X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannelmanager.rs;h=7b8b2a258705eaa3f8339696f7b3a57ef67731e1;hb=37fe22fece33156d9a969aef8337d9c5913a857d;hp=451bf8be4a1cf02a74e4daa189658e59d8e05d98;hpb=38a544eafd51f0446b1bb460a42107d35c740388;p=rust-lightning

diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
index 451bf8be..7b8b2a25 100644
--- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitor
 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
 // construct one themselves.
+use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
@@ -196,19 +197,6 @@ pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
 	}
 }
 
-/// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
-/// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
-#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
-pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
-/// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
-/// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
-#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
-pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
-/// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
-/// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
-#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
-pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
-
 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
 
 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
@@ -1755,13 +1743,17 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
 	/// only Tor Onion addresses.
 	///
 	/// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
-	pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
+	pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
 		let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
 
 		if addresses.len() > 500 {
 			panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
 		}
 
+		// While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
+		// addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
+		addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
+
 		let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
 			features: NodeFeatures::known(),
 			timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
@@ -3467,6 +3459,10 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
 	/// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
 	/// [`PaymentReceived`].
 	///
+	/// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
+	/// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
+	/// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
+	///
 	/// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
 	///
 	/// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`