X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannelmanager.rs;h=720f6e42992db450fb02baf5b25c7b9227e9850c;hb=2223e92ac6b1ef0b11ac7448ed35f5d0adf77aaa;hp=03a150e4fe208493dea2480abeba968b5b79a877;hpb=d8a20eda5f74126d96700263716ee3938d4d3c8d;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index 03a150e4..82f48c3a 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -9,15 +9,13 @@ //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here. //! -//! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is +//! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s). //! -//! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing +//! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages). -//! -//! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader; use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction; @@ -26,12 +24,10 @@ use bitcoin::network::constants::Network; use bitcoin::hashes::Hash; use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; -use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash; use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid}; use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey}; use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1; -use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret; use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence}; use crate::chain; @@ -47,7 +43,7 @@ use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, No #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))] use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures; use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph; -use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, Router}; +use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router}; use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer; use crate::ln::msgs; use crate::ln::onion_utils; @@ -55,30 +51,33 @@ use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason; use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT}; #[cfg(test)] use crate::ln::outbound_payment; -use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PendingOutboundPayment}; +use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment}; use crate::ln::wire::Encode; -use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysInterface, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, Sign, SignerProvider}; +use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner}; use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig}; use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination}; use crate::util::events; use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier}; use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid; +use crate::util::string::UntrustedString; use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter}; use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger}; use crate::util::errors::APIError; +use alloc::collections::BTreeMap; + use crate::io; use crate::prelude::*; use core::{cmp, mem}; use core::cell::RefCell; use crate::io::Read; -use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock}; +use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState}; use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering}; use core::time::Duration; use core::ops::Deref; // Re-export this for use in the public API. -pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::PaymentSendFailure; +pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure}; // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself: // @@ -200,7 +199,8 @@ struct ClaimableHTLC { } /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK. -/// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly +/// +/// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]); @@ -218,7 +218,8 @@ impl Readable for PaymentId { } /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK. -/// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly +/// +/// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]); @@ -234,6 +235,36 @@ impl Readable for InterceptId { Ok(InterceptId(buf)) } } + +#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)] +/// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`]. +pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId { + PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 }, + OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey }, +} +impl SentHTLCId { + pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self { + match source { + HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData { + short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id, + htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id, + }, + HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => + Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv }, + } + } +} +impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId, + (0, PreviousHopData) => { + (0, short_channel_id, required), + (2, htlc_id, required), + }, + (2, OutboundRoute) => { + (0, session_priv, required), + }; +); + + /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] @@ -247,7 +278,6 @@ pub(crate) enum HTLCSource { first_hop_htlc_msat: u64, payment_id: PaymentId, payment_secret: Option, - payment_params: Option, }, } #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash @@ -258,14 +288,13 @@ impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource { 0u8.hash(hasher); prev_hop_data.hash(hasher); }, - HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => { + HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat } => { 1u8.hash(hasher); path.hash(hasher); session_priv[..].hash(hasher); payment_id.hash(hasher); payment_secret.hash(hasher); first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher); - payment_params.hash(hasher); }, } } @@ -280,7 +309,6 @@ impl HTLCSource { first_hop_htlc_msat: 0, payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]), payment_secret: None, - payment_params: None, } } } @@ -291,12 +319,31 @@ struct ReceiveError { msg: &'static str, } +/// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC +/// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`]. +/// +/// For more info on failure codes, see . +#[derive(Clone, Copy)] +pub enum FailureCode { + /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit + /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry. + TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2, + /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require + /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment. + RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3, + /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of + /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling. + /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is + /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`]. + IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15, +} + type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>); -/// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a +/// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a -/// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in +/// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it. struct MsgHandleErrInternal { @@ -322,17 +369,6 @@ impl MsgHandleErrInternal { } } #[inline] - fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self { - Self { - err: LightningError { - err, - action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError, - }, - chan_id: None, - shutdown_finish: None, - } - } - #[inline] fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self { Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None } } @@ -390,7 +426,7 @@ impl MsgHandleErrInternal { /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited). /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly. -const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100; +pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100; /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be @@ -434,14 +470,6 @@ struct ClaimablePayments { pending_claiming_payments: HashMap, } -// Note this is only exposed in cfg(test): -pub(super) struct ChannelHolder { - pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>, - /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except - /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict). - pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec, -} - /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with /// quite some time lag. @@ -451,6 +479,7 @@ enum BackgroundEvent { ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)), } +#[derive(Debug)] pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction { /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for @@ -461,10 +490,55 @@ pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction { EmitEvent { event: events::Event }, } -/// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold -/// the latest Init features we heard from the peer. -struct PeerState { +impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction, + (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) }, + (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) }, +); + +/// State we hold per-peer. +pub(super) struct PeerState { + /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`. + /// + /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a + /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the + /// `channel_id`. + pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>, + /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer. latest_features: InitFeatures, + /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except + /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict). + pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec, + /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending + /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating. + /// + /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A + /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few + /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of + /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole. + /// + /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we + /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update + /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the + /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior + /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure + /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing. + monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec>, + /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a + /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding + /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`]. + is_connected: bool, +} + +impl PeerState { + /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage. + /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't + /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`. + fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool { + if require_disconnected && self.is_connected { + return false + } + self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() + } } /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is @@ -488,19 +562,22 @@ struct PendingInboundPayment { min_value_msat: Option, } -/// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g. -/// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static +/// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g. +/// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case -/// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents -/// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type -/// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this -/// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter. +/// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents +/// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type +/// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager, +/// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types +/// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`]. /// -/// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings +/// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings pub type SimpleArcChannelManager = ChannelManager< Arc, Arc, Arc, + Arc, + Arc, Arc, Arc>>, @@ -510,54 +587,71 @@ pub type SimpleArcChannelManager = ChannelManager< Arc >; -/// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference -/// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't +/// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference +/// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as -/// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes). +/// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes). /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type -/// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this -/// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter. +/// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager, +/// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types +/// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`]. /// -/// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings -pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex, &'g L>>>, &'g L>; +/// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings +pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex, &'g L>>>, &'g L>; /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately. /// -/// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through +/// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through /// to individual Channels. /// -/// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for +/// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being -/// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie -/// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels). +/// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e., +/// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed. /// -/// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with -/// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before -/// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates -/// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during +/// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with +/// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before +/// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates +/// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the -/// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the -/// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees). +/// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the +/// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees). /// -/// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which -/// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along -/// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call -/// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the -/// object! +/// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which +/// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager. +/// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details. /// -/// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating -/// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid +/// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating +/// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call -/// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect. +/// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect. +/// +/// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and +/// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do +/// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have +/// many peers with unfunded channels. /// -/// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager -/// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but -/// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a -/// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when +/// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are +/// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are +/// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself. +/// +/// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] +/// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but +/// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a +/// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when /// you're using lightning-net-tokio. +/// +/// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected +/// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated +/// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated +/// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash +/// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel +/// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate +/// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred +/// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read // // Lock order: // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the @@ -574,19 +668,19 @@ pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = C // | | // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs` // | -// |__`pending_inbound_payments` +// |__`per_peer_state` // | | -// | |__`claimable_payments` -// | | -// | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds +// | |__`pending_inbound_payments` // | | -// | |__`channel_state` -// | | -// | |__`id_to_peer` -// | | -// | |__`short_to_chan_info` +// | |__`claimable_payments` +// | | +// | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds // | | -// | |__`per_peer_state` +// | |__`peer_state` +// | | +// | |__`id_to_peer` +// | | +// | |__`short_to_chan_info` // | | // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases` // | | @@ -596,11 +690,13 @@ pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = C // | | // | |__`pending_background_events` // -pub struct ChannelManager +pub struct ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + ES::Target: EntropySource, + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, F::Target: FeeEstimator, R::Target: Router, L::Target: Logger, @@ -620,12 +716,6 @@ where best_block: RwLock, secp_ctx: Secp256k1, - /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements. - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))] - pub(super) channel_state: Mutex::Signer>>, - #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))] - channel_state: Mutex::Signer>>, - /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed @@ -692,6 +782,9 @@ where /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during /// the handling of the events. /// + /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the + /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps. + /// /// TODO: /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately @@ -719,7 +812,6 @@ where #[cfg(not(test))] short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock>, - our_network_key: SecretKey, our_network_pubkey: PublicKey, inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey, @@ -741,15 +833,23 @@ where /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future. highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize, - /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like). + /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer + /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features. + /// /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels /// are currently open with that peer. + /// /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then - /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a - /// new channel. + /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for + /// channels. + /// + /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time. /// /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements. - per_peer_state: RwLock>>, + #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))] + per_peer_state: FairRwLock::Signer>>>>, + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))] + pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock::Signer>>>>, /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements. pending_events: Mutex>, @@ -765,7 +865,9 @@ where persistence_notifier: Notifier, - keys_manager: K, + entropy_source: ES, + node_signer: NS, + signer_provider: SP, logger: L, } @@ -864,12 +966,12 @@ pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7; pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6; /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments. -/// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least +/// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least /// this value. // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe. -pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3; +pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3; // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within @@ -895,6 +997,19 @@ pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3; /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`]. pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7; +/// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new +/// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in +/// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`]. +const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4; + +/// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach +/// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel. +const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50; + +/// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this +/// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections. +const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250; + /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel. #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)] pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo { @@ -937,7 +1052,7 @@ pub struct ChannelCounterparty { pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option, } -/// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels +/// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`] #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)] pub struct ChannelDetails { /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes, @@ -1008,6 +1123,11 @@ pub struct ChannelDetails { /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to /// 0.0.113. pub user_channel_id: u128, + /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units, + /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions. + /// + /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115. + pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option, /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel. /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close. @@ -1119,6 +1239,86 @@ impl ChannelDetails { pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option { self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias) } + + fn from_channel(channel: &Channel, + best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self { + + let balance = channel.get_available_balances(); + let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) = + channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(); + ChannelDetails { + channel_id: channel.channel_id(), + counterparty: ChannelCounterparty { + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + features: latest_features, + unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis, + forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(), + // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value + // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` + // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty). + // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the + // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`. + outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() { + Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None }, + outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(), + }, + funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(), + // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so + // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed. + channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None }, + short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(), + outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None }, + inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(), + channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(), + feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()), + unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis, + balance_msat: balance.balance_msat, + inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat, + outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat, + next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, + user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(), + confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(), + confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)), + force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(), + is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(), + is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(), + is_usable: channel.is_live(), + is_public: channel.should_announce(), + inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()), + inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(), + config: Some(channel.config()), + } + } +} + +/// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments. +/// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs. +#[derive(Debug, PartialEq)] +pub enum RecentPaymentDetails { + /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery. + Pending { + /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or + /// abandoned. + payment_hash: PaymentHash, + /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment, + /// not just the amount currently inflight. + total_msat: u64, + }, + /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have + /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the + /// payment is removed from tracking. + Fulfilled { + /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`] + /// made before LDK version 0.0.104. + payment_hash: Option, + }, + /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly + /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all + /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated. + Abandoned { + /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send. + payment_hash: PaymentHash, + }, } /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents]. @@ -1140,13 +1340,10 @@ macro_rules! handle_error { match $internal { Ok(msg) => Ok(msg), Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => { - #[cfg(debug_assertions)] - { - // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon - // entering the macro. - assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok()); - assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok()); - } + // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon + // entering the macro. + debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread); + debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread); let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2); @@ -1175,7 +1372,11 @@ macro_rules! handle_error { } if !msg_events.is_empty() { - $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events); + let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) { + let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events); + } } // Return error in case higher-API need one @@ -1266,78 +1467,6 @@ macro_rules! remove_channel { } } -macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res { - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => { - match $err { - ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => { - log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..])); - update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan); - // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the - // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which - // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain. - // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they - // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than - // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're - // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't - // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is - // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees. - let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(), - $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() )); - (res, true) - }, - ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => { - log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations", - log_bytes!($chan_id[..]), - if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa { - match $action_type { - RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" }, - RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" }, - } - } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" } - else if $resend_raa { "RAA" } - else { "nothing" }, - (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(), - (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(), - (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec).len()); - if !$resend_commitment { - debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa); - } - if !$resend_raa { - debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment); - } - $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills); - (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false) - }, - ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => { - (Ok(()), false) - }, - } - }; - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { { - let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key()); - if drop { - $entry.remove_entry(); - } - res - } }; - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { { - debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst); - handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id) - } }; - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => { - handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id) - }; - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => { - handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()) - }; - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => { - handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()) - }; - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { - handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new()) - }; -} - macro_rules! send_channel_ready { ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{ $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { @@ -1375,29 +1504,124 @@ macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event { } } -impl ChannelManager +macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion { + ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { { + let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger, + &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration, + $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()); + let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id(); + let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() { + // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a + // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a + // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public + // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees + // now. + if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) { + Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { + node_id: counterparty_node_id, + msg, + }) + } else { None } + } else { None }; + + let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions + .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new()); + + let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption( + &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa, + updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, + updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, + updates.announcement_sigs); + if let Some(upd) = channel_update { + $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd); + } + + let channel_id = $chan.channel_id(); + core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock); + core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock); + + $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions); + + if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards { + $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]); + } + $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs); + for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) { + let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id }; + $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver); + } + } } +} + +macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update { + ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { { + // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in + // any case so that it won't deadlock. + debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok()); + match $update_res { + ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => { + log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.", + log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..])); + Ok(()) + }, + ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => { + log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", + log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..])); + update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan); + let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown( + "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(), + $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false), + $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok())); + $remove; + res + }, + ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => { + if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update() + .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued") + .update_id == $update_id) && + $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id + { + handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan); + } + Ok(()) + }, + } + } }; + ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => { + handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry()) + } +} + +impl ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + ES::Target: EntropySource, + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, F::Target: FeeEstimator, R::Target: Router, L::Target: Logger, { - /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. + /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them. /// /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements - /// ChannelMessageHandler. + /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`]. /// /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator. /// - /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or - /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting - /// from after `params.latest_hash`. - pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self { + /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or + /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting + /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for + /// more details. + /// + /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected + /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected + /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash + pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self { let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); - secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); - let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material(); + secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()); + let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material(); let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material); ChannelManager { default_configuration: config.clone(), @@ -1409,10 +1633,6 @@ where best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block), - channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{ - by_id: HashMap::new(), - pending_msg_events: Vec::new(), - }), outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()), pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(), @@ -1422,25 +1642,26 @@ where id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()), - our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(), - our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()), + our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(), secp_ctx, inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key, - fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(), + fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(), - probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(), + probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(), highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0), - per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()), + per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()), pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()), persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(), - keys_manager, + entropy_source, + node_signer, + signer_provider, logger, } @@ -1459,7 +1680,7 @@ where if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias outbound_scid_alias += 1; } else { - outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager); + outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source); } if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; @@ -1500,37 +1721,35 @@ where return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) }); } + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard. + debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); + + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) + .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?; + + let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); let channel = { - let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); - match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) { - Some(peer_state) => { - let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(); - let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap(); - let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features; - let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration }; - match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, - their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, - self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias) - { - Ok(res) => res, - Err(e) => { - self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias); - return Err(e); - }, - } + let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(); + let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features; + let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration }; + match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key, + their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, + self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias) + { + Ok(res) => res, + Err(e) => { + self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias); + return Err(e); }, - None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }), } }; let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone()); - let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard. - debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); - let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id(); - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) { + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { if cfg!(fuzzing) { return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() }); @@ -1540,89 +1759,50 @@ where }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); } } - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { + + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { node_id: their_network_key, msg: res, }); Ok(temporary_channel_id) } - fn list_channels_with_filter::Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec { - let mut res = Vec::new(); + fn list_channels_with_filter::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec { + // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res` + // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without + // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside + // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is + // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for + // the same channel. + let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len()); { - let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); - res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len()); - for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) { - let balance = channel.get_available_balances(); - let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) = - channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(); - res.push(ChannelDetails { - channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(), - counterparty: ChannelCounterparty { - node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), - features: InitFeatures::empty(), - unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis, - forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(), - // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value - // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` - // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty). - // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the - // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`. - outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() { - Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None }, - outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(), - }, - funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(), - // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so - // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed. - channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None }, - short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(), - outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None }, - inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(), - channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(), - unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis, - balance_msat: balance.balance_msat, - inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat, - outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat, - next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, - user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(), - confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(), - confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)), - force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(), - is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(), - is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(), - is_usable: channel.is_live(), - is_public: channel.should_announce(), - inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()), - inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(), - config: Some(channel.config()), - }); - } - } - let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); - for chan in res.iter_mut() { - if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) { - chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone(); + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) { + let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, + peer_state.latest_features.clone()); + res.push(details); + } } } res } - /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for + /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for /// more information. pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec { self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true) } - /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`] - /// to ensure non-announced channels are used. + /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to + /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used. /// /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria /// are. - /// - /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec { // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user @@ -1630,8 +1810,54 @@ where self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live()) } + /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order. + pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec { + let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + + if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let features = &peer_state.latest_features; + return peer_state.channel_by_id + .iter() + .map(|(_, channel)| + ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone())) + .collect(); + } + vec![] + } + + /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a + /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs. + /// + /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a + /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an + /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment. + /// + /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent + pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec { + self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter() + .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment { + PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => { + Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { + payment_hash: *payment_hash, + total_msat: *total_msat, + }) + }, + PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => { + Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash }) + }, + PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => { + Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash }) + }, + PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None + }) + .collect() + } + /// Helper function that issues the channel close events - fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) { + fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) { let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() { Some(transaction) => { @@ -1651,46 +1877,40 @@ where let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>; let result: Result<(), _> = loop { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?; + + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => { - if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){ - return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() }); - } - let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = { - let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); - match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) { - Some(peer_state) => { - let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap(); - let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features; - chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)? - }, - None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }), - } - }; + let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo(); + let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features; + let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut() + .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?; failed_htlcs = htlcs; - // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary. - if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update { - let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update); - let (result, is_permanent) = - handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE); - if is_permanent { - remove_channel!(self, chan_entry); - break result; - } - } - - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { + // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor` + // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a + // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update. + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id: *counterparty_node_id, - msg: shutdown_msg + msg: shutdown_msg, }); + // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary. + if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() { + let update_id = monitor_update.update_id; + let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update); + break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry); + } + if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() { let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry); if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: channel_update }); } @@ -1698,7 +1918,7 @@ where } break Ok(()); }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()}) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) } }; @@ -1724,11 +1944,12 @@ where /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however. /// - /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed. + /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed. /// /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal + /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::util::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> { self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None) } @@ -1747,11 +1968,12 @@ where /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower). /// - /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed. + /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed. /// /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal + /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::util::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> { self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)) } @@ -1771,7 +1993,7 @@ where // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to // ignore the result here. - let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update); + let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update); } } @@ -1779,28 +2001,28 @@ where /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason. fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool) -> Result { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?; let mut chan = { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id { - return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()}); - } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) { if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg { - self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() }); + self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }); } else { self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed); } remove_channel!(self, chan) } else { - return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()}); + return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) }); } }; log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..])); self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast)); if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: update }); } @@ -1812,14 +2034,18 @@ where let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) { Ok(counterparty_node_id) => { - self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push( - events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { - node_id: counterparty_node_id, - action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { - msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() } - }, - } - ); + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) { + let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push( + events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { + node_id: counterparty_node_id, + action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { + msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() } + }, + } + ); + } Ok(()) }, Err(e) => Err(e) @@ -1876,6 +2102,7 @@ where // final_expiry_too_soon // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go. + // // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale). @@ -1975,7 +2202,9 @@ where return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6); } - let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes(); + let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh( + Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None + ).unwrap().secret_bytes(); if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 { //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other @@ -2060,9 +2289,8 @@ where // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward. if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing { if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop { - let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned(); - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option { + let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned(); + let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option { None => { // unknown_next_peer // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a // phantom or an intercept. @@ -2075,13 +2303,20 @@ where break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None)); } }, - Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()), + Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())), }; - let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt { - let chan = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) { + let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id); + if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { + break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None)); + } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) { None => { - // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and by_id maps have - // no consistency guarantees. + // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps + // have no consistency guarantees. break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None)); }, Some(chan) => chan @@ -2183,12 +2418,17 @@ where pending_forward_info } - /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is + /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event. /// - /// May be called with channel_state already locked! - fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<::Signer>) -> Result { + /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state` + /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the + /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped. + /// + /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate + /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed + fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<::Signer>) -> Result { if !chan.should_announce() { return Err(LightningError { err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(), @@ -2202,12 +2442,18 @@ where self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) } - /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel - /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id), + /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel + /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID), /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel. - /// May be called with channel_state already locked! - fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<::Signer>) -> Result { + /// + /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the + /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been + /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped. + /// + /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate + /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed + fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<::Signer>) -> Result { log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id())); let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) { None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}), @@ -2216,9 +2462,9 @@ where self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan) } - fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<::Signer>) -> Result { + fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<::Signer>) -> Result { log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id())); - let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..]; + let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..]; let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { chain_hash: self.genesis_hash, @@ -2232,9 +2478,11 @@ where fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(), excess_data: Vec::new(), }; - - let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]); - let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key); + // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`. + // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever + // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding + // channel. + let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap(); Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate { signature: sig, @@ -2242,88 +2490,75 @@ where }) } - // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly - pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec, payment_params: &Option, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> { + #[cfg(test)] + pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> { + let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes) + } + + fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> { + // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock. + debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id); - let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); + let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(); let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted"); let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv) - .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?; + .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?; let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?; if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) { - return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"}); + return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()}); } let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash); - let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - let err: Result<(), _> = loop { - let id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) { + let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) { None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}), - Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(), + Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()), }; - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) { - match { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey { - return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"}); - } - if !chan.get().is_live() { - return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()}); - } - break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit( - htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { - path: path.clone(), - session_priv: session_priv.clone(), - first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat, - payment_id, - payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(), - payment_params: payment_params.clone(), - }, onion_packet, &self.logger), - chan) - } { - Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => { - let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update); - let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id(); - match (update_err, - handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan, - RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)) - { - (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e), - (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {}, - (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => { - // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function - // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor - // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error - // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, - // which we do in the send_payment check for - // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below. - return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress); - }, - _ => unreachable!(), + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) { + if !chan.get().is_live() { + return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()}); + } + let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(); + let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), + htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { + path: path.clone(), + session_priv: session_priv.clone(), + first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat, + payment_id, + payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(), + }, onion_packet, &self.logger); + match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) { + Some(monitor_update) => { + let update_id = monitor_update.update_id; + let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update); + if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) { + break Err(e); + } + if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress { + // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function + // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor + // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error + // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, + // which we do in the send_payment check for + // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below. + return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress); } - - log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id)); - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey, - updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { - update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add], - update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fee: None, - commitment_signed, - }, - }); }, None => { }, } } else { // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the - // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the `by_id` map. + // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the + // `channel_by_id` map. // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps. return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}); } @@ -2340,14 +2575,19 @@ where /// Sends a payment along a given route. /// - /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop + /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`] /// fields for more info. /// + /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via + /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]). + /// + /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments + /// /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an - /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same - /// [`PaymentId`]. + /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a + /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`]. /// /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you @@ -2355,12 +2595,16 @@ where /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes. /// - /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via - /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]). + /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash + /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're + /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See + /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information. /// - /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with + /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`] + /// + /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see - /// PaymentSendFailure for more info. + /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info. /// /// In general, a path may raise: /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee, @@ -2371,87 +2615,85 @@ where /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the /// relevant updates. /// - /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been + /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a /// different route unless you intend to pay twice! /// - /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate - /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For - /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route - /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided - /// payment_secret. + /// # A caution on `payment_secret` + /// + /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to + /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) + /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, + /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a + /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`. /// - /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature - /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route, - /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set. + /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret + /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the + /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set. /// /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent + /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed + /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events + /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> { let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + self.pending_outbound_payments + .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, + |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| + self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)) + } + + /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on + /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`. + pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> { + let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); self.pending_outbound_payments - .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height, - |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| - self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)) + .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, + &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), + &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger, + &self.pending_events, + |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| + self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)) } #[cfg(test)] fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option, keysend_preimage: Option, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> { let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); - self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height, - |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| - self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)) + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, + |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| + self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)) } #[cfg(test)] pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result, PaymentSendFailure> { let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); - self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height) + self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height) } - /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`]. - /// - /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see - /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the - /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment - /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if - /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`]. - /// - /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] - /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] - pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> { - let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); - self.pending_outbound_payments.retry_payment_with_route(route, payment_id, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height, - |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| - self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)) - } - - /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur. + /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a + /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before + /// retries are exhausted. /// - /// After this method returns, no future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id` - /// are allowed. If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be - /// generated as soon as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment. + /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon + /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment. /// /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to /// determine the ultimate status of a payment. /// /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this - /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, the payment may still be in the pending state - /// upon restart. This allows further calls to [`retry_payment`] (and requiring a second call - /// to [`abandon_payment`] to mark the payment as failed again). Otherwise, future calls to - /// [`retry_payment`] will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. + /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated. /// - /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment - /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - if let Some(payment_failed_ev) = self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id) { - self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(payment_failed_ev); - } + self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events); } /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have @@ -2471,9 +2713,30 @@ where /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result { let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); - self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height, - |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| - self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)) + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route( + route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, + best_block_height, + |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| + self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)) + } + + /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route + /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`. + /// + /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous + /// payments. + /// + /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend + pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result { + let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id, + retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), + || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, + &self.logger, &self.pending_events, + |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| + self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)) } /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the @@ -2481,9 +2744,10 @@ where /// us to easily discern them from real payments. pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> { let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); - self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.keys_manager, best_block_height, - |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| - self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)) + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, + |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| + self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)) } /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a @@ -2495,38 +2759,45 @@ where /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel. - fn funding_transaction_generated_intern::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result>( - &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput + fn funding_transaction_generated_intern::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result>( + &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput ) -> Result<(), APIError> { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?; + + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; let (chan, msg) = { - let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) { - Some(mut chan) => { - let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?; - - (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger) - .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e { - MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None) - } else { unreachable!(); }) - , chan) - }, - None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) }, + let (res, chan) = { + match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) { + Some(mut chan) => { + let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?; + + (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger) + .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e { + MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None) + } else { unreachable!(); }) + , chan) + }, + None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) }, + } }; match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) { Ok(funding_msg) => { (chan, funding_msg) }, Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { - err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned() + err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned() }) }, } }; - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg, }); - match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) { + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?"); }, @@ -2660,34 +2931,30 @@ where let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop( &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, ); - { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - for channel_id in channel_ids { - let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id) - .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { - err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)), - })? - .get_counterparty_node_id(); - if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { - err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(), - }); - } + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + for channel_id in channel_ids { + if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) { + return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { + err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id), + }); } - for channel_id in channel_ids { - let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap(); - if !channel.update_config(config) { - continue; - } - if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg }); - } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { - node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), - msg, - }); - } + } + for channel_id in channel_ids { + let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap(); + if !channel.update_config(config) { + continue; + } + if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg }); + } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + msg, + }); } } Ok(()) @@ -2715,21 +2982,28 @@ where /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id` - pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> { + pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - let next_hop_scid = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) { - Some(chan) => { - if !chan.is_usable() { - return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { - err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id)) - }) - } - chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) - }, - None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { - err: format!("Channel with id {} not found", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id)) - }) + let next_hop_scid = { + let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) { + Some(chan) => { + if !chan.is_usable() { + return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { + err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id)) + }) + } + chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) + }, + None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { + err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id) + }) + } }; let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id) @@ -2856,9 +3130,9 @@ where } } if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing { - let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode); - if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) { - let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes(); + let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode); + if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) { + let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes(); let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) { Ok(res) => res, Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => { @@ -2899,16 +3173,22 @@ where } } } - let forward_chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) { - Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(), + let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) { + Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()), None => { forwarding_channel_not_found!(); continue; } }; - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id); + if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { + forwarding_channel_not_found!(); + continue; + } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) { hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { forwarding_channel_not_found!(); continue; @@ -3028,7 +3308,7 @@ where let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret; let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey; if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() { - receiver_node_id = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode) + receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode) .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient"); } @@ -3108,13 +3388,23 @@ where match claimable_htlc.onion_payload { OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => { let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap(); - let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) { - Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage, + let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) { + Ok(result) => result, Err(()) => { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash); continue } }; + if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta { + let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64; + if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})", + log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height); + fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash); + continue; + } + } check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage); }, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => { @@ -3177,6 +3467,13 @@ where } } + let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(), + || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, + &self.pending_events, &self.logger, + |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| + self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)); + for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) { self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination); } @@ -3211,7 +3508,7 @@ where BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => { // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the // monitor updating completing. - let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update); + let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update); }, } } @@ -3224,21 +3521,21 @@ where self.process_background_events(); } - fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption { + fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption { if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; } // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother - if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() { + if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() { log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.", - log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate); + log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate); return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; } if !chan.is_live() { log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).", - log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate); + log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate); return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; } log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.", - log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate); + log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate); chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger); NotifyOption::DoPersist @@ -3255,10 +3552,14 @@ where let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal); - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - for (chan_id, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() { - let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate); - if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; } + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() { + let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate); + if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; } + } } should_persist @@ -3269,14 +3570,18 @@ where /// /// This currently includes: /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels, - /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more + /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over /// the channel. - /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs - /// with the current `ChannelConfig`. + /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs + /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`]. + /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels. /// - /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate + /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate /// estimate fetches. + /// + /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate + /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) { PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || { let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist; @@ -3286,50 +3591,85 @@ where let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new(); let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new(); + let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new(); { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; - channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| { - let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate); - if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; } + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events; + let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id; + peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| { + let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate); + if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; } + + if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() { + let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id); + handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id)); + if needs_close { return false; } + } + + match chan.channel_update_status() { + ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged), + ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged), + ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled), + ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled), + ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => { + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; + chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled); + }, + ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => { + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; + chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled); + }, + _ => {}, + } + + chan.maybe_expire_prev_config(); - if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() { - let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id); - handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id())); - if needs_close { return false; } + true + }); + if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) { + pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id); } + } + } - match chan.channel_update_status() { - ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged), - ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged), - ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled), - ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled), - ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => { - if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { - msg: update - }); - } - should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; - chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled); - }, - ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => { - if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { - msg: update - }); + // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the + // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels + // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed), + // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately. + // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are + // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the + // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible. + if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 { + let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap(); + for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal { + match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => { + // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still + // have no channels to the peer. + let remove_entry = { + let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap(); + peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) + }; + if remove_entry { + entry.remove_entry(); } - should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; - chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled); }, - _ => {}, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ } } - - chan.maybe_expire_prev_config(); - - true - }); + } } self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| { @@ -3392,27 +3732,46 @@ where /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed. pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) { + self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails); + } + + /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the + /// reason for the failure. + /// + /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes. + pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash); if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source { for htlc in sources.drain(..) { - let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec(); - htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes()); + let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc); let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop); - let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data); let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash }; self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver); } } } + /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`]. + fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason { + match failure_code { + FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16), + FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16), + FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => { + let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec(); + htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes()); + HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data) + } + } + } + /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code /// that we want to return and a channel. /// /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures /// forwarding - fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec) { + fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec) { // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use @@ -3432,7 +3791,7 @@ where /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code /// that we want to return and a channel. - fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec) { + fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec) { debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000); if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) { let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6)); @@ -3461,13 +3820,19 @@ where &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey ) { - let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = - match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => { - self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get()) - }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) - }; + let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => { + self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get()) + }, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) + } + } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) } + }; for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) { let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone()); @@ -3479,13 +3844,12 @@ where /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us. /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available. fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) { - #[cfg(debug_assertions)] - { - // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function. - // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for - // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this - // function with the `channel_state` locked would. - assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok()); + // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function. + // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for + // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling + // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would. + for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() { + debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread); } //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can @@ -3497,17 +3861,20 @@ where // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more. match source { - HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => { - self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx, &self.pending_events, &self.logger); + HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => { + if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path, + session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx, + &self.pending_events, &self.logger) + { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); } }, HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => { log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error); let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret); - let mut forward_event = None; + let mut push_forward_ev = false; let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap(); if forward_htlcs.is_empty() { - forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS)); + push_forward_ev = true; } match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { @@ -3518,12 +3885,8 @@ where } } mem::drop(forward_htlcs); + if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); } let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - if let Some(time) = forward_event { - pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { - time_forwardable: time - }); - } pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(), failed_next_destination: destination, @@ -3560,7 +3923,7 @@ where let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey; for htlc in sources.iter() { if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() { - let phantom_pubkey = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode) + let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode) .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient"); receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey; break; @@ -3600,17 +3963,26 @@ where let mut expected_amt_msat = None; let mut valid_mpp = true; let mut errs = Vec::new(); - let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); for htlc in sources.iter() { - let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) { - Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(), + let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) { + Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()), None => { valid_mpp = false; break; } }; - if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_id) { + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id); + if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { + valid_mpp = false; + break; + } + + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + + if peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id).is_none() { valid_mpp = false; break; } @@ -3621,6 +3993,7 @@ where valid_mpp = false; break; } + expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat); if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload { // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check @@ -3635,14 +4008,13 @@ where claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value; } + mem::drop(per_peer_state); if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() { - mem::drop(channel_state); self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash); log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!"); return; } if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() { - mem::drop(channel_state); self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash); log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.", expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat); @@ -3650,9 +4022,8 @@ where } if valid_mpp { for htlc in sources.drain(..) { - if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); } - if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.take().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, - payment_preimage, + if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop( + htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage, |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })) { if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action { @@ -3663,7 +4034,6 @@ where } } } - mem::drop(channel_state); if !valid_mpp { for htlc in sources.drain(..) { let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec(); @@ -3684,116 +4054,89 @@ where } fn claim_funds_from_hop) -> Option>(&self, - mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard::Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc) -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> { //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay! + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) { - let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(); - match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) { - Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => { - if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option { - match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { - ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {}, - e => { - log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug }, - "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}", - payment_preimage, e); - let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(); - mem::drop(channel_state_lock); - self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat))); - return Err((counterparty_node_id, err)); - } - } - if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs { - log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", - log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), - updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { - update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg], - update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fee: None, - commitment_signed, - } - }); - } - mem::drop(channel_state_lock); - self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat))); - Ok(()) - } else { - Ok(()) - } - }, - Err((e, monitor_update)) => { - match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { - ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {}, - e => { - // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update - // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream - // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same update and try - // again on restart. - log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info }, - "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}", - payment_preimage, e); - }, + let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) { + Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()), + None => None + }; + + let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map( + |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map( + |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap() + ) + ).unwrap_or(None); + + if peer_state_opt.is_some() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) { + let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(); + let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger); + + if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res { + if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}", + log_bytes!(chan_id), action); + peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action); } - let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id); - if drop { - chan.remove_entry(); + let update_id = monitor_update.update_id; + let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update); + let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, + peer_state, per_peer_state, chan); + if let Err(e) = res { + // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge + // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor + // update over and over again until morale improves. + log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage); + return Err((counterparty_node_id, e)); } - mem::drop(channel_state_lock); - self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None)); - Err((counterparty_node_id, res)) - }, - } - } else { - let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate { - update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID, - updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { - payment_preimage, - }], - }; - // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after - // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link. - let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update); - if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed { - // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update - // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream - // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try - // again on restart. - log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}", - payment_preimage, update_res); + } + return Ok(()); } - mem::drop(channel_state_lock); - // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a - // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the - // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are - // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in - // `PaymentForwarded`). - self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None)); - Ok(()) } + let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate { + update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID, + updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { + payment_preimage, + }], + }; + // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after + // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link. + let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update); + if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed { + // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update + // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream + // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try + // again on restart. + log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}", + payment_preimage, update_res); + } + // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a + // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the + // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are + // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in + // `PaymentForwarded`). + self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None)); + Ok(()) } fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec) { self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events); } - fn claim_funds_internal(&self, channel_state_lock: MutexGuard::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) { + fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) { match source { HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => { - mem::drop(channel_state_lock); self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger); }, HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => { let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint; - let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage, + let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage, |htlc_claim_value_msat| { if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat { let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat { @@ -3845,11 +4188,19 @@ where /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor /// update completion. fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec, - channel: &mut Channel<::Signer>, raa: Option, + channel: &mut Channel<::Signer>, raa: Option, commitment_update: Option, order: RAACommitmentOrder, pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option, channel_ready: Option, announcement_sigs: Option) -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement", + log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), + if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" }, + if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(), + if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " }, + if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" }, + if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" }); + let mut htlc_forwards = None; let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id(); @@ -3905,51 +4256,39 @@ where htlc_forwards } - fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) { - let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) { + debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock - let htlc_forwards; - let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) { + let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id { + Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(), + None => { + // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the + // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed. + let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap(); + match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) { + Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(), + None => return, + } + } + }; + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let mut peer_state_lock; + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id); + if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return } + peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let mut channel = { + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return, - }; - if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id { - return; } - - let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(); - let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()); - let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() { - // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a - // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a - // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public - // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees - // now. - if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) { - Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { - node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), - msg, - }) - } else { None } - } else { None }; - htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs); - if let Some(upd) = channel_update { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd); - } - - (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id) }; - if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards { - self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]); - } - self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims); - for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) { - let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() }; - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver); + log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}", + highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id()); + if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id { + return; } + handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut()); } /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]. @@ -3997,16 +4336,18 @@ where fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) { + let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty()); + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => { if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() { return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() }); } - if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() { - return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() }); - } if accept_0conf { channel.get_mut().set_0conf(); } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() { @@ -4016,24 +4357,76 @@ where msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), } } }; - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event); + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event); let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel); return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() }); + } else { + // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers + // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded + // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones. + if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS { + let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { + node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), + action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{ + msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), } + } + }; + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event); + let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel); + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() }); + } } - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id), }); } hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { - return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() }); + return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }); } } Ok(()) } - fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound, + /// or 0-conf channels. + /// + /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and + /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer. + fn peers_without_funded_channels(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize + where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<::Signer>) -> bool { + let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0; + let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + { + let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() { + let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap(); + if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; } + let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height); + if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() { + peers_without_funded_channels += 1; + } + } + } + return peers_without_funded_channels; + } + + fn unfunded_channel_count( + peer: &PeerState<::Signer>, best_block_height: u32 + ) -> usize { + let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0; + for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() { + if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 && + chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0 + { + num_unfunded_channels += 1; + } + } + num_unfunded_channels + } + + fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())); } @@ -4043,13 +4436,46 @@ where } let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16]; - random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]); + random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]); let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes); - let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(); - let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, - counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, - self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias) + + // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much + // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one + // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels. + let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty()); + + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) + })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + + // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers + // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded + // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones. + if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() && + channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS && + !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels + { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close( + "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), + msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())); + } + + let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close( + format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER), + msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())); + } + + let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, + counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id, + &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias) { Err(e) => { self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias); @@ -4057,19 +4483,17 @@ where }, Ok(res) => res }; - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) { + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias); - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())) + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())) }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels { if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())); } - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id), }); @@ -4092,19 +4516,22 @@ where Ok(()) } - fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let (value, output_script, user_id) = { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id) + })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id)); - } - try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan); + try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan); (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id()) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)) } }; let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); @@ -4119,54 +4546,31 @@ where } fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = { - let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap(); - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) { + let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap(); + + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id) + })?; + + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) = + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id)); - } - (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove()) + (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove()) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id)) - } - }; - // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state - // lock before watch_channel - match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) { - ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {}, - ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => { - // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the - // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the - // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for - // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway. - // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor - // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond - // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain). - let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false); - assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty()); - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id)); - }, - ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => { - // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor - // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't - // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready - // until we have persisted our monitor. - chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()); - channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now - }, - } - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) { + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)) + }; + + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id)) + Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id)) }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { - let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap(); - match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) { + match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close( "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(), @@ -4176,74 +4580,85 @@ where i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id()); } } - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { + + // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor + // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't + // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready + // until we have persisted our monitor. + let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id; + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg: funding_msg, }); - if let Some(msg) = channel_ready { - send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg); + + let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor); + + let chan = e.insert(chan); + let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, + per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) }); + + // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the + // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the + // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for + // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway. + // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor + // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond + // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain). + if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res { + res.0 = None; } - e.insert(chan); + res } } - Ok(()) } fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let funding_tx = { - let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap(); - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } - let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger) { - Ok(update) => update, - Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan), - }; - match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) { - ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {}, - e => { - let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED); - if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res { - // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on - // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the - // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied. - if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish { - shutdown_finish.0.take(); - } - } - return res - }, - } - if let Some(msg) = channel_ready { - send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg); + let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap(); + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) + })?; + + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { + let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, + chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan); + let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor); + let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan); + if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res { + // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on + // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the + // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied. + if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish { + shutdown_finish.0.take(); } - funding_tx - }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) - } - }; - log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid()); - self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx); - Ok(()) + } + res + }, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + } } fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) + })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } - let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(), - self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan); + let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer, + self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan); if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt { log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg: announcement_sigs, }); @@ -4255,7 +4670,7 @@ where // announcement_signatures. log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg, }); @@ -4266,21 +4681,23 @@ where Ok(()) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } } - fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>; let result: Result<(), _> = loop { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) + })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => { - if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() { log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.", @@ -4288,30 +4705,30 @@ where if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" }); } - let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry); + let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo(); + let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, + chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry); dropped_htlcs = htlcs; - // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary. - if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update { - let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update); - let (result, is_permanent) = - handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE); - if is_permanent { - remove_channel!(self, chan_entry); - break result; - } - } - if let Some(msg) = shutdown { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { + // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor` + // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a + // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update. + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id: *counterparty_node_id, msg, }); } + // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary. + if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt { + let update_id = monitor_update.update_id; + let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update); + break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry); + } break Ok(()); }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } }; for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) { @@ -4320,22 +4737,24 @@ where self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver); } - let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id); - Ok(()) + result } fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) + })?; let (tx, chan_option) = { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => { - if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry); if let Some(msg) = closing_signed { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg, }); @@ -4349,7 +4768,7 @@ where (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry))) } else { (tx, None) } }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } }; if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx { @@ -4358,8 +4777,9 @@ where } if let Some(chan) = chan_option { if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: update }); } @@ -4379,16 +4799,18 @@ where //but we should prevent it anyway. let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg); - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) + })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } - let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| { + let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| { // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close, // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding. @@ -4412,52 +4834,61 @@ where }; try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan); }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } Ok(()) } fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = { - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) + })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } }; - self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id); + self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id); Ok(()) } fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) + })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan); }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } Ok(()) } fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) + })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 { let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned()); try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan); @@ -4465,61 +4896,36 @@ where try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan); Ok(()) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } } fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) + })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } - let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) = - match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) { - Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan), - Err((Some(update), e)) => { - assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update()); - let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update); - try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan); - unreachable!(); - }, - Ok(res) => res - }; - let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update); - if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) { - return Err(e); - } - - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { - node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), - msg: revoke_and_ack, - }); - if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), - updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { - update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fee: None, - commitment_signed: msg, - }, - }); - } - Ok(()) + let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo(); + let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan); + let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update); + let update_id = monitor_update.update_id; + handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, + peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } } #[inline] fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) { for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards { - let mut forward_event = None; + let mut push_forward_event = false; let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new(); let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new(); if !pending_forwards.is_empty() { @@ -4577,7 +4983,7 @@ where // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted // payments are being processed. if forward_htlcs_empty { - forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS)); + push_forward_event = true; } entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }))); @@ -4595,137 +5001,115 @@ where let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); events.append(&mut new_intercept_events); } + if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() } + } + } - match forward_event { - Some(time) => { - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { - time_forwardable: time - }); - } - None => {}, - } + // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. + fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) { + let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter() + .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }) + .is_some(); + if !forward_ev_exists { + pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { + time_forwardable: + Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS), + }); } } fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new(); - let res = loop { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) + }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?; + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } - let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update(); - let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self, - chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan); - htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs; - let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update); - if was_paused_for_mon_update { - assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed); - assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none()); - assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty()); - assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty()); - assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty()); - break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned())); - } - if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed { - if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, - RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, - raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false, - raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs, - raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) { - break Err(e); - } else { unreachable!(); } - } - if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), - updates, - }); - } - break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs, - raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, - chan.get().get_short_channel_id() - .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()), - chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), - chan.get().get_user_id())) + let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo(); + let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan); + let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update); + let update_id = monitor_update.update_id; + let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, + peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan); + (htlcs_to_fail, res) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } }; self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id); - match res { - Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs, - short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) => - { - for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) { - let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() }; - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver); - } - self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]); - self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs); - Ok(()) - }, - Err(e) => Err(e) - } + res } fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) + })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan); }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } Ok(()) } fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) + })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } if !chan.get().is_usable() { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError})); } - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures( - self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan), + &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), + msg, &self.default_configuration + ), chan), // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced, // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here. - update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(), + update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()), }); }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } Ok(()) } /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err. fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result { - let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) { - Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(), + let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) { + Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()), None => { // It's not a local channel return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist) } }; - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id); + if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { + return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist) + } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { if chan.get().should_announce() { @@ -4753,24 +5137,27 @@ where fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let htlc_forwards; let need_lnd_workaround = { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); - match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) + })?; + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); - } // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here. let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish( - msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash, - &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan); + msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, + &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan); let mut channel_update = None; if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg, }); @@ -4787,14 +5174,14 @@ where } let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take(); htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption( - &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order, + &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order, Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs); if let Some(upd) = channel_update { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd); + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd); } need_lnd_workaround }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } }; @@ -4808,8 +5195,10 @@ where Ok(()) } - /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed. + /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed. fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool { + debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock + let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events(); let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty(); @@ -4819,7 +5208,7 @@ where MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => { if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage { log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0)); - self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()); + self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()); } else { log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0)); let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() }; @@ -4829,34 +5218,47 @@ where }, MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) | MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id; - let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; - if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) { - let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry); - failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false)); - if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { - msg: update - }); + let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id { + Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id), + None => { + // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the + // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed. + let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap(); + id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned() + } + }; + if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events; + if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) { + let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry); + failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false)); + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event { + ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() } + } else { + ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed + }; + self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason); + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { + node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), + action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { + msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() } + }, + }); + } } - let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event { - ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() } - } else { - ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed - }; - self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason); - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { - node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), - action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { - msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() } - }, - }); } }, MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => { - self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id); + self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref()); }, } } @@ -4874,7 +5276,13 @@ where /// update events as a separate process method here. #[cfg(fuzzing)] pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) { - self.process_pending_monitor_events(); + PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || { + if self.process_pending_monitor_events() { + NotifyOption::DoPersist + } else { + NotifyOption::SkipPersist + } + }); } /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible. @@ -4884,48 +5292,45 @@ where let mut has_monitor_update = false; let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new(); let mut handle_errors = Vec::new(); - { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id; - let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; - - by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| { - match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) { - Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => { + + // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an + // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the + // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we + // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update. + 'peer_loop: loop { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + 'chan_loop: loop { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock; + for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() { + let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id(); + let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo(); + let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) = + chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger); if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() { - failed_htlcs.push(( - holding_cell_failed_htlcs, - *channel_id, - chan.get_counterparty_node_id() - )); + failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id)); } - if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt { - match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { - ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), - updates: commitment_update, - }); - }, - e => { - has_monitor_update = true; - let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY); - handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res)); - if close_channel { return false; } - }, + if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt { + has_monitor_update = true; + + let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel( + funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update); + let update_id = monitor_update.update_id; + let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id; + let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, + peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, + peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id)); + if res.is_err() { + handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res)); } + continue 'peer_loop; } - true - }, - Err(e) => { - let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id); - handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res))); - // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us - !close_channel } + break 'chan_loop; } - }); + } + break 'peer_loop; } let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty(); @@ -4947,45 +5352,47 @@ where let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new(); let mut has_update = false; { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id; - let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; - - by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| { - match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) { - Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => { - if let Some(msg) = msg_opt { - has_update = true; - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { - node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg, - }); - } - if let Some(tx) = tx_opt { - // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back - // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast. - if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { - msg: update + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + + for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events; + peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| { + match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) { + Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => { + if let Some(msg) = msg_opt { + has_update = true; + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { + node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg, }); } + if let Some(tx) = tx_opt { + // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back + // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast. + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } - self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); + self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); - log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx)); - self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx); - update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan); - false - } else { true } - }, - Err(e) => { - has_update = true; - let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id); - handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res))); - !close_channel + log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx)); + self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx); + update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan); + false + } else { true } + }, + Err(e) => { + has_update = true; + let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id); + handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res))); + !close_channel + } } - } - }); + }); + } } for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) { @@ -5025,7 +5432,7 @@ where return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) }); } - let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); + let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()); let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); @@ -5056,7 +5463,8 @@ where /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you. /// /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which - /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be + /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with + /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`]. /// /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements. @@ -5071,12 +5479,20 @@ where /// /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply. /// + /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable + /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114. + /// /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable - /// [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage + /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose + /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment + /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash - pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> { - inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64) + pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> { + inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, + &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) } /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share @@ -5090,7 +5506,7 @@ where /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment #[deprecated] pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> { - let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); + let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()); let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()); let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?; Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) @@ -5124,8 +5540,8 @@ where /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of /// [`PaymentClaimable`]. /// - /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry` - /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`]. + /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` + /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]. /// /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime. @@ -5137,10 +5553,16 @@ where /// /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply. /// + /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable + /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114. + /// /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable - pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result { - inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64) + pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option, + invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option) -> Result { + inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, + invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, + min_final_cltv_expiry) } /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share @@ -5173,7 +5595,7 @@ where let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap(); loop { - let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager); + let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source); // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel. match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) { Some(_) => continue, @@ -5203,7 +5625,7 @@ where let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap(); loop { - let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager); + let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source); // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel. if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue } return scid_candidate @@ -5215,10 +5637,15 @@ where pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs { let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new(); - for chan in self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.values() { - for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() { - if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source { - inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id()); + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() { + for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() { + if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source { + inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id()); + } } } } @@ -5234,6 +5661,12 @@ where events.into_inner() } + #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")] + pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) { + let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); + events.push(event); + } + #[cfg(test)] pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option { let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); @@ -5284,15 +5717,30 @@ where } } -impl MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager +impl MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + ES::Target: EntropySource, + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, F::Target: FeeEstimator, R::Target: Router, L::Target: Logger, { + /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated. + /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if + /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer + /// is always placed next to each other. + /// + /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for + /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains + /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a` + /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array. + /// + /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate` + /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among + /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under. fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec { let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new()); PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || { @@ -5312,8 +5760,14 @@ where } let mut pending_events = Vec::new(); - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events); + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 { + pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events); + } + } if !pending_events.is_empty() { events.replace(pending_events); @@ -5325,11 +5779,13 @@ where } } -impl EventsProvider for ChannelManager +impl EventsProvider for ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + ES::Target: EntropySource, + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, F::Target: FeeEstimator, R::Target: Router, L::Target: Logger, @@ -5362,11 +5818,13 @@ where } } -impl chain::Listen for ChannelManager +impl chain::Listen for ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + ES::Target: EntropySource, + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, F::Target: FeeEstimator, R::Target: Router, L::Target: Logger, @@ -5396,15 +5854,17 @@ where *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height) } - self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)); + self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)); } } -impl chain::Confirm for ChannelManager +impl chain::Confirm for ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + ES::Target: EntropySource, + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, F::Target: FeeEstimator, R::Target: Router, L::Target: Logger, @@ -5418,13 +5878,13 @@ where log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height); let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger) + self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger) .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b))); let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); if height < last_best_block_height { let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire); - self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)); + self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)); } } @@ -5440,7 +5900,7 @@ where *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height); - self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)); + self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)); macro_rules! max_time { ($timestamp: expr) => { @@ -5466,11 +5926,14 @@ where } fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option)> { - let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len()); - for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() { - if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) { - res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash)); + let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len()); + for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() { + if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) { + res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash))); + } } } res @@ -5488,11 +5951,13 @@ where } } -impl ChannelManager +impl ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + ES::Target: EntropySource, + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, F::Target: FeeEstimator, R::Target: Router, L::Target: Logger, @@ -5500,7 +5965,7 @@ where /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by /// the function. - fn do_chain_event::Signer>) -> Result<(Option, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option), ClosureReason>> + fn do_chain_event::Signer>) -> Result<(Option, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option), ClosureReason>> (&self, height_opt: Option, f: FN) { // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases. @@ -5509,89 +5974,92 @@ where let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new(); { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; - channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| { - let res = f(channel); - if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res { - for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) { - let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel); - timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data), - HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() })); - } - if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt { - send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready); - if channel.is_usable() { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); - if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { - node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), - msg, - }); + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events; + peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| { + let res = f(channel); + if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res { + for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) { + let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel); + timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data), + HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() })); + } + if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt { + send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready); + if channel.is_usable() { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); + if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + msg, + }); + } + } else { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); } - } else { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); } - } - emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel); + emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel); - if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { - node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), - msg: announcement_sigs, - }); - if let Some(height) = height_opt { - if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { - msg: announcement, - // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced, - // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here. - update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(), - }); + if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + msg: announcement_sigs, + }); + if let Some(height) = height_opt { + if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { + msg: announcement, + // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced, + // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here. + update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()), + }); + } } } - } - if channel.is_our_channel_ready() { - if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { - // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it - // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we - // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e. - // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever - // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info - // is always consistent. - let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap(); - let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id())); - assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()), - "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels", - fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW); + if channel.is_our_channel_ready() { + if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { + // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it + // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we + // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e. + // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever + // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info + // is always consistent. + let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap(); + let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id())); + assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()), + "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels", + fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW); + } } - } - } else if let Err(reason) = res { - update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel); - // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was - // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel. - failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true)); - if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { - msg: update + } else if let Err(reason) = res { + update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel); + // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was + // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel. + failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true)); + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + let reason_message = format!("{}", reason); + self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason); + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { + channel_id: channel.channel_id(), + data: reason_message, + } }, }); + return false; } - let reason_message = format!("{}", reason); - self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason); - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { - node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), - action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { - channel_id: channel.channel_id(), - data: reason_message, - } }, - }); - return false; - } - true - }); + true + }); + } } if let Some(height) = height_opt { @@ -5687,26 +6155,62 @@ where pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock { self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone() } + + /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by + /// [`ChannelManager`]. + pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures { + provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration) + } + + /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by + /// [`ChannelManager`]. + /// + /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice" + /// or not. Thus, this method is not public. + #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))] + pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures { + provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration) + } + + /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by + /// [`ChannelManager`]. + pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures { + provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration) + } + + /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by + /// [`ChannelManager`]. + pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures { + provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration) + } + + /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by + /// [`ChannelManager`]. + pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures { + provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration) + } } -impl - ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager +impl + ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + ES::Target: EntropySource, + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, F::Target: FeeEstimator, R::Target: Router, L::Target: Logger, { - fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) { + fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) { + fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) { @@ -5724,9 +6228,9 @@ where let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) { + fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) { @@ -5789,118 +6293,150 @@ where let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) { + fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); - let mut no_channels_remain = true; - { - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; - log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.", - log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" }); - channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| { - if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id { + let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap(); + let remove_peer = { + log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.", + log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)); + if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events; + peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| { chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger); if chan.is_shutdown() { update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan); self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer); return false; - } else { - no_channels_remain = false; } - } - true - }); - pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| { - match msg { - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true, - &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false, - } - }); - } - if no_channels_remain { - self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id); + true + }); + pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| { + match msg { + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true, + &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true, + &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false, + } + }); + debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect"); + peer_state.is_connected = false; + peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) + } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true } + }; + if remove_peer { + per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id); } + mem::drop(per_peer_state); for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) { self.finish_force_close_channel(failure); } } - fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> { + fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> { if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() { - log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)); + log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)); return Err(()); } - log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)); - let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the + // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of + // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new + // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them. + let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected); + let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS; + { let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap(); match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { + if inbound_peer_limited { + return Err(()); + } e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState { + channel_by_id: HashMap::new(), latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(), + pending_msg_events: Vec::new(), + monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(), + is_connected: true, })); }, hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => { - e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone(); + let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap(); + peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone(); + + let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + if inbound_peer_limited && + Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) == + peer_state.channel_by_id.len() + { + return Err(()); + } + + debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice"); + peer_state.is_connected = true; }, } } - let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; - channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| { - let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id { - if !chan.have_received_message() { - // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the - // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now - // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just - // drop it. - false - } else { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { - node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), - msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger), - }); - true - } - } else { true }; - if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) { - if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { - node_id: *counterparty_node_id, - msg, update_msg, + log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)); + + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events; + peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| { + let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id { + if !chan.have_received_message() { + // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the + // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now + // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just + // drop it. + false + } else { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { + node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), + msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger), }); + true + } + } else { true }; + if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) { + if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { + node_id: *counterparty_node_id, + msg, update_msg, + }); + } } } - } - retain - }); + retain + }); + } //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures Ok(()) } @@ -5909,22 +6445,29 @@ where let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] { - for chan in self.list_channels() { - if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id { - // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel - let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true); - } + let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id); + if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect() + }; + for channel_id in channel_ids { + // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel + let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true); } } else { { // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again. - let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { - if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { - return; - } + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id); + if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; } + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) { if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) { - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { node_id: *counterparty_node_id, msg, }); @@ -5939,18 +6482,18 @@ where } fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures { - provided_node_features() + provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration) } fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures { - provided_init_features() + provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration) } } /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by /// [`ChannelManager`]. -pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures { - provided_init_features().to_context() +pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures { + provided_init_features(config).to_context() } /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by @@ -5959,22 +6502,28 @@ pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures { /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice" /// or not. Thus, this method is not public. #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))] -pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures { - provided_init_features().to_context() +pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures { + provided_init_features(config).to_context() } /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by /// [`ChannelManager`]. -pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures { - provided_init_features().to_context() +pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures { + provided_init_features(config).to_context() +} + +/// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by +/// [`ChannelManager`]. +pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures { + ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config)) } /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by /// [`ChannelManager`]. -pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures { +pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures { // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we - // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for - // ErroringMessageHandler. + // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for + // [`ErroringMessageHandler`]. let mut features = InitFeatures::empty(); features.set_data_loss_protect_optional(); features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional(); @@ -5987,6 +6536,12 @@ pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures { features.set_channel_type_optional(); features.set_scid_privacy_optional(); features.set_zero_conf_optional(); + #[cfg(anchors)] + { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41. + if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx { + features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional(); + } + } features } @@ -6042,6 +6597,7 @@ impl Writeable for ChannelDetails { (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option), (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option), (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option), + (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option), }); Ok(()) } @@ -6049,7 +6605,7 @@ impl Writeable for ChannelDetails { impl Readable for ChannelDetails { fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result { - init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, { + _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, { (1, inbound_scid_alias, option), (2, channel_id, required), (3, channel_type, option), @@ -6077,6 +6633,7 @@ impl Readable for ChannelDetails { (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option), (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option), (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option), + (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option), }); // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with @@ -6110,6 +6667,7 @@ impl Readable for ChannelDetails { is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(), inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, + feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, }) } } @@ -6246,7 +6804,7 @@ impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC { impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC { fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result { - let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None); + let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None); let mut value = 0; let mut payment_data: Option = None; let mut cltv_expiry = 0; @@ -6296,32 +6854,40 @@ impl Readable for HTLCSource { let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?; match id { 0 => { - let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None); + let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None); let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0; - let mut path = Some(Vec::new()); + let mut path: Option> = Some(Vec::new()); let mut payment_id = None; let mut payment_secret = None; - let mut payment_params = None; + let mut payment_params: Option = None; read_tlv_fields!(reader, { (0, session_priv, required), (1, payment_id, option), (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required), (3, payment_secret, option), (4, path, vec_type), - (5, payment_params, option), + (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)), }); if payment_id.is_none() { // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes // instead. payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref())); } + if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() { + return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); + } + let path = path.unwrap(); + if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() { + if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 { + params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta; + } + } Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(), first_hop_htlc_msat, - path: path.unwrap(), + path, payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(), payment_secret, - payment_params, }) } 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)), @@ -6333,7 +6899,7 @@ impl Readable for HTLCSource { impl Writeable for HTLCSource { fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> { match self { - HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => { + HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret } => { 0u8.write(writer)?; let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id); write_tlv_fields!(writer, { @@ -6342,7 +6908,7 @@ impl Writeable for HTLCSource { (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required), (3, payment_secret, option), (4, *path, vec_type), - (5, payment_params, option), + (5, None::, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 }); } HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => { @@ -6378,11 +6944,13 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, { (8, min_value_msat, required), }); -impl Writeable for ChannelManager +impl Writeable for ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + ES::Target: EntropySource, + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, F::Target: FeeEstimator, R::Target: Router, L::Target: Logger, @@ -6399,20 +6967,34 @@ where best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?; } + let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0; { - // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires - // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state` - let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); let mut unfunded_channels = 0; - for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() { - if !channel.is_funding_initiated() { - unfunded_channels += 1; + let mut number_of_channels = 0; + for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) { + serializable_peer_count += 1; + } + number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len(); + for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() { + if !channel.is_funding_initiated() { + unfunded_channels += 1; + } } } - ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?; - for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() { - if channel.is_funding_initiated() { - channel.write(writer)?; + + ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?; + + for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() { + if channel.is_funding_initiated() { + channel.write(writer)?; + } } } } @@ -6429,6 +7011,8 @@ where } } + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap(); + let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap(); let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap(); @@ -6444,12 +7028,30 @@ where htlc_purposes.push(purpose); } - let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap(); - (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?; - for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { - peer_pubkey.write(writer)?; - let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); - peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?; + let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None; + let mut peer_states = Vec::new(); + for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance + // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any + // per_peer_state lock at all. + peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self()); + } + + (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?; + for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) { + // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we + // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we + // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with + // no channels. + if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) { + peer_pubkey.write(writer)?; + peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?; + if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() { + monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer + .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new) + .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions)); + } + } } let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); @@ -6526,8 +7128,6 @@ where // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it. pending_claiming_payments = None; - } else { - debug_assert!(false, "While we have code to serialize pending_claiming_payments, the map should always be empty until a later PR"); } write_tlv_fields!(writer, { @@ -6536,6 +7136,7 @@ where (3, pending_outbound_payments, required), (4, pending_claiming_payments, option), (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required), + (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option), (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required), (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type), (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required), @@ -6577,19 +7178,27 @@ where /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction. /// /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor -pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> +pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + ES::Target: EntropySource, + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, F::Target: FeeEstimator, R::Target: Router, L::Target: Logger, { + /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy. + pub entropy_source: ES, + + /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations. + pub node_signer: NS, + /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel /// signing data. - pub keys_manager: K, + pub signer_provider: SP, /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future. /// @@ -6629,16 +7238,18 @@ where /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in /// this struct. /// - /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings - pub channel_monitors: HashMap::Signer>>, + /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings + pub channel_monitors: HashMap::Signer>>, } -impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> - ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, R, L> +impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> + ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + ES::Target: EntropySource, + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, F::Target: FeeEstimator, R::Target: Router, L::Target: Logger, @@ -6646,10 +7257,10 @@ where /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to /// populate a HashMap directly from C. - pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig, - mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<::Signer>>) -> Self { + pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig, + mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<::Signer>>) -> Self { Self { - keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config, + entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config, channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect() } } @@ -6657,33 +7268,37 @@ where // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the // SipmleArcChannelManager type: -impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> - ReadableArgs> for (BlockHash, Arc>) +impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> + ReadableArgs> for (BlockHash, Arc>) where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + ES::Target: EntropySource, + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, F::Target: FeeEstimator, R::Target: Router, L::Target: Logger, { - fn read(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, R, L>) -> Result { - let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)?; + fn read(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result { + let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)?; Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager))) } } -impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> - ReadableArgs> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager) +impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> + ReadableArgs> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager) where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + ES::Target: EntropySource, + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, F::Target: FeeEstimator, R::Target: Router, L::Target: Logger, { - fn read(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, R, L>) -> Result { + fn read(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result { let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION); let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?; @@ -6694,12 +7309,14 @@ where let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); - let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); + let mut peer_channels: HashMap::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); let mut channel_closures = Vec::new(); for _ in 0..channel_count { - let mut channel: Channel<::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?; + let mut channel: Channel<::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, ( + &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config) + ))?; let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?; funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone()); if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) { @@ -6760,7 +7377,17 @@ where if channel.is_funding_initiated() { id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id()); } - by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel); + match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { + let by_id_map = entry.get_mut(); + by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel); + }, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { + let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new(); + by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel); + entry.insert(by_id_map); + } + } } } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() { // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence @@ -6782,7 +7409,7 @@ where } } - for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() { + for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() { if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) { log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id())); monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger); @@ -6815,11 +7442,15 @@ where } let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex)>())); + let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex::Signer>>)>())); for _ in 0..peer_count { let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?; let peer_state = PeerState { + channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()), latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?, + pending_msg_events: Vec::new(), + monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(), + is_connected: false, }; per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state)); } @@ -6875,22 +7506,28 @@ where let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None; let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None; let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new()); + let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new()); read_tlv_fields!(reader, { (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option), (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option), (3, pending_outbound_payments, option), (4, pending_claiming_payments, option), (5, received_network_pubkey, option), + (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option), (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option), (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type), (11, probing_cookie_secret, option), }); if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() { - fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); + fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()); } if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() { - probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); + probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()); + } + + if !channel_closures.is_empty() { + pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures); } if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() { @@ -6901,7 +7538,13 @@ where outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs }); } pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds); - } else { + } + let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments { + pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()), + retry_lock: Mutex::new(()) + }; + + { // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a @@ -6911,17 +7554,18 @@ where // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by // 0.0.102+ for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() { - if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() { - for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() { + if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() { + for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() { if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source { if path.is_empty() { log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment"); return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } + let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat; let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32]; session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]); - match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) { + match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path); log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}", @@ -6930,9 +7574,13 @@ where hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { let path_fee = path.get_path_fees(); entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { + retry_strategy: None, + attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(), + payment_params: None, session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(), payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash, payment_secret, + keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup pending_amt_msat: path_amt, pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee), total_msat: path_amt, @@ -6944,48 +7592,65 @@ where } } } - for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() { - if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source { - let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| { - info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint && - info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id - }; - // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's - // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we - // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or - // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after - // the monitor was when forwarding the payment. - forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| { - forwards.retain(|forward| { - if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward { - if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) { - log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}", - log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id())); - false + for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() { + match htlc_source { + HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => { + let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| { + info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint && + info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id + }; + // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's + // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we + // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or + // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after + // the monitor was when forwarding the payment. + forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| { + forwards.retain(|forward| { + if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward { + if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) { + log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}", + log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id())); + false + } else { true } } else { true } + }); + !forwards.is_empty() + }); + pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| { + if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) { + log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}", + log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id())); + pending_events_read.retain(|event| { + if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event { + intercepted_id != ev_id + } else { true } + }); + false } else { true } }); - !forwards.is_empty() - }); - pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| { - if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) { - log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}", - log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id())); - pending_events_read.retain(|event| { - if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event { - intercepted_id != ev_id - } else { true } - }); - false - } else { true } - }); + }, + HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => { + if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt { + let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read); + // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here, + // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever. + // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're + // force-closing for being stale that's okay. + // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming, + // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating + // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the + // `ChannelMonitor` is removed. + pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger); + pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap(); + } + }, } } } } } - if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() { + if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() { // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small @@ -6996,7 +7661,7 @@ where }); } - let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material(); + let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material(); let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material); let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len()); @@ -7021,7 +7686,7 @@ where payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) { Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage, None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) { - Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage, + Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage, Err(()) => { log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); @@ -7040,17 +7705,12 @@ where } let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); - secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); - - if !channel_closures.is_empty() { - pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures); - } + secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()); - let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) { + let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) { Ok(key) => key, Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }; - let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key); if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey { if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey { log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key."); @@ -7059,28 +7719,32 @@ where } let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new(); - for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() { - if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 { - let mut outbound_scid_alias; - loop { - outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias - .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager); - if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; } - } - chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias); - } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) { - // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older - // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above. - log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias()); - return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); - } - if chan.is_usable() { - if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() { + for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() { + if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 { + let mut outbound_scid_alias; + loop { + outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias + .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source); + if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; } + } + chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias); + } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) { // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above. log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias()); return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } + if chan.is_usable() { + if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() { + // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older + // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above. + log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias()); + return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); + } + } } } @@ -7094,7 +7758,7 @@ where let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey); let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret; if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() { - let phantom_pubkey = args.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode) + let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode) .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient"); receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey) } @@ -7117,8 +7781,13 @@ where // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on // restart. let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(); - if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) { - channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger); + if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){ + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap(); + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) { + channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger); + } } if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) { previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger); @@ -7134,6 +7803,15 @@ where } } + for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() { + if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) { + peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions; + } else { + log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id); + return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); + } + } + let channel_manager = ChannelManager { genesis_hash, fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator, @@ -7143,13 +7821,9 @@ where best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)), - channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder { - by_id, - pending_msg_events: Vec::new(), - }), inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key, pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments), - pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments { pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()) }, + pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds, pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()), forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs), @@ -7161,20 +7835,22 @@ where probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(), - our_network_key, our_network_pubkey, secp_ctx, highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize), - per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state), + per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state), pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read), pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read), total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()), persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(), - keys_manager: args.keys_manager, + entropy_source: args.entropy_source, + node_signer: args.node_signer, + signer_provider: args.signer_provider, + logger: args.logger, default_configuration: args.default_config, }; @@ -7197,10 +7873,11 @@ where mod tests { use bitcoin::hashes::Hash; use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; + use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey}; use core::time::Duration; use core::sync::atomic::Ordering; use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret}; - use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure}; + use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId}; use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*; use crate::ln::msgs; use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler; @@ -7208,7 +7885,8 @@ mod tests { use crate::util::errors::APIError; use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason}; use crate::util::test_utils; - use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysInterface}; + use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig; + use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource; #[test] fn test_notify_limits() { @@ -7225,14 +7903,16 @@ mod tests { assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1))); assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1))); - let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); + let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try // to connect messages with new values chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2; chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2; - let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone(); - let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone(); + let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty( + &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap(); + let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty( + &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap(); // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1))); @@ -7296,7 +7976,7 @@ mod tests { let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); - create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); // First, send a partial MPP payment. let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000); @@ -7308,7 +7988,7 @@ mod tests { // indicates there are more HTLCs coming. let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match. let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap(); - nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); @@ -7338,7 +8018,7 @@ mod tests { expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true); // Send the second half of the original MPP payment. - nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); @@ -7418,8 +8098,8 @@ mod tests { let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); - create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); - let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0); + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new(); let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it. @@ -7428,9 +8108,8 @@ mod tests { // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails. let route_params = RouteParameters { - payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()), + payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV), final_value_msat: 100_000, - final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV, }; let route = find_route( &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph, @@ -7516,18 +8195,15 @@ mod tests { let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); - nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap(); - nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap(); - let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); + let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]); let route_params = RouteParameters { - payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey), + payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40), final_value_msat: 10_000, - final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40, }; let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone(); let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels(); - let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0); + let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new(); let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); let route = find_route( &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::>()), @@ -7548,7 +8224,7 @@ mod tests { assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]); - nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1); + nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1); } #[test] @@ -7561,18 +8237,15 @@ mod tests { let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); - nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap(); - nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap(); - let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()); + let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]); let route_params = RouteParameters { - payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey), + payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40), final_value_msat: 10_000, - final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40, }; let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone(); let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels(); - let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0); + let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new(); let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); let route = find_route( &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::>()), @@ -7594,7 +8267,7 @@ mod tests { assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]); - nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1); + nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1); } #[test] @@ -7604,10 +8277,10 @@ mod tests { let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]); let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); - let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id; - let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id; - let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id; - let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id; + let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id; + let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id; + let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id; + let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id; // Marshall an MPP route. let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000); @@ -7622,11 +8295,46 @@ mod tests { match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() { PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => { - assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) }, + assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) + }, _ => panic!("unexpected error") } } + #[test] + fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() { + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + + nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + + nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed); + + { + // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been + // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed. + let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed. + assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1); + assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some()); + } + + nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); + + { + // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed. + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0); + } + } + #[test] fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() { // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret. @@ -7648,7 +8356,7 @@ mod tests { match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) { Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"), Err(()) => { - nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1); + nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1); } } @@ -7668,9 +8376,9 @@ mod tests { nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap(); let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); - nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel); + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel); let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); - nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel); + nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel); let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42); let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner(); @@ -7688,10 +8396,10 @@ mod tests { let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1); assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id)); - - assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0); } + assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0); + let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg); @@ -7699,7 +8407,9 @@ mod tests { let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1); assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id)); + } + { // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as // as it has the funding transaction. let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap(); @@ -7715,9 +8425,9 @@ mod tests { update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update); nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); - nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())); + nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())); let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); - nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown); + nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown); let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0); @@ -7729,7 +8439,9 @@ mod tests { let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1); assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id)); + } + { // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is @@ -7768,13 +8480,310 @@ mod tests { check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); } + + fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error(res_err: Result, expected_public_key: PublicKey) { + let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key); + check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err) + } + + fn check_unkown_peer_error(res_err: Result, expected_public_key: PublicKey) { + let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key); + check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err) + } + + fn check_api_error_message(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result) { + match res_err { + Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => { + assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message); + }, + Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => { + assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message); + }, + Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"), + Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"), + } + } + + #[test] + fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() { + // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as + // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the + // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map. + let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg); + let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr); + + // Dummy values + let channel_id = [4; 32]; + let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()); + let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]); + + // Test the API functions. + check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key); + + check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key); + + check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key); + + check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key); + + check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key); + + check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key); + + check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key); + } + + #[test] + fn test_connection_limiting() { + // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly. + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us + + nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); + let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + + let mut funding_tx = None; + for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER { + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg); + let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + + if idx == 0 { + nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel); + let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42); + funding_tx = Some(tx.clone()); + nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap(); + let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + + nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + + nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + } + open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); + } + + // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected + open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg); + assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id, + open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id); + + // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded, + // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS + // limit. + let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS); + for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS { + let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx, + &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap()); + peer_pks.push(random_pk); + nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init { + features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap(); + } + let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx, + &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap()); + nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init { + features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err(); + + // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from + // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers. + nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1); + for ev in chan_closed_events { + if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); } + } + nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init { + features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap(); + nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { + features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err(); + + // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed... + nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { + features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap(); + nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + + // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around. + // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them + // open channels. + assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1); + for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 { + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg); + get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]); + open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); + } + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg); + assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id, + open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id); + + // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed + nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); + get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk); + + // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now + // "protected" and can connect again. + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap()); + nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { + features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap(); + get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + + // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with + // last_random_pk. + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg); + get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk); + } + + #[test] + fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() { + // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us + + nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); + let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + + for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER { + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg); + get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); + } + + // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be + // rejected. + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg); + assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id, + open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id); + + // but we can still open an outbound channel. + nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); + get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + + // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail. + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg); + assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id, + open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id); + } + + #[test] + fn test_0conf_limiting() { + // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance + // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf. + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let mut settings = test_default_channel_config(); + settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true; + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us + + nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); + let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + + // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge + for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 { + let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx, + &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap()); + nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init { + features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap(); + + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg); + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + match events[0] { + Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => { + nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap(); + } + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk); + open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); + } + + // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail. + let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx, + &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap()); + nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init { + features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap(); + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg); + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + match events[0] { + Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => { + match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) { + Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => + assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"), + _ => panic!(), + } + } + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id, + open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id); + + // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine. + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg); + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + match events[0] { + Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => { + nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap(); + } + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk); + } + + #[cfg(anchors)] + #[test] + fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() { + // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept + // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry + // the channel without the anchors feature. + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config(); + anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true; + anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true; + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap(); + let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx()); + + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg); + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + match events[0] { + Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => { + nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + } + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + + let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg); + + let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx()); + + check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed); + } } #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))] pub mod bench { use crate::chain::Listen; use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist}; - use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner}; + use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner}; use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId}; use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*; use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init}; @@ -7797,7 +8806,7 @@ pub mod bench { &'a ChainMonitor, - &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, + &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>, } @@ -7813,12 +8822,12 @@ pub mod bench { // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync // calls per node. let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet; - let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(); let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))}; let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }; let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned()); - let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a))); + let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new()); + let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer); let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default(); config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1; @@ -7826,9 +8835,9 @@ pub mod bench { let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a); let seed_a = [1u8; 32]; let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42); - let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters { + let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters { network, - best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network), + best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network), }); let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a }; @@ -7836,17 +8845,17 @@ pub mod bench { let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b); let seed_b = [2u8; 32]; let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42); - let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters { + let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters { network, - best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network), + best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network), }); let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b }; - node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap(); - node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap(); + node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap(); + node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap(); node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap(); - node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id())); - node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id())); + node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id())); + node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id())); let tx; if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) { @@ -7862,7 +8871,7 @@ pub mod bench { assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]); let block = Block { - header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }, + header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }, txdata: vec![tx], }; Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1); @@ -7901,15 +8910,15 @@ pub mod bench { _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } - let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a); + let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a); let mut payment_count: u64 = 0; macro_rules! send_payment { ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => { let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels(); - let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id()) - .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()); - let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0); + let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV) + .with_features($node_b.invoice_features()); + let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new(); let seed = [3u8; 32]; let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42); let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); @@ -7920,13 +8929,13 @@ pub mod bench { payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes()); payment_count += 1; let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()); - let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap(); + let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap(); $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap(); let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap()); $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]); $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); - let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id()); + let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id()); $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa); $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs); $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id())); @@ -7945,7 +8954,7 @@ pub mod bench { _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"), } - let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id()); + let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id()); $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa); $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs); $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));