X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannelmanager.rs;h=aa44a63e590d0c60547bea8cc7156d6810f7d27b;hb=09cf4847bd2b21c6ffe0a92d5b6a19306d77be13;hp=bad5e2f12841c811e082c2dafbda528ecbff5250;hpb=870a0f14bab32d21c7652773b5d9a37f8e59cd5e;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index bad5e2f1..aa44a63e 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -17,9 +17,10 @@ //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages). -use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader; +use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header; use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction; use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash; +use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE; use bitcoin::network::constants::Network; use bitcoin::hashes::Hash; @@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid}; use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey}; use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1; -use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence}; +use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence}; use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath; use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs}; @@ -49,9 +50,10 @@ use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures; use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph; use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router}; use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters}; +use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundOnionErr, NextPacketDetails}; use crate::ln::msgs; use crate::ln::onion_utils; -use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason; +use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING}; use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError}; #[cfg(test)] use crate::ln::outbound_payment; @@ -64,7 +66,8 @@ use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder}; use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError; use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder}; use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message}; -use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner}; +use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider}; +use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner; use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate}; use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier}; use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid; @@ -116,16 +119,23 @@ pub enum PendingHTLCRouting { /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module. short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero eventually when we bump MSRV + /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path. + blinded: Option, }, - /// An HTLC paid to an invoice we generated. + /// An HTLC paid to an invoice (supposedly) generated by us. + /// At this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually generated by us, + /// but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours. Receive { /// Payment secret and total msat received. payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData, /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info. payment_metadata: Option>, + /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC. /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed. incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, - /// Optional shared secret for phantom node. + /// Shared secret derived using a phantom node secret key. If this field is Some, the + /// payment was sent to a phantom node (one hop beyond the current node), but can be + /// settled by this node. phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info. custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec)>, @@ -134,31 +144,57 @@ pub enum PendingHTLCRouting { ReceiveKeysend { /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades. payment_data: Option, - /// Preimage for this onion payment. + /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be + /// used to settle the spontaneous payment. payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info. payment_metadata: Option>, - /// CLTV expiry of the incoming HTLC. - incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed + /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC. + /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed. + incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info. custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec)>, }, } +/// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path. +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)] +pub struct BlindedForward { + /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound + /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's + /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`]. + pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey, + // Another field will be added here when we support forwarding as a non-intro node. +} + +impl PendingHTLCRouting { + // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded. + fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option { + // TODO: needs update when we support receiving to multi-hop blinded paths + if let Self::Forward { blinded: Some(_), .. } = self { + Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) + } else { + None + } + } +} + /// Full details of an incoming HTLC, including routing info. #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug pub struct PendingHTLCInfo { /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received. pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting, /// Shared secret from the previous hop. + /// Used encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC needs to be failed backwards. pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32], - payment_hash: PaymentHash, - /// Amount received + /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage. + pub payment_hash: PaymentHash, + /// Amount offered by this HTLC. pub incoming_amt_msat: Option, // Added in 0.0.113 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received /// may overshoot this in either case) pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64, - /// Outgoing CLTV height. + /// Outgoing timelock expiration blockheight. pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32, /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed. @@ -201,6 +237,13 @@ pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo { }, } +// Used for failing blinded HTLCs backwards correctly. +#[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)] +enum BlindedFailure { + FromIntroductionNode, + // Another variant will be added here for non-intro nodes. +} + /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)] pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData { @@ -210,6 +253,7 @@ pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData { htlc_id: u64, incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32], phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, + blinded_failure: Option, // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel. @@ -313,7 +357,7 @@ impl Readable for InterceptId { /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`]. pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId { PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 }, - OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey }, + OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] }, } impl SentHTLCId { pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self { @@ -323,7 +367,7 @@ impl SentHTLCId { htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id, }, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => - Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv }, + Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() }, } } } @@ -395,16 +439,6 @@ impl HTLCSource { } } -/// Invalid inbound onion payment. -pub struct InboundOnionErr { - /// BOLT 4 error code. - pub err_code: u16, - /// Data attached to this error. - pub err_data: Vec, - /// Error message text. - pub msg: &'static str, -} - /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`]. /// @@ -921,7 +955,7 @@ pub trait AChannelManager { /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`]. type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized; /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`]. - type SignerProvider: SignerProvider + ?Sized; + type SignerProvider: SignerProvider + ?Sized; /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`]. type SP: Deref; /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`]. @@ -943,7 +977,7 @@ pub trait AChannelManager { impl AChannelManager for ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, ES::Target: EntropySource, NS::Target: NodeSigner, @@ -960,7 +994,7 @@ where type ES = ES; type NodeSigner = NS::Target; type NS = NS; - type Signer = ::Signer; + type Signer = ::EcdsaSigner; type SignerProvider = SP::Target; type SP = SP; type FeeEstimator = F::Target; @@ -1068,7 +1102,7 @@ where // pub struct ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, ES::Target: EntropySource, NS::Target: NodeSigner, @@ -2283,7 +2317,7 @@ macro_rules! process_events_body { impl ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, ES::Target: EntropySource, NS::Target: NodeSigner, @@ -2943,14 +2977,24 @@ where msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx )?; + let is_blinded = match next_hop { + onion_utils::Hop::Forward { + next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward { .. }, .. + } => true, + _ => false, // TODO: update this when we support receiving to multi-hop blinded paths + }; + macro_rules! return_err { ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => { { log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); + let (err_code, err_data) = if is_blinded { + (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..]) + } else { ($err_code, $data) }; return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id: msg.channel_id, htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, - reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec()) + reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec()) .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None), })); } @@ -3751,7 +3795,10 @@ where // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom. - if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 { + if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && + funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() && + funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1 + { result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned() })); @@ -4008,8 +4055,10 @@ where })?; let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing { - PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => { - PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid } + PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => { + PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { + onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid + } }, _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted }; @@ -4053,6 +4102,7 @@ where htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret: None, + blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(), }); let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10); @@ -4101,6 +4151,7 @@ where htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss, + blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(), }); let reason = if $next_hop_unknown { @@ -4130,7 +4181,7 @@ where } } } - if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing { + if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing { let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode); if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) { let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes(); @@ -4140,7 +4191,7 @@ where ) { Ok(res) => res, Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => { - let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner(); + let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array(); // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256 @@ -4205,7 +4256,9 @@ where prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, - routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, .. + routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { + onion_packet, blinded, .. + }, skimmed_fee_msat, .. }, }) => { log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id); @@ -4217,10 +4270,19 @@ where incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive. phantom_shared_secret: None, + blinded_failure: blinded.map(|_| BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode), + }); + let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| { + let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh( + Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None + ).unwrap().secret_bytes(); + onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey( + &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss + ).ok() }); if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), - onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator, + onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) { if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e { @@ -4271,6 +4333,7 @@ where skimmed_fee_msat, .. } }) => { + let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure(); let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing { PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => { let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone()); @@ -4300,6 +4363,7 @@ where htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, + blinded_failure, }, // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete @@ -4330,6 +4394,7 @@ where htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, + blinded_failure: None, }), payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data), HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash }, @@ -5163,7 +5228,7 @@ where } fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) { - let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()); + let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array()); let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self); @@ -6376,8 +6441,12 @@ where // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding. match pending_forward_info { - PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => { - let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 { + PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { + ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, .. + }) => { + let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() { + HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]) + } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 { let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan); HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data) } else { @@ -6556,7 +6625,7 @@ where if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() && fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash) { - let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner()); + let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array()); let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap(); match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) { hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { @@ -6579,6 +6648,7 @@ where htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret: None, + blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(), }); failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, @@ -7797,349 +7867,9 @@ where } } -fn create_fwd_pending_htlc_info( - msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32], - new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32], - next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option> -) -> Result { - debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some()); - let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket { - version: 0, - public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)), - hop_data: new_packet_bytes, - hmac: hop_hmac, - }; - - let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data { - msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } => - (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value), - msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } => - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", - err_code: 0x4000 | 22, - err_data: Vec::new(), - }), - }; - - Ok(PendingHTLCInfo { - routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { - onion_packet: outgoing_packet, - short_channel_id, - }, - payment_hash: msg.payment_hash, - incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret, - incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat), - outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward, - outgoing_cltv_value, - skimmed_fee_msat: None, - }) -} - -fn create_recv_pending_htlc_info( - hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash, - amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool, - counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option, current_height: u32, accept_mpp_keysend: bool, -) -> Result { - let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data { - msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { - payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, .. - } => - (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata), - msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { - amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, .. - } => { - let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat }; - (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None) - } - msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 0x4000|22, - err_data: Vec::new(), - msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", - }) - }, - }; - // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry - if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender", - err_code: 18, - err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec() - }) - } - // final_expiry_too_soon - // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure - // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go. - // - // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our - // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a - // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale). - if cltv_expiry <= current_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 { - let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12); - err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes()); - err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes()); - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data, - msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", - }); - } - if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) || - (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > - amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0))) - { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 19, - err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(), - msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", - }); - } - - let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage { - // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this - // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X - // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route - // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing - // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X. - let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()); - if hashed_preimage != payment_hash { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 0x4000|22, - err_data: Vec::new(), - msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", - }); - } - if !accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 0x4000|22, - err_data: Vec::new(), - msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments", - }); - } - PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { - payment_data, - payment_preimage, - payment_metadata, - incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value, - custom_tlvs, - } - } else if let Some(data) = payment_data { - PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { - payment_data: data, - payment_metadata, - incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value, - phantom_shared_secret, - custom_tlvs, - } - } else { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3, - err_data: Vec::new(), - msg: "We require payment_secrets", - }); - }; - Ok(PendingHTLCInfo { - routing, - payment_hash, - incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret, - incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat), - outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat, - outgoing_cltv_value, - skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, - }) -} - -/// Peel one layer off an incoming onion, returning [`PendingHTLCInfo`] (either Forward or Receive). -/// This does all the relevant context-free checks that LDK requires for payment relay or -/// acceptance. If the payment is to be received, and the amount matches the expected amount for -/// a given invoice, this indicates the [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], once fully committed in the -/// channel, will generate an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]. -pub fn peel_payment_onion( - msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, node_signer: &NS, logger: &L, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, - cur_height: u32, accept_mpp_keysend: bool, -) -> Result -where - NS::Target: NodeSigner, - L::Target: Logger, -{ - let (hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = - decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, node_signer, logger, secp_ctx - ).map_err(|e| { - let (err_code, err_data) = match e { - HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(m) => (m.failure_code, Vec::new()), - HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(r) => (0x4000 | 22, r.reason.data), - }; - let msg = "Failed to decode update add htlc onion"; - InboundOnionErr { msg, err_code, err_data } - })?; - Ok(match hop { - onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => { - let NextPacketDetails { - next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat: _, outgoing_scid: _, outgoing_cltv_value - } = match next_packet_details_opt { - Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details, - // Forward should always include the next hop details - None => return Err(InboundOnionErr { - msg: "Failed to decode update add htlc onion", - err_code: 0x4000 | 22, - err_data: Vec::new(), - }), - }; - - if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv( - cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry - ) { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - msg: err_msg, - err_code: code, - err_data: Vec::new(), - }); - } - create_fwd_pending_htlc_info( - msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, - Some(next_packet_pubkey) - )? - }, - onion_utils::Hop::Receive(received_data) => { - create_recv_pending_htlc_info( - received_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, - None, false, msg.skimmed_fee_msat, cur_height, accept_mpp_keysend, - )? - } - }) -} - -struct NextPacketDetails { - next_packet_pubkey: Result, - outgoing_scid: u64, - outgoing_amt_msat: u64, - outgoing_cltv_value: u32, -} - -fn decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion( - msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, node_signer: &NS, logger: &L, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, -) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option), HTLCFailureMsg> -where - NS::Target: NodeSigner, - L::Target: Logger, -{ - macro_rules! return_malformed_err { - ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => { - { - log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); - return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC { - channel_id: msg.channel_id, - htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, - sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(), - failure_code: $err_code, - })); - } - } - } - - if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key { - return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6); - } - - let shared_secret = node_signer.ecdh( - Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None - ).unwrap().secret_bytes(); - - if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 { - //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other - //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way, - //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the - //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the - //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the - //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there... - return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4); - } - macro_rules! return_err { - ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => { - { - log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); - return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { - channel_id: msg.channel_id, - htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, - reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec()) - .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None), - })); - } - } - } - - let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop( - shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, - msg.payment_hash, node_signer - ) { - Ok(res) => res, - Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => { - return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code); - }, - Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => { - return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]); - }, - }; - - let next_packet_details = match next_hop { - onion_utils::Hop::Forward { - next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { - short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value - }, .. - } => { - let next_packet_pubkey = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(secp_ctx, - msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret); - NextPacketDetails { - next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_scid: short_channel_id, - outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value - } - }, - onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)), - onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } | - onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } => - { - return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]); - } - }; - - Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details))) -} - -fn check_incoming_htlc_cltv( - cur_height: u32, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, cltv_expiry: u32 -) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> { - if (cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { - return Err(( - "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", - 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry - )); - } - // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, - // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see - // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale). - if cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon - return Err(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14)); - } - if cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far - return Err(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21)); - } - // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our - // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with - // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and - // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline. - // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure - // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it, - // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our - // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments. - if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 { - return Err(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14)); - } - - Ok(()) -} - impl MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, ES::Target: EntropySource, NS::Target: NodeSigner, @@ -8201,7 +7931,7 @@ where impl EventsProvider for ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, ES::Target: EntropySource, NS::Target: NodeSigner, @@ -8222,7 +7952,7 @@ where impl chain::Listen for ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, ES::Target: EntropySource, NS::Target: NodeSigner, @@ -8231,7 +7961,7 @@ where R::Target: Router, L::Target: Logger, { - fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) { + fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) { { let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap(); assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash, @@ -8244,7 +7974,7 @@ where self.best_block_updated(header, height); } - fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) { + fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events( self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist }); @@ -8264,7 +7994,7 @@ where impl chain::Confirm for ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, ES::Target: EntropySource, NS::Target: NodeSigner, @@ -8273,7 +8003,7 @@ where R::Target: Router, L::Target: Logger, { - fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) { + fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) { // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases. // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more. @@ -8294,7 +8024,7 @@ where } } - fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) { + fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) { // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases. // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more. @@ -8332,14 +8062,17 @@ where }); } - fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option)> { + fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option)> { let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len()); for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() { let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) { - if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) { - res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash))); + let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo(); + let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(); + let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(); + if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) { + res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash))); } } } @@ -8362,7 +8095,7 @@ where impl ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, ES::Target: EntropySource, NS::Target: NodeSigner, @@ -8512,6 +8245,7 @@ where incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret: None, outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint, + blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(), }); let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing { @@ -8606,7 +8340,7 @@ where impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, ES::Target: EntropySource, NS::Target: NodeSigner, @@ -9160,7 +8894,7 @@ where impl OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, ES::Target: EntropySource, NS::Target: NodeSigner, @@ -9475,9 +9209,14 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, { (6, real_node_pubkey, required), }); +impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, { + (0, inbound_blinding_point, required), +}); + impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting, (0, Forward) => { (0, onion_packet, required), + (1, blinded, option), (2, short_channel_id, required), }, (1, Receive) => { @@ -9579,10 +9318,15 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ; (1, Fail), ); +impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure, + (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {}, ; +); + impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, { (0, short_channel_id, required), (1, phantom_shared_secret, option), (2, outpoint, required), + (3, blinded_failure, option), (4, htlc_id, required), (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required), (7, user_channel_id, option), @@ -9757,7 +9501,7 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, { impl Writeable for ChannelManager where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, ES::Target: EntropySource, NS::Target: NodeSigner, @@ -10061,7 +9805,7 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState, /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, ES::Target: EntropySource, NS::Target: NodeSigner, @@ -10120,13 +9864,13 @@ where /// this struct. /// /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings - pub channel_monitors: HashMap::Signer>>, + pub channel_monitors: HashMap::EcdsaSigner>>, } impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, ES::Target: EntropySource, NS::Target: NodeSigner, @@ -10139,7 +9883,7 @@ where /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to /// populate a HashMap directly from C. pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig, - mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<::Signer>>) -> Self { + mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self { Self { entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config, channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect() @@ -10152,7 +9896,7 @@ where impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ReadableArgs> for (BlockHash, Arc>) where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, ES::Target: EntropySource, NS::Target: NodeSigner, @@ -10170,7 +9914,7 @@ where impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ReadableArgs> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager) where - M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + M::Target: chain::Watch<::EcdsaSigner>, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, ES::Target: EntropySource, NS::Target: NodeSigner, @@ -11032,11 +10776,10 @@ mod tests { use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret}; use crate::ln::ChannelId; use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId}; - use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures}; use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*; use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction}; use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler; - use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route}; + use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route}; use crate::util::errors::APIError; use crate::util::test_utils; use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate}; @@ -11412,7 +11155,7 @@ mod tests { let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]); let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value( PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000); - let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone(); + let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph; let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels(); let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new(); let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); @@ -11457,7 +11200,7 @@ mod tests { let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]); let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value( PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000); - let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone(); + let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph; let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels(); let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new(); let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); @@ -11468,7 +11211,7 @@ mod tests { let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]); let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]); - let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner()); + let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array()); let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap(); nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, @@ -11600,7 +11343,7 @@ mod tests { nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel); let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42); - let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner()); + let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array()); { // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`. @@ -12312,137 +12055,6 @@ mod tests { check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx); } } - - #[test] - fn test_peel_payment_onion() { - use super::*; - let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); - - let bob = crate::sign::KeysManager::new(&[2; 32], 42, 42); - let bob_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bob.get_node_secret_key()); - let charlie = crate::sign::KeysManager::new(&[3; 32], 42, 42); - let charlie_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &charlie.get_node_secret_key()); - - let (session_priv, total_amt_msat, cur_height, recipient_onion, preimage, payment_hash, - prng_seed, hops, recipient_amount, pay_secret) = payment_onion_args(bob_pk, charlie_pk); - - let path = Path { - hops: hops, - blinded_tail: None, - }; - - let (amount_msat, cltv_expiry, onion) = create_payment_onion( - &secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_amt_msat, recipient_onion, cur_height, - payment_hash, Some(preimage), prng_seed - ).unwrap(); - - let msg = make_update_add_msg(amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, onion); - let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("bob".to_string()); - - let peeled = peel_payment_onion(&msg, &&bob, &&logger, &secp_ctx, cur_height, true) - .map_err(|e| e.msg).unwrap(); - - let next_onion = match peeled.routing { - PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: _ } => { - onion_packet - }, - _ => panic!("expected a forwarded onion"), - }; - - let msg2 = make_update_add_msg(amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, next_onion); - let peeled2 = peel_payment_onion(&msg2, &&charlie, &&logger, &secp_ctx, cur_height, true) - .map_err(|e| e.msg).unwrap(); - - match peeled2.routing { - PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, .. } => { - assert_eq!(payment_preimage, preimage); - assert_eq!(peeled2.outgoing_amt_msat, recipient_amount); - assert_eq!(incoming_cltv_expiry, peeled2.outgoing_cltv_value); - let msgs::FinalOnionHopData{total_msat, payment_secret} = payment_data.unwrap(); - assert_eq!(total_msat, total_amt_msat); - assert_eq!(payment_secret, pay_secret); - }, - _ => panic!("expected a received keysend"), - }; - } - - fn make_update_add_msg( - amount_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, payment_hash: PaymentHash, - onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket - ) -> msgs::UpdateAddHTLC { - msgs::UpdateAddHTLC { - channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([0; 32]), - htlc_id: 0, - amount_msat, - cltv_expiry, - payment_hash, - onion_routing_packet, - skimmed_fee_msat: None, - } - } - - fn payment_onion_args(hop_pk: PublicKey, recipient_pk: PublicKey) -> ( - SecretKey, u64, u32, RecipientOnionFields, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, [u8; 32], - Vec, u64, PaymentSecret, - ) { - let session_priv_bytes = [42; 32]; - let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes).unwrap(); - let total_amt_msat = 1000; - let cur_height = 1000; - let pay_secret = PaymentSecret([99; 32]); - let recipient_onion = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(pay_secret); - let preimage_bytes = [43; 32]; - let preimage = PaymentPreimage(preimage_bytes); - let rhash_bytes = Sha256::hash(&preimage_bytes).into_inner(); - let payment_hash = PaymentHash(rhash_bytes); - let prng_seed = [44; 32]; - - // make a route alice -> bob -> charlie - let hop_fee = 1; - let recipient_amount = total_amt_msat - hop_fee; - let hops = vec![ - RouteHop { - pubkey: hop_pk, - fee_msat: hop_fee, - cltv_expiry_delta: 42, - short_channel_id: 1, - node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), - channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(), - maybe_announced_channel: false, - }, - RouteHop { - pubkey: recipient_pk, - fee_msat: recipient_amount, - cltv_expiry_delta: 42, - short_channel_id: 2, - node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), - channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(), - maybe_announced_channel: false, - } - ]; - - (session_priv, total_amt_msat, cur_height, recipient_onion, preimage, payment_hash, - prng_seed, hops, recipient_amount, pay_secret) - } - - pub fn create_payment_onion( - secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, path: &Path, session_priv: &SecretKey, total_msat: u64, - recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, best_block_height: u32, payment_hash: PaymentHash, - keysend_preimage: Option, prng_seed: [u8; 32] - ) -> Result<(u64, u32, msgs::OnionPacket), ()> { - let onion_keys = super::onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv).map_err(|_| ())?; - let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = super::onion_utils::build_onion_payloads( - &path, - total_msat, - recipient_onion, - best_block_height + 1, - &keysend_preimage, - ).map_err(|_| ())?; - let onion_packet = super::onion_utils::construct_onion_packet( - onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash - )?; - Ok((htlc_msat, htlc_cltv, onion_packet)) - } } #[cfg(ldk_bench)] @@ -12459,9 +12071,10 @@ pub mod bench { use crate::util::test_utils; use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure}; + use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime; use bitcoin::hashes::Hash; use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; - use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut}; + use bitcoin::{Block, Transaction, TxOut}; use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock}; @@ -12538,7 +12151,7 @@ pub mod bench { let tx; if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) { - tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut { + tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut { value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script, }]}; node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap(); @@ -12611,7 +12224,7 @@ pub mod bench { let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]); payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes()); payment_count += 1; - let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()); + let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array()); let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap(); $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),