available. - let _ = persistence_notifier.wait(); - - // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are - // available. - loop { - if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) { - break - } - } - - exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst); - - // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates - // are available. - loop { - if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) { - break - } - } - } + use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret}; + use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure}; + use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*; + use crate::ln::msgs; + use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler; + use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route}; + use crate::util::errors::APIError; + use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason}; + use crate::util::test_utils; + use crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface; #[test] fn test_notify_limits() { @@ -7256,7 +7446,7 @@ mod tests { assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1))); assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1))); - let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); + let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try // to connect messages with new values @@ -7327,22 +7517,26 @@ mod tests { let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); - create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); // First, send a partial MPP payment. let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000); + let mut mpp_route = route.clone(); + mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone()); + let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]); // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which // indicates there are more HTLCs coming. let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match. - nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap(); + let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None); // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails. - nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); @@ -7352,7 +7546,7 @@ mod tests { check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); - expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); + expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); @@ -7365,7 +7559,7 @@ mod tests { expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true); // Send the second half of the original MPP payment. - nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); @@ -7445,7 +7639,7 @@ mod tests { let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); - create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0); let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); @@ -7463,7 +7657,7 @@ mod tests { &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes ).unwrap(); - nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); @@ -7472,8 +7666,10 @@ mod tests { nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false); + // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and + // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); - expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); + expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); @@ -7494,7 +7690,7 @@ mod tests { &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes ).unwrap(); - let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap(); + let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); @@ -7504,7 +7700,7 @@ mod tests { // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails. let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]); - nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); @@ -7514,7 +7710,7 @@ mod tests { check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); - expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); + expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); @@ -7541,13 +7737,13 @@ mod tests { let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); - nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None }); - nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None }); + nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap(); + nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap(); - let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); + let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); let route_params = RouteParameters { payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey), - final_value_msat: 10000, + final_value_msat: 10_000, final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40, }; let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph; @@ -7561,7 +7757,8 @@ mod tests { let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]); let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]); - let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap(); + let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); @@ -7585,13 +7782,13 @@ mod tests { let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); - nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None }); - nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None }); + nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap(); + nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap(); - let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()); + let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); let route_params = RouteParameters { payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey), - final_value_msat: 10000, + final_value_msat: 10_000, final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40, }; let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph; @@ -7606,7 +7803,8 @@ mod tests { let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]); let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]); let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner()); - let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap(); + let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); @@ -7627,10 +7825,10 @@ mod tests { let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]); let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); - let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id; - let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id; - let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id; - let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id; + let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id; + let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id; + let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id; + let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id; // Marshall an MPP route. let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000); @@ -7643,7 +7841,7 @@ mod tests { route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id; route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id; - match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() { + match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() { PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) }, _ => panic!("unexpected error") @@ -7678,38 +7876,150 @@ mod tests { // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds. assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok()); } + + #[test] + fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() { + // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned + // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once + // the channel is successfully closed. + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap(); + let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel); + let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel); + + let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42); + let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner(); + { + // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the + // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`. + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0); + assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0); + } + + nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap(); + { + // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as + // as it has the funding transaction. + let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1); + assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id)); + + assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0); + } + + let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + + nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg); + { + let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1); + assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id)); + + // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as + // as it has the funding transaction. + let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1); + assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id)); + } + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx); + let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready); + update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update); + + nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())); + let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown); + + let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0); + { + // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the + // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the + // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other + // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.) + let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1); + assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id)); + + // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the + // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature + // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is + // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map. + let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1); + assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id)); + } + + nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())); + { + // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and + // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the + // closing transaction). + // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be + // fully closed by `nodes[0]`. + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0); + + // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]` + // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet. + let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1); + assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id)); + } + + let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + + nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap()); + { + // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once + // they both have everything required to fully close the channel. + assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0); + } + let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + + check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); + } } #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))] pub mod bench { - use chain::Listen; - use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist}; - use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner}; - use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage}; - use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures}; - use ln::functional_test_utils::*; - use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init}; - use routing::gossip::NetworkGraph; - use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route}; - use util::test_utils; - use util::config::UserConfig; - use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider}; + use crate::chain::Listen; + use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist}; + use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner}; + use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId}; + use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*; + use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init}; + use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph; + use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route}; + use crate::util::test_utils; + use crate::util::config::UserConfig; + use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider}; use bitcoin::hashes::Hash; use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; - use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut}; + use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut}; - use sync::{Arc, Mutex}; + use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex}; use test::Bencher; struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist> { - node: &'a ChannelManager, &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, - &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger> + &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>, } #[cfg(test)] @@ -7751,15 +8061,15 @@ pub mod bench { }); let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b }; - node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None }); - node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None }); + node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap(); + node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap(); node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap(); - node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id())); - node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id())); + node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id())); + node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id())); let tx; if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) { - tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut { + tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut { value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script, }]}; node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap(); @@ -7771,7 +8081,7 @@ pub mod bench { assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]); let block = Block { - header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }, + header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }, txdata: vec![tx], }; Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1); @@ -7792,6 +8102,24 @@ pub mod bench { _ => panic!(), } + let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1); + match events_a[0] { + Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => { + assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id()); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + + let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1); + match events_b[0] { + Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => { + assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id()); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a); let mut payment_count: u64 = 0; @@ -7799,7 +8127,7 @@ pub mod bench { ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => { let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels(); let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id()) - .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known()); + .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()); let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0); let seed = [3u8; 32]; let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42); @@ -7813,7 +8141,7 @@ pub mod bench { let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()); let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap(); - $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap(); + $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap(); let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap()); $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]); $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);