X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannelmanager.rs;h=a9093b567120dbb4b82d0d00c9b04feef3fd8966;hb=7297e138716ec34147e591e125a96aa8a2cb2903;hp=5441ab4b57013152b063359ef5dd7ba2d55f049e;hpb=62f466a0a2370b9f9696e05d3ce651216d7410d9;p=rust-lightning

diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
index 5441ab4b..a9093b56 100644
--- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
@@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
 
 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
-/// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly six hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
+/// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
 ///
 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
 ///
@@ -572,13 +572,16 @@ pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
-pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 6;
+pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
 
 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
 /// this value.
-pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
+// Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
+// any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
+// a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
+pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
 
 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
@@ -590,7 +593,7 @@ pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
 #[allow(dead_code)]
 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
 
-// Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
+// Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
 #[deny(const_err)]
 #[allow(dead_code)]
@@ -1765,13 +1768,17 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
 	/// only Tor Onion addresses.
 	///
 	/// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
-	pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
+	pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
 		let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
 
 		if addresses.len() > 500 {
 			panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
 		}
 
+		// While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
+		// addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
+		addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
+
 		let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
 			features: NodeFeatures::known(),
 			timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
@@ -2558,6 +2565,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
 				},
 			}
 			if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
+				log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
 				self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
 			}
 			if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
@@ -2713,6 +2721,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
 				hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
 			}
 		};
+		log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
 		self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
 		Ok(())
 	}
@@ -2827,7 +2836,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
 			}
 		};
 		if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
-			log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
+			log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
 			self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
 		}
 		if let Some(chan) = chan_option {