X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannelmanager.rs;h=d47eba0539bf3438b21c70447d77aee3bf6a2200;hb=d73711104482c78d501a5ea47a39b466585ca34d;hp=600702dfcb6413e9ef29383fff1515dd7836bca8;hpb=236887da76ab4ed7457afde133116400a57e5db3;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index 600702df..d47eba05 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -1,43 +1,56 @@ +// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control +// history. +// +// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 or the MIT license +// , at your option. +// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these +// licenses. + //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here. //! //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s). //! -//! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing +//! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages). +//! use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader; -use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction; use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block; use bitcoin::network::constants::Network; -use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash; - -use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine}; -use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine}; -use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; -use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash; -use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq; -use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey}; -use secp256k1::Secp256k1; -use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret; -use secp256k1; - -use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator}; -use chain::transaction::OutPoint; +use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine}; +use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine}; +use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; +use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash; +use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq; +use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash; + +use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey}; +use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1; +use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret; +use bitcoin::secp256k1; + +use chain; +use chain::Watch; +use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator}; +use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID}; +use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData}; use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError}; -use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY}; use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures}; -use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop}; +use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop}; use ln::msgs; +use ln::msgs::NetAddress; use ln::onion_utils; -use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError}; +use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField}; use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemoryChannelKeys}; use util::config::UserConfig; +use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider}; use util::{byte_utils, events}; -use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer}; +use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer}; use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader}; use util::logger::Logger; use util::errors::APIError; @@ -50,6 +63,7 @@ use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering}; use std::time::Duration; use std::marker::{Sync, Send}; use std::ops::Deref; +use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex; // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself: // @@ -76,6 +90,7 @@ enum PendingHTLCRouting { }, Receive { payment_data: Option, + incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed }, } @@ -103,9 +118,15 @@ pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus { pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo { AddHTLC { + forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo, + + // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in + // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the + // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded + // HTLCs. prev_short_channel_id: u64, prev_htlc_id: u64, - forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo, + prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, }, FailHTLC { htlc_id: u64, @@ -115,10 +136,14 @@ pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo { /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] -pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData { +pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64, incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32], + + // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards + // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel. + outpoint: OutPoint, } struct ClaimableHTLC { @@ -129,11 +154,12 @@ struct ClaimableHTLC { /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which /// are part of the same payment. payment_data: Option, + cltv_expiry: u32, } /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] -pub(super) enum HTLCSource { +pub(crate) enum HTLCSource { PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData), OutboundRoute { path: Vec, @@ -166,12 +192,15 @@ pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason { } /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop +/// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]); /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop +/// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]); /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together +/// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]); @@ -189,14 +218,14 @@ struct MsgHandleErrInternal { } impl MsgHandleErrInternal { #[inline] - fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self { + fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self { Self { err: LightningError { - err, + err: err.clone(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, - data: err.to_string() + data: err }, }, }, @@ -204,7 +233,7 @@ impl MsgHandleErrInternal { } } #[inline] - fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self { + fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self { Self { err: LightningError { err, @@ -218,14 +247,14 @@ impl MsgHandleErrInternal { Self { err, shutdown_finish: None } } #[inline] - fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option) -> Self { + fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option) -> Self { Self { err: LightningError { - err, + err: err.clone(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, - data: err.to_string() + data: err }, }, }, @@ -241,20 +270,20 @@ impl MsgHandleErrInternal { action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError, }, ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError { - err: msg, + err: msg.clone(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, - data: msg.to_string() + data: msg }, }, }, - ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => LightningError { - err: msg, + ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError { + err: msg.clone(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, - data: msg.to_string() + data: msg }, }, }, @@ -296,12 +325,10 @@ pub(super) struct ChannelHolder { /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you /// go to read them! - /// TODO: We need to time out HTLCs sitting here which are waiting on other AMP HTLCs to - /// arrive. claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option), Vec>, /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict). - pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec, + pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec, } /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold @@ -320,7 +347,7 @@ const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assum /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the /// concrete type of the KeysManager. -pub type SimpleArcChannelManager = Arc, Arc, Arc, Arc>>; +pub type SimpleArcChannelManager = Arc, Arc, Arc, Arc, Arc>>; /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't @@ -330,7 +357,7 @@ pub type SimpleArcChannelManager = Arc = ChannelManager; +pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager; /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately. @@ -345,7 +372,7 @@ pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, M, T, F> = ChannelManager = ChannelManager - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, +pub struct ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, { default_configuration: UserConfig, - genesis_hash: Sha256dHash, + genesis_hash: BlockHash, fee_estimator: F, - monitor: M, + chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, #[cfg(test)] pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize, #[cfg(not(test))] latest_block_height: AtomicUsize, - last_block_hash: Mutex, + last_block_hash: Mutex, secp_ctx: Secp256k1, - #[cfg(test)] + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))] pub(super) channel_state: Mutex>, - #[cfg(not(test))] + #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))] channel_state: Mutex>, our_network_key: SecretKey, @@ -413,7 +441,7 @@ pub struct ChannelManager, + logger: L, } /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when @@ -447,6 +475,7 @@ const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_P const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER; /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels +#[derive(Clone)] pub struct ChannelDetails { /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes, /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output). @@ -519,7 +548,7 @@ pub enum PaymentSendFailure { } macro_rules! handle_error { - ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => { + ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { match $internal { Ok(msg) => Ok(msg), Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => { @@ -541,11 +570,11 @@ macro_rules! handle_error { } } - log_error!($self, "{}", err.err); + log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err); if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action { } else { msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { - node_id: $their_node_id, + node_id: $counterparty_node_id, action: err.action.clone() }); } @@ -569,13 +598,14 @@ macro_rules! break_chan_entry { break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone())) }, Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => { - log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg); + log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg); let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry(); if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() { $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id); } - break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok())) }, - Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); } + break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok())) + }, + Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); } } } } @@ -588,29 +618,19 @@ macro_rules! try_chan_entry { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone())) }, Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => { - log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg); + log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg); let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry(); if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() { $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id); } return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok())) }, - Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => { - log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg); + Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => { + log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg); let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry(); if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() { $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id); } - if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) { - match e { - // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save - // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able - // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't - // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds. - ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {}, - ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {}, - } - } let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false); return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok())) } @@ -625,7 +645,7 @@ macro_rules! handle_monitor_err { ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { match $err { ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => { - log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..])); + log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..])); let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry(); if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() { $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id); @@ -639,11 +659,11 @@ macro_rules! handle_monitor_err { // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees. - let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok())); + let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok())); res }, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => { - log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails", + log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa { match $action_type { @@ -662,7 +682,7 @@ macro_rules! handle_monitor_err { debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment); } $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails); - Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key())) + Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$entry.key())) }, } } @@ -689,11 +709,12 @@ macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err { } } -impl ChannelManager - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, +impl ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, { /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. /// @@ -709,18 +730,14 @@ impl ChannelMan /// /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. - /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register - /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's - /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one - /// go. - pub fn new(network: Network, fee_est: F, monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: Arc, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result, secp256k1::Error> { + pub fn new(network: Network, fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Self { let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); - let res = ChannelManager { + ChannelManager { default_configuration: config.clone(), - genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(), + genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(), fee_estimator: fee_est, - monitor, + chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height), @@ -746,9 +763,7 @@ impl ChannelMan keys_manager, logger, - }; - - Ok(res) + } } /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value. @@ -765,19 +780,19 @@ impl ChannelMan /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000. pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option) -> Result<(), APIError> { if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 { - return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" }); + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) }); } let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration }; - let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), config)?; - let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.fee_estimator); + let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?; + let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone()); - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") { - return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" }); + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() }); } else { panic!("RNG is bad???"); } @@ -801,7 +816,7 @@ impl ChannelMan res.push(ChannelDetails { channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(), short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(), - remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), + remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(), channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(), inbound_capacity_msat, @@ -827,7 +842,7 @@ impl ChannelMan } /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to - /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used. + /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used. /// /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are. @@ -844,7 +859,7 @@ impl ChannelMan /// /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed. pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); @@ -853,7 +868,7 @@ impl ChannelMan hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => { let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?; channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { - node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(), + node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), msg: shutdown_msg }); if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() { @@ -863,7 +878,7 @@ impl ChannelMan (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1)) } else { (failed_htlcs, None) } }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"}) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()}) } }; for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) { @@ -888,7 +903,7 @@ impl ChannelMan #[inline] fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) { let (funding_txo_option, monitor_update, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res; - log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len()); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len()); for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) { self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }); } @@ -897,14 +912,14 @@ impl ChannelMan // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to // ignore the result here. - let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(funding_txo, monitor_update); + let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update); } } /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); let mut chan = { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); @@ -918,7 +933,7 @@ impl ChannelMan return; } }; - log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..])); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..])); self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true)); if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) { let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); @@ -940,7 +955,7 @@ impl ChannelMan macro_rules! return_malformed_err { ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => { { - log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); + log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC { channel_id: msg.channel_id, htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, @@ -983,7 +998,7 @@ impl ChannelMan macro_rules! return_err { ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => { { - log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); + log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); } @@ -1039,7 +1054,11 @@ impl ChannelMan // OUR PAYMENT! // final_expiry_too_soon - if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 { + // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least + // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go. + // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward + // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational). + if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 { return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]); } // final_incorrect_htlc_amount @@ -1063,7 +1082,10 @@ impl ChannelMan // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed! PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { - routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data }, + routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { + payment_data, + incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry, + }, payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(), incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret, amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward, @@ -1116,7 +1138,7 @@ impl ChannelMan PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet: outgoing_packet, - short_channel_id: short_channel_id, + short_channel_id, }, payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(), incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret, @@ -1149,10 +1171,10 @@ impl ChannelMan if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))); } - if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum + if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))); } - let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) }); + let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) }); if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))); } @@ -1160,13 +1182,20 @@ impl ChannelMan break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))); } let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1; - // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration - if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon + // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty + // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational) + if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))); } if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None)); } + // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS. + // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay. + if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 { + break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap()))); + } + break None; } { @@ -1179,7 +1208,8 @@ impl ChannelMan res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry)); } else if code == 0x1000 | 20 { - res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags)); + // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791 + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0)); } res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]); } @@ -1195,20 +1225,21 @@ impl ChannelMan /// May be called with channel_state already locked! fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result { let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() { - None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}), + None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}), Some(id) => id, }; - let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..]; + let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..]; let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { chain_hash: self.genesis_hash, - short_channel_id: short_channel_id, + short_channel_id, timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(), - flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1), + flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1), cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, - htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(), - fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator), + htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(), + htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()), + fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator), fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(), excess_data: Vec::new(), }; @@ -1222,6 +1253,81 @@ impl ChannelMan }) } + // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly + pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id); + let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); + let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..]).expect("RNG is busted"); + + let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv) + .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?; + let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?; + if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) { + return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"}); + } + let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash); + + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + + let err: Result<(), _> = loop { + let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) { + None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}), + Some(id) => id.clone(), + }; + + let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; + if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) { + match { + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey { + return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"}); + } + if !chan.get().is_live() { + return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()}); + } + break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { + path: path.clone(), + session_priv: session_priv.clone(), + first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat, + }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan) + } { + Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => { + if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true); + // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs) + // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating + // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that + // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the + // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below. + return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed); + } + + channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { + node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey, + updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { + update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add], + update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(), + update_fee: None, + commitment_signed, + }, + }); + }, + None => {}, + } + } else { unreachable!(); } + return Ok(()); + }; + + match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) { + Ok(_) => unreachable!(), + Err(e) => { + Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err }) + }, + } + } + /// Sends a payment along a given route. /// /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop @@ -1294,89 +1400,8 @@ impl ChannelMan let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1; let mut results = Vec::new(); - 'path_loop: for path in route.paths.iter() { - macro_rules! check_res_push { - ($res: expr) => { match $res { - Ok(r) => r, - Err(e) => { - results.push(Err(e)); - continue 'path_loop; - }, - } - } - } - - log_trace!(self, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id); - let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand(); - - let onion_keys = check_res_push!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv) - .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})); - let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = check_res_push!(onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)); - if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) { - check_res_push!(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"})); - } - let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash); - - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - - let err: Result<(), _> = loop { - let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); - let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) { - None => check_res_push!(Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"})), - Some(id) => id.clone(), - }; - - let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; - if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) { - match { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey { - check_res_push!(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"})); - } - if !chan.get().is_live() { - check_res_push!(Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"})); - } - break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { - path: path.clone(), - session_priv: session_priv.clone(), - first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat, - }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan) - } { - Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => { - if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { - maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true); - // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs) - // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating - // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that - // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the - // next check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below. - check_res_push!(Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed)); - } - - channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey, - updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { - update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add], - update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fee: None, - commitment_signed, - }, - }); - }, - None => {}, - } - } else { unreachable!(); } - results.push(Ok(())); - continue 'path_loop; - }; - - match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) { - Ok(_) => unreachable!(), - Err(e) => { - check_res_push!(Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })); - }, - } + for path in route.paths.iter() { + results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height)); } let mut has_ok = false; let mut has_err = false; @@ -1410,12 +1435,12 @@ impl ChannelMan /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel). pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = { + let (chan, msg) = { let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) { Some(mut chan) => { - (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo) + (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo, &self.logger) .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e { MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None) } else { unreachable!(); }) @@ -1423,37 +1448,18 @@ impl ChannelMan }, None => return }; - match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) { + match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) { Ok(funding_msg) => { - (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1) + (chan, funding_msg) }, Err(_) => { return; } } }; - // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state - // lock before add_monitor - if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) { - match e { - ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => { - match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), None)), chan.get_their_node_id()) { - Err(_) => { return; }, - Ok(()) => unreachable!(), - } - }, - ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => { - // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor - // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe - // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not, - // in fact, safe). - chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new()); - }, - } - } let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { - node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(), - msg: msg, + node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), + msg, }); match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { @@ -1467,7 +1473,7 @@ impl ChannelMan fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option { if !chan.should_announce() { - log_trace!(self, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id())); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id())); return None } @@ -1491,7 +1497,7 @@ impl ChannelMan // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB // message... - const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (msgs::NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2; + const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2; #[deny(const_err)] #[allow(dead_code)] // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is @@ -1511,15 +1517,15 @@ impl ChannelMan /// only Tor Onion addresses. /// /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500). - pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec) { + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); if addresses.len() > 500 { panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!"); } let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement { - features: NodeFeatures::supported(), + features: NodeFeatures::known(), timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32, node_id: self.get_our_node_id(), rgb, alias, addresses, @@ -1542,7 +1548,7 @@ impl ChannelMan /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event. /// Will likely generate further events. pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); let mut new_events = Vec::new(); let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new(); @@ -1559,9 +1565,11 @@ impl ChannelMan failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len()); for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) { match forward_info { - HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => { + HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info, + prev_funding_outpoint } => { let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, + outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret, }); @@ -1588,17 +1596,19 @@ impl ChannelMan HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo { routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. - }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, } => { - log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id); + }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, + prev_funding_outpoint } => { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id); let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, + outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, }); match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) { Err(e) => { if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e { - log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg); } else { panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met"); } @@ -1628,11 +1638,11 @@ impl ChannelMan panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward"); }, HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => { - log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id); match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) { Err(e) => { if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e { - log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg); } else { panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met"); } @@ -1658,36 +1668,36 @@ impl ChannelMan } if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() { - let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() { + let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) { Ok(res) => res, Err(e) => { // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case // close channel and then send error message to peer. - let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id(); + let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(); let err: Result<(), _> = match e { ChannelError::Ignore(_) => { panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met"); }, ChannelError::Close(msg) => { - log_trace!(self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg); let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry(); if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id); } Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok())) }, - ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); } + ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); } }; - handle_errors.push((their_node_id, err)); + handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err)); continue; } }; - if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { - handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))); + if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))); continue; } channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(), + node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs, update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), @@ -1705,10 +1715,12 @@ impl ChannelMan for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) { match forward_info { HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo { - routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data }, - incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, } => { + routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry }, + incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, + prev_funding_outpoint } => { let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, + outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, }; @@ -1722,6 +1734,7 @@ impl ChannelMan prev_hop, value: amt_to_forward, payment_data: payment_data.clone(), + cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry, }); if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { for htlc in htlcs.iter() { @@ -1742,6 +1755,7 @@ impl ChannelMan ); failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id, + outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret, }), payment_hash, @@ -1750,14 +1764,14 @@ impl ChannelMan } } else if total_value == data.total_msat { new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived { - payment_hash: payment_hash, + payment_hash, payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret), amt: total_value, }); } } else { new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived { - payment_hash: payment_hash, + payment_hash, payment_secret: None, amt: amt_to_forward, }); @@ -1779,8 +1793,8 @@ impl ChannelMan self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason); } - for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) { - let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id); + for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) { + let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id); } if new_events.is_empty() { return } @@ -1794,7 +1808,7 @@ impl ChannelMan /// /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute. pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() { @@ -1819,7 +1833,7 @@ impl ChannelMan /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the /// HTLC backwards has been started. pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option) -> bool { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret)); @@ -1838,6 +1852,44 @@ impl ChannelMan } else { false } } + // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be + // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to + // be surfaced to the user. + fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) { + for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) { + match htlc_src { + HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => { + let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = + match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => { + if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) { + (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len()) + } else { + (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) + } + }, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) + }; + let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state, + htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data}); + }, + HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => { + self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push( + events::Event::PaymentFailed { + payment_hash, + rejected_by_dest: false, +#[cfg(test)] + error_code: None, +#[cfg(test)] + error_data: None, + } + ) + }, + }; + } + } + /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us. /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here. /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes @@ -1851,7 +1903,7 @@ impl ChannelMan //timer handling. match source { HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => { - log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); mem::drop(channel_state_lock); match &onion_error { &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => { @@ -1888,7 +1940,7 @@ impl ChannelMan .. } => { // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary - // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route + // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via // ChannelDetails. // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the @@ -1906,15 +1958,15 @@ impl ChannelMan } } }, - HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => { + HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => { let err_packet = match onion_error { HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => { - log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code); let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode(); onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet) }, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => { - log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data) } }; @@ -1960,7 +2012,7 @@ impl ChannelMan pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option, expected_amount: u64) -> bool { let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()); - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret)); @@ -2012,13 +2064,13 @@ impl ChannelMan if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action { // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain). - log_error!(self, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err); + log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err); claimed_any_htlcs = true; } else { errs.push(e); } }, Err(None) if is_mpp => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"), Err(None) => { - log_warn!(self, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed."); + log_warn!(self.logger, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed."); }, Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true, } @@ -2029,9 +2081,9 @@ impl ChannelMan // which were generated. channel_state.take(); - for (their_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) { + for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) { let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err); - let _ = handle_error!(self, res, their_node_id); + let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id); } claimed_any_htlcs @@ -2050,20 +2102,20 @@ impl ChannelMan if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) { let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update(); - match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage) { + match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) { Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => { if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option { - if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { if was_frozen_for_monitor { assert!(msgs.is_none()); } else { - return Err(Some((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err()))); + return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err()))); } } } if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(), + node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg], @@ -2101,19 +2153,30 @@ impl ChannelMan }); }, HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => { - if let Err((their_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) { + let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint; + if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) { Ok(()) => Ok(()), Err(None) => { - // TODO: There is probably a channel monitor somewhere that needs to - // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's - // why it's missing. + let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate { + update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID, + updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { + payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(), + }], + }; + // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after + // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the + // event being update_fulfill_htlc). + if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) { + log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}", + payment_preimage, e); + } Ok(()) }, Err(Some(res)) => Err(res), } { mem::drop(channel_state_lock); let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err); - let _ = handle_error!(self, res, their_node_id); + let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id); } }, } @@ -2137,7 +2200,7 @@ impl ChannelMan /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls. /// /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level: - /// 1) You register a ManyChannelMonitor with this ChannelManager, + /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager, /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures /// any time it cannot do so instantly, @@ -2145,7 +2208,7 @@ impl ChannelMan /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled. pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); let mut close_results = Vec::new(); let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new(); @@ -2165,16 +2228,16 @@ impl ChannelMan return; } - let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(); + let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger); if !pending_forwards.is_empty() { - htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards)); + htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), funding_txo.clone(), pending_forwards)); } htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures); macro_rules! handle_cs { () => { if let Some(update) = commitment_update { pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), updates: update, }); } @@ -2182,7 +2245,7 @@ impl ChannelMan macro_rules! handle_raa { () => { if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa { pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { - node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg: revoke_and_ack, }); } @@ -2205,12 +2268,12 @@ impl ChannelMan } if let Some(msg) = funding_locked { pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { - node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg, }); if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) { pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { - node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg: announcement_sigs, }); } @@ -2230,20 +2293,20 @@ impl ChannelMan } } - fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())); + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())); } - let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration) + let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration) .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?; let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg: channel.get_accept_channel(), }); entry.insert(channel); @@ -2252,55 +2315,55 @@ impl ChannelMan Ok(()) } - fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let (value, output_script, user_id) = { let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id)); + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id)); } try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan); (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id()) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id)) } }; let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id, channel_value_satoshis: value, - output_script: output_script, + output_script, user_channel_id: user_id, }); Ok(()) } - fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = { + fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = { let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id)); + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id)); } - (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove()) + (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove()) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id)) } }; // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state - // lock before add_monitor - if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + // lock before watch_channel + if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) { match e { ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => { // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway. - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), None)); + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), None)); }, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => { // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor @@ -2315,11 +2378,11 @@ impl ChannelMan let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id)) + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id)) }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg: funding_msg, }); e.insert(chan); @@ -2328,52 +2391,46 @@ impl ChannelMan Ok(()) } - fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let (funding_txo, user_id) = { let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } - let monitor_update = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg) { - Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan), - Err((Some(monitor_update), e)) => { - assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update()); - let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update); - try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan); - unreachable!(); - }, + let monitor = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, &self.logger) { Ok(update) => update, + Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan), }; - if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) { return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false); } (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id()) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } }; let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { - funding_txo: funding_txo, + funding_txo, user_channel_id: user_id, }); Ok(()) } - fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan); if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) { - log_trace!(self, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking @@ -2384,36 +2441,36 @@ impl ChannelMan // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network. channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg: announcement_sigs, }); } Ok(()) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } } - fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => { - if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry); if let Some(msg) = shutdown { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg, }); } if let Some(msg) = closing_signed { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg, }); } @@ -2424,7 +2481,7 @@ impl ChannelMan (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1)) } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) } }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } }; for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) { @@ -2441,19 +2498,19 @@ impl ChannelMan Ok(()) } - fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let (tx, chan_option) = { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => { - if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry); if let Some(msg) = closing_signed { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg, }); } @@ -2469,11 +2526,11 @@ impl ChannelMan (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1)) } else { (tx, None) } }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } }; if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx { - log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx)); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx)); self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx); } if let Some(chan) = chan_option { @@ -2487,7 +2544,7 @@ impl ChannelMan Ok(()) } - fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack. @@ -2497,135 +2554,143 @@ impl ChannelMan //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that, //but we should prevent it anyway. - let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg); + let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } - if !chan.get().is_usable() { + + let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| { + // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a + // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC. + assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0); // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close, // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding. - if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info { - let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()); - pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { - channel_id: msg.channel_id, - htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, - reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update { - // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing - // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply - // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled. - // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be - // allowed. - onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{ + match pending_forward_info { + PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => { + let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) { + onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{ let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128); - res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags)); - res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]); + // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791 + res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0)); + res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]); res }[..]) } else { - // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded - // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments - // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should - // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no - // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer - onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[]) - }, - })); + // The only case where we'd be unable to + // successfully get a channel update is if the + // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet, + // implying our counterparty is trying to route + // payments over the channel back to themselves + // (cause no one else should know the short_id + // is a lightning channel yet). We should have + // no problem just calling this + // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10). + onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[]) + }; + let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { + channel_id: msg.channel_id, + htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, + reason + }; + PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg)) + }, + _ => pending_forward_info } - } - try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan); + }; + try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan); }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } Ok(()) } - fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let htlc_source = { let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } }; self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone()); Ok(()) } - fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan); }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } Ok(()) } - fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 { - let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set"); + let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned()); try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan); } try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan); Ok(()) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } } - fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) = - match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator) { - Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan), - Err((Some(update), e)) => { - assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update()); - let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update); - try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan); - unreachable!(); - }, - Ok(res) => res - }; - if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) { + Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan), + Err((Some(update), e)) => { + assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update()); + let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update); + try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan); + unreachable!(); + }, + Ok(res) => res + }; + if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()); //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration } channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg: revoke_and_ack, }); if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), @@ -2638,19 +2703,19 @@ impl ChannelMan } if let Some(msg) = closing_signed { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg, }); } Ok(()) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } } #[inline] - fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) { - for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards { + fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) { + for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards { let mut forward_event = None; if !pending_forwards.is_empty() { let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); @@ -2663,10 +2728,12 @@ impl ChannelMan PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0, }) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { - entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }); + entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, + prev_htlc_id, forward_info }); }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { - entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info })); + entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, + prev_htlc_id, forward_info })); } } } @@ -2683,77 +2750,86 @@ impl ChannelMan } } - fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = { + fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new(); + let res = loop { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update(); - let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update) = - try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan); - if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) = + break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan); + htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in; + if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { if was_frozen_for_monitor { assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty()); - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA")); + break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned())); } else { - return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures); + if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) { + break Err(e); + } else { unreachable!(); } } } if let Some(updates) = commitment_update { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), updates, }); } if let Some(msg) = closing_signed { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg, }); } - (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel")) + break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap())) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } }; - for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) { - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2); + self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id); + match res { + Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => { + for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) { + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2); + } + self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]); + Ok(()) + }, + Err(e) => Err(e) } - self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]); - - Ok(()) } - fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan); }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } Ok(()) } - fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } if !chan.get().is_usable() { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError})); + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError})); } let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id(); @@ -2762,10 +2838,21 @@ impl ChannelMan let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id; let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]); - if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() || - self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() { - let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature"); - try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan); + { + let their_node_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }; + let their_bitcoin_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }; + match (self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, their_node_key), + self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, their_bitcoin_key)) { + (Err(e), _) => { + let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature: {:?}. Maybe using different node_secret for transport and routing msg? UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", e, &announcement, their_node_key)); + try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan); + }, + (_, Err(e)) => { + let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature: {:?}. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})", e, &announcement, their_bitcoin_key)); + try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan); + }, + _ => {} + } } let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key); @@ -2781,24 +2868,28 @@ impl ChannelMan update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state }); }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } Ok(()) } - fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id)); + if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)); } + // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer + // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell + // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending + // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here. let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) = - try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan); + try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan); if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt { - if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane. @@ -2814,14 +2905,14 @@ impl ChannelMan } if let Some(msg) = funding_locked { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg }); } macro_rules! send_raa { () => { if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg }); } @@ -2829,7 +2920,7 @@ impl ChannelMan macro_rules! send_cu { () => { if let Some(updates) = commitment_update { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), updates }); } @@ -2846,13 +2937,13 @@ impl ChannelMan } if let Some(msg) = shutdown { channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { - node_id: their_node_id.clone(), + node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg, }); } Ok(()) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) } } @@ -2860,35 +2951,36 @@ impl ChannelMan /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards. /// Note: This API is likely to change! + /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway #[doc(hidden)] - pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let their_node_id; + pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> { + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let counterparty_node_id; let err: Result<(), _> = loop { let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock; match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) { - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}), + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}), hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { if !chan.get().is_outbound() { - return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"}); + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()}); } if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed); } if !chan.get().is_live() { - return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"}); + return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()}); } - their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id(); + counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(); if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) = - break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan) + break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan) { - if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { + if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) { unimplemented!(); } channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(), + node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), @@ -2904,35 +2996,66 @@ impl ChannelMan return Ok(()) }; - match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) { + match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) { Ok(_) => unreachable!(), Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })} } } + + /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`. + fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) { + let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); + { + for monitor_event in self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events() { + match monitor_event { + MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => { + if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0)); + self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage); + } else { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0)); + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }); + } + }, + MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => { + let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); + let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; + let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id; + let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id; + let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; + if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) { + if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() { + short_to_id.remove(&short_id); + } + failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false)); + if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { + msg: update + }); + } + } + }, + } + } + } + + for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) { + self.finish_force_close_channel(failure); + } + } } -impl events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, +impl MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, { - fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec { - // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a - // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on - // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events! - { - //TODO: This behavior should be documented. - for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() { - if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage { - log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0)); - self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage); - } else { - log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0)); - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }); - } - } - } + fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec { + //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query + // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events. + self.process_pending_monitor_events(); let mut ret = Vec::new(); let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); @@ -2941,28 +3064,17 @@ impl events::Me } } -impl events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, +impl EventsProvider for ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, { - fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec { - // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a - // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on - // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events! - { - //TODO: This behavior should be documented. - for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() { - if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage { - log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0)); - self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage); - } else { - log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0)); - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }); - } - } - } + fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec { + //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query + // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events. + self.process_pending_monitor_events(); let mut ret = Vec::new(); let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); @@ -2971,52 +3083,63 @@ impl events::Ev } } -impl - ChainListener for ChannelManager - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, +impl ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, { - fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) { - let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash(); - log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len()); - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + /// Updates channel state based on transactions seen in a connected block. + pub fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) { + let header_hash = header.block_hash(); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Block {} at height {} connected", header_hash, height); + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); + let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new(); { let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock; let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id; let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events; channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| { - let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched); - if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { - node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), - msg: funding_locked, - }); - if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) { - log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { - node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), - msg: announcement_sigs, + let res = channel.block_connected(header, txdata, height); + if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res { + for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) { + let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe + timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { + failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now + data: chan_update, + })); + } + if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res { + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + msg: funding_locked, }); - } else { - log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); + if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); + pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + msg: announcement_sigs, + }); + } else { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); + } + short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id()); } - short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id()); - } else if let Err(e) = chan_res { + } else if let Err(e) = res { pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { - node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(), + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e }, }); return false; } if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() { - for tx in txn_matched { + for &(_, tx) in txdata.iter() { for inp in tx.input.iter() { if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() { - log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id())); if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { short_to_id.remove(&short_id); } @@ -3034,27 +3157,35 @@ impl= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER { + let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec(); + htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height)); + timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason { + failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, + data: htlc_msat_height_data + })); + false + } else { true } + }); + !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry. + }); } for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) { self.finish_force_close_channel(failure); } + + for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) { + self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason); + } self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release); *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash; loop { @@ -3071,9 +3202,12 @@ impl - ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, +impl + ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, { - fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) { + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) { + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) { + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) { + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) { + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) { + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) { + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) { + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) { + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) { + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) { + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) { + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) { + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) { + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) { + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); - let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id); + fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) { + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) { + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); let mut failed_payments = Vec::new(); let mut no_channels_remain = true; @@ -3203,9 +3338,9 @@ impl node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, - &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true, &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true, &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true, - &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id, + &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id, &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true, } }); } if no_channels_remain { - self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(their_node_id); + self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id); } for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) { @@ -3277,14 +3416,14 @@ impl { e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState { latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(), @@ -3300,7 +3439,7 @@ impl { + &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => { 1u8.write(writer)?; payment_data.write(writer)?; + incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?; }, } self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?; @@ -3368,6 +3508,7 @@ impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo { }, 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?, + incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?, }, _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), }, @@ -3433,6 +3574,7 @@ impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus { impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, { short_channel_id, + outpoint, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }); @@ -3440,7 +3582,8 @@ impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, { impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, { prev_hop, value, - payment_data + payment_data, + cltv_expiry }); impl Writeable for HTLCSource { @@ -3508,9 +3651,10 @@ impl Readable for HTLCFailReason { impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo { fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { match self { - &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => { + &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_funding_outpoint, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => { 0u8.write(writer)?; prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?; + prev_funding_outpoint.write(writer)?; prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?; forward_info.write(writer)?; }, @@ -3529,6 +3673,7 @@ impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo { match ::read(reader)? { 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?, + prev_funding_outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?, prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?, forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?, }), @@ -3541,14 +3686,15 @@ impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo { } } -impl Writeable for ChannelManager - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, +impl Writeable for ChannelManager + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, { fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { - let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap(); + let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap(); writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?; writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?; @@ -3597,6 +3743,12 @@ impl - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, +pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, { - /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during /// deserialization. pub keys_manager: K, @@ -3633,12 +3784,12 @@ pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: /// /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization. pub fee_estimator: F, - /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future. + /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future. /// - /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that + /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your - /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager. - pub monitor: M, + /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager. + pub chain_monitor: M, /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be @@ -3646,7 +3797,7 @@ pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: pub tx_broadcaster: T, /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during /// deserialization. - pub logger: Arc, + pub logger: L, /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized. pub default_config: UserConfig, @@ -3661,41 +3812,65 @@ pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: /// /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in /// this struct. - pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap>, + /// + /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings + pub channel_monitors: HashMap>, +} + +impl<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> + ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L> + where M::Target: chain::Watch, + T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + K::Target: KeysInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, + { + /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor + /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to + /// populate a HashMap directly from C. + pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig, + mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor>) -> Self { + Self { + keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config, + channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect() + } + } } // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the // SipmleArcChannelManager type: -impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> - ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, Arc>) - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, +impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> + ReadableArgs> for (BlockHash, Arc>) + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, { - fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>) -> Result { - let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)?; + fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result { + let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)?; Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager))) } } -impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> - ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager) - where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor, +impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> + ReadableArgs> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager) + where M::Target: chain::Watch, T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, K::Target: KeysInterface, F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, { - fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>) -> Result { + fn read(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result { let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?; let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?; if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION { return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion); } - let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?; + let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?; let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?; + let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?; let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new(); @@ -3704,7 +3879,7 @@ impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: De let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); for _ in 0..channel_count { - let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?; + let mut channel: Channel = Readable::read(reader)?; if channel.last_block_connected != Default::default() && channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } @@ -3712,20 +3887,20 @@ impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: De let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?; funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone()); if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) { - if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() || - channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() || - channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() || + if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() || + channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() || + channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() { // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue: return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); - } else if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() || - channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() || - channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() || + } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() || + channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() || + channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() { // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel: let (_, _, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true); failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs); - monitor.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster); + monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger); } else { if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() { short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id()); @@ -3739,16 +3914,17 @@ impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: De for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() { if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) { - monitor.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster); + monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger); } } + const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64; let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128)); for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count { let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?; let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128)); + let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::())); for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count { pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?); } @@ -3760,7 +3936,7 @@ impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: De for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count { let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?; let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2)); + let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::())); for _ in 0..previous_hops_len { previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?); } @@ -3768,7 +3944,7 @@ impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: De } let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, 128)); + let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex)>())); for _ in 0..peer_count { let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?; let peer_state = PeerState { @@ -3777,12 +3953,21 @@ impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: De per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state)); } + let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut pending_events_read: Vec = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::())); + for _ in 0..event_count { + match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? { + Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event), + None => continue, + } + } + let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; let channel_manager = ChannelManager { genesis_hash, fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator, - monitor: args.monitor, + chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster, latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize), @@ -3802,7 +3987,7 @@ impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: De per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state), - pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), + pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read), total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()), keys_manager: args.keys_manager, logger: args.logger,