X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannelmanager.rs;h=a3842285263f604bbda4b46d599db205bcc0cfbb;hb=7f964462941d654ad4d733083d7535672fb7ccd8;hp=724c0d77ec65085a08b26c8a24aa6d569bd3ce3e;hpb=27b9794beddbef6f0cf844d4fc7afed0226c765f;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index 724c0d77..a3842285 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -36,23 +36,24 @@ use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs}; use crate::chain; use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock}; use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator}; -use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID}; +use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID}; use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData}; use crate::events; use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason}; // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to // construct one themselves. use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret}; -use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel}; +use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext}; use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures}; #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))] use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures; use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph; use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router}; use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters}; +use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundOnionErr, NextPacketDetails}; use crate::ln::msgs; use crate::ln::onion_utils; -use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason; +use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING}; use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError}; #[cfg(test)] use crate::ln::outbound_payment; @@ -65,13 +66,14 @@ use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder}; use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError; use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder}; use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message}; -use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner}; +use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider}; +use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner; use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate}; use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier}; use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid; use crate::util::string::UntrustedString; use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter}; -use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger}; +use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext}; use crate::util::errors::APIError; use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap}; @@ -117,16 +119,23 @@ pub enum PendingHTLCRouting { /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module. short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero eventually when we bump MSRV + /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path. + blinded: Option, }, - /// An HTLC paid to an invoice we generated. + /// An HTLC paid to an invoice (supposedly) generated by us. + /// At this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually generated by us, + /// but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours. Receive { /// Payment secret and total msat received. payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData, /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info. payment_metadata: Option>, + /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC. /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed. incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, - /// Optional shared secret for phantom node. + /// Shared secret derived using a phantom node secret key. If this field is Some, the + /// payment was sent to a phantom node (one hop beyond the current node), but can be + /// settled by this node. phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info. custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec)>, @@ -135,31 +144,57 @@ pub enum PendingHTLCRouting { ReceiveKeysend { /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades. payment_data: Option, - /// Preimage for this onion payment. + /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be + /// used to settle the spontaneous payment. payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info. payment_metadata: Option>, - /// CLTV expiry of the incoming HTLC. - incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed + /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC. + /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed. + incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info. custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec)>, }, } +/// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path. +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub struct BlindedForward { + /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound + /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's + /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`]. + pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey, + // Another field will be added here when we support forwarding as a non-intro node. +} + +impl PendingHTLCRouting { + // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded. + fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option { + // TODO: needs update when we support receiving to multi-hop blinded paths + if let Self::Forward { blinded: Some(_), .. } = self { + Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) + } else { + None + } + } +} + /// Full details of an incoming HTLC, including routing info. #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug pub struct PendingHTLCInfo { /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received. pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting, /// Shared secret from the previous hop. + /// Used encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC needs to be failed backwards. pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32], - payment_hash: PaymentHash, - /// Amount received + /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage. + pub payment_hash: PaymentHash, + /// Amount offered by this HTLC. pub incoming_amt_msat: Option, // Added in 0.0.113 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received /// may overshoot this in either case) pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64, - /// Outgoing CLTV height. + /// Outgoing timelock expiration blockheight. pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32, /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed. @@ -202,6 +237,13 @@ pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo { }, } +// Used for failing blinded HTLCs backwards correctly. +#[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)] +enum BlindedFailure { + FromIntroductionNode, + // Another variant will be added here for non-intro nodes. +} + /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)] pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData { @@ -211,6 +253,7 @@ pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData { htlc_id: u64, incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32], phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, + blinded_failure: Option, // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel. @@ -396,16 +439,6 @@ impl HTLCSource { } } -/// Invalid inbound onion payment. -pub struct InboundOnionErr { - /// BOLT 4 error code. - pub err_code: u16, - /// Data attached to this error. - pub err_data: Vec, - /// Error message text. - pub msg: &'static str, -} - /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`]. /// @@ -1884,7 +1917,10 @@ macro_rules! handle_error { } } - log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err); + let logger = WithContext::from( + &$self.logger, Some($counterparty_node_id), chan_id.map(|(chan_id, _)| chan_id) + ); + log_error!(logger, "{}", err.err); if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action { } else { msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { @@ -1906,15 +1942,6 @@ macro_rules! handle_error { }, } } }; - ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => { - match $internal { - Ok(res) => Ok(res), - Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => { - let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id(); - handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err)) - }, - } - }; } macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal { @@ -1948,7 +1975,8 @@ macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err { (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id)) }, ChannelError::Close(msg) => { - log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg); + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context); + log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg); update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context); let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true); let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id(); @@ -2074,7 +2102,8 @@ macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event { macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion { ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { { - let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger, + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context); + let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger, &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration, $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()); let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(); @@ -2169,14 +2198,15 @@ macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion { macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update { ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { { debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire)); + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context); match $update_res { ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => { let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down."; - log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str); + log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str); panic!("{}", err_str); }, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => { - log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.", + log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.", &$chan.context.channel_id()); false }, @@ -2778,7 +2808,10 @@ where debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread); } - log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len()); + let logger = WithContext::from( + &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id), + ); + log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len()); for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) { let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source; let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8); @@ -2833,8 +2866,9 @@ where } else { ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed }; + let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id)); if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) { - log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id); + log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id); self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason); let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry); mem::drop(peer_state); @@ -2851,7 +2885,7 @@ where }, } } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() { - log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id); + log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id); // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening // events anyway. @@ -2936,7 +2970,7 @@ where } fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion( - &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC + &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, ) -> Result< (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option>), HTLCFailureMsg > { @@ -2944,14 +2978,27 @@ where msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx )?; + let is_blinded = match next_hop { + onion_utils::Hop::Forward { + next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward { .. }, .. + } => true, + _ => false, // TODO: update this when we support receiving to multi-hop blinded paths + }; + macro_rules! return_err { ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => { { - log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); + log_info!( + WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)), + "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg + ); + let (err_code, err_data) = if is_blinded { + (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..]) + } else { ($err_code, $data) }; return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id: msg.channel_id, htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, - reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec()) + reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec()) .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None), })); } @@ -3089,13 +3136,15 @@ where } fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>( - &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, - allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option> + &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32], + decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool, + next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option>, ) -> PendingHTLCStatus { macro_rules! return_err { ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => { { - log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); + let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)); + log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id: msg.channel_id, htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, @@ -3153,7 +3202,8 @@ where if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() { return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}); } - log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id()); + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context); + log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id()); self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) } @@ -3169,7 +3219,8 @@ where /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id()); + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context); + log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id().0)); let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) { None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}), Some(id) => id, @@ -3179,7 +3230,8 @@ where } fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel) -> Result { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id()); + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context); + log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id().0)); let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..]; let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() { @@ -3229,24 +3281,33 @@ where } = args; // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock. debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); - - log_trace!(self.logger, - "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}", - payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id); let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(); let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted"); let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion( &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed - )?; + ).map_err(|e| { + let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None); + log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash); + e + })?; let err: Result<(), _> = loop { let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) { - None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}), + None => { + let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None); + log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash); + return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}) + }, Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()), }; + let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id)); + log_trace!(logger, + "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}", + payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id); + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?; @@ -3259,13 +3320,14 @@ where return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()}); } let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(); + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context); let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path: path.clone(), session_priv: session_priv.clone(), first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat, payment_id, - }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger); + }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger); match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) { Some(monitor_update) => { match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) { @@ -3295,7 +3357,6 @@ where } return Ok(()); }; - match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) { Ok(_) => unreachable!(), Err(e) => { @@ -3621,7 +3682,8 @@ where Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => { let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?; - let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger) + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context); + let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger) .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e { let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id(); let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id(); @@ -3634,7 +3696,6 @@ where Err((chan, err)) => { mem::drop(peer_state_lock); mem::drop(per_peer_state); - let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned() @@ -3998,7 +4059,8 @@ where None => { let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id); - log_error!(self.logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error); + let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id)); + log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error); return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: error }) @@ -4012,8 +4074,10 @@ where })?; let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing { - PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => { - PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid } + PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => { + PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { + onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid + } }, _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted }; @@ -4057,6 +4121,7 @@ where htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret: None, + blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(), }); let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10); @@ -4083,6 +4148,7 @@ where for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs { if short_chan_id != 0 { + let mut forwarding_counterparty = None; macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found { () => { for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) { @@ -4096,7 +4162,8 @@ where }) => { macro_rules! failure_handler { ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => { - log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); + let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())); + log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, @@ -4105,6 +4172,7 @@ where htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss, + blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(), }); let reason = if $next_hop_unknown { @@ -4134,7 +4202,7 @@ where } } } - if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing { + if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing { let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode); if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) { let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes(); @@ -4194,6 +4262,7 @@ where continue; } }; + forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id); let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id); if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { @@ -4203,16 +4272,19 @@ where let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) { + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context); for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) { match forward_info { HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, - routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, .. + routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { + onion_packet, blinded, .. + }, skimmed_fee_msat, .. }, }) => { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id); + log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id); let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id), @@ -4221,14 +4293,23 @@ where incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive. phantom_shared_secret: None, + blinded_failure: blinded.map(|_| BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode), + }); + let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| { + let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh( + Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None + ).unwrap().secret_bytes(); + onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey( + &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss + ).ok() }); if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), - onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator, - &self.logger) + onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator, + &&logger) { if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg); + log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg); } else { panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met"); } @@ -4244,12 +4325,12 @@ where panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward"); }, HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id); + log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id); if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc( - htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger + htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger ) { if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg); + log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg); } else { panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met"); } @@ -4275,6 +4356,7 @@ where skimmed_fee_msat, .. } }) => { + let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure(); let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing { PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => { let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone()); @@ -4304,6 +4386,7 @@ where htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, + blinded_failure, }, // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete @@ -4334,6 +4417,7 @@ where htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, + blinded_failure: None, }), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data), HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash }, @@ -4614,23 +4698,26 @@ where fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption { if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; } + + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context); + // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() { if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.", + log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.", chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate); } return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; } if !chan.context.is_live() { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).", + log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).", chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate); return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; } - log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.", + log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.", &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate); - chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger); + chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger); NotifyOption::DoPersist } @@ -4709,7 +4796,8 @@ where | { context.maybe_expire_prev_config(); if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() { - log_error!(self.logger, + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context); + log_error!(logger, "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id); update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context); self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed); @@ -4794,7 +4882,8 @@ where chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config(); if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() { - log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}", + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context); + log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}", counterparty_node_id, chan_id); pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id: counterparty_node_id, @@ -4822,7 +4911,8 @@ where for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() { if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 { - log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id); + let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id)); + log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id); peer_state.pending_msg_events.push( events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id: counterparty_node_id, @@ -5097,9 +5187,26 @@ where &self.pending_events, &self.logger) { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); } }, - HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error); - let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret); + HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { + ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, + ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, ref blinded_failure, .. + }) => { + log_trace!( + WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(outpoint.to_channel_id())), + "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}", + if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error + ); + let err_packet = match blinded_failure { + Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => { + let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]); + blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet( + incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret + ) + }, + None => { + onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret) + } + }; let mut push_forward_ev = false; let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap(); @@ -5259,6 +5366,7 @@ where } if valid_mpp { for htlc in sources.drain(..) { + let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(); if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop( htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage, |_, definitely_duplicate| { @@ -5269,6 +5377,7 @@ where if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action { // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain). + let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id)); log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err); } else { errs.push((pk, err)); } } @@ -5327,12 +5436,13 @@ where if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) { if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() { let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(); - let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger); + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context); + let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger); match fulfill_res { UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => { if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}", + log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}", chan_id, action); peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action); } @@ -5359,7 +5469,7 @@ where }; mem::drop(peer_state_lock); - log_trace!(self.logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}", + log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}", chan_id, action); let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) = if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { @@ -5416,7 +5526,7 @@ where // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try // again on restart. - log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}", + log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id())), "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}", payment_preimage, update_res); } } else { @@ -5628,7 +5738,8 @@ where pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option, channel_ready: Option, announcement_sigs: Option) -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement", + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context); + log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement", &channel.context.channel_id(), if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" }, if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(), @@ -5682,7 +5793,7 @@ where } if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable { - log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid()); + log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid()); self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]); } @@ -5732,7 +5843,8 @@ where pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id); pending.len() } else { 0 }; - log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.", + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context); + log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.", highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(), remaining_in_flight); if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id { @@ -6058,7 +6170,8 @@ where let (chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) { Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => { - match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) { + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context); + match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) { Ok(res) => res, Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => { // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState` @@ -6118,7 +6231,8 @@ where } Ok(()) } else { - log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated"); + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context); + log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated"); let channel_id = match funding_msg_opt { Some(msg) => msg.channel_id, None => chan.context.channel_id(), @@ -6148,8 +6262,9 @@ where hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => { match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() { ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => { + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context); let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, - chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry); + chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger), chan_phase_entry); if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) { handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR); Ok(()) @@ -6180,10 +6295,11 @@ where match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => { if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() { + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context); let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer, - self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry); + self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry); if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id()); + log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id()); peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg: announcement_sigs, @@ -6194,7 +6310,7 @@ where // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an // announcement_signatures. - log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id()); + log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id()); if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) { peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), @@ -6237,7 +6353,8 @@ where match phase { ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => { if !chan.received_shutdown() { - log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.", + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context); + log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.", msg.channel_id, if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" }); } @@ -6264,7 +6381,8 @@ where }, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => { let context = phase.context_mut(); - log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id); + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context); + log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id); self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel); let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry); finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false)); @@ -6324,7 +6442,8 @@ where } }; if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx { - log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx)); + let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id()); + log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx)); self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]); } if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option { @@ -6357,7 +6476,7 @@ where // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart! - let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg); + let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id); let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) .ok_or_else(|| { @@ -6371,8 +6490,10 @@ where if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() { let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res { Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) => - self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop, - chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt), + self.construct_pending_htlc_status( + msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop, + chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt, + ), Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e) }; let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| { @@ -6380,8 +6501,12 @@ where // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding. match pending_forward_info { - PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => { - let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 { + PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { + ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, .. + }) => { + let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() { + HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]) + } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 { let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan); HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data) } else { @@ -6397,7 +6522,8 @@ where _ => pending_forward_info } }; - try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry); + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context); + try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry); } else { return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close( "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry); @@ -6424,7 +6550,8 @@ where if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() { let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry); if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 { - log_trace!(self.logger, + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context); + log_trace!(logger, "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor", msg.channel_id); peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id) @@ -6517,8 +6644,9 @@ where match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => { if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() { + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context); let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo(); - let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry); + let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry); if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt { handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan); @@ -6575,7 +6703,8 @@ where prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }); }, hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { - log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid); + let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())); + log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid); let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id), @@ -6583,6 +6712,7 @@ where htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret: None, + blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(), }); failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, @@ -6683,6 +6813,7 @@ where match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => { if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() { + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context); let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo(); let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt { self.raa_monitor_updates_held( @@ -6690,7 +6821,7 @@ where *counterparty_node_id) } else { false }; let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, - chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry); + chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry); if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt { let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed"); @@ -6722,7 +6853,8 @@ where match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => { if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() { - try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry); + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context); + try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry); } else { return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close( "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry); @@ -6801,7 +6933,8 @@ where if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one { return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents); } else { - log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id); + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context); + log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id); let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry); // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother // persisting. @@ -6832,6 +6965,7 @@ where msg.channel_id ) })?; + let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)); let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { @@ -6842,7 +6976,7 @@ where // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here. let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish( - msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, + msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry); let mut channel_update = None; if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg { @@ -6875,7 +7009,7 @@ where } }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { - log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure", + log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure", log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0)); // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119). @@ -6933,11 +7067,12 @@ where for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) { match monitor_event { MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => { + let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())); if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage); + log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage); self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint); } else { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash); + log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash); let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() }; let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8); self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver); @@ -7025,7 +7160,7 @@ where let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(); let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo(); let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) = - chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger); + chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context)); if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() { failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id)); } @@ -7128,7 +7263,8 @@ where peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| { match phase { ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => { - match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) { + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context); + match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) { Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => { if let Some(msg) = msg_opt { has_update = true; @@ -7151,7 +7287,7 @@ where self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); - log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx)); + log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx)); self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]); update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context); false @@ -7724,12 +7860,14 @@ where /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly. fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option) { + let logger = WithContext::from( + &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) + ); loop { let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) { let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap(); let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck; - if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() { // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop. if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates @@ -7744,7 +7882,7 @@ where // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor // update(s) when those blockers complete. - log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first", + log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first", &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()); break; } @@ -7753,7 +7891,7 @@ where if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() { debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint); if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() { - log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor", + log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor", channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()); handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan); @@ -7763,13 +7901,13 @@ where continue; } } else { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update", + log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update", channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()); } } } } else { - log_debug!(self.logger, + log_debug!(logger, "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)); } @@ -7801,346 +7939,6 @@ where } } -fn create_fwd_pending_htlc_info( - msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32], - new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32], - next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option> -) -> Result { - debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some()); - let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket { - version: 0, - public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)), - hop_data: new_packet_bytes, - hmac: hop_hmac, - }; - - let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data { - msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } => - (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value), - msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } => - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", - err_code: 0x4000 | 22, - err_data: Vec::new(), - }), - }; - - Ok(PendingHTLCInfo { - routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { - onion_packet: outgoing_packet, - short_channel_id, - }, - payment_hash: msg.payment_hash, - incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret, - incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat), - outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward, - outgoing_cltv_value, - skimmed_fee_msat: None, - }) -} - -fn create_recv_pending_htlc_info( - hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash, - amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool, - counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option, current_height: u32, accept_mpp_keysend: bool, -) -> Result { - let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data { - msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { - payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, .. - } => - (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata), - msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { - amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, .. - } => { - let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat }; - (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None) - } - msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 0x4000|22, - err_data: Vec::new(), - msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", - }) - }, - }; - // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry - if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender", - err_code: 18, - err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec() - }) - } - // final_expiry_too_soon - // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure - // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go. - // - // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our - // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a - // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale). - if cltv_expiry <= current_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 { - let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12); - err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes()); - err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes()); - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data, - msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", - }); - } - if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) || - (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > - amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0))) - { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 19, - err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(), - msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", - }); - } - - let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage { - // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this - // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X - // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route - // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing - // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X. - let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array()); - if hashed_preimage != payment_hash { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 0x4000|22, - err_data: Vec::new(), - msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", - }); - } - if !accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 0x4000|22, - err_data: Vec::new(), - msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments", - }); - } - PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { - payment_data, - payment_preimage, - payment_metadata, - incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value, - custom_tlvs, - } - } else if let Some(data) = payment_data { - PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { - payment_data: data, - payment_metadata, - incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value, - phantom_shared_secret, - custom_tlvs, - } - } else { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3, - err_data: Vec::new(), - msg: "We require payment_secrets", - }); - }; - Ok(PendingHTLCInfo { - routing, - payment_hash, - incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret, - incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat), - outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat, - outgoing_cltv_value, - skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, - }) -} - -/// Peel one layer off an incoming onion, returning [`PendingHTLCInfo`] (either Forward or Receive). -/// This does all the relevant context-free checks that LDK requires for payment relay or -/// acceptance. If the payment is to be received, and the amount matches the expected amount for -/// a given invoice, this indicates the [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], once fully committed in the -/// channel, will generate an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]. -pub fn peel_payment_onion( - msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, node_signer: &NS, logger: &L, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, - cur_height: u32, accept_mpp_keysend: bool, -) -> Result -where - NS::Target: NodeSigner, - L::Target: Logger, -{ - let (hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = - decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, node_signer, logger, secp_ctx - ).map_err(|e| { - let (err_code, err_data) = match e { - HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(m) => (m.failure_code, Vec::new()), - HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(r) => (0x4000 | 22, r.reason.data), - }; - let msg = "Failed to decode update add htlc onion"; - InboundOnionErr { msg, err_code, err_data } - })?; - Ok(match hop { - onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => { - let NextPacketDetails { - next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat: _, outgoing_scid: _, outgoing_cltv_value - } = match next_packet_details_opt { - Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details, - // Forward should always include the next hop details - None => return Err(InboundOnionErr { - msg: "Failed to decode update add htlc onion", - err_code: 0x4000 | 22, - err_data: Vec::new(), - }), - }; - - if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv( - cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry - ) { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - msg: err_msg, - err_code: code, - err_data: Vec::new(), - }); - } - create_fwd_pending_htlc_info( - msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, - Some(next_packet_pubkey) - )? - }, - onion_utils::Hop::Receive(received_data) => { - create_recv_pending_htlc_info( - received_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, - None, false, msg.skimmed_fee_msat, cur_height, accept_mpp_keysend, - )? - } - }) -} - -struct NextPacketDetails { - next_packet_pubkey: Result, - outgoing_scid: u64, - outgoing_amt_msat: u64, - outgoing_cltv_value: u32, -} - -fn decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion( - msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, node_signer: &NS, logger: &L, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, -) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option), HTLCFailureMsg> -where - NS::Target: NodeSigner, - L::Target: Logger, -{ - macro_rules! return_malformed_err { - ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => { - { - log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); - return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC { - channel_id: msg.channel_id, - htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, - sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array(), - failure_code: $err_code, - })); - } - } - } - - if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key { - return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6); - } - - let shared_secret = node_signer.ecdh( - Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None - ).unwrap().secret_bytes(); - - if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 { - //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other - //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way, - //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the - //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the - //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the - //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there... - return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4); - } - macro_rules! return_err { - ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => { - { - log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); - return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { - channel_id: msg.channel_id, - htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, - reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec()) - .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None), - })); - } - } - } - - let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop( - shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, - msg.payment_hash, node_signer - ) { - Ok(res) => res, - Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => { - return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code); - }, - Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => { - return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]); - }, - }; - - let next_packet_details = match next_hop { - onion_utils::Hop::Forward { - next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { - short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value - }, .. - } => { - let next_packet_pubkey = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(secp_ctx, - msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret); - NextPacketDetails { - next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_scid: short_channel_id, - outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value - } - }, - onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)), - onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } | - onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } => - { - return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]); - } - }; - - Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details))) -} - -fn check_incoming_htlc_cltv( - cur_height: u32, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, cltv_expiry: u32 -) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> { - if (cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { - return Err(( - "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", - 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry - )); - } - // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, - // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see - // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale). - if cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon - return Err(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14)); - } - if cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far - return Err(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21)); - } - // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our - // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with - // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and - // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline. - // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure - // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it, - // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our - // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments. - if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 { - return Err(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14)); - } - - Ok(()) -} - impl MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager where M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, @@ -8262,7 +8060,7 @@ where *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height) } - self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)); + self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))); } } @@ -8288,13 +8086,13 @@ where let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events( self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist }); - self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger) + self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)) .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b))); let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); if height < last_best_block_height { let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire); - self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)); + self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))); } } @@ -8311,7 +8109,7 @@ where self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist }); *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height); - self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)); + self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))); macro_rules! max_time { ($timestamp: expr) => { @@ -8360,7 +8158,7 @@ where self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| { if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() { if funding_txo.txid == *txid { - channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None)) + channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None)) } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) } } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) } }); @@ -8407,10 +8205,11 @@ where timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data), HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() })); } + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context); if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt { send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready); if channel.context.is_usable() { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id()); + log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id()); if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) { pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), @@ -8418,7 +8217,7 @@ where }); } } else { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id()); + log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id()); } } @@ -8428,7 +8227,7 @@ where } if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id()); + log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id()); pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg: announcement_sigs, @@ -8519,6 +8318,7 @@ where incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret: None, outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint, + blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(), }); let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing { @@ -8528,7 +8328,10 @@ where timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2), HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid })); - log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid); + let logger = WithContext::from( + &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) + ); + log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid); false } else { true } }); @@ -8835,8 +8638,11 @@ where let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap(); let remove_peer = { - log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.", - log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)); + log_debug!( + WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None), + "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.", + log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id) + ); if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) { let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; @@ -8844,7 +8650,8 @@ where peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| { let context = match phase { ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => { - if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() { + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context); + if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() { // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown. return true; } @@ -8931,8 +8738,9 @@ where } fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> { + let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None); if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() { - log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)); + log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)); return Err(()); } @@ -8984,7 +8792,7 @@ where } } - log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)); + log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)); let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) { @@ -9001,9 +8809,10 @@ where None } ).for_each(|chan| { + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context); pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), - msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger), + msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger), }); }); } @@ -9482,9 +9291,14 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, { (6, real_node_pubkey, required), }); +impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, { + (0, inbound_blinding_point, required), +}); + impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting, (0, Forward) => { (0, onion_packet, required), + (1, blinded, option), (2, short_channel_id, required), }, (1, Receive) => { @@ -9586,10 +9400,15 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ; (1, Fail), ); +impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure, + (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {}, ; +); + impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, { (0, short_channel_id, required), (1, phantom_shared_secret, option), (2, outpoint, required), + (3, blinded_failure, option), (4, htlc_id, required), (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required), (7, user_channel_id, option), @@ -10206,6 +10025,7 @@ where let mut channel: Channel = Channel::read(reader, ( &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config) ))?; + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context); let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?; funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone()); if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) { @@ -10214,22 +10034,22 @@ where channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() { // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel: - log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!"); - log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast."); + log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!"); + log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast."); if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() { - log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", + log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id()); } if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() { - log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.", + log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.", &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number()); } if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() { - log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.", + log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.", &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number()); } if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() { - log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.", + log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.", &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number()); } let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true); @@ -10262,14 +10082,14 @@ where // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected. - log_info!(args.logger, + log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager", &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash); failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id())); } } } else { - log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}", + log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}", &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id()); if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() { @@ -10303,18 +10123,19 @@ where channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()), }, None)); } else { - log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id()); - log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,"); - log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!"); - log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds."); - log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning"); + log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id()); + log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,"); + log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!"); + log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds."); + log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning"); return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } } - for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() { + for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() { if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) { - log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed", + let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor); + log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed", &funding_txo.to_channel_id()); let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate { update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID, @@ -10491,12 +10312,12 @@ where let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new(); macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates { ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr, - $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr + $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr ) => { { let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0; $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id()); for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() { - log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}", + log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}", update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id()); max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id); pending_background_events.push( @@ -10517,7 +10338,7 @@ where }); } if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() { - log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!"); + log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!"); return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } max_in_flight_update_id @@ -10529,6 +10350,8 @@ where let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() { if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context); + // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been // discarded. let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?; @@ -10539,19 +10362,19 @@ where if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) { max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds, - funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "")); + funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "")); } } if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id { // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue: - log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!"); - log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight", + log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!"); + log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight", chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id); - log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id()); - log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,"); - log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!"); - log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds."); - log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning"); + log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id()); + log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,"); + log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!"); + log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds."); + log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning"); return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } } else { @@ -10565,6 +10388,7 @@ where if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates { for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds { + let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), Some(funding_txo.to_channel_id())); if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) { // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels, @@ -10574,15 +10398,15 @@ where }); let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates, - funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed "); + funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed "); } else { - log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!"); - log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", + log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!"); + log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", &funding_txo.to_channel_id()); - log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,"); - log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!"); - log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds."); - log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning"); + log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,"); + log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!"); + log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds."); + log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning"); return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } } @@ -10607,11 +10431,13 @@ where // 0.0.102+ for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() { let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()); + let chan_id = monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id(); if counterparty_opt.is_none() { + let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor); for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() { if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source { if path.hops.is_empty() { - log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment"); + log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment"); return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } @@ -10621,8 +10447,8 @@ where match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path); - log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}", - if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash); + log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}", + if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0)); }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { let path_fee = path.fee_msat(); @@ -10642,7 +10468,7 @@ where starting_block_height: best_block_height, remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup }); - log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}", + log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}", path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes)); } } @@ -10664,7 +10490,7 @@ where forwards.retain(|forward| { if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward { if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) { - log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}", + log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()); false } else { true } @@ -10674,7 +10500,7 @@ where }); pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| { if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) { - log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}", + log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()); pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| { if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event { @@ -10702,7 +10528,7 @@ where counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey, }; pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, - path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger); + path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger); pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap(); } }, @@ -10833,6 +10659,7 @@ where let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() { if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context); if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 { let mut outbound_scid_alias; loop { @@ -10844,14 +10671,14 @@ where } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) { // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above. - log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()); + log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()); return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } if chan.context.is_usable() { if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() { // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above. - log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()); + log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()); return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } } @@ -10902,11 +10729,13 @@ where let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) { - channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger); + let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context); + channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger); } } if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) { - previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger); + let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, previous_hop_monitor); + previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &&logger); } } pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed { @@ -10923,14 +10752,15 @@ where for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() { if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) { - for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() { + for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() { + let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id)); for action in actions.iter() { if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel { downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), .. } = action { if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) { - log_trace!(args.logger, + log_trace!(logger, "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor", blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()); blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates @@ -10951,7 +10781,7 @@ where } peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions; } else { - log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id); + log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id); return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } } @@ -11039,11 +10869,10 @@ mod tests { use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret}; use crate::ln::ChannelId; use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId}; - use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures}; use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*; use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction}; use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler; - use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route}; + use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route}; use crate::util::errors::APIError; use crate::util::test_utils; use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate}; @@ -12319,137 +12148,6 @@ mod tests { check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx); } } - - #[test] - fn test_peel_payment_onion() { - use super::*; - let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); - - let bob = crate::sign::KeysManager::new(&[2; 32], 42, 42); - let bob_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bob.get_node_secret_key()); - let charlie = crate::sign::KeysManager::new(&[3; 32], 42, 42); - let charlie_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &charlie.get_node_secret_key()); - - let (session_priv, total_amt_msat, cur_height, recipient_onion, preimage, payment_hash, - prng_seed, hops, recipient_amount, pay_secret) = payment_onion_args(bob_pk, charlie_pk); - - let path = Path { - hops: hops, - blinded_tail: None, - }; - - let (amount_msat, cltv_expiry, onion) = create_payment_onion( - &secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_amt_msat, recipient_onion, cur_height, - payment_hash, Some(preimage), prng_seed - ).unwrap(); - - let msg = make_update_add_msg(amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, onion); - let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("bob".to_string()); - - let peeled = peel_payment_onion(&msg, &&bob, &&logger, &secp_ctx, cur_height, true) - .map_err(|e| e.msg).unwrap(); - - let next_onion = match peeled.routing { - PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: _ } => { - onion_packet - }, - _ => panic!("expected a forwarded onion"), - }; - - let msg2 = make_update_add_msg(amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, next_onion); - let peeled2 = peel_payment_onion(&msg2, &&charlie, &&logger, &secp_ctx, cur_height, true) - .map_err(|e| e.msg).unwrap(); - - match peeled2.routing { - PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, .. } => { - assert_eq!(payment_preimage, preimage); - assert_eq!(peeled2.outgoing_amt_msat, recipient_amount); - assert_eq!(incoming_cltv_expiry, peeled2.outgoing_cltv_value); - let msgs::FinalOnionHopData{total_msat, payment_secret} = payment_data.unwrap(); - assert_eq!(total_msat, total_amt_msat); - assert_eq!(payment_secret, pay_secret); - }, - _ => panic!("expected a received keysend"), - }; - } - - fn make_update_add_msg( - amount_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, payment_hash: PaymentHash, - onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket - ) -> msgs::UpdateAddHTLC { - msgs::UpdateAddHTLC { - channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([0; 32]), - htlc_id: 0, - amount_msat, - cltv_expiry, - payment_hash, - onion_routing_packet, - skimmed_fee_msat: None, - } - } - - fn payment_onion_args(hop_pk: PublicKey, recipient_pk: PublicKey) -> ( - SecretKey, u64, u32, RecipientOnionFields, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, [u8; 32], - Vec, u64, PaymentSecret, - ) { - let session_priv_bytes = [42; 32]; - let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes).unwrap(); - let total_amt_msat = 1000; - let cur_height = 1000; - let pay_secret = PaymentSecret([99; 32]); - let recipient_onion = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(pay_secret); - let preimage_bytes = [43; 32]; - let preimage = PaymentPreimage(preimage_bytes); - let rhash_bytes = Sha256::hash(&preimage_bytes).to_byte_array(); - let payment_hash = PaymentHash(rhash_bytes); - let prng_seed = [44; 32]; - - // make a route alice -> bob -> charlie - let hop_fee = 1; - let recipient_amount = total_amt_msat - hop_fee; - let hops = vec![ - RouteHop { - pubkey: hop_pk, - fee_msat: hop_fee, - cltv_expiry_delta: 42, - short_channel_id: 1, - node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), - channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(), - maybe_announced_channel: false, - }, - RouteHop { - pubkey: recipient_pk, - fee_msat: recipient_amount, - cltv_expiry_delta: 42, - short_channel_id: 2, - node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), - channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(), - maybe_announced_channel: false, - } - ]; - - (session_priv, total_amt_msat, cur_height, recipient_onion, preimage, payment_hash, - prng_seed, hops, recipient_amount, pay_secret) - } - - pub fn create_payment_onion( - secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, path: &Path, session_priv: &SecretKey, total_msat: u64, - recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, best_block_height: u32, payment_hash: PaymentHash, - keysend_preimage: Option, prng_seed: [u8; 32] - ) -> Result<(u64, u32, msgs::OnionPacket), ()> { - let onion_keys = super::onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv).map_err(|_| ())?; - let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = super::onion_utils::build_onion_payloads( - &path, - total_msat, - recipient_onion, - best_block_height + 1, - &keysend_preimage, - ).map_err(|_| ())?; - let onion_packet = super::onion_utils::construct_onion_packet( - onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash - )?; - Ok((htlc_msat, htlc_cltv, onion_packet)) - } } #[cfg(ldk_bench)]