X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannelmanager.rs;h=a28d6347332694af4dab7fc0737dd13a2a38c834;hb=a731efcb6822609b400170bce54d59addc5821c3;hp=df1ba36c7e447ef4df1e133338d73c5505a2b271;hpb=54e9c07ad9ae1d187d57e5a8847cc5c84b4a4d0c;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index df1ba36c..a28d6347 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -159,20 +159,26 @@ pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData { } enum OnionPayload { - /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a - /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which - /// are part of the same payment. - Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData), + /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice. + Invoice { + /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be + /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier. + _legacy_hop_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData, + }, /// Contains the payer-provided preimage. Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage), } +/// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user struct ClaimableHTLC { prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, cltv_expiry: u32, + /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part value: u64, onion_payload: OnionPayload, timer_ticks: u8, + /// The sum total of all MPP parts + total_msat: u64, } /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK. @@ -1005,6 +1011,13 @@ pub struct ChannelDetails { /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we /// should be able to spend nearly this amount. pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64, + /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is + /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by + /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us + /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send. + /// + /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]. + pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64, /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs). @@ -1509,8 +1522,6 @@ impl ChannelMana /// /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator. /// - /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`! - /// /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting /// from after `params.latest_hash`. @@ -1670,8 +1681,7 @@ impl ChannelMana let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len()); for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) { - let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(); - let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat(); + let balance = channel.get_available_balances(); let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) = channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(); res.push(ChannelDetails { @@ -1698,9 +1708,10 @@ impl ChannelMana inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(), channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(), unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis, - balance_msat, - inbound_capacity_msat, - outbound_capacity_msat, + balance_msat: balance.balance_msat, + inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat, + outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat, + next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(), confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(), force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(), @@ -3091,11 +3102,13 @@ impl ChannelMana HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo { routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, prev_funding_outpoint } => { - let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing { - PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => - (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret), + let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing { + PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => { + let _legacy_hop_data = payment_data.clone(); + (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret) + }, PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } => - (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None), + (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None), _ => { panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive"); } @@ -3110,6 +3123,7 @@ impl ChannelMana }, value: amt_to_forward, timer_ticks: 0, + total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward }, cltv_expiry, onion_payload, }; @@ -3133,7 +3147,7 @@ impl ChannelMana } macro_rules! check_total_value { - ($payment_data_total_msat: expr, $payment_secret: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{ + ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{ let mut payment_received_generated = false; let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) .or_insert(Vec::new()); @@ -3148,10 +3162,10 @@ impl ChannelMana for htlc in htlcs.iter() { total_value += htlc.value; match &htlc.onion_payload { - OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => { - if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != $payment_data_total_msat { + OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => { + if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat { log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})", - log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data_total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat); + log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat); total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT; } if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; } @@ -3159,17 +3173,17 @@ impl ChannelMana _ => unreachable!(), } } - if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data_total_msat { + if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat { log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)", - log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data_total_msat); + log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat); fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc); - } else if total_value == $payment_data_total_msat { + } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat { htlcs.push(claimable_htlc); new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: $payment_preimage, - payment_secret: $payment_secret, + payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret, }, amt: total_value, }); @@ -3194,17 +3208,16 @@ impl ChannelMana match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) { hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { match claimable_htlc.onion_payload { - OnionPayload::Invoice(ref payment_data) => { - let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) { + OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => { + let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap(); + let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) { Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage, Err(()) => { fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc); continue } }; - let payment_data_total_msat = payment_data.total_msat; - let payment_secret = payment_data.payment_secret.clone(); - check_total_value!(payment_data_total_msat, payment_secret, payment_preimage); + check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage); }, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => { match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) { @@ -3225,14 +3238,12 @@ impl ChannelMana } }, hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => { - let payment_data = - if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload { - data.clone() - } else { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); - fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc); - continue - }; + if payment_data.is_none() { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); + fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc); + continue + }; + let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap(); if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret { log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc); @@ -3241,7 +3252,7 @@ impl ChannelMana log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap()); fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc); } else { - let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data.total_msat, payment_data.payment_secret, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage); + let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage); if payment_received_generated { inbound_payment.remove_entry(); } @@ -3460,10 +3471,10 @@ impl ChannelMana debug_assert!(false); return false; } - if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref final_hop_data) = htlcs[0].onion_payload { + if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload { // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat). // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here. - if final_hop_data.total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) { + if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) { return true; } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| { htlc.timer_ticks += 1; @@ -5936,6 +5947,9 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, { (14, user_channel_id, required), (16, balance_msat, required), (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required), + // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be + // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here. + (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap())), (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required), (22, confirmations_required, option), (24, force_close_spend_delay, option), @@ -6061,20 +6075,21 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, { impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC { fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> { let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload { - OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()), + OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => Some(_legacy_hop_data), _ => None, }; let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload { - OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None, + OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => None, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()), }; - write_tlv_fields! - (writer, - { - (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required), - (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required), - (8, keysend_preimage, option), - }); + write_tlv_fields!(writer, { + (0, self.prev_hop, required), + (1, self.total_msat, required), + (2, self.value, required), + (4, payment_data, option), + (6, self.cltv_expiry, required), + (8, keysend_preimage, option), + }); Ok(()) } } @@ -6085,32 +6100,41 @@ impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC { let mut value = 0; let mut payment_data: Option = None; let mut cltv_expiry = 0; + let mut total_msat = None; let mut keysend_preimage: Option = None; - read_tlv_fields! - (reader, - { - (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required), - (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required), - (8, keysend_preimage, option) - }); + read_tlv_fields!(reader, { + (0, prev_hop, required), + (1, total_msat, option), + (2, value, required), + (4, payment_data, option), + (6, cltv_expiry, required), + (8, keysend_preimage, option) + }); let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage { Some(p) => { if payment_data.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) } + if total_msat.is_none() { + total_msat = Some(value); + } OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p) }, None => { if payment_data.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) } - OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap()) + if total_msat.is_none() { + total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat); + } + OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data.unwrap() } }, }; Ok(Self { prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(), timer_ticks: 0, value, + total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(), onion_payload, cltv_expiry, }) @@ -7311,7 +7335,7 @@ mod tests { // payment verification fails as expected. let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone(); bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1; - match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) { + match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) { Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"), Err(()) => { nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1); @@ -7319,7 +7343,7 @@ mod tests { } // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds. - assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok()); + assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok()); } }