X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannelmanager.rs;h=d27dc9d3a7d891209c2a87a72d7786dc5b54369b;hb=192fe051470c75d154055bca4bfea39f04ffff41;hp=531d013c2c85794f68b82682b170c2524eaa546e;hpb=46dab8f5ef20d9c43bd53209e8b4858e72806d69;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index 531d013c..d27dc9d3 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1; use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence}; use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath; +use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs}; use crate::chain; use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock}; use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator}; @@ -42,7 +43,7 @@ use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, Messa // construct one themselves. use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret}; use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel}; -use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures}; +use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures}; #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))] use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures; use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph; @@ -54,11 +55,15 @@ use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason; use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError}; #[cfg(test)] use crate::ln::outbound_payment; -use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs}; +use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration}; use crate::ln::wire::Encode; -use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, OfferBuilder}; +use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder}; +use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError; +use crate::offers::merkle::SignError; +use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder}; use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError; -use crate::offers::refund::RefundBuilder; +use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder}; +use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message}; use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner}; use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate}; use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier}; @@ -101,47 +106,63 @@ use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript; // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent. +/// Routing info for an inbound HTLC onion. #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug -pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting { +pub enum PendingHTLCRouting { + /// A forwarded HTLC. Forward { + /// BOLT 4 onion packet. onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module. short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero eventually when we bump MSRV }, + /// An HTLC paid to an invoice we generated. Receive { + /// Payment secret and total msat received. payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData, + /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info. payment_metadata: Option>, - incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed + /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed. + incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, + /// Optional shared secret for phantom node. phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info. custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec)>, }, + /// Incoming keysend (sender provided the preimage in a TLV). ReceiveKeysend { /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades. payment_data: Option, + /// Preimage for this onion payment. payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, + /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info. payment_metadata: Option>, + /// CLTV expiry of the incoming HTLC. incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info. custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec)>, }, } +/// Full details of an incoming HTLC, including routing info. #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug -pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo { - pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting, - pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32], +pub struct PendingHTLCInfo { + /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received. + pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting, + /// Shared secret from the previous hop. + pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash, /// Amount received - pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option, // Added in 0.0.113 + pub incoming_amt_msat: Option, // Added in 0.0.113 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received /// may overshoot this in either case) - pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64, - pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32, + pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64, + /// Outgoing CLTV height. + pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32, /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed. - pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option, + pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option, } #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug @@ -373,10 +394,14 @@ impl HTLCSource { } } -struct InboundOnionErr { - err_code: u16, - err_data: Vec, - msg: &'static str, +/// Invalid inbound onion payment. +pub struct InboundOnionErr { + /// BOLT 4 error code. + pub err_code: u16, + /// Data attached to this error. + pub err_data: Vec, + /// Error message text. + pub msg: &'static str, } /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC @@ -452,7 +477,7 @@ impl MsgHandleErrInternal { #[inline] fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self { let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() }; - let action = if let (Some(_), ..) = &shutdown_res { + let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() { // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest // commitment upon reconnecting. @@ -568,6 +593,7 @@ struct ClaimablePayments { /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied. +#[derive(Debug)] enum BackgroundEvent { /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel. /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the @@ -620,10 +646,34 @@ pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction { event: events::Event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>, }, + /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is + /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately + /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set. + /// + /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge + /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge + /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant + /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in + /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately. + /// + /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than + /// stored for later processing. + FreeOtherChannelImmediately { + downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, + downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, + blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction, + }, } impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction, (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) }, + // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free + // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here. + (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => { + (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required), + (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required), + (4, blocking_action, required), + }, (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => { (0, event, upgradable_required), // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was @@ -797,7 +847,8 @@ struct PendingInboundPayment { /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`]. /// -/// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings +/// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages. +#[cfg(not(c_bindings))] pub type SimpleArcChannelManager = ChannelManager< Arc, Arc, @@ -825,7 +876,8 @@ pub type SimpleArcChannelManager = ChannelManager< /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`]. /// -/// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings +/// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages. +#[cfg(not(c_bindings))] pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager< &'a M, @@ -983,6 +1035,8 @@ where // // Lock order tree: // +// `pending_offers_messages` +// // `total_consistency_lock` // | // |__`forward_htlcs` @@ -990,26 +1044,26 @@ where // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs` // | // |__`per_peer_state` -// | | -// | |__`pending_inbound_payments` -// | | -// | |__`claimable_payments` -// | | -// | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds -// | | -// | |__`peer_state` -// | | -// | |__`id_to_peer` -// | | -// | |__`short_to_chan_info` -// | | -// | |__`outbound_scid_aliases` -// | | -// | |__`best_block` -// | | -// | |__`pending_events` -// | | -// | |__`pending_background_events` +// | +// |__`pending_inbound_payments` +// | +// |__`claimable_payments` +// | +// |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds +// | +// |__`peer_state` +// | +// |__`id_to_peer` +// | +// |__`short_to_chan_info` +// | +// |__`outbound_scid_aliases` +// | +// |__`best_block` +// | +// |__`pending_events` +// | +// |__`pending_background_events` // pub struct ChannelManager where @@ -1221,6 +1275,8 @@ where event_persist_notifier: Notifier, needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool, + pending_offers_messages: Mutex>>, + entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, @@ -2301,6 +2357,8 @@ where needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false), funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()), + pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), + entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, @@ -2564,7 +2622,7 @@ where let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self); let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>; - let mut shutdown_result = None; + let shutdown_result; loop { let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); @@ -2579,10 +2637,11 @@ where if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() { let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo(); let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features; - let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(); - let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = + let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs, local_shutdown_result) = chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?; failed_htlcs = htlcs; + shutdown_result = local_shutdown_result; + debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown()); // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor` // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a @@ -2610,7 +2669,6 @@ where }); } self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed); - shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid)); } } break; @@ -2645,11 +2703,11 @@ where /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain. /// - /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and - /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee - /// estimate. + /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and + /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] + /// fee estimate. /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing - /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which + /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however. /// @@ -2661,8 +2719,8 @@ where /// channel. /// /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis - /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background - /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal + /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum + /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> { self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None) @@ -2676,8 +2734,8 @@ where /// the channel being closed or not: /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by - /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee - /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater). + /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] + /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater). /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower). @@ -2695,29 +2753,27 @@ where /// channel. /// /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis - /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background - /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal + /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option, shutdown_script: Option) -> Result<(), APIError> { self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script) } - fn finish_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) { + fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) { debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread); #[cfg(debug_assertions)] for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() { debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread); } - let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid) = shutdown_res; - log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len()); - for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) { + log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len()); + for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) { let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source; let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8); let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id }; self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver); } - if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option { + if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update { // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to @@ -2725,7 +2781,7 @@ where let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update); } let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new(); - if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid { + if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid { let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap(); let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten(); let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); @@ -2867,192 +2923,15 @@ where } } - fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info( - &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32], - new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32], - next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option> - ) -> Result { - debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some()); - let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket { - version: 0, - public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)), - hop_data: new_packet_bytes, - hmac: hop_hmac, - }; - - let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data { - msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } => - (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value), - msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } => - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", - err_code: 0x4000 | 22, - err_data: Vec::new(), - }), - }; - - Ok(PendingHTLCInfo { - routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { - onion_packet: outgoing_packet, - short_channel_id, - }, - payment_hash: msg.payment_hash, - incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret, - incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat), - outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward, - outgoing_cltv_value, - skimmed_fee_msat: None, - }) - } - - fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info( - &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash, - amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool, - counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option, - ) -> Result { - let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data { - msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { - payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, .. - } => - (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata), - msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { - amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, .. - } => { - let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat }; - (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None) - } - msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 0x4000|22, - err_data: Vec::new(), - msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", - }) - }, - }; - // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry - if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender", - err_code: 18, - err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec() - }) - } - // final_expiry_too_soon - // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure - // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go. - // - // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our - // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a - // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale). - let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); - if cltv_expiry <= current_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 { - let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12); - err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes()); - err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes()); - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data, - msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", - }); - } - if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) || - (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > - amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0))) - { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 19, - err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(), - msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", - }); - } - - let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage { - // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this - // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X - // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route - // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing - // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X. - let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()); - if hashed_preimage != payment_hash { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 0x4000|22, - err_data: Vec::new(), - msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", - }); - } - if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 0x4000|22, - err_data: Vec::new(), - msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments", - }); - } - PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { - payment_data, - payment_preimage, - payment_metadata, - incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value, - custom_tlvs, - } - } else if let Some(data) = payment_data { - PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { - payment_data: data, - payment_metadata, - incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value, - phantom_shared_secret, - custom_tlvs, - } - } else { - return Err(InboundOnionErr { - err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3, - err_data: Vec::new(), - msg: "We require payment_secrets", - }); - }; - Ok(PendingHTLCInfo { - routing, - payment_hash, - incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret, - incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat), - outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat, - outgoing_cltv_value, - skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, - }) - } - fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion( &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC - ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option>), HTLCFailureMsg> { - macro_rules! return_malformed_err { - ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => { - { - log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); - return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC { - channel_id: msg.channel_id, - htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, - sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(), - failure_code: $err_code, - })); - } - } - } - - if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key { - return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6); - } - - let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh( - Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None - ).unwrap().secret_bytes(); + ) -> Result< + (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option>), HTLCFailureMsg + > { + let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion( + msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx + )?; - if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 { - //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other - //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way, - //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the - //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the - //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the - //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there... - return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4); - } macro_rules! return_err { ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => { { @@ -3067,36 +2946,12 @@ where } } - let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop( - shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, - msg.payment_hash, &self.node_signer - ) { - Ok(res) => res, - Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => { - return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code); - }, - Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => { - return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]); - }, - }; - let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop { - onion_utils::Hop::Forward { - next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { - short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value - }, .. - } => { - let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, - msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret); - (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk)) - }, - // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the - // inbound channel's state. - onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)), - onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } | - onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } => - { - return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]); - } + let NextPacketDetails { + next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value + } = match next_packet_details_opt { + Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details, + // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks + None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)), }; // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we @@ -3173,38 +3028,22 @@ where } chan_update_opt } else { - if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { - // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not - // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update - // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure. - break Some(( - "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", - 0x2000 | 2, None, - )); - } None }; let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1; - // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, - // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see - // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale). - if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon - break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt)); - } - if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far - break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None)); - } - // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our - // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with - // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and - // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline. - // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure - // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it, - // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our - // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments. - if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 { - break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt)); + + if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv( + cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry + ) { + if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() { + // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not + // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update + // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure. + break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None)) + } + let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None }; + break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt)); } break None; @@ -3234,7 +3073,7 @@ where } return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]); } - Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) + Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey))) } fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>( @@ -3257,8 +3096,10 @@ where match decoded_hop { onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => { // OUR PAYMENT! - match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, - msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat) + let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, + msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat, + current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend) { Ok(info) => { // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc @@ -3271,7 +3112,7 @@ where } }, onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => { - match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, + match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) { Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info), Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data) @@ -3545,6 +3386,17 @@ where self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata); } + pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> { + let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self); + self.pending_outbound_payments + .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice( + invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), + || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, + best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events, + |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args) + ) + } /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before @@ -3559,10 +3411,20 @@ where /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to /// determine the ultimate status of a payment. /// + /// # Requested Invoices + /// + /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning + /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`] + /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated + /// once the invoice has been received. + /// /// # Restart Behavior /// /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the - /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated. + /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for + /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]. + /// + /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self); self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events); @@ -4276,9 +4138,11 @@ where }; match next_hop { onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => { - match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, + let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, - outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None) + outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None, + current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend) { Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])), Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) @@ -4760,8 +4624,8 @@ where PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || { let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; - let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal); - let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum); + let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee); + let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee); let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { @@ -4771,9 +4635,9 @@ where |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None } ) { let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { - min_mempool_feerate + anchor_feerate } else { - normal_feerate + non_anchor_feerate }; let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate); if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; } @@ -4797,8 +4661,8 @@ where /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner. /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time. - /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the block time minus two - /// hours in `no-std`. + /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time + /// minus two hours in `no-std`. /// /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate /// estimate fetches. @@ -4809,8 +4673,8 @@ where PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || { let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; - let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal); - let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum); + let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee); + let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee); let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new(); let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new(); @@ -4857,9 +4721,9 @@ where match phase { ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => { let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { - min_mempool_feerate + anchor_feerate } else { - normal_feerate + non_anchor_feerate }; let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate); if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; } @@ -5378,8 +5242,11 @@ where for htlc in sources.drain(..) { if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop( htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage, - |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })) - { + |_, definitely_duplicate| { + debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment"); + Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }) + } + ) { if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action { // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain). @@ -5407,7 +5274,7 @@ where } } - fn claim_funds_from_hop) -> Option>(&self, + fn claim_funds_from_hop, bool) -> Option>(&self, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc) -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> { //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay! @@ -5417,6 +5284,11 @@ where // `BackgroundEvent`s. let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire); + // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that + // the required mutexes are not held before we start. + debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread); + debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread); + { let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(); @@ -5438,25 +5310,70 @@ where let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(); let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger); - if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res { - if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}", - chan_id, action); - peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action); + match fulfill_res { + UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => { + if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}", + chan_id, action); + peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action); + } + if !during_init { + handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, + peer_state, per_peer_state, chan); + } else { + // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - + // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the + // monitor update as a background event. + self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push( + BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { + counterparty_node_id, + funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint, + update: monitor_update.clone(), + }); + } } - if !during_init { - handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, - peer_state, per_peer_state, chan); - } else { - // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - - // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the - // monitor update as a background event. - self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push( - BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { - counterparty_node_id, - funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint, - update: monitor_update.clone(), - }); + UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => { + let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) { + action + } else { + return Ok(()); + }; + mem::drop(peer_state_lock); + + log_trace!(self.logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}", + chan_id, action); + let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) = + if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { + downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id, + downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint, + blocking_action: blocker, + } = action { + (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) + } else { + debug_assert!(false, + "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately"); + return Ok(()); + }; + if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) { + let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap(); + if let Some(blockers) = peer_state + .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates + .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) + { + let mut found_blocker = false; + blockers.retain(|iter| { + // Note that we could actually be blocked, in + // which case we need to only remove the one + // blocker which was added duplicatively. + let first_blocker = !found_blocker; + if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; } + *iter != blocker || !first_blocker + }); + debug_assert!(found_blocker); + } + } else { + debug_assert!(false); + } } } } @@ -5504,7 +5421,7 @@ where // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in // `PaymentForwarded`). - self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None)); + self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false)); Ok(()) } @@ -5513,7 +5430,7 @@ where } fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, - forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option, from_onchain: bool, + forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint ) { match source { @@ -5534,13 +5451,84 @@ where HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => { let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint; let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data); + #[cfg(debug_assertions)] + let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint; let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage, - |htlc_claim_value_msat| { - if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat { - let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat { - Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value) - } else { None }; + |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| { + let chan_to_release = + if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id { + Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker)) + } else { + // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a + // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we + // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream + // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already + // closed. + None + }; + if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay { + // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to + // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't + // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete + // in the background. + #[cfg(debug_assertions)] { + let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(); + // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending... + assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| { + match ev { + // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel, + BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { + funding_txo, update, .. + } => { + if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint { + assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd| + if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { + payment_preimage: update_preimage + } = upd { + payment_preimage == *update_preimage + } else { false } + ), "{:?}", update); + true + } else { false } + }, + // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed, + BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup( + (funding_txo, monitor_update) + ) => { + if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint { + assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1); + assert!(matches!( + monitor_update.updates[0], + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } + )); + true + } else { false } + }, + // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock + // immediately once we get going. + BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { + channel_id, .. + } => + *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), + } + }), "{:?}", *background_events); + } + None + } else if definitely_duplicate { + if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release { + Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { + downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0, + downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1, + blocking_action: other_chan.2, + }) + } else { None } + } else { + let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat { + if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat { + Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value) + } else { None } + } else { None }; Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, @@ -5549,19 +5537,9 @@ where next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()), outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat, }, - downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: - if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id { - Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker)) - } else { - // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a - // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we - // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream - // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already - // closed. - None - }, + downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release, }) - } else { None } + } }); if let Err((pk, err)) = res { let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err); @@ -5577,6 +5555,10 @@ where } fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions>(&self, actions: I) { + debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread); + debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread); + debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread); + for action in actions.into_iter() { match action { MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => { @@ -5606,6 +5588,15 @@ where self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker)); } }, + MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { + downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action, + } => { + self.handle_monitor_update_release( + downstream_counterparty_node_id, + downstream_funding_outpoint, + Some(blocking_action), + ); + }, } } } @@ -6268,22 +6259,20 @@ where } fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let mut shutdown_result = None; - let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid; let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) .ok_or_else(|| { debug_assert!(false); MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) })?; - let (tx, chan_option) = { + let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = { let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => { if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() { - unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(); - let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry); + let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry); + debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown()); if let Some(msg) = closing_signed { peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), @@ -6296,8 +6285,8 @@ where // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to // watch for old state broadcasts)! - (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry))) - } else { (tx, None) } + (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result) + } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) } } else { return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close( "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry); @@ -6319,7 +6308,6 @@ where }); } self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure); - shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid)); } mem::drop(per_peer_state); if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result { @@ -6408,6 +6396,9 @@ where if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() { let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry); if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 { + log_trace!(self.logger, + "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor", + msg.channel_id); peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id) .or_insert_with(Vec::new) .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop)); @@ -6428,7 +6419,7 @@ where hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } }; - self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo); + self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo); Ok(()) } @@ -6916,7 +6907,7 @@ where MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => { if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage { log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage); - self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint); + self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint); } else { log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash); let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() }; @@ -7049,15 +7040,18 @@ where peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| { match phase { ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => { - let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(); match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) { - Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => { + Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => { if let Some(msg) = msg_opt { has_update = true; pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg, }); } + debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown()); + if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt { + shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result); + } if let Some(tx) = tx_opt { // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast. @@ -7072,7 +7066,6 @@ where log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx)); self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]); update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context); - shutdown_results.push((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid)); false } else { true } }, @@ -7113,7 +7106,7 @@ where // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization, // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally. - if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() { + if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() { assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1); if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] { assert!(should_broadcast); @@ -7131,11 +7124,20 @@ where /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder. /// + /// # Privacy + /// /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently, /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`]. /// + /// # Limitations + /// + /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s + /// reply path. + /// + /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics. + /// /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest pub fn create_offer_builder( @@ -7153,19 +7155,47 @@ where } /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the - /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund. The builder will - /// have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the returned builder will - /// not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. + /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund. + /// + /// # Payment /// /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund. + /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent. + /// + /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the + /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen + /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has + /// expired. + /// + /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the + /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail + /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]. + /// + /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from + /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied. + /// + /// # Privacy /// /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as - /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for sender privacy. As such, currently, the + /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`]. /// + /// # Limitations + /// + /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding + /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]. + /// + /// # Errors + /// + /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link + /// or if `amount_msats` is invalid. + /// + /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics. + /// /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice + /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths pub fn create_refund_builder( &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option @@ -7183,15 +7213,195 @@ where .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry) .path(path); + let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry); self.pending_outbound_payments .add_new_awaiting_invoice( - payment_id, absolute_expiry, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat, + payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat, ) .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?; Ok(builder) } + /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and + /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual + /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received. + /// + /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by + /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request. + /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`: + /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if + /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`. + /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and + /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]. + /// + /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from + /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied. + /// + /// # Payment + /// + /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request + /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has + /// been sent. + /// + /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the + /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the + /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]. + /// + /// # Privacy + /// + /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] + /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the + /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node + /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`]. + /// + /// # Limitations + /// + /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to + /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding + /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]. + /// + /// # Errors + /// + /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link + /// or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer. + /// + /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest + /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity + /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note + /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder + /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice + /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths + /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments + pub fn pay_for_offer( + &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option, amount_msats: Option, + payer_note: Option, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, + max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option + ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> { + let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key; + let entropy = &*self.entropy_source; + let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx; + + let builder = offer + .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)? + .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?; + let builder = match quantity { + None => builder, + Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?, + }; + let builder = match amount_msats { + None => builder, + Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?, + }; + let builder = match payer_note { + None => builder, + Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note), + }; + + let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?; + let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path(); + + let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1); + self.pending_outbound_payments + .add_new_awaiting_invoice( + payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat + ) + .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?; + + let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap(); + if offer.paths().is_empty() { + let message = new_pending_onion_message( + OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request), + Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()), + Some(reply_path), + ); + pending_offers_messages.push(message); + } else { + // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound). + // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only + // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received. + const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10; + for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) { + let message = new_pending_onion_message( + OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()), + Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()), + Some(reply_path.clone()), + ); + pending_offers_messages.push(message); + } + } + + Ok(()) + } + + /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion + /// message. + /// + /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a + /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding + /// [`PaymentPreimage`]. + /// + /// # Limitations + /// + /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to + /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each + /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be + /// received and no retries will be made. + /// + /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice + pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> { + let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key; + let entropy = &*self.entropy_source; + let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx; + + let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats(); + let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32; + + match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) { + Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => { + let payment_paths = vec![ + self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret), + ]; + #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))] + let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys( + payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy + )?; + #[cfg(feature = "no-std")] + let created_at = Duration::from_secs( + self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + ); + #[cfg(feature = "no-std")] + let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std( + payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy + )?; + let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?; + let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path(); + + let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap(); + if refund.paths().is_empty() { + let message = new_pending_onion_message( + OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice), + Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()), + Some(reply_path), + ); + pending_offers_messages.push(message); + } else { + for path in refund.paths() { + let message = new_pending_onion_message( + OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()), + Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()), + Some(reply_path.clone()), + ); + pending_offers_messages.push(message); + } + } + + Ok(()) + }, + Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount), + } + } + /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing /// to pay us. /// @@ -7300,6 +7510,29 @@ where BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap() } + /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction + /// node. + fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path( + &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret + ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) { + let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref(); + let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx; + + let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id(); + let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS; + let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs { + payment_secret, + payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints { + max_cltv_expiry, + htlc_minimum_msat: 1, + }, + }; + // TODO: Err for overflow? + BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment( + payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx + ).unwrap() + } + /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints. /// @@ -7480,6 +7713,346 @@ where } } +fn create_fwd_pending_htlc_info( + msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32], + new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32], + next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option> +) -> Result { + debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some()); + let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket { + version: 0, + public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)), + hop_data: new_packet_bytes, + hmac: hop_hmac, + }; + + let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data { + msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } => + (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value), + msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } => + return Err(InboundOnionErr { + msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", + err_code: 0x4000 | 22, + err_data: Vec::new(), + }), + }; + + Ok(PendingHTLCInfo { + routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { + onion_packet: outgoing_packet, + short_channel_id, + }, + payment_hash: msg.payment_hash, + incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret, + incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat), + outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward, + outgoing_cltv_value, + skimmed_fee_msat: None, + }) +} + +fn create_recv_pending_htlc_info( + hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash, + amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool, + counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option, current_height: u32, accept_mpp_keysend: bool, +) -> Result { + let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data { + msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { + payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, .. + } => + (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata), + msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { + amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, .. + } => { + let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat }; + (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None) + } + msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => { + return Err(InboundOnionErr { + err_code: 0x4000|22, + err_data: Vec::new(), + msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", + }) + }, + }; + // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry + if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry { + return Err(InboundOnionErr { + msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender", + err_code: 18, + err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec() + }) + } + // final_expiry_too_soon + // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure + // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go. + // + // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our + // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a + // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale). + if cltv_expiry <= current_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 { + let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12); + err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes()); + err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes()); + return Err(InboundOnionErr { + err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data, + msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", + }); + } + if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) || + (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > + amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0))) + { + return Err(InboundOnionErr { + err_code: 19, + err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(), + msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", + }); + } + + let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage { + // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this + // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X + // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route + // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing + // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X. + let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()); + if hashed_preimage != payment_hash { + return Err(InboundOnionErr { + err_code: 0x4000|22, + err_data: Vec::new(), + msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", + }); + } + if !accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() { + return Err(InboundOnionErr { + err_code: 0x4000|22, + err_data: Vec::new(), + msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments", + }); + } + PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { + payment_data, + payment_preimage, + payment_metadata, + incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value, + custom_tlvs, + } + } else if let Some(data) = payment_data { + PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { + payment_data: data, + payment_metadata, + incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value, + phantom_shared_secret, + custom_tlvs, + } + } else { + return Err(InboundOnionErr { + err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3, + err_data: Vec::new(), + msg: "We require payment_secrets", + }); + }; + Ok(PendingHTLCInfo { + routing, + payment_hash, + incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret, + incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat), + outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat, + outgoing_cltv_value, + skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, + }) +} + +/// Peel one layer off an incoming onion, returning [`PendingHTLCInfo`] (either Forward or Receive). +/// This does all the relevant context-free checks that LDK requires for payment relay or +/// acceptance. If the payment is to be received, and the amount matches the expected amount for +/// a given invoice, this indicates the [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], once fully committed in the +/// channel, will generate an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]. +pub fn peel_payment_onion( + msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, node_signer: &NS, logger: &L, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, + cur_height: u32, accept_mpp_keysend: bool, +) -> Result +where + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + L::Target: Logger, +{ + let (hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = + decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, node_signer, logger, secp_ctx + ).map_err(|e| { + let (err_code, err_data) = match e { + HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(m) => (m.failure_code, Vec::new()), + HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(r) => (0x4000 | 22, r.reason.data), + }; + let msg = "Failed to decode update add htlc onion"; + InboundOnionErr { msg, err_code, err_data } + })?; + Ok(match hop { + onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => { + let NextPacketDetails { + next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat: _, outgoing_scid: _, outgoing_cltv_value + } = match next_packet_details_opt { + Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details, + // Forward should always include the next hop details + None => return Err(InboundOnionErr { + msg: "Failed to decode update add htlc onion", + err_code: 0x4000 | 22, + err_data: Vec::new(), + }), + }; + + if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv( + cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry + ) { + return Err(InboundOnionErr { + msg: err_msg, + err_code: code, + err_data: Vec::new(), + }); + } + create_fwd_pending_htlc_info( + msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, + Some(next_packet_pubkey) + )? + }, + onion_utils::Hop::Receive(received_data) => { + create_recv_pending_htlc_info( + received_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, + None, false, msg.skimmed_fee_msat, cur_height, accept_mpp_keysend, + )? + } + }) +} + +struct NextPacketDetails { + next_packet_pubkey: Result, + outgoing_scid: u64, + outgoing_amt_msat: u64, + outgoing_cltv_value: u32, +} + +fn decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion( + msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, node_signer: &NS, logger: &L, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, +) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option), HTLCFailureMsg> +where + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + L::Target: Logger, +{ + macro_rules! return_malformed_err { + ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => { + { + log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); + return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC { + channel_id: msg.channel_id, + htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, + sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(), + failure_code: $err_code, + })); + } + } + } + + if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key { + return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6); + } + + let shared_secret = node_signer.ecdh( + Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None + ).unwrap().secret_bytes(); + + if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 { + //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other + //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way, + //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the + //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the + //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the + //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there... + return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4); + } + macro_rules! return_err { + ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => { + { + log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); + return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { + channel_id: msg.channel_id, + htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, + reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec()) + .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None), + })); + } + } + } + + let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop( + shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, + msg.payment_hash, node_signer + ) { + Ok(res) => res, + Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => { + return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code); + }, + Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => { + return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]); + }, + }; + + let next_packet_details = match next_hop { + onion_utils::Hop::Forward { + next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { + short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value + }, .. + } => { + let next_packet_pubkey = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(secp_ctx, + msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret); + NextPacketDetails { + next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_scid: short_channel_id, + outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value + } + }, + onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)), + onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } | + onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } => + { + return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]); + } + }; + + Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details))) +} + +fn check_incoming_htlc_cltv( + cur_height: u32, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, cltv_expiry: u32 +) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> { + if (cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { + return Err(( + "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", + 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry + )); + } + // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, + // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see + // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale). + if cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon + return Err(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14)); + } + if cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far + return Err(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21)); + } + // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our + // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with + // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and + // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline. + // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure + // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it, + // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our + // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments. + if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 { + return Err(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14)); + } + + Ok(()) +} + impl MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager where M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, @@ -7905,35 +8478,41 @@ where self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone() } - /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by + /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by /// [`ChannelManager`]. pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures { provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration) } - /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by + /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by /// [`ChannelManager`]. /// /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice" /// or not. Thus, this method is not public. #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))] - pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures { - provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration) + pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures { + provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration) + } + + /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by + /// [`ChannelManager`]. + fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures { + provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration) } - /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by + /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by /// [`ChannelManager`]. pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures { provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration) } - /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by + /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by /// [`ChannelManager`]. pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures { provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration) } - /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by + /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by /// [`ChannelManager`]. pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures { provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration) @@ -8464,7 +9043,128 @@ where } } -/// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by +impl +OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager +where + M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, + T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + ES::Target: EntropySource, + NS::Target: NodeSigner, + SP::Target: SignerProvider, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + R::Target: Router, + L::Target: Logger, +{ + fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option { + let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx; + let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key; + + match message { + OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => { + let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::::amount_msats( + &invoice_request + ) { + Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats), + Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())), + }; + let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) { + Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request, + Err(()) => { + let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata; + return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())); + }, + }; + let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32; + + match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) { + Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => { + let payment_paths = vec![ + self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret), + ]; + #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))] + let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys( + payment_paths, payment_hash + ); + #[cfg(feature = "no-std")] + let created_at = Duration::from_secs( + self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + ); + #[cfg(feature = "no-std")] + let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std( + payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at + ); + match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) { + Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)), + Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())), + } + }, + Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => { + let payment_paths = vec![ + self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret), + ]; + #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))] + let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash); + #[cfg(feature = "no-std")] + let created_at = Duration::from_secs( + self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + ); + #[cfg(feature = "no-std")] + let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std( + payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at + ); + let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build()) + .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into())) + .and_then(|invoice| + match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) { + Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)), + Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError( + InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string()) + )), + Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError( + InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string()) + )), + }); + match response { + Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice), + Err(error) => Some(error), + } + }, + Err(()) => { + Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into())) + }, + } + }, + OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => { + match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) { + Err(()) => { + Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned()))) + }, + Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => { + Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into())) + }, + Ok(payment_id) => { + if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e); + Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e)))) + } else { + None + } + }, + } + }, + OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error); + None + }, + } + } + + fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec> { + core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap()) + } +} + +/// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by /// [`ChannelManager`]. pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures { let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context(); @@ -8472,29 +9172,35 @@ pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures { node_features } -/// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by +/// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by /// [`ChannelManager`]. /// /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice" /// or not. Thus, this method is not public. #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))] -pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures { +pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures { + provided_init_features(config).to_context() +} + +/// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by +/// [`ChannelManager`]. +pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures { provided_init_features(config).to_context() } -/// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by +/// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by /// [`ChannelManager`]. pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures { provided_init_features(config).to_context() } -/// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by +/// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by /// [`ChannelManager`]. pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures { ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config)) } -/// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by +/// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by /// [`ChannelManager`]. pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures { // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we @@ -9405,16 +10111,16 @@ where log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.", &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number()); } - let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs, batch_funding_txid) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true); - if batch_funding_txid.is_some() { + let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true); + if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } - if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update { + if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update { close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update }); } - failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs); + failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs); channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(), user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(), @@ -10103,6 +10809,9 @@ where Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), .. } = action { if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) { + log_trace!(args.logger, + "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor", + blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()); blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()) .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone()); @@ -10114,6 +10823,9 @@ where // anymore. } } + if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action { + debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue"); + } } } peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions; @@ -10164,6 +10876,8 @@ where funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()), + pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), + entropy_source: args.entropy_source, node_signer: args.node_signer, signer_provider: args.signer_provider, @@ -10184,7 +10898,7 @@ where // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim. channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), - downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding); + downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding); } //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a @@ -10203,11 +10917,12 @@ mod tests { use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason}; use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret}; use crate::ln::ChannelId; - use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId}; + use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId}; + use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures}; use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*; use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction}; use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler; - use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route}; + use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route}; use crate::util::errors::APIError; use crate::util::test_utils; use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate}; @@ -11205,9 +11920,11 @@ mod tests { }; // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender // intended amount, we fail the payment. + let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) = - node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), - sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)) + create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), + sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat), + current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend) { assert_eq!(err_code, 19); } else { panic!(); } @@ -11223,8 +11940,10 @@ mod tests { }), custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), }; - assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), - sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok()); + let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), + sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat), + current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok()); } #[test] @@ -11234,7 +11953,8 @@ mod tests { let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]); let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr); - let result = node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { + let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { amt_msat: 100, outgoing_cltv_value: 22, payment_metadata: None, @@ -11243,7 +11963,8 @@ mod tests { payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100, }), custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), - }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None); + }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height, + node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend); // Should not return an error as this condition: // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334 @@ -11477,6 +12198,137 @@ mod tests { check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx); } } + + #[test] + fn test_peel_payment_onion() { + use super::*; + let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + + let bob = crate::sign::KeysManager::new(&[2; 32], 42, 42); + let bob_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bob.get_node_secret_key()); + let charlie = crate::sign::KeysManager::new(&[3; 32], 42, 42); + let charlie_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &charlie.get_node_secret_key()); + + let (session_priv, total_amt_msat, cur_height, recipient_onion, preimage, payment_hash, + prng_seed, hops, recipient_amount, pay_secret) = payment_onion_args(bob_pk, charlie_pk); + + let path = Path { + hops: hops, + blinded_tail: None, + }; + + let (amount_msat, cltv_expiry, onion) = create_payment_onion( + &secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_amt_msat, recipient_onion, cur_height, + payment_hash, Some(preimage), prng_seed + ).unwrap(); + + let msg = make_update_add_msg(amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, onion); + let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("bob".to_string()); + + let peeled = peel_payment_onion(&msg, &&bob, &&logger, &secp_ctx, cur_height, true) + .map_err(|e| e.msg).unwrap(); + + let next_onion = match peeled.routing { + PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: _ } => { + onion_packet + }, + _ => panic!("expected a forwarded onion"), + }; + + let msg2 = make_update_add_msg(amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, next_onion); + let peeled2 = peel_payment_onion(&msg2, &&charlie, &&logger, &secp_ctx, cur_height, true) + .map_err(|e| e.msg).unwrap(); + + match peeled2.routing { + PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, .. } => { + assert_eq!(payment_preimage, preimage); + assert_eq!(peeled2.outgoing_amt_msat, recipient_amount); + assert_eq!(incoming_cltv_expiry, peeled2.outgoing_cltv_value); + let msgs::FinalOnionHopData{total_msat, payment_secret} = payment_data.unwrap(); + assert_eq!(total_msat, total_amt_msat); + assert_eq!(payment_secret, pay_secret); + }, + _ => panic!("expected a received keysend"), + }; + } + + fn make_update_add_msg( + amount_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, payment_hash: PaymentHash, + onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket + ) -> msgs::UpdateAddHTLC { + msgs::UpdateAddHTLC { + channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([0; 32]), + htlc_id: 0, + amount_msat, + cltv_expiry, + payment_hash, + onion_routing_packet, + skimmed_fee_msat: None, + } + } + + fn payment_onion_args(hop_pk: PublicKey, recipient_pk: PublicKey) -> ( + SecretKey, u64, u32, RecipientOnionFields, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, [u8; 32], + Vec, u64, PaymentSecret, + ) { + let session_priv_bytes = [42; 32]; + let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes).unwrap(); + let total_amt_msat = 1000; + let cur_height = 1000; + let pay_secret = PaymentSecret([99; 32]); + let recipient_onion = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(pay_secret); + let preimage_bytes = [43; 32]; + let preimage = PaymentPreimage(preimage_bytes); + let rhash_bytes = Sha256::hash(&preimage_bytes).into_inner(); + let payment_hash = PaymentHash(rhash_bytes); + let prng_seed = [44; 32]; + + // make a route alice -> bob -> charlie + let hop_fee = 1; + let recipient_amount = total_amt_msat - hop_fee; + let hops = vec![ + RouteHop { + pubkey: hop_pk, + fee_msat: hop_fee, + cltv_expiry_delta: 42, + short_channel_id: 1, + node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), + channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(), + maybe_announced_channel: false, + }, + RouteHop { + pubkey: recipient_pk, + fee_msat: recipient_amount, + cltv_expiry_delta: 42, + short_channel_id: 2, + node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), + channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(), + maybe_announced_channel: false, + } + ]; + + (session_priv, total_amt_msat, cur_height, recipient_onion, preimage, payment_hash, + prng_seed, hops, recipient_amount, pay_secret) + } + + pub fn create_payment_onion( + secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, path: &Path, session_priv: &SecretKey, total_msat: u64, + recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, best_block_height: u32, payment_hash: PaymentHash, + keysend_preimage: Option, prng_seed: [u8; 32] + ) -> Result<(u64, u32, msgs::OnionPacket), ()> { + let onion_keys = super::onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv).map_err(|_| ())?; + let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = super::onion_utils::build_onion_payloads( + &path, + total_msat, + recipient_onion, + best_block_height + 1, + &keysend_preimage, + ).map_err(|_| ())?; + let onion_packet = super::onion_utils::construct_onion_packet( + onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash + )?; + Ok((htlc_msat, htlc_cltv, onion_packet)) + } } #[cfg(ldk_bench)] @@ -11641,7 +12493,7 @@ pub mod bench { macro_rules! send_payment { ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => { let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV) - .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap(); + .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap(); let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]); payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes()); payment_count += 1;