X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannelmanager.rs;h=913bbd62d3b946f061cb7b5148539e5382e004ce;hb=47ad3d6bd87affc14281ac8dbf62d69b6c066072;hp=918f8b28f37304c319e065f4b89fda05f3b0de98;hpb=a93d6e905b83a850bb5ba9ad649ffa0903fb19d1;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index 918f8b28..31c8dcca 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -1,43 +1,59 @@ +// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control +// history. +// +// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 or the MIT license +// , at your option. +// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these +// licenses. + //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here. //! //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s). //! -//! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing +//! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages). +//! -use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader; -use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction; +use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader}; use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block; use bitcoin::network::constants::Network; -use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash; - -use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine}; -use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine}; -use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; -use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash; -use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq; -use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey}; -use secp256k1::Secp256k1; -use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret; -use secp256k1; - -use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator}; -use chain::transaction::OutPoint; +use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine}; +use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine}; +use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; +use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash; +use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq; +use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash; + +use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey}; +use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1; +use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret; +use bitcoin::secp256k1; + +use chain; +use chain::Watch; +use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator}; +use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID}; +use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData}; +// Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to +// construct one themselves. +pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo; use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError}; -use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY}; use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures}; -use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop}; +use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop}; use ln::msgs; +use ln::msgs::NetAddress; use ln::onion_utils; -use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError}; -use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemoryChannelKeys}; +use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField}; +use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner}; use util::config::UserConfig; +use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider}; use util::{byte_utils, events}; -use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer}; +use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer}; use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader}; use util::logger::Logger; use util::errors::APIError; @@ -45,11 +61,14 @@ use util::errors::APIError; use std::{cmp, mem}; use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet}; use std::io::{Cursor, Read}; -use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock}; +use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard}; use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering}; use std::time::Duration; +#[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))] +use std::time::Instant; use std::marker::{Sync, Send}; use std::ops::Deref; +use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex; // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself: // @@ -76,6 +95,7 @@ enum PendingHTLCRouting { }, Receive { payment_data: Option, + incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed }, } @@ -103,9 +123,15 @@ pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus { pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo { AddHTLC { + forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo, + + // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in + // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the + // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded + // HTLCs. prev_short_channel_id: u64, prev_htlc_id: u64, - forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo, + prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, }, FailHTLC { htlc_id: u64, @@ -115,10 +141,14 @@ pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo { /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] -pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData { +pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64, incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32], + + // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards + // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel. + outpoint: OutPoint, } struct ClaimableHTLC { @@ -129,11 +159,12 @@ struct ClaimableHTLC { /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which /// are part of the same payment. payment_data: Option, + cltv_expiry: u32, } /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] -pub(super) enum HTLCSource { +pub(crate) enum HTLCSource { PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData), OutboundRoute { path: Vec, @@ -166,16 +197,19 @@ pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason { } /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop +/// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]); /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop +/// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]); /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together +/// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]); -type ShutdownResult = (Option, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>); +type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>); /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel @@ -189,14 +223,14 @@ struct MsgHandleErrInternal { } impl MsgHandleErrInternal { #[inline] - fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self { + fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self { Self { err: LightningError { - err, + err: err.clone(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, - data: err.to_string() + data: err }, }, }, @@ -204,7 +238,7 @@ impl MsgHandleErrInternal { } } #[inline] - fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self { + fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self { Self { err: LightningError { err, @@ -218,14 +252,14 @@ impl MsgHandleErrInternal { Self { err, shutdown_finish: None } } #[inline] - fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option) -> Self { + fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option) -> Self { Self { err: LightningError { - err, + err: err.clone(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, - data: err.to_string() + data: err }, }, }, @@ -241,20 +275,20 @@ impl MsgHandleErrInternal { action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError, }, ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError { - err: msg, + err: msg.clone(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, - data: msg.to_string() + data: msg }, }, }, - ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => LightningError { - err: msg, + ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError { + err: msg.clone(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, - data: msg.to_string() + data: msg }, }, }, @@ -283,8 +317,8 @@ pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder { } // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test): -pub(super) struct ChannelHolder { - pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>, +pub(super) struct ChannelHolder { + pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>, pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap, /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency @@ -296,12 +330,19 @@ pub(super) struct ChannelHolder { /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you /// go to read them! - /// TODO: We need to time out HTLCs sitting here which are waiting on other AMP HTLCs to - /// arrive. claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option), Vec>, /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict). - pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec, + pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec, +} + +/// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site +/// for some reason. They are handled in timer_chan_freshness_every_min, so may be processed with +/// quite some time lag. +enum BackgroundEvent { + /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder + /// commitment transaction. + ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)), } /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold @@ -320,7 +361,7 @@ const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assum /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the /// concrete type of the KeysManager. -pub type SimpleArcChannelManager = Arc, Arc, Arc, Arc>>; +pub type SimpleArcChannelManager = ChannelManager, Arc, Arc, Arc, Arc>; /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't @@ -330,7 +371,7 @@ pub type SimpleArcChannelManager = Arc = ChannelManager; +pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager; /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately. @@ -345,13 +386,13 @@ pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, M, T, F> = ChannelManager = ChannelManager - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, +pub struct ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, { default_configuration: UserConfig, - genesis_hash: Sha256dHash, + genesis_hash: BlockHash, fee_estimator: F, - monitor: M, + chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, #[cfg(test)] pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize, #[cfg(not(test))] latest_block_height: AtomicUsize, - last_block_hash: Mutex, + last_block_hash: RwLock, secp_ctx: Secp256k1, - #[cfg(test)] - pub(super) channel_state: Mutex>, - #[cfg(not(test))] - channel_state: Mutex>, + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))] + pub(super) channel_state: Mutex>, + #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))] + channel_state: Mutex>, our_network_key: SecretKey, /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this @@ -406,28 +448,91 @@ pub struct ChannelManager>>, pending_events: Mutex>, + pending_background_events: Mutex>, /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent. /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out. /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks. + /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call + /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the PersistenceNotifier + /// the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released. total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>, + persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier, + keys_manager: K, - logger: Arc, + logger: L, } -/// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when -/// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction). -pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24; -/// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us -pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7; +/// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`. +/// +/// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network, +/// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters +/// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`. +pub struct ChainParameters { + /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages. + pub network: Network, + + /// The hash of the latest block successfully connected. + pub latest_hash: BlockHash, + + /// The height of the latest block successfully connected. + /// + /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks. + pub latest_height: usize, +} + +/// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is +/// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/ +/// `await_persistable_update` that new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this +/// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope, +/// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the +/// updates are ready for persistence). +struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> { + persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, + // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately. + _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>, +} + +impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> { + fn new(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> Self { + let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap(); + + Self { + persistence_notifier: notifier, + _read_guard: read_guard, + } + } +} + +impl<'a> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> { + fn drop(&mut self) { + self.persistence_notifier.notify(); + } +} + +/// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time +/// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction). +/// +/// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] +/// +/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay +pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24; +/// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches +/// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021. +pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7; /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound -/// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, -/// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out -/// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the -/// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more). -const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO? +/// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly six hours of blocks at six blocks/hour. +/// +/// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`] +/// +/// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta +// This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, +// i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out +// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the +// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more). +pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 6; pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO? // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, @@ -438,24 +543,16 @@ pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO? // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS. #[deny(const_err)] #[allow(dead_code)] -const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS; +const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS; // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed. #[deny(const_err)] #[allow(dead_code)] -const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER; - -macro_rules! secp_call { - ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => { - match $res { - Ok(key) => key, - Err(_) => return Err($err), - } - }; -} +const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER; /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels +#[derive(Clone)] pub struct ChannelDetails { /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes, /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output). @@ -489,10 +586,50 @@ pub struct ChannelDetails { /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b) /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution. pub is_live: bool, + + /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding + /// payments to us through this channel. + pub counterparty_forwarding_info: Option, +} + +/// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the +/// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum +/// states for more. +#[derive(Clone, Debug)] +pub enum PaymentSendFailure { + /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to + /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and + /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full. + ParameterError(APIError), + /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us + /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages + /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the + /// payment in full. + /// + /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to + /// send_payment. + PathParameterError(Vec>), + /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place. + /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different + /// paths than the ones selected). + AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec), + /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some + /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result + /// in over-/re-payment. + /// + /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to + /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely + /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so). + /// + /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried + /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the + /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel + /// with the latest update_id. + PartialFailure(Vec>), } macro_rules! handle_error { - ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => { + ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { match $internal { Ok(msg) => Ok(msg), Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => { @@ -514,11 +651,11 @@ macro_rules! handle_error { } } - log_error!($self, "{}", err.err); + log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err); if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action { } else { msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { - node_id: $their_node_id, + node_id: $counterparty_node_id, action: err.action.clone() }); } @@ -542,13 +679,14 @@ macro_rules! break_chan_entry { break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone())) }, Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => { - log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg); + log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg); let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry(); if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() { $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id); } - break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok())) }, - Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); } + break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok())) + }, + Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); } } } } @@ -561,29 +699,19 @@ macro_rules! try_chan_entry { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone())) }, Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => { - log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg); + log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg); let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry(); if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() { $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id); } return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok())) }, - Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => { - log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg); + Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => { + log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg); let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry(); if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() { $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id); } - if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) { - match e { - // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save - // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able - // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't - // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds. - ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {}, - ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {}, - } - } let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false); return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok())) } @@ -598,7 +726,7 @@ macro_rules! handle_monitor_err { ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { match $err { ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => { - log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..])); + log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..])); let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry(); if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() { $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id); @@ -612,11 +740,11 @@ macro_rules! handle_monitor_err { // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees. - let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok())); + let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok())); res }, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => { - log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails", + log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa { match $action_type { @@ -635,7 +763,7 @@ macro_rules! handle_monitor_err { debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment); } $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails); - Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key())) + Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$entry.key())) }, } } @@ -662,11 +790,12 @@ macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err { } } -impl ChannelManager - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, +impl ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, { /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. /// @@ -677,27 +806,22 @@ impl ChannelMan /// /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`! /// - /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel - /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks. - /// /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or - /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. - /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register - /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's - /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one - /// go. - pub fn new(network: Network, fee_est: F, monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: Arc, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result, secp256k1::Error> { - let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); - - let res = ChannelManager { + /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting + /// from after `params.latest_hash`. + pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self { + let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); + + ChannelManager { default_configuration: config.clone(), - genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(), + genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(), fee_estimator: fee_est, - monitor, + chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, - latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height), - last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()), + latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(params.latest_height), + last_block_hash: RwLock::new(params.latest_hash), secp_ctx, channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{ @@ -714,14 +838,14 @@ impl ChannelMan per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()), pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), + pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()), + persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(), keys_manager, logger, - }; - - Ok(res) + } } /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value. @@ -738,19 +862,22 @@ impl ChannelMan /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000. pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option) -> Result<(), APIError> { if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 { - return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" }); + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) }); } let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration }; - let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), config)?; - let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.fee_estimator); + let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?; + let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone()); + + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard. + debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") { - return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" }); + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() }); } else { panic!("RNG is bad???"); } @@ -764,7 +891,7 @@ impl ChannelMan Ok(()) } - fn list_channels_with_filter)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec { + fn list_channels_with_filter)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec { let mut res = Vec::new(); { let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); @@ -774,13 +901,14 @@ impl ChannelMan res.push(ChannelDetails { channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(), short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(), - remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), + remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(), channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(), inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat, user_id: channel.get_user_id(), is_live: channel.is_live(), + counterparty_forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(), }); } } @@ -800,7 +928,7 @@ impl ChannelMan } /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to - /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used. + /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used. /// /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are. @@ -817,7 +945,7 @@ impl ChannelMan /// /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed. pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); @@ -826,7 +954,7 @@ impl ChannelMan hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => { let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?; channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { - node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), + node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), msg: shutdown_msg }); if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() { @@ -836,7 +964,7 @@ impl ChannelMan (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1)) } else { (failed_htlcs, None) } }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"}) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()}) } }; for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) { @@ -860,38 +988,39 @@ impl ChannelMan #[inline] fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) { - let (funding_txo_option, monitor_update, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res; - log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len()); + let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res; + log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len()); for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) { self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }); } - if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_option { + if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option { // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to // ignore the result here. - let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(funding_txo, monitor_update); + let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update); } } - /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to - /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. - pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - + fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result { let mut chan = { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) { - if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() { + if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) { + if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id { + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id { + return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()}); + } + } + if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() { channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id); } - chan + chan.remove_entry().1 } else { - return; + return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()}); } }; - log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..])); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..])); self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true)); if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) { let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); @@ -899,21 +1028,43 @@ impl ChannelMan msg: update }); } + + Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) + } + + /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to + /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager. + pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) { + Ok(counterparty_node_id) => { + self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push( + events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { + node_id: counterparty_node_id, + action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { + msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() } + }, + } + ); + Ok(()) + }, + Err(e) => Err(e) + } } /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each. pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) { for chan in self.list_channels() { - self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id); + let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id); } } - fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard>) { + fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard>) { macro_rules! return_malformed_err { ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => { { - log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); + log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC { channel_id: msg.channel_id, htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, @@ -956,7 +1107,7 @@ impl ChannelMan macro_rules! return_err { ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => { { - log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); + log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); } @@ -1012,7 +1163,11 @@ impl ChannelMan // OUR PAYMENT! // final_expiry_too_soon - if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 { + // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least + // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go. + // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward + // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational). + if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 { return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]); } // final_incorrect_htlc_amount @@ -1036,7 +1191,10 @@ impl ChannelMan // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed! PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { - routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data }, + routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { + payment_data, + incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry, + }, payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(), incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret, amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward, @@ -1089,7 +1247,7 @@ impl ChannelMan PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet: outgoing_packet, - short_channel_id: short_channel_id, + short_channel_id, }, payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(), incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret, @@ -1122,24 +1280,31 @@ impl ChannelMan if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))); } - if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum + if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))); } - let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) }); + let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) }); if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))); } - if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry + if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))); } let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1; - // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration - if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon + // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty + // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational) + if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))); } if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None)); } + // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS. + // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay. + if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 { + break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))); + } + break None; } { @@ -1152,7 +1317,8 @@ impl ChannelMan res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry)); } else if code == 0x1000 | 20 { - res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags)); + // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791 + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0)); } res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]); } @@ -1166,22 +1332,23 @@ impl ChannelMan /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id /// May be called with channel_state already locked! - fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result { + fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result { let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() { - None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}), + None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}), Some(id) => id, }; - let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..]; + let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..]; let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { chain_hash: self.genesis_hash, - short_channel_id: short_channel_id, + short_channel_id, timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(), - flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1), - cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, - htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(), - fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator), + flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1), + cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(), + htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(), + htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()), + fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator), fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(), excess_data: Vec::new(), }; @@ -1195,103 +1362,57 @@ impl ChannelMan }) } - /// Sends a payment along a given route. - /// - /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop - /// fields for more info. - /// - /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative - /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided - /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as - /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own - /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of - /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself. - /// - /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed. - /// - /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter - /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified. - /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates - /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure). - /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the - /// relevant updates. - /// - /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed - /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately. - /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably - /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry - /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice! - /// - /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate - /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For - /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route - /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided - /// payment_secret. - /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature - /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route, - /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set. - pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option) -> Result<(), APIError> { - if route.paths.len() < 1 || route.paths.len() > 1 { - return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "We currently don't support MPP, and we need at least one path"}); - } - if route.paths[0].len() < 1 || route.paths[0].len() > 20 { - return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}); - } - let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id(); - for (idx, hop) in route.paths[0].iter().enumerate() { - if idx != route.paths[0].len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id { - return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}); - } - } - - let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand(); + // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly + pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id); + let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); + let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..]).expect("RNG is busted"); - let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1; - - let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv), - APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"}); - let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], payment_secret, cur_height)?; + let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv) + .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?; + let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?; if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) { return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"}); } - let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash); + let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash); - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let err: Result<(), _> = loop { let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.paths[0].first().unwrap().short_channel_id) { - None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}), + let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) { + None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}), Some(id) => id.clone(), }; let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) { match { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.paths[0].first().unwrap().pubkey { + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey { return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"}); } if !chan.get().is_live() { - return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"}); + return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()}); } break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { - path: route.paths[0].clone(), + path: path.clone(), session_priv: session_priv.clone(), first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat, - }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan) + }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan) } { Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => { - if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true); // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs) - // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor - // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return - // something else in case we will resend later! + // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating + // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that + // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the + // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below. return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed); } channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: route.paths[0].first().unwrap().pubkey, + node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add], update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), @@ -1308,9 +1429,108 @@ impl ChannelMan return Ok(()); }; - match handle_error!(self, err, route.paths[0].first().unwrap().pubkey) { + match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) { Ok(_) => unreachable!(), - Err(e) => { Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err }) } + Err(e) => { + Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err }) + }, + } + } + + /// Sends a payment along a given route. + /// + /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop + /// fields for more info. + /// + /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative + /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided + /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as + /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own + /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of + /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself. + /// + /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed. + /// + /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with + /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see + /// PaymentSendFailure for more info. + /// + /// In general, a path may raise: + /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee, + /// node public key) is specified. + /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates + /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update + /// failure). + /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the + /// relevant updates. + /// + /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been + /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a + /// different route unless you intend to pay twice! + /// + /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate + /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For + /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route + /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided + /// payment_secret. + /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature + /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route, + /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set. + pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> { + if route.paths.len() < 1 { + return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"})); + } + if route.paths.len() > 10 { + // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count + // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but + // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure. + return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"})); + } + let mut total_value = 0; + let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id(); + let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len()); + 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() { + if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 { + path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"})); + continue 'path_check; + } + for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() { + if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id { + path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"})); + continue 'path_check; + } + } + total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat; + path_errs.push(Ok(())); + } + if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) { + return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs)); + } + + let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1; + let mut results = Vec::new(); + for path in route.paths.iter() { + results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height)); + } + let mut has_ok = false; + let mut has_err = false; + for res in results.iter() { + if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; } + if res.is_err() { has_err = true; } + if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res { + // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a + // PartialFailure. + has_err = true; + has_ok = true; + break; + } + } + if has_err && has_ok { + Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results)) + } else if has_err { + Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect())) + } else { + Ok(()) } } @@ -1324,12 +1544,12 @@ impl ChannelMan /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel). pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = { + let (chan, msg) = { let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) { Some(mut chan) => { - (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) + (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo, &self.logger) .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e { MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None) } else { unreachable!(); }) @@ -1337,37 +1557,18 @@ impl ChannelMan }, None => return }; - match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) { + match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) { Ok(funding_msg) => { - (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1) + (chan, funding_msg) }, Err(_) => { return; } } }; - // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state - // lock before add_monitor - if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) { - match e { - ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => { - match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), None)), chan.get_their_node_id()) { - Err(_) => { return; }, - Ok(()) => unreachable!(), - } - }, - ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => { - // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor - // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe - // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not, - // in fact, safe). - chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new()); - }, - } - } let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { - node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(), - msg: msg, + node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), + msg, }); match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { @@ -1379,9 +1580,9 @@ impl ChannelMan } } - fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option { + fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option { if !chan.should_announce() { - log_trace!(self, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id())); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id())); return None } @@ -1405,7 +1606,7 @@ impl ChannelMan // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB // message... - const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (msgs::NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2; + const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2; #[deny(const_err)] #[allow(dead_code)] // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is @@ -1425,15 +1626,15 @@ impl ChannelMan /// only Tor Onion addresses. /// /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500). - pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); if addresses.len() > 500 { panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!"); } let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement { - features: NodeFeatures::supported(), + features: NodeFeatures::known(), timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32, node_id: self.get_our_node_id(), rgb, alias, addresses, @@ -1456,7 +1657,7 @@ impl ChannelMan /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event. /// Will likely generate further events. pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let mut new_events = Vec::new(); let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new(); @@ -1473,9 +1674,11 @@ impl ChannelMan failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len()); for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) { match forward_info { - HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => { + HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info, + prev_funding_outpoint } => { let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, + outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret, }); @@ -1502,17 +1705,19 @@ impl ChannelMan HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo { routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. - }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, } => { - log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id); + }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, + prev_funding_outpoint } => { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id); let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, + outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, }); match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) { Err(e) => { if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e { - log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg); } else { panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met"); } @@ -1542,11 +1747,11 @@ impl ChannelMan panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward"); }, HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => { - log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id); match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) { Err(e) => { if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e { - log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg); } else { panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met"); } @@ -1572,36 +1777,36 @@ impl ChannelMan } if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() { - let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() { + let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) { Ok(res) => res, Err(e) => { // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case // close channel and then send error message to peer. - let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id(); + let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(); let err: Result<(), _> = match e { ChannelError::Ignore(_) => { panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met"); }, ChannelError::Close(msg) => { - log_trace!(self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg); let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry(); if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id); } Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok())) }, - ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); } + ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); } }; - handle_errors.push((their_node_id, err)); + handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err)); continue; } }; - if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { - handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))); + if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))); continue; } channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(), + node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs, update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), @@ -1619,10 +1824,12 @@ impl ChannelMan for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) { match forward_info { HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo { - routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data }, - incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, } => { + routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry }, + incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, + prev_funding_outpoint } => { let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, + outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, }; @@ -1636,6 +1843,7 @@ impl ChannelMan prev_hop, value: amt_to_forward, payment_data: payment_data.clone(), + cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry, }); if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { for htlc in htlcs.iter() { @@ -1647,24 +1855,32 @@ impl ChannelMan } if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > data.total_msat { for htlc in htlcs.iter() { + let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec(); + htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice( + &byte_utils::be32_to_array( + self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) + as u32, + ), + ); failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id, + outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret, }), payment_hash, - HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec() } + HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data } )); } } else if total_value == data.total_msat { new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived { - payment_hash: payment_hash, + payment_hash, payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret), amt: total_value, }); } } else { new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived { - payment_hash: payment_hash, + payment_hash, payment_secret: None, amt: amt_to_forward, }); @@ -1686,8 +1902,8 @@ impl ChannelMan self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason); } - for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) { - let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id); + for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) { + let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id); } if new_events.is_empty() { return } @@ -1695,13 +1911,42 @@ impl ChannelMan events.append(&mut new_events); } + /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_chan_freshness_every_min. + /// + /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental + /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_chan_freshness_every_min. + /// + /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock. + fn process_background_events(&self) { + let mut background_events = Vec::new(); + mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events); + for event in background_events.drain(..) { + match event { + BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => { + // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the + // monitor updating completing. + let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update); + }, + } + } + } + + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))] + pub(crate) fn test_process_background_events(&self) { + self.process_background_events(); + } + /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'. /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels. /// /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute. + /// + /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call. pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + self.process_background_events(); + let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() { @@ -1726,42 +1971,88 @@ impl ChannelMan /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the /// HTLC backwards has been started. pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option) -> bool { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret)); if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source { for htlc in sources.drain(..) { if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); } + let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec(); + htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array( + self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32, + )); self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash, - HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec() }); + HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }); } true } else { false } } + // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be + // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to + // be surfaced to the user. + fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) { + for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) { + match htlc_src { + HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => { + let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = + match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => { + if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) { + (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len()) + } else { + (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) + } + }, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) + }; + let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state, + htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data}); + }, + HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => { + self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push( + events::Event::PaymentFailed { + payment_hash, + rejected_by_dest: false, +#[cfg(test)] + error_code: None, +#[cfg(test)] + error_data: None, + } + ) + }, + }; + } + } + /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us. /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here. /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to /// still-available channels. - fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) { + fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) { //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs //timer handling. + + // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called + // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor + // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more. match source { HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => { - log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); mem::drop(channel_state_lock); match &onion_error { &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => { #[cfg(test)] - let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone()); + let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone()); #[cfg(not(test))] - let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone()); + let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone()); // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our // next-hop is needlessly blaming us! @@ -1777,17 +2068,21 @@ impl ChannelMan payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(), rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable, #[cfg(test)] - error_code: onion_error_code + error_code: onion_error_code, +#[cfg(test)] + error_data: onion_error_data } ); }, &HTLCFailReason::Reason { #[cfg(test)] ref failure_code, +#[cfg(test)] + ref data, .. } => { // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary - // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route + // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via // ChannelDetails. // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the @@ -1798,20 +2093,22 @@ impl ChannelMan rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1, #[cfg(test)] error_code: Some(*failure_code), +#[cfg(test)] + error_data: Some(data.clone()), } ); } } }, - HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => { + HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => { let err_packet = match onion_error { HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => { - log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code); let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode(); onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet) }, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => { - log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data) } }; @@ -1857,7 +2154,7 @@ impl ChannelMan pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option, expected_amount: u64) -> bool { let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()); - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret)); @@ -1896,25 +2193,26 @@ impl ChannelMan for htlc in sources.drain(..) { if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); } if (is_mpp && !valid_mpp) || (!is_mpp && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2)) { - let mut htlc_msat_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec(); - let mut height_data = byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).to_vec(); - htlc_msat_data.append(&mut height_data); + let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec(); + htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array( + self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32, + )); self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash, - HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_data }); + HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }); } else { match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) { Err(Some(e)) => { if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action { // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain). - log_error!(self, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err); + log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err); claimed_any_htlcs = true; } else { errs.push(e); } }, Err(None) if is_mpp => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"), Err(None) => { - log_warn!(self, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed."); + log_warn!(self.logger, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed."); }, Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true, } @@ -1925,16 +2223,16 @@ impl ChannelMan // which were generated. channel_state.take(); - for (their_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) { + for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) { let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err); - let _ = handle_error!(self, res, their_node_id); + let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id); } claimed_any_htlcs } else { false } } - fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> { + fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> { //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay! let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock; let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) { @@ -1946,20 +2244,20 @@ impl ChannelMan if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) { let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update(); - match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage) { + match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) { Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => { if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option { - if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { if was_frozen_for_monitor { assert!(msgs.is_none()); } else { - return Err(Some((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err()))); + return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err()))); } } } if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(), + node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg], @@ -1987,7 +2285,7 @@ impl ChannelMan } else { unreachable!(); } } - fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) { + fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) { match source { HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => { mem::drop(channel_state_lock); @@ -1997,19 +2295,30 @@ impl ChannelMan }); }, HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => { - if let Err((their_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) { + let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint; + if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) { Ok(()) => Ok(()), Err(None) => { - // TODO: There is probably a channel monitor somewhere that needs to - // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's - // why it's missing. + let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate { + update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID, + updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { + payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(), + }], + }; + // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after + // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the + // event being update_fulfill_htlc). + if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) { + log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}", + payment_preimage, e); + } Ok(()) }, Err(Some(res)) => Err(res), } { mem::drop(channel_state_lock); let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err); - let _ = handle_error!(self, res, their_node_id); + let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id); } }, } @@ -2033,7 +2342,7 @@ impl ChannelMan /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls. /// /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level: - /// 1) You register a ManyChannelMonitor with this ChannelManager, + /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager, /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures /// any time it cannot do so instantly, @@ -2041,7 +2350,7 @@ impl ChannelMan /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled. pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let mut close_results = Vec::new(); let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new(); @@ -2061,16 +2370,16 @@ impl ChannelMan return; } - let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(); + let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger); if !pending_forwards.is_empty() { - htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards)); + htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), funding_txo.clone(), pending_forwards)); } htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures); macro_rules! handle_cs { () => { if let Some(update) = commitment_update { pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), updates: update, }); } @@ -2078,7 +2387,7 @@ impl ChannelMan macro_rules! handle_raa { () => { if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa { pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { - node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg: revoke_and_ack, }); } @@ -2101,12 +2410,12 @@ impl ChannelMan } if let Some(msg) = funding_locked { pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { - node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg, }); if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) { pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { - node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg: announcement_sigs, }); } @@ -2126,20 +2435,20 @@ impl ChannelMan } } - fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())); + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())); } - let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration) + let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration) .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?; let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg: channel.get_accept_channel(), }); entry.insert(channel); @@ -2148,55 +2457,61 @@ impl ChannelMan Ok(()) } - fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let (value, output_script, user_id) = { let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id)); + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id)); } try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan); (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id()) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id)) } }; let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id, channel_value_satoshis: value, - output_script: output_script, + output_script, user_channel_id: user_id, }); Ok(()) } - fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = { + fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = { + let last_block_hash = *self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap(); let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id)); + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id)); } - (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove()) + (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, last_block_hash, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove()) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id)) } }; // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state - // lock before add_monitor - if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + // lock before watch_channel + if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) { match e { ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => { // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway. - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), None)); + // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for + // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we + // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain). + let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true); + assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty()); + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id)); }, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => { // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor @@ -2211,11 +2526,11 @@ impl ChannelMan let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id)) + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id)) }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg: funding_msg, }); e.insert(chan); @@ -2224,52 +2539,47 @@ impl ChannelMan Ok(()) } - fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let (funding_txo, user_id) = { + let last_block_hash = *self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap(); let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } - let monitor_update = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg) { - Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan), - Err((Some(monitor_update), e)) => { - assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update()); - let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update); - try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan); - unreachable!(); - }, + let monitor = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, last_block_hash, &self.logger) { Ok(update) => update, + Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan), }; - if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) { return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false); } (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id()) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } }; let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { - funding_txo: funding_txo, + funding_txo, user_channel_id: user_id, }); Ok(()) } - fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan); if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) { - log_trace!(self, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking @@ -2280,36 +2590,36 @@ impl ChannelMan // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network. channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg: announcement_sigs, }); } Ok(()) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } } - fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => { - if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } - let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry); + let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry); if let Some(msg) = shutdown { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg, }); } if let Some(msg) = closing_signed { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg, }); } @@ -2320,7 +2630,7 @@ impl ChannelMan (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1)) } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) } }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } }; for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) { @@ -2337,19 +2647,19 @@ impl ChannelMan Ok(()) } - fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let (tx, chan_option) = { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => { - if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry); if let Some(msg) = closing_signed { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg, }); } @@ -2365,11 +2675,11 @@ impl ChannelMan (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1)) } else { (tx, None) } }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } }; if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx { - log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx)); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx)); self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx); } if let Some(chan) = chan_option { @@ -2383,7 +2693,7 @@ impl ChannelMan Ok(()) } - fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack. @@ -2393,135 +2703,143 @@ impl ChannelMan //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that, //but we should prevent it anyway. - let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg); + let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } - if !chan.get().is_usable() { + + let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| { + // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a + // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC. + assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0); // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close, // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding. - if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info { - let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()); - pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { - channel_id: msg.channel_id, - htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, - reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update { - // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing - // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply - // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled. - // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be - // allowed. - onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{ + match pending_forward_info { + PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => { + let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) { + onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128); - res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags)); - res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]); + // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791 + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0)); + res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]); res }[..]) } else { - // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded - // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments - // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should - // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no - // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer - onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[]) - }, - })); + // The only case where we'd be unable to + // successfully get a channel update is if the + // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet, + // implying our counterparty is trying to route + // payments over the channel back to themselves + // (cause no one else should know the short_id + // is a lightning channel yet). We should have + // no problem just calling this + // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10). + onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[]) + }; + let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { + channel_id: msg.channel_id, + htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, + reason + }; + PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg)) + }, + _ => pending_forward_info } - } - try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan); + }; + try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan); }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } Ok(()) } - fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let htlc_source = { let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } }; self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone()); Ok(()) } - fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan); }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } Ok(()) } - fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 { - let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set"); + let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned()); try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan); } try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan); Ok(()) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } } - fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) = - match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator) { - Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan), - Err((Some(update), e)) => { - assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update()); - let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update); - try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan); - unreachable!(); - }, - Ok(res) => res - }; - if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) { + Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan), + Err((Some(update), e)) => { + assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update()); + let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update); + try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan); + unreachable!(); + }, + Ok(res) => res + }; + if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()); //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration } channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg: revoke_and_ack, }); if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), @@ -2534,19 +2852,19 @@ impl ChannelMan } if let Some(msg) = closing_signed { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg, }); } Ok(()) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } } #[inline] - fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) { - for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards { + fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) { + for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards { let mut forward_event = None; if !pending_forwards.is_empty() { let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); @@ -2559,10 +2877,12 @@ impl ChannelMan PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0, }) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { - entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }); + entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, + prev_htlc_id, forward_info }); }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { - entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info })); + entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, + prev_htlc_id, forward_info })); } } } @@ -2579,77 +2899,86 @@ impl ChannelMan } } - fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = { + fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new(); + let res = loop { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update(); - let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update) = - try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan); - if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) = + break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan); + htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in; + if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { if was_frozen_for_monitor { assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty()); - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA")); + break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned())); } else { - return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures); + if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) { + break Err(e); + } else { unreachable!(); } } } if let Some(updates) = commitment_update { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), updates, }); } if let Some(msg) = closing_signed { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg, }); } - (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel")) + break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap())) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } }; - for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) { - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2); + self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id); + match res { + Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => { + for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) { + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2); + } + self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]); + Ok(()) + }, + Err(e) => Err(e) } - self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]); - - Ok(()) } - fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan); }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } Ok(()) } - fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } if !chan.get().is_usable() { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError})); + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError})); } let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id(); @@ -2658,10 +2987,21 @@ impl ChannelMan let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id; let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]); - if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() || - self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() { - let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature"); - try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan); + { + let their_node_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }; + let their_bitcoin_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }; + match (self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, their_node_key), + self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, their_bitcoin_key)) { + (Err(e), _) => { + let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature: {:?}. Maybe using different node_secret for transport and routing msg? UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", e, &announcement, their_node_key)); + try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan); + }, + (_, Err(e)) => { + let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature: {:?}. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})", e, &announcement, their_bitcoin_key)); + try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan); + }, + _ => {} + } } let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key); @@ -2677,24 +3017,51 @@ impl ChannelMan update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state }); }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } Ok(()) } - fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; + let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) { + Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(), + None => { + // It's not a local channel + return Ok(()) + } + }; + match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + // TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), chan_id)); + } + try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan); + }, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!() + } + Ok(()) + } + + fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } + // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer + // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell + // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending + // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here. let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) = - try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan); + try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan); if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt { - if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane. @@ -2710,14 +3077,14 @@ impl ChannelMan } if let Some(msg) = funding_locked { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg }); } macro_rules! send_raa { () => { if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg }); } @@ -2725,7 +3092,7 @@ impl ChannelMan macro_rules! send_cu { () => { if let Some(updates) = commitment_update { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), updates }); } @@ -2742,13 +3109,13 @@ impl ChannelMan } if let Some(msg) = shutdown { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg, }); } Ok(()) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } } @@ -2756,35 +3123,36 @@ impl ChannelMan /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards. /// Note: This API is likely to change! + /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway #[doc(hidden)] - pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let their_node_id; + pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let counterparty_node_id; let err: Result<(), _> = loop { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) { - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}), + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}), hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { if !chan.get().is_outbound() { - return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"}); + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()}); } if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed); } if !chan.get().is_live() { - return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"}); + return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()}); } - their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id(); + counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(); if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) = - break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan) + break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan) { - if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { unimplemented!(); } channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(), + node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), @@ -2800,36 +3168,96 @@ impl ChannelMan return Ok(()) }; - match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) { + match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) { Ok(_) => unreachable!(), Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })} } } -} -impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, - T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, - F::Target: FeeEstimator, -{ - fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec { - // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a - // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on - // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events! + /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`. + fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) { + let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); { - //TODO: This behavior should be documented. - for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() { - if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage { - log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0)); - self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage); - } else { - log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0)); - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }); + for monitor_event in self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events() { + match monitor_event { + MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => { + if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0)); + self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage); + } else { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0)); + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }); + } + }, + MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => { + let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; + let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id; + let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id; + let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; + if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) { + if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() { + short_to_id.remove(&short_id); + } + failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false)); + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { + node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), + action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { + msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() } + }, + }); + } + }, } } } + for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) { + self.finish_force_close_channel(failure); + } + } + + /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call, + /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the + /// Channel object. + fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec) { + for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) { + // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or + // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been + // reorganized out of the main chain. + // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as + // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization, + // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls + // timer_chan_freshness_every_min, guaranteeing we're running normally. + if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() { + assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1); + if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] { + assert!(should_broadcast); + } else { unreachable!(); } + self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update))); + } + self.finish_force_close_channel(failure); + } + } +} + +impl MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch, + T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, +{ + fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec { + //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query + // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events. + self.process_pending_monitor_events(); + let mut ret = Vec::new(); let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events); @@ -2837,28 +3265,17 @@ impl events::Me } } -impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, +impl EventsProvider for ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, { - fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec { - // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a - // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on - // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events! - { - //TODO: This behavior should be documented. - for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() { - if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage { - log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0)); - self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage); - } else { - log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0)); - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }); - } - } - } + fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec { + //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query + // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events. + self.process_pending_monitor_events(); let mut ret = Vec::new(); let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); @@ -2867,92 +3284,189 @@ impl events::Ev } } -impl - ChainListener for ChannelManager - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, +impl chain::Listen for ChannelManager +where + M::Target: chain::Watch, + T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, +{ + fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) { + assert_eq!(*self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap(), block.header.prev_blockhash, + "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header"); + assert_eq!(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, height as u64 - 1, + "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height"); + let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect(); + self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, height, &txdata); + self.update_best_block(&block.header, height); + } + + fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) { + assert_eq!(*self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap(), header.block_hash(), + "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header"); + + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let new_height = self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32 - 1; + assert_eq!(new_height, height - 1, + "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height"); + *self.last_block_hash.write().unwrap() = header.prev_blockhash; + + self.do_chain_event(new_height, |channel| channel.update_best_block(new_height, header.time)); + } +} + +impl ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, { - fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) { - let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash(); - log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len()); - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + fn do_chain_event) -> Result<(Option, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>> + (&self, height: u32, f: FN) { + // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called + // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases. + // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more. + let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); + let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new(); { let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id; let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| { - let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched); - if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { - node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), - msg: funding_locked, - }); - if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) { - log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { - node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), - msg: announcement_sigs, - }); - } else { - log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); + let res = f(channel); + if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res { + for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) { + let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe + timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { + failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now + data: chan_update, + })); } - short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id()); - } else if let Err(e) = chan_res { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { - node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), - action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }, - }); - return false; - } - if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() { - for tx in txn_matched { - for inp in tx.input.iter() { - if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() { - log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); - if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { - short_to_id.remove(&short_id); - } - // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and - // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its - // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped. - failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true)); - if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { - msg: update - }); - } - return false; - } + if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + msg: funding_locked, + }); + if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + msg: announcement_sigs, + }); + } else { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); } + short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id()); } - } - if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) { + } else if let Err(e) = res { if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { short_to_id.remove(&short_id); } - // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast - // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really - // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler). - failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(false)); + // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was + // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel. + failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true)); if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) { pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: update }); } + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }, + }); return false; } true }); + + channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|&(ref payment_hash, _), htlcs| { + htlcs.retain(|htlc| { + // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get + // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the + // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update, + // just give up on it and fail the HTLC. + if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER { + let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec(); + htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height)); + timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason { + failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, + data: htlc_msat_height_data + })); + false + } else { true } + }); + !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry. + }); } - for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) { - self.finish_force_close_channel(failure); + + self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels); + + for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) { + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason); } + } + + /// Updates channel state to take note of transactions which were confirmed in the given block + /// at the given height. + /// + /// Note that you must still call (or have called) [`update_best_block`] with the block + /// information which is included here. + /// + /// This method may be called before or after [`update_best_block`] for a given block's + /// transaction data and may be called multiple times with additional transaction data for a + /// given block. + /// + /// This method may be called for a previous block after an [`update_best_block`] call has + /// been made for a later block, however it must *not* be called with transaction data from a + /// block which is no longer in the best chain (ie where [`update_best_block`] has already + /// been informed about a blockchain reorganization which no longer includes the block which + /// corresponds to `header`). + /// + /// [`update_best_block`]: `Self::update_best_block` + pub fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData) { + // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called + // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases. + // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more. + + let block_hash = header.block_hash(); + log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height); + + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + self.do_chain_event(height, |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new()))); + } + + /// Updates channel state with the current best blockchain tip. You should attempt to call this + /// quickly after a new block becomes available, however if multiple new blocks become + /// available at the same time, only a single `update_best_block()` call needs to be made. + /// + /// This method should also be called immediately after any block disconnections, once at the + /// reorganization fork point, and once with the new chain tip. Calling this method at the + /// blockchain reorganization fork point ensures we learn when a funding transaction which was + /// previously confirmed is reorganized out of the blockchain, ensuring we do not continue to + /// accept payments which cannot be enforced on-chain. + /// + /// In both the block-connection and block-disconnection case, this method may be called either + /// once per block connected or disconnected, or simply at the fork point and new tip(s), + /// skipping any intermediary blocks. + pub fn update_best_block(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) { + // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called + // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases. + // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more. + + let block_hash = header.block_hash(); + log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height); + + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release); - *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash; + *self.last_block_hash.write().unwrap() = block_hash; + + self.do_chain_event(height, |channel| channel.update_best_block(height, header.time)); + loop { // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on @@ -2967,129 +3481,127 @@ impl bool { + self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait) + } + + /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on + /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken + /// up. + pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) { + self.persistence_notifier.wait() + } + + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))] + pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool { + let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock; + let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond; + let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap(); + *guard } } -impl - ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, +impl + ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, { - fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id); + } + + fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); let mut failed_payments = Vec::new(); let mut no_channels_remain = true; @@ -3099,9 +3611,9 @@ impl node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true, &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true, &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true, - &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false, } }); } if no_channels_remain { - self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(their_node_id); + self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id); } for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) { @@ -3173,14 +3692,14 @@ impl { e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState { latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(), @@ -3196,7 +3715,7 @@ impl, Condvar), +} + +impl PersistenceNotifier { + fn new() -> Self { + Self { + persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()), + } + } + + fn wait(&self) { + loop { + let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock; + let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap(); + guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap(); + let result = *guard; + if result { + *guard = false; + return + } + } + } + + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))] + fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool { + let current_time = Instant::now(); + loop { + let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock; + let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap(); + guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0; + // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the + // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait + // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of + // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to + // 1.42.0. + let elapsed = current_time.elapsed(); + let result = *guard; + if result || elapsed >= max_wait { + *guard = false; + return result; + } + match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) { + None => return result, + Some(_) => continue + } + } + } + + // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk. + fn notify(&self) { + let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock; + let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap(); + *persistence_lock = true; + mem::drop(persistence_lock); + cnd.notify_all(); + } +} + const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; @@ -3241,9 +3825,10 @@ impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo { onion_packet.write(writer)?; short_channel_id.write(writer)?; }, - &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data } => { + &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => { 1u8.write(writer)?; payment_data.write(writer)?; + incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?; }, } self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?; @@ -3264,6 +3849,7 @@ impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo { }, 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?, + incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?, }, _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), }, @@ -3329,6 +3915,7 @@ impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus { impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, { short_channel_id, + outpoint, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }); @@ -3336,7 +3923,8 @@ impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, { impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, { prev_hop, value, - payment_data + payment_data, + cltv_expiry }); impl Writeable for HTLCSource { @@ -3404,9 +3992,10 @@ impl Readable for HTLCFailReason { impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo { fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { match self { - &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => { + &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_funding_outpoint, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => { 0u8.write(writer)?; prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?; + prev_funding_outpoint.write(writer)?; prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?; forward_info.write(writer)?; }, @@ -3425,6 +4014,7 @@ impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo { match ::read(reader)? { 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?, + prev_funding_outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?, prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?, forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?, }), @@ -3437,21 +4027,22 @@ impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo { } } -impl Writeable for ChannelManager - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, +impl Writeable for ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, { fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap(); + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap(); writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?; writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?; self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?; (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?; - self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?; + self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap().write(writer)?; let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let mut unfunded_channels = 0; @@ -3493,6 +4084,24 @@ impl { + 0u8.write(writer)?; + funding_txo.write(writer)?; + monitor_update.write(writer)?; + }, + } + } + (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?; Ok(()) @@ -3504,37 +4113,48 @@ impl::read(reader, args). +/// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling: +/// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args) /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted. -/// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using -/// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo(). +/// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same +/// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and +/// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo(). /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors. -/// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor. -/// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager. -/// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface. -pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, +/// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager. +/// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch. +/// +/// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you +/// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager. +/// +/// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you +/// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to +/// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be +/// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will +/// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for +/// which you've already broadcasted the transaction. +pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, { - /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during - /// deserialization. + /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel + /// signing data. pub keys_manager: K, /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future. /// /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization. pub fee_estimator: F, - /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future. + /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future. /// - /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that + /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your - /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager. - pub monitor: M, + /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager. + pub chain_monitor: M, /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be @@ -3542,7 +4162,7 @@ pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: pub tx_broadcaster: T, /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during /// deserialization. - pub logger: Arc, + pub logger: L, /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized. pub default_config: UserConfig, @@ -3557,41 +4177,65 @@ pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: /// /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in /// this struct. - pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap>, + /// + /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings + pub channel_monitors: HashMap>, +} + +impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> + ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L> + where M::Target: chain::Watch, + T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, + { + /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor + /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to + /// populate a HashMap directly from C. + pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig, + mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor>) -> Self { + Self { + keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config, + channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect() + } + } } // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the // SipmleArcChannelManager type: -impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> - ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, Arc>) - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, +impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> + ReadableArgs> for (BlockHash, Arc>) + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, { - fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>) -> Result { - let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)?; + fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result { + let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)?; Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager))) } } -impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> - ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, +impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> + ReadableArgs> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager) + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, { - fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>) -> Result { + fn read(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result { let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?; let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?; if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION { return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion); } - let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?; + let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?; let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?; + let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?; let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new(); @@ -3600,28 +4244,24 @@ impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: De let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); for _ in 0..channel_count { - let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?; - if channel.last_block_connected != Default::default() && channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash { - return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); - } - + let mut channel: Channel = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?; let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?; funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone()); if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) { - if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() || - channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() || - channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() || + if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() || + channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() || + channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() { // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue: return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); - } else if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() || - channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() || - channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() || + } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() || + channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() || + channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() { // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel: - let (_, _, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true); + let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true); failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs); - monitor.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster); + monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger); } else { if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id()); @@ -3635,16 +4275,17 @@ impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: De for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() { if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) { - monitor.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster); + monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger); } } + const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64; let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128)); for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count { let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?; let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128)); + let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::())); for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count { pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?); } @@ -3656,7 +4297,7 @@ impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: De for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count { let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?; let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2)); + let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::())); for _ in 0..previous_hops_len { previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?); } @@ -3664,7 +4305,7 @@ impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: De } let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, 128)); + let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex)>())); for _ in 0..peer_count { let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?; let peer_state = PeerState { @@ -3673,17 +4314,38 @@ impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: De per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state)); } + let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut pending_events_read: Vec = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::())); + for _ in 0..event_count { + match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? { + Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event), + None => continue, + } + } + + let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::())); + for _ in 0..background_event_count { + match ::read(reader)? { + 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))), + _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), + } + } + let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()); + let channel_manager = ChannelManager { genesis_hash, fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator, - monitor: args.monitor, + chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster, latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize), - last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash), - secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(), + last_block_hash: RwLock::new(last_block_hash), + secp_ctx, channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder { by_id, @@ -3698,8 +4360,11 @@ impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: De per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state), - pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), + pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read), + pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read), total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()), + persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(), + keys_manager: args.keys_manager, logger: args.logger, default_configuration: args.default_config, @@ -3715,3 +4380,54 @@ impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: De Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager)) } } + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier; + use std::sync::Arc; + use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering}; + use std::thread; + use std::time::Duration; + + #[test] + fn test_wait_timeout() { + let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new()); + let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier); + + let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)); + let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone(); + thread::spawn(move || { + loop { + let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock; + let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap(); + *persistence_lock = true; + cnd.notify_all(); + + if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) { + break + } + } + }); + + // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available. + let _ = persistence_notifier.wait(); + + // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are + // available. + loop { + if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) { + break + } + } + + exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst); + + // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates + // are available. + loop { + if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) { + break + } + } + } +}