X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannelmanager.rs;h=a759443d86ed9ab56374c3d44d24ad8affa6a5a9;hb=523fcb6f3f16b8cd79cd2c5f21c4f92923ccc0e3;hp=d668cdd59e0651a32b9d8a246fca0258d3e810fb;hpb=1fc6d6b5ee2451862768979399e381611ef00565;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index d668cdd5..a759443d 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -1,3 +1,12 @@ +// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control +// history. +// +// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 or the MIT license +// , at your option. +// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these +// licenses. + //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here. //! //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is @@ -7,12 +16,11 @@ //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages). +//! use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader; -use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction; use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block; use bitcoin::network::constants::Network; -use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash; use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine}; use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine}; @@ -26,17 +34,21 @@ use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1; use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret; use bitcoin::secp256k1; -use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator}; -use chain::transaction::OutPoint; +use chain; +use chain::Watch; +use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator}; +use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID}; +use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData}; use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError}; -use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY}; use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures}; use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop}; use ln::msgs; +use ln::msgs::NetAddress; use ln::onion_utils; -use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError}; -use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemoryChannelKeys}; +use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField}; +use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner}; use util::config::UserConfig; +use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider}; use util::{byte_utils, events}; use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer}; use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader}; @@ -46,9 +58,11 @@ use util::errors::APIError; use std::{cmp, mem}; use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet}; use std::io::{Cursor, Read}; -use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock}; +use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard}; use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering}; use std::time::Duration; +#[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))] +use std::time::Instant; use std::marker::{Sync, Send}; use std::ops::Deref; use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex; @@ -106,9 +120,15 @@ pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus { pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo { AddHTLC { + forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo, + + // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in + // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the + // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded + // HTLCs. prev_short_channel_id: u64, prev_htlc_id: u64, - forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo, + prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, }, FailHTLC { htlc_id: u64, @@ -118,10 +138,14 @@ pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo { /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] -pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData { +pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64, incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32], + + // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards + // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel. + outpoint: OutPoint, } struct ClaimableHTLC { @@ -137,7 +161,7 @@ struct ClaimableHTLC { /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] -pub(super) enum HTLCSource { +pub(crate) enum HTLCSource { PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData), OutboundRoute { path: Vec, @@ -170,12 +194,15 @@ pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason { } /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop +/// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]); /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop +/// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]); /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together +/// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]); @@ -287,8 +314,8 @@ pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder { } // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test): -pub(super) struct ChannelHolder { - pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>, +pub(super) struct ChannelHolder { + pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>, pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap, /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency @@ -303,7 +330,7 @@ pub(super) struct ChannelHolder { claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option), Vec>, /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict). - pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec, + pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec, } /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold @@ -322,7 +349,7 @@ const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assum /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the /// concrete type of the KeysManager. -pub type SimpleArcChannelManager = Arc, Arc, Arc, Arc, Arc>>; +pub type SimpleArcChannelManager = Arc, Arc, Arc, Arc, Arc>>; /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't @@ -332,7 +359,7 @@ pub type SimpleArcChannelManager = Arc = ChannelManager; +pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager; /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately. @@ -347,7 +374,7 @@ pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManage /// /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before -/// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_/update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates +/// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the @@ -370,17 +397,17 @@ pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManage /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when /// you're using lightning-net-tokio. -pub struct ChannelManager - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, +pub struct ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { default_configuration: UserConfig, genesis_hash: BlockHash, fee_estimator: F, - monitor: M, + chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, #[cfg(test)] @@ -390,10 +417,10 @@ pub struct ChannelManager, secp_ctx: Secp256k1, - #[cfg(test)] - pub(super) channel_state: Mutex>, - #[cfg(not(test))] - channel_state: Mutex>, + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))] + pub(super) channel_state: Mutex>, + #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))] + channel_state: Mutex>, our_network_key: SecretKey, /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this @@ -412,13 +439,46 @@ pub struct ChannelManager, + persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier, + keys_manager: K, logger: L, } +/// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is +/// desirable to notify any listeners on `wait_timeout`/`wait` that new updates are available for +/// persistence. Therefore, this struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, +/// upon going out of scope, sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released +/// indicates that the updates are ready for persistence). +struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> { + persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, + // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately. + _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>, +} + +impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> { + fn new(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> Self { + let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap(); + + Self { + persistence_notifier: notifier, + _read_guard: read_guard, + } + } +} + +impl<'a> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> { + fn drop(&mut self) { + self.persistence_notifier.notify(); + } +} + /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction). pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24; @@ -450,6 +510,7 @@ const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_P const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER; /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels +#[derive(Clone)] pub struct ChannelDetails { /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes, /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output). @@ -488,7 +549,7 @@ pub struct ChannelDetails { /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum /// states for more. -#[derive(Debug)] +#[derive(Clone, Debug)] pub enum PaymentSendFailure { /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and @@ -522,7 +583,7 @@ pub enum PaymentSendFailure { } macro_rules! handle_error { - ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => { + ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { match $internal { Ok(msg) => Ok(msg), Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => { @@ -548,7 +609,7 @@ macro_rules! handle_error { if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action { } else { msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { - node_id: $their_node_id, + node_id: $counterparty_node_id, action: err.action.clone() }); } @@ -683,10 +744,10 @@ macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err { } } -impl ChannelManager - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, +impl ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { @@ -704,18 +765,14 @@ impl /// /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. - /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register - /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's - /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one - /// go. - pub fn new(network: Network, fee_est: F, monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Self { + pub fn new(network: Network, fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Self { let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); ChannelManager { default_configuration: config.clone(), - genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(), + genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(), fee_estimator: fee_est, - monitor, + chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height), @@ -737,6 +794,7 @@ impl pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()), + persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(), keys_manager, @@ -765,7 +823,10 @@ impl let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?; let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone()); - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard. + debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); + let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { @@ -784,7 +845,7 @@ impl Ok(()) } - fn list_channels_with_filter)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec { + fn list_channels_with_filter)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec { let mut res = Vec::new(); { let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); @@ -794,7 +855,7 @@ impl res.push(ChannelDetails { channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(), short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(), - remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), + remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(), channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(), inbound_capacity_msat, @@ -837,7 +898,7 @@ impl /// /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed. pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); @@ -846,7 +907,7 @@ impl hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => { let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?; channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { - node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), + node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), msg: shutdown_msg }); if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() { @@ -890,25 +951,28 @@ impl // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to // ignore the result here. - let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(funding_txo, monitor_update); + let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update); } } - /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to - /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. - pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - + fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<(), APIError> { let mut chan = { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; - if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) { - if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() { + if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) { + if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id { + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id { + // Error or Ok here doesn't matter - the result is only exposed publicly + // when peer_node_id is None anyway. + return Ok(()); + } + } + if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() { channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id); } - chan + chan.remove_entry().1 } else { - return; + return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()}); } }; log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..])); @@ -919,17 +983,26 @@ impl msg: update }); } + + Ok(()) + } + + /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to + /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager. + pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) } /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each. pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) { for chan in self.list_channels() { - self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id); + let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id); } } - fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard>) { + fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard>) { macro_rules! return_malformed_err { ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => { { @@ -1116,7 +1189,7 @@ impl PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet: outgoing_packet, - short_channel_id: short_channel_id, + short_channel_id, }, payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(), incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret, @@ -1149,10 +1222,10 @@ impl if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))); } - if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum + if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))); } - let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) }); + let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) }); if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))); } @@ -1186,7 +1259,8 @@ impl res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry)); } else if code == 0x1000 | 20 { - res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags)); + // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791 + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0)); } res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]); } @@ -1200,22 +1274,23 @@ impl /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id /// May be called with channel_state already locked! - fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result { + fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result { let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() { None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}), Some(id) => id, }; - let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..]; + let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..]; let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { chain_hash: self.genesis_hash, - short_channel_id: short_channel_id, + short_channel_id, timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(), - flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1), + flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1), cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, - htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(), - fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator), + htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(), + htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()), + fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator), fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(), excess_data: Vec::new(), }; @@ -1232,7 +1307,8 @@ impl // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> { log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id); - let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand(); + let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); + let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..]).expect("RNG is busted"); let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv) .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?; @@ -1242,7 +1318,7 @@ impl } let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash); - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let err: Result<(), _> = loop { let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); @@ -1254,7 +1330,7 @@ impl let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) { match { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey { + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey { return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"}); } if !chan.get().is_live() { @@ -1267,7 +1343,7 @@ impl }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan) } { Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => { - if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true); // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs) // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating @@ -1410,7 +1486,7 @@ impl /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel). pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let (chan, msg) = { let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) { @@ -1423,7 +1499,7 @@ impl }, None => return }; - match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) { + match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) { Ok(funding_msg) => { (chan, funding_msg) }, @@ -1433,8 +1509,8 @@ impl let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { - node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(), - msg: msg, + node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), + msg, }); match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { @@ -1446,7 +1522,7 @@ impl } } - fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option { + fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option { if !chan.should_announce() { log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id())); return None @@ -1472,7 +1548,7 @@ impl // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB // message... - const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (msgs::NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2; + const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2; #[deny(const_err)] #[allow(dead_code)] // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is @@ -1492,8 +1568,8 @@ impl /// only Tor Onion addresses. /// /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500). - pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); if addresses.len() > 500 { panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!"); @@ -1523,7 +1599,7 @@ impl /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event. /// Will likely generate further events. pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let mut new_events = Vec::new(); let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new(); @@ -1540,9 +1616,11 @@ impl failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len()); for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) { match forward_info { - HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => { + HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info, + prev_funding_outpoint } => { let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, + outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret, }); @@ -1569,10 +1647,12 @@ impl HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo { routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. - }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, } => { + }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, + prev_funding_outpoint } => { log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id); let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, + outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, }); @@ -1644,7 +1724,7 @@ impl Err(e) => { // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case // close channel and then send error message to peer. - let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id(); + let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(); let err: Result<(), _> = match e { ChannelError::Ignore(_) => { panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met"); @@ -1659,16 +1739,16 @@ impl }, ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); } }; - handle_errors.push((their_node_id, err)); + handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err)); continue; } }; - if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { - handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))); + if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))); continue; } channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(), + node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs, update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), @@ -1687,9 +1767,11 @@ impl match forward_info { HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo { routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry }, - incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, } => { + incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, + prev_funding_outpoint } => { let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, + outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, }; @@ -1724,6 +1806,7 @@ impl ); failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id, + outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret, }), payment_hash, @@ -1732,14 +1815,14 @@ impl } } else if total_value == data.total_msat { new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived { - payment_hash: payment_hash, + payment_hash, payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret), amt: total_value, }); } } else { new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived { - payment_hash: payment_hash, + payment_hash, payment_secret: None, amt: amt_to_forward, }); @@ -1761,8 +1844,8 @@ impl self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason); } - for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) { - let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id); + for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) { + let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id); } if new_events.is_empty() { return } @@ -1776,7 +1859,7 @@ impl /// /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute. pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() { @@ -1801,7 +1884,7 @@ impl /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the /// HTLC backwards has been started. pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option) -> bool { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret)); @@ -1820,13 +1903,51 @@ impl } else { false } } + // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be + // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to + // be surfaced to the user. + fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) { + for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) { + match htlc_src { + HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => { + let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = + match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => { + if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) { + (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len()) + } else { + (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) + } + }, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) + }; + let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state, + htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data}); + }, + HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => { + self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push( + events::Event::PaymentFailed { + payment_hash, + rejected_by_dest: false, +#[cfg(test)] + error_code: None, +#[cfg(test)] + error_data: None, + } + ) + }, + }; + } + } + /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us. /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here. /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to /// still-available channels. - fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) { + fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) { //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs @@ -1888,7 +2009,7 @@ impl } } }, - HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => { + HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => { let err_packet = match onion_error { HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => { log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code); @@ -1942,7 +2063,7 @@ impl pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option, expected_amount: u64) -> bool { let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()); - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret)); @@ -2011,16 +2132,16 @@ impl // which were generated. channel_state.take(); - for (their_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) { + for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) { let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err); - let _ = handle_error!(self, res, their_node_id); + let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id); } claimed_any_htlcs } else { false } } - fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> { + fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> { //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay! let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock; let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) { @@ -2035,17 +2156,17 @@ impl match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) { Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => { if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option { - if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { if was_frozen_for_monitor { assert!(msgs.is_none()); } else { - return Err(Some((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err()))); + return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err()))); } } } if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(), + node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg], @@ -2073,7 +2194,7 @@ impl } else { unreachable!(); } } - fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) { + fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) { match source { HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => { mem::drop(channel_state_lock); @@ -2083,19 +2204,30 @@ impl }); }, HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => { - if let Err((their_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) { + let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint; + if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) { Ok(()) => Ok(()), Err(None) => { - // TODO: There is probably a channel monitor somewhere that needs to - // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's - // why it's missing. + let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate { + update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID, + updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { + payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(), + }], + }; + // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after + // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the + // event being update_fulfill_htlc). + if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) { + log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}", + payment_preimage, e); + } Ok(()) }, Err(Some(res)) => Err(res), } { mem::drop(channel_state_lock); let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err); - let _ = handle_error!(self, res, their_node_id); + let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id); } }, } @@ -2119,7 +2251,7 @@ impl /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls. /// /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level: - /// 1) You register a ManyChannelMonitor with this ChannelManager, + /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager, /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures /// any time it cannot do so instantly, @@ -2127,7 +2259,7 @@ impl /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled. pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let mut close_results = Vec::new(); let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new(); @@ -2149,14 +2281,14 @@ impl let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger); if !pending_forwards.is_empty() { - htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards)); + htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), funding_txo.clone(), pending_forwards)); } htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures); macro_rules! handle_cs { () => { if let Some(update) = commitment_update { pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), updates: update, }); } @@ -2164,7 +2296,7 @@ impl macro_rules! handle_raa { () => { if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa { pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { - node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg: revoke_and_ack, }); } @@ -2187,12 +2319,12 @@ impl } if let Some(msg) = funding_locked { pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { - node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg, }); if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) { pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { - node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg: announcement_sigs, }); } @@ -2212,12 +2344,12 @@ impl } } - fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())); } - let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration) + let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration) .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?; let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; @@ -2225,7 +2357,7 @@ impl hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg: channel.get_accept_channel(), }); entry.insert(channel); @@ -2234,13 +2366,13 @@ impl Ok(()) } - fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let (value, output_script, user_id) = { let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id)); } try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan); @@ -2253,19 +2385,19 @@ impl pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id, channel_value_satoshis: value, - output_script: output_script, + output_script, user_channel_id: user_id, }); Ok(()) } - fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = { + fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = { let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id)); } (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove()) @@ -2274,15 +2406,20 @@ impl } }; // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state - // lock before add_monitor - if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_update) { + // lock before watch_channel + if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) { match e { ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => { // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway. - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), None)); + // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for + // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we + // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain). + let (_funding_txo_option, _monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true); + assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty()); + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id)); }, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => { // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor @@ -2301,7 +2438,7 @@ impl }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg: funding_msg, }); e.insert(chan); @@ -2310,20 +2447,20 @@ impl Ok(()) } - fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let (funding_txo, user_id) = { let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } let monitor = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, &self.logger) { Ok(update) => update, Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan), }; - if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) { + if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) { return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false); } (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id()) @@ -2333,18 +2470,18 @@ impl }; let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { - funding_txo: funding_txo, + funding_txo, user_channel_id: user_id, }); Ok(()) } - fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan); @@ -2360,7 +2497,7 @@ impl // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network. channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg: announcement_sigs, }); } @@ -2370,26 +2507,26 @@ impl } } - fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => { - if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { + if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry); if let Some(msg) = shutdown { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg, }); } if let Some(msg) = closing_signed { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg, }); } @@ -2417,19 +2554,19 @@ impl Ok(()) } - fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let (tx, chan_option) = { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => { - if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { + if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry); if let Some(msg) = closing_signed { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg, }); } @@ -2463,7 +2600,7 @@ impl Ok(()) } - fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack. @@ -2478,11 +2615,11 @@ impl match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } - let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| { + let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| { // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC. assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0); @@ -2494,7 +2631,8 @@ impl let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) { onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128); - res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(upd.contents.flags)); + // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791 + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0)); res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]); res }[..]) @@ -2527,13 +2665,13 @@ impl Ok(()) } - fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let htlc_source = { let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan) @@ -2545,12 +2683,12 @@ impl Ok(()) } - fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan); @@ -2560,12 +2698,12 @@ impl Ok(()) } - fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 { @@ -2579,12 +2717,12 @@ impl } } - fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) = @@ -2592,23 +2730,23 @@ impl Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan), Err((Some(update), e)) => { assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update()); - let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update); + let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update); try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan); unreachable!(); }, Ok(res) => res }; - if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()); //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration } channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg: revoke_and_ack, }); if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), @@ -2621,7 +2759,7 @@ impl } if let Some(msg) = closing_signed { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg, }); } @@ -2632,8 +2770,8 @@ impl } #[inline] - fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) { - for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards { + fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) { + for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards { let mut forward_event = None; if !pending_forwards.is_empty() { let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); @@ -2646,10 +2784,12 @@ impl PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0, }) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { - entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }); + entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, + prev_htlc_id, forward_info }); }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { - entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info })); + entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, + prev_htlc_id, forward_info })); } } } @@ -2666,57 +2806,66 @@ impl } } - fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = { + fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new(); + let res = loop { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update(); - let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update) = - try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan); - if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) = + break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan); + htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in; + if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { if was_frozen_for_monitor { assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty()); - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned())); + break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned())); } else { - return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures); + if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) { + break Err(e); + } else { unreachable!(); } } } if let Some(updates) = commitment_update { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), updates, }); } if let Some(msg) = closing_signed { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg, }); } - (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel")) + break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap())) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } }; - for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) { - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2); + self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id); + match res { + Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => { + for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) { + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2); + } + self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]); + Ok(()) + }, + Err(e) => Err(e) } - self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]); - - Ok(()) } - fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan); @@ -2726,13 +2875,13 @@ impl Ok(()) } - fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } if !chan.get().is_usable() { @@ -2745,10 +2894,21 @@ impl let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id; let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]); - if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() || - self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() { - let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature".to_owned()); - try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan); + { + let their_node_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }; + let their_bitcoin_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }; + match (self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, their_node_key), + self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, their_bitcoin_key)) { + (Err(e), _) => { + let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature: {:?}. Maybe using different node_secret for transport and routing msg? UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", e, &announcement, their_node_key)); + try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan); + }, + (_, Err(e)) => { + let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature: {:?}. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})", e, &announcement, their_bitcoin_key)); + try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan); + }, + _ => {} + } } let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key); @@ -2769,19 +2929,23 @@ impl Ok(()) } - fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } + // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer + // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell + // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending + // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here. let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan); if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt { - if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane. @@ -2797,14 +2961,14 @@ impl } if let Some(msg) = funding_locked { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg }); } macro_rules! send_raa { () => { if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg }); } @@ -2812,7 +2976,7 @@ impl macro_rules! send_cu { () => { if let Some(updates) = commitment_update { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), updates }); } @@ -2829,7 +2993,7 @@ impl } if let Some(msg) = shutdown { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg, }); } @@ -2843,10 +3007,11 @@ impl /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards. /// Note: This API is likely to change! + /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway #[doc(hidden)] pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let their_node_id; + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let counterparty_node_id; let err: Result<(), _> = loop { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; @@ -2863,15 +3028,15 @@ impl if !chan.get().is_live() { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()}); } - their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id(); + counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(); if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) = break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan) { - if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { unimplemented!(); } channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(), + node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), @@ -2887,36 +3052,66 @@ impl return Ok(()) }; - match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) { + match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) { Ok(_) => unreachable!(), Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })} } } + + /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`. + fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) { + let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); + { + for monitor_event in self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events() { + match monitor_event { + MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => { + if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0)); + self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage); + } else { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0)); + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }); + } + }, + MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => { + let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; + let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id; + let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id; + let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; + if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) { + if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() { + short_to_id.remove(&short_id); + } + failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false)); + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + } + }, + } + } + } + + for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) { + self.finish_force_close_channel(failure); + } + } } -impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, +impl MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { - fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec { - // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a - // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on - // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events! - { - //TODO: This behavior should be documented. - for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() { - if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0)); - self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage); - } else { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0)); - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }); - } - } - } + fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec { + //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query + // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events. + self.process_pending_monitor_events(); let mut ret = Vec::new(); let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); @@ -2925,29 +3120,17 @@ impl } } -impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, +impl EventsProvider for ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { - fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec { - // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a - // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on - // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events! - { - //TODO: This behavior should be documented. - for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() { - if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0)); - self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage); - } else { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0)); - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }); - } - } - } + fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec { + //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query + // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events. + self.process_pending_monitor_events(); let mut ret = Vec::new(); let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); @@ -2956,18 +3139,18 @@ impl } } -impl - ChainListener for ChannelManager - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, +impl ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, - L::Target: Logger, + L::Target: Logger, { - fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[usize]) { - let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash(); - log_trace!(self.logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len()); - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + /// Updates channel state based on transactions seen in a connected block. + pub fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) { + let header_hash = header.block_hash(); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Block {} at height {} connected", header_hash, height); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new(); { @@ -2976,7 +3159,7 @@ impl bool { + self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait) + } + + /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on `wait` is + /// guaranteed to be woken up. + pub fn wait(&self) { + self.persistence_notifier.wait() + } + + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))] + pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool { + let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock; + let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond; + let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap(); + *guard } } -impl - ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, +impl + ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { - fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) { + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); let mut failed_payments = Vec::new(); let mut no_channels_remain = true; @@ -3223,9 +3417,9 @@ impl node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true, &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true, &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true, - &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false, } }); } if no_channels_remain { - self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(their_node_id); + self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id); } for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) { @@ -3297,14 +3497,14 @@ impl { e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState { latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(), @@ -3320,7 +3520,7 @@ impl, Condvar), +} + +impl PersistenceNotifier { + fn new() -> Self { + Self { + persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()), + } + } + + fn wait(&self) { + loop { + let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock; + let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap(); + guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap(); + let result = *guard; + if result { + *guard = false; + return + } + } + } + + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))] + fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool { + let current_time = Instant::now(); + loop { + let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock; + let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap(); + guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0; + // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the + // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait + // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of + // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to + // 1.42.0. + let elapsed = current_time.elapsed(); + let result = *guard; + if result || elapsed >= max_wait { + *guard = false; + return result; + } + match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) { + None => return result, + Some(_) => continue + } } } + + // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk. + fn notify(&self) { + let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock; + let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap(); + *persistence_lock = true; + mem::drop(persistence_lock); + cnd.notify_all(); + } } const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; @@ -3455,6 +3720,7 @@ impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus { impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, { short_channel_id, + outpoint, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }); @@ -3531,9 +3797,10 @@ impl Readable for HTLCFailReason { impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo { fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { match self { - &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => { + &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_funding_outpoint, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => { 0u8.write(writer)?; prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?; + prev_funding_outpoint.write(writer)?; prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?; forward_info.write(writer)?; }, @@ -3552,6 +3819,7 @@ impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo { match ::read(reader)? { 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?, + prev_funding_outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?, prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?, forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?, }), @@ -3564,15 +3832,15 @@ impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo { } } -impl Writeable for ChannelManager - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, +impl Writeable for ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap(); + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap(); writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?; writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?; @@ -3643,33 +3911,32 @@ impl - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, +pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { - /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during - /// deserialization. + /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel + /// signing data. pub keys_manager: K, /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future. /// /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization. pub fee_estimator: F, - /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future. + /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future. /// - /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that + /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your - /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager. - pub monitor: M, + /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager. + pub chain_monitor: M, /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be @@ -3692,34 +3959,56 @@ pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: /// /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in /// this struct. - pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap>, + /// + /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings + pub channel_monitors: HashMap>, +} + +impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> + ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L> + where M::Target: chain::Watch, + T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, + { + /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor + /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to + /// populate a HashMap directly from C. + pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig, + mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor>) -> Self { + Self { + keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config, + channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect() + } + } } // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the // SipmleArcChannelManager type: -impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> - ReadableArgs> for (BlockHash, Arc>) - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, +impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> + ReadableArgs> for (BlockHash, Arc>) + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { - fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result { - let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)?; + fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result { + let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)?; Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager))) } } -impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> - ReadableArgs> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager) - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, +impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> + ReadableArgs> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager) + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - K::Target: KeysInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { - fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result { + fn read(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result { let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?; let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?; if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION { @@ -3737,7 +4026,7 @@ impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: De let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); for _ in 0..channel_count { - let mut channel: Channel = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut channel: Channel = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?; if channel.last_block_connected != Default::default() && channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } @@ -3745,20 +4034,20 @@ impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: De let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?; funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone()); if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) { - if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() || - channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() || - channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() || + if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() || + channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() || + channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() { // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue: return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); - } else if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() || - channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() || - channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() || + } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() || + channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() || + channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() { // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel: let (_, _, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true); failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs); - monitor.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger); + monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger); } else { if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id()); @@ -3772,7 +4061,7 @@ impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: De for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() { if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) { - monitor.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger); + monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger); } } @@ -3825,7 +4114,7 @@ impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: De let channel_manager = ChannelManager { genesis_hash, fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator, - monitor: args.monitor, + chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster, latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize), @@ -3847,6 +4136,8 @@ impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: De pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read), total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()), + persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(), + keys_manager: args.keys_manager, logger: args.logger, default_configuration: args.default_config, @@ -3862,3 +4153,54 @@ impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: De Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager)) } } + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier; + use std::sync::Arc; + use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering}; + use std::thread; + use std::time::Duration; + + #[test] + fn test_wait_timeout() { + let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new()); + let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier); + + let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)); + let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone(); + thread::spawn(move || { + loop { + let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock; + let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap(); + *persistence_lock = true; + cnd.notify_all(); + + if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) { + break + } + } + }); + + // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available. + let _ = persistence_notifier.wait(); + + // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are + // available. + loop { + if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) { + break + } + } + + exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst); + + // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates + // are available. + loop { + if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) { + break + } + } + } +}