X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannelmanager.rs;h=d591788f64a68209349b2d7b86c269997a63fbab;hb=783e8188a7bd6470d5926bf5d1bae1350996801a;hp=39cb9a7b5fe24d543674095fdbda3464b776ec10;hpb=5e4f0bcff0cea5e4c0652c2ef3c86ddc19585e21;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index 39cb9a7b..d591788f 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -9,15 +9,13 @@ //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here. //! -//! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is +//! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s). //! -//! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing +//! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages). -//! -//! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader; use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction; @@ -37,6 +35,8 @@ use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock}; use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator}; use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID}; use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData}; +use crate::events; +use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination}; // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to // construct one themselves. use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret}; @@ -55,16 +55,17 @@ use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VA use crate::ln::outbound_payment; use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment}; use crate::ln::wire::Encode; -use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner}; +use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner}; use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig}; -use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination}; -use crate::util::events; use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier}; use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid; +use crate::util::string::UntrustedString; use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter}; use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger}; use crate::util::errors::APIError; +use alloc::collections::BTreeMap; + use crate::io; use crate::prelude::*; use core::{cmp, mem}; @@ -76,7 +77,7 @@ use core::time::Duration; use core::ops::Deref; // Re-export this for use in the public API. -pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry}; +pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure}; // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself: // @@ -119,7 +120,10 @@ pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo { pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting, pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash, + /// Amount received pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option, // Added in 0.0.113 + /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received + /// may overshoot this in either case) pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64, pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32, } @@ -191,14 +195,21 @@ struct ClaimableHTLC { cltv_expiry: u32, /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part value: u64, + /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP + /// part (used for validating total MPP amount) + sender_intended_value: u64, onion_payload: OnionPayload, timer_ticks: u8, - /// The sum total of all MPP parts + /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP). + /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]. + total_value_received: Option, + /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion total_msat: u64, } /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK. -/// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly +/// +/// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]); @@ -216,7 +227,8 @@ impl Readable for PaymentId { } /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK. -/// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly +/// +/// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)] pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]); @@ -232,6 +244,36 @@ impl Readable for InterceptId { Ok(InterceptId(buf)) } } + +#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)] +/// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`]. +pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId { + PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 }, + OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey }, +} +impl SentHTLCId { + pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self { + match source { + HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData { + short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id, + htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id, + }, + HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => + Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv }, + } + } +} +impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId, + (0, PreviousHopData) => { + (0, short_channel_id, required), + (2, htlc_id, required), + }, + (2, OutboundRoute) => { + (0, session_priv, required), + }; +); + + /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] @@ -245,11 +287,6 @@ pub(crate) enum HTLCSource { first_hop_htlc_msat: u64, payment_id: PaymentId, payment_secret: Option, - /// Note that this is now "deprecated" - we write it for forwards (and read it for - /// backwards) compatibility reasons, but prefer to use the data in the - /// [`super::outbound_payment`] module, which stores per-payment data once instead of in - /// each HTLC. - payment_params: Option, }, } #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash @@ -260,14 +297,13 @@ impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource { 0u8.hash(hasher); prev_hop_data.hash(hasher); }, - HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => { + HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat } => { 1u8.hash(hasher); path.hash(hasher); session_priv[..].hash(hasher); payment_id.hash(hasher); payment_secret.hash(hasher); first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher); - payment_params.hash(hasher); }, } } @@ -282,7 +318,6 @@ impl HTLCSource { first_hop_htlc_msat: 0, payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]), payment_secret: None, - payment_params: None, } } } @@ -343,17 +378,6 @@ impl MsgHandleErrInternal { } } #[inline] - fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self { - Self { - err: LightningError { - err, - action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError, - }, - chan_id: None, - shutdown_finish: None, - } - } - #[inline] fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self { Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None } } @@ -464,6 +488,7 @@ enum BackgroundEvent { ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)), } +#[derive(Debug)] pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction { /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for @@ -474,6 +499,11 @@ pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction { EmitEvent { event: events::Event }, } +impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction, + (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) }, + (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) }, +); + /// State we hold per-peer. pub(super) struct PeerState { /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`. @@ -487,6 +517,21 @@ pub(super) struct PeerState { /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict). pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec, + /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending + /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating. + /// + /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A + /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few + /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of + /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole. + /// + /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we + /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update + /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the + /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior + /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure + /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing. + monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec>, /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`]. @@ -501,7 +546,7 @@ impl PeerState { if require_disconnected && self.is_connected { return false } - self.channel_by_id.len() == 0 + self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() } } @@ -526,15 +571,16 @@ struct PendingInboundPayment { min_value_msat: Option, } -/// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g. -/// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static +/// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g. +/// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case -/// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents -/// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type -/// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this -/// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter. +/// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents +/// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type +/// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager, +/// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types +/// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`]. /// -/// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings +/// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings pub type SimpleArcChannelManager = ChannelManager< Arc, Arc, @@ -550,54 +596,71 @@ pub type SimpleArcChannelManager = ChannelManager< Arc >; -/// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference -/// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't +/// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference +/// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as -/// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes). +/// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes). /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type -/// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this -/// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter. +/// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager, +/// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types +/// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`]. /// -/// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings +/// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex, &'g L>>>, &'g L>; /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately. /// -/// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through +/// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through /// to individual Channels. /// -/// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for +/// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being -/// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie -/// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels). +/// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e., +/// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed. /// -/// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with -/// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before -/// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates -/// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during +/// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with +/// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before +/// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates +/// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the -/// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the -/// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees). +/// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the +/// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees). /// -/// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which -/// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along -/// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call -/// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the -/// object! +/// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which +/// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager. +/// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details. /// -/// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating -/// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid +/// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating +/// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call -/// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect. +/// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect. +/// +/// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and +/// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do +/// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have +/// many peers with unfunded channels. /// -/// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager -/// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but -/// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a -/// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when +/// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are +/// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are +/// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself. +/// +/// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] +/// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but +/// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a +/// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when /// you're using lightning-net-tokio. +/// +/// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected +/// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated +/// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated +/// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash +/// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel +/// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate +/// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred +/// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read // // Lock order: // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the @@ -943,6 +1006,19 @@ pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3; /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`]. pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7; +/// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new +/// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in +/// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`]. +const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4; + +/// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach +/// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel. +const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50; + +/// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this +/// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections. +const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250; + /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel. #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)] pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo { @@ -985,7 +1061,7 @@ pub struct ChannelCounterparty { pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option, } -/// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels +/// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`] #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)] pub struct ChannelDetails { /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes, @@ -1056,6 +1132,11 @@ pub struct ChannelDetails { /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to /// 0.0.113. pub user_channel_id: u128, + /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units, + /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions. + /// + /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115. + pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option, /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel. /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close. @@ -1167,6 +1248,56 @@ impl ChannelDetails { pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option { self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias) } + + fn from_channel(channel: &Channel, + best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self { + + let balance = channel.get_available_balances(); + let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) = + channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(); + ChannelDetails { + channel_id: channel.channel_id(), + counterparty: ChannelCounterparty { + node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), + features: latest_features, + unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis, + forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(), + // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value + // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` + // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty). + // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the + // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`. + outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() { + Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None }, + outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(), + }, + funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(), + // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so + // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed. + channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None }, + short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(), + outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None }, + inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(), + channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(), + feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()), + unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis, + balance_msat: balance.balance_msat, + inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat, + outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat, + next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, + user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(), + confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(), + confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)), + force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(), + is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(), + is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(), + is_usable: channel.is_live(), + is_public: channel.should_announce(), + inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()), + inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(), + config: Some(channel.config()), + } + } } /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments. @@ -1345,78 +1476,6 @@ macro_rules! remove_channel { } } -macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res { - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => { - match $err { - ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => { - log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..])); - update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan); - // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the - // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which - // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain. - // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they - // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than - // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're - // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't - // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is - // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees. - let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(), - $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() )); - (res, true) - }, - ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => { - log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations", - log_bytes!($chan_id[..]), - if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa { - match $action_type { - RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" }, - RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" }, - } - } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" } - else if $resend_raa { "RAA" } - else { "nothing" }, - (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(), - (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(), - (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec).len()); - if !$resend_commitment { - debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa); - } - if !$resend_raa { - debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment); - } - $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills); - (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false) - }, - ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => { - (Ok(()), false) - }, - } - }; - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { { - let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key()); - if drop { - $entry.remove_entry(); - } - res - } }; - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { { - debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst); - handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id) - } }; - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => { - handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id) - }; - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => { - handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()) - }; - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => { - handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()) - }; - ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { - handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new()) - }; -} - macro_rules! send_channel_ready { ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{ $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { @@ -1454,6 +1513,94 @@ macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event { } } +macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion { + ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { { + let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger, + &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration, + $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()); + let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id(); + let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() { + // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a + // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a + // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public + // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees + // now. + if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) { + Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { + node_id: counterparty_node_id, + msg, + }) + } else { None } + } else { None }; + + let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions + .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new()); + + let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption( + &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa, + updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, + updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, + updates.announcement_sigs); + if let Some(upd) = channel_update { + $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd); + } + + let channel_id = $chan.channel_id(); + core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock); + core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock); + + $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions); + + if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards { + $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]); + } + $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs); + for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) { + let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id }; + $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver); + } + } } +} + +macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update { + ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { { + // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in + // any case so that it won't deadlock. + debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok()); + match $update_res { + ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => { + log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.", + log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..])); + Ok(()) + }, + ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => { + log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", + log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..])); + update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan); + let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown( + "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(), + $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false), + $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok())); + $remove; + res + }, + ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => { + if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update() + .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued") + .update_id == $update_id) && + $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id + { + handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan); + } + Ok(()) + }, + } + } }; + ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => { + handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry()) + } +} + impl ChannelManager where M::Target: chain::Watch<::Signer>, @@ -1465,16 +1612,21 @@ where R::Target: Router, L::Target: Logger, { - /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them. + /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them. /// /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements - /// ChannelMessageHandler. + /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`]. /// /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator. /// - /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or - /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting - /// from after `params.latest_hash`. + /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or + /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting + /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for + /// more details. + /// + /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected + /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected + /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self { let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()); @@ -1638,71 +1790,28 @@ where for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; - for (channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) { - let balance = channel.get_available_balances(); - let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) = - channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(); - res.push(ChannelDetails { - channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(), - counterparty: ChannelCounterparty { - node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), - features: peer_state.latest_features.clone(), - unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis, - forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(), - // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value - // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` - // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty). - // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the - // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`. - outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() { - Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None }, - outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(), - }, - funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(), - // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so - // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed. - channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None }, - short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(), - outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None }, - inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(), - channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(), - unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis, - balance_msat: balance.balance_msat, - inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat, - outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat, - next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, - user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(), - confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(), - confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)), - force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(), - is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(), - is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(), - is_usable: channel.is_live(), - is_public: channel.should_announce(), - inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()), - inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(), - config: Some(channel.config()), - }); + for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) { + let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, + peer_state.latest_features.clone()); + res.push(details); } } } res } - /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for + /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for /// more information. pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec { self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true) } - /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`] - /// to ensure non-announced channels are used. + /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to + /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used. /// /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria /// are. - /// - /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec { // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user @@ -1710,6 +1819,24 @@ where self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live()) } + /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order. + pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec { + let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + + if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let features = &peer_state.latest_features; + return peer_state.channel_by_id + .iter() + .map(|(_, channel)| + ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone())) + .collect(); + } + vec![] + } + /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs. /// @@ -1768,25 +1895,27 @@ where let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => { - let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?; + let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo(); + let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features; + let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut() + .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?; failed_htlcs = htlcs; - // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary. - if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update { - let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update); - let (result, is_permanent) = - handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE); - if is_permanent { - remove_channel!(self, chan_entry); - break result; - } - } - + // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor` + // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a + // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update. peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id: *counterparty_node_id, - msg: shutdown_msg + msg: shutdown_msg, }); + // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary. + if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() { + let update_id = monitor_update.update_id; + let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update); + break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry); + } + if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() { let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry); if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) { @@ -1824,11 +1953,12 @@ where /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however. /// - /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed. + /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed. /// /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal + /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> { self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None) } @@ -1847,11 +1977,12 @@ where /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower). /// - /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed. + /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed. /// /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal + /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> { self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)) } @@ -1887,7 +2018,7 @@ where let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) { if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg { - self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() }); + self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }); } else { self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed); } @@ -1970,9 +2101,9 @@ where payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result { // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry - if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry { + if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry { return Err(ReceiveError { - msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", + msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender", err_code: 18, err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec() }) @@ -2056,7 +2187,7 @@ where payment_hash, incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret, incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat), - outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat, + outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value, }) } @@ -2296,13 +2427,16 @@ where pending_forward_info } - /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is + /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event. /// - /// Note that in `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the `peer_state` + /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state` /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped. + /// + /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate + /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<::Signer>) -> Result { if !chan.should_announce() { return Err(LightningError { @@ -2317,14 +2451,17 @@ where self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) } - /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel - /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id), + /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel + /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID), /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel. /// - /// Note that through `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the + /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped. + /// + /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate + /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<::Signer>) -> Result { log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id())); let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) { @@ -2362,22 +2499,28 @@ where }) } - // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly - pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec, payment_params: &Option, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> { + #[cfg(test)] + pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> { + let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap(); + self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes) + } + + fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> { + // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock. + debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id); let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(); let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted"); let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv) - .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?; + .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?; let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?; if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) { - return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"}); + return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()}); } let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash); - let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); - let err: Result<(), _> = loop { let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) { None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}), @@ -2390,54 +2533,34 @@ where let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) { - match { - if !chan.get().is_live() { - return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()}); - } - break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit( - htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { - path: path.clone(), - session_priv: session_priv.clone(), - first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat, - payment_id, - payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(), - payment_params: payment_params.clone(), - }, onion_packet, &self.logger), - chan) - } { - Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => { - let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update); - let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id(); - match (update_err, - handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan, - RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)) - { - (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e), - (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {}, - (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => { - // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function - // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor - // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error - // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, - // which we do in the send_payment check for - // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below. - return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress); - }, - _ => unreachable!(), + if !chan.get().is_live() { + return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()}); + } + let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(); + let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), + htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { + path: path.clone(), + session_priv: session_priv.clone(), + first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat, + payment_id, + payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(), + }, onion_packet, &self.logger); + match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) { + Some(monitor_update) => { + let update_id = monitor_update.update_id; + let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update); + if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) { + break Err(e); + } + if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress { + // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function + // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor + // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error + // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, + // which we do in the send_payment check for + // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below. + return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress); } - - log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id)); - peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey, - updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { - update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add], - update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fee: None, - commitment_signed, - }, - }); }, None => { }, } @@ -2464,7 +2587,7 @@ where /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`] /// fields for more info. /// - /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via + /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]). /// /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments @@ -2488,7 +2611,7 @@ where /// /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`] /// - /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with + /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info. /// @@ -2501,7 +2624,7 @@ where /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the /// relevant updates. /// - /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been + /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a /// different route unless you intend to pay twice! /// @@ -2519,35 +2642,39 @@ where /// /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed + /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> { let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); self.pending_outbound_payments .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, - |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| - self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)) + |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| + self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)) } /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`. - pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> { + pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> { let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); self.pending_outbound_payments .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events, - |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| - self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)) + |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| + self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)) } #[cfg(test)] - fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option, keysend_preimage: Option, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> { + pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option, keysend_preimage: Option, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> { let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, - |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| - self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)) + |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| + self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)) } #[cfg(test)] @@ -2595,11 +2722,12 @@ where /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result { let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route( route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, - |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| - self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)) + |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| + self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)) } /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route @@ -2609,14 +2737,15 @@ where /// payments. /// /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend - pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result { + pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result { let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events, - |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| - self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)) + |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| + self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)) } /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the @@ -2624,9 +2753,10 @@ where /// us to easily discern them from real payments. pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> { let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, - |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| - self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)) + |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| + self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)) } /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a @@ -2667,7 +2797,7 @@ where (chan, funding_msg) }, Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { - err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned() + err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned() }) }, } }; @@ -2726,8 +2856,8 @@ where /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See /// for more details. /// - /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady - /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed + /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady + /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); @@ -3137,7 +3267,7 @@ where HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo { - routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, .. + routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, .. } }) => { let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing { @@ -3151,7 +3281,7 @@ where panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive"); } }; - let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC { + let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC { prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, @@ -3159,8 +3289,13 @@ where incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, }, - value: outgoing_amt_msat, + // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value + // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete + // if routing nodes overpay + value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat), + sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat, timer_ticks: 0, + total_value_received: None, total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat }, cltv_expiry, onion_payload, @@ -3205,7 +3340,7 @@ where fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash); continue } - let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) + let (_, ref mut htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new())); if htlcs.len() == 1 { if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload { @@ -3214,9 +3349,9 @@ where continue } } - let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value; + let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value; for htlc in htlcs.iter() { - total_value += htlc.value; + total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value; match &htlc.onion_payload { OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => { if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat { @@ -3229,18 +3364,24 @@ where _ => unreachable!(), } } - if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)", - log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat); + // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must + // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred` + if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { + fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash); + } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable", + log_bytes!(payment_hash.0)); fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash); - } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat { + } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat { let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(); htlcs.push(claimable_htlc); + let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum(); + htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat)); new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable { receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id), payment_hash, purpose: purpose(), - amount_msat: total_value, + amount_msat, via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id), via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id), }); @@ -3294,13 +3435,15 @@ where } match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) { hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { + let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value; + claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat); let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage); e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc])); let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(); new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable { receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id), payment_hash, - amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat, + amount_msat, purpose, via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id), via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id), @@ -3350,8 +3493,8 @@ where self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.pending_events, &self.logger, - |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| - self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)); + |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv| + self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv)); for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) { self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination); @@ -3403,18 +3546,18 @@ where fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption { if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; } // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother - if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() { + if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() { log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.", - log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate); + log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate); return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; } if !chan.is_live() { log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).", - log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate); + log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate); return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; } log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.", - log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate); + log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate); chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger); NotifyOption::DoPersist @@ -3449,15 +3592,18 @@ where /// /// This currently includes: /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels, - /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more + /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over /// the channel. - /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs - /// with the current `ChannelConfig`. + /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs + /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`]. /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels. /// - /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate + /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate /// estimate fetches. + /// + /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate + /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) { PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || { let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist; @@ -3557,7 +3703,9 @@ where if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload { // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat). // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here. - if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) { + // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match + // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`. + if htlcs[0].total_msat <= htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value) { return true; } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| { htlc.timer_ticks += 1; @@ -3608,14 +3756,14 @@ where /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed. pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) { - self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, &FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails); + self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails); } /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the /// reason for the failure. /// /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes. - pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: &FailureCode) { + pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash); @@ -3630,14 +3778,14 @@ where } /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`]. - fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: &FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason { + fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason { match failure_code { - FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16), - FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16), + FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16), + FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16), FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => { let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec(); htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes()); - HTLCFailReason::reason(*failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data) + HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data) } } } @@ -3737,9 +3885,9 @@ where // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more. match source { - HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => { + HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => { if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path, - session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx, + session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx, &self.pending_events, &self.logger) { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); } }, @@ -3783,8 +3931,8 @@ where /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment. /// - /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable - /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed + /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable + /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash @@ -3836,6 +3984,7 @@ where // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth // it. let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0; + let mut prev_total_msat = None; let mut expected_amt_msat = None; let mut valid_mpp = true; let mut errs = Vec::new(); @@ -3863,14 +4012,22 @@ where break; } - if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) { - log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!"); + if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) { + log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!"); debug_assert!(false); valid_mpp = false; break; } + prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat); + + if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received { + log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!"); + debug_assert!(false); + valid_mpp = false; + break; + } + expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received; - expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat); if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload { // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check // that there's one payment here and move on. @@ -3936,111 +4093,69 @@ where let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(); - let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) { Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()), None => None }; - let mut peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map( + let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map( |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map( |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap() ) ).unwrap_or(None); - if let Some(hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan)) = peer_state_opt.as_mut().map(|peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id)) - { - let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(); - match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) { - Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => { - if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option { - match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) { - ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {}, - e => { - log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug }, - "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}", - payment_preimage, e); - let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(); - mem::drop(peer_state_opt); - mem::drop(per_peer_state); - self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat))); - return Err((counterparty_node_id, err)); - } - } - if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs { - log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", - log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id())); - peer_state_opt.as_mut().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: counterparty_node_id, - updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { - update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg], - update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fee: None, - commitment_signed, - } - }); - } - mem::drop(peer_state_opt); - mem::drop(per_peer_state); - self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat))); - Ok(()) - } else { - Ok(()) - } - }, - Err((e, monitor_update)) => { - match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) { - ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {}, - e => { - // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update - // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream - // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same update and try - // again on restart. - log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info }, - "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}", - payment_preimage, e); - }, + if peer_state_opt.is_some() { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) { + let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(); + let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger); + + if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res { + if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}", + log_bytes!(chan_id), action); + peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action); } - let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id); - if drop { - chan.remove_entry(); + let update_id = monitor_update.update_id; + let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update); + let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, + peer_state, per_peer_state, chan); + if let Err(e) = res { + // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge + // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor + // update over and over again until morale improves. + log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage); + return Err((counterparty_node_id, e)); } - mem::drop(peer_state_opt); - mem::drop(per_peer_state); - self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None)); - Err((counterparty_node_id, res)) - }, - } - } else { - let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate { - update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID, - updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { - payment_preimage, - }], - }; - // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after - // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link. - let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update); - if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed { - // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update - // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream - // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try - // again on restart. - log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}", - payment_preimage, update_res); + } + return Ok(()); } - mem::drop(peer_state_opt); - mem::drop(per_peer_state); - // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a - // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the - // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are - // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in - // `PaymentForwarded`). - self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None)); - Ok(()) } + let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate { + update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID, + updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { + payment_preimage, + }], + }; + // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after + // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link. + let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update); + if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed { + // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update + // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream + // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try + // again on restart. + log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}", + payment_preimage, update_res); + } + // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a + // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the + // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are + // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in + // `PaymentForwarded`). + self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None)); + Ok(()) } fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec) { @@ -4069,6 +4184,7 @@ where claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain, prev_channel_id, next_channel_id, + outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat, }}) } else { None } }); @@ -4111,6 +4227,14 @@ where pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option, channel_ready: Option, announcement_sigs: Option) -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> { + log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement", + log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), + if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" }, + if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(), + if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " }, + if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" }, + if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" }); + let mut htlc_forwards = None; let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id(); @@ -4167,67 +4291,38 @@ where } fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) { - let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock - let htlc_forwards; - let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = { - let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id { - Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(), - None => { - // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the - // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed. - let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap(); - match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) { - Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(), - None => return, - } - } - }; - let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); - let mut peer_state_lock; - let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id); - if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return } - peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); - let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; - let mut channel = { - match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){ - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return, + let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id { + Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(), + None => { + // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the + // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed. + let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap(); + match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) { + Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(), + None => return, } - }; - if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id { - return; } - - let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()); - let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() { - // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a - // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a - // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public - // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees - // now. - if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) { - Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { - node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), - msg, - }) - } else { None } - } else { None }; - htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs); - if let Some(upd) = channel_update { - peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd); + }; + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let mut peer_state_lock; + let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id); + if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return } + peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let mut channel = { + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){ + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return, } - - (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id) }; - if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards { - self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]); - } - self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims); - for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) { - let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() }; - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver); + log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}", + highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id()); + if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id { + return; } + handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut()); } /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]. @@ -4275,11 +4370,13 @@ where fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty()); let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?; let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1; match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => { if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() { @@ -4297,6 +4394,21 @@ where peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event); let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel); return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() }); + } else { + // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers + // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded + // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones. + if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS { + let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { + node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), + action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{ + msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), } + } + }; + peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event); + let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel); + return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() }); + } } peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { @@ -4311,6 +4423,43 @@ where Ok(()) } + /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound, + /// or 0-conf channels. + /// + /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and + /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer. + fn peers_without_funded_channels(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize + where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<::Signer>) -> bool { + let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0; + let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + { + let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() { + let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap(); + if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; } + let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height); + if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() { + peers_without_funded_channels += 1; + } + } + } + return peers_without_funded_channels; + } + + fn unfunded_channel_count( + peer: &PeerState<::Signer>, best_block_height: u32 + ) -> usize { + let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0; + for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() { + if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 && + chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0 + { + num_unfunded_channels += 1; + } + } + num_unfunded_channels + } + fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())); @@ -4323,8 +4472,13 @@ where let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16]; random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]); let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes); - let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(); + + // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much + // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one + // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels. + let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty()); + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) .ok_or_else(|| { @@ -4333,9 +4487,29 @@ where })?; let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + + // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers + // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded + // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones. + if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() && + channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS && + !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels + { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close( + "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), + msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())); + } + + let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER { + return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close( + format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER), + msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())); + } + let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, - counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, - self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias) + counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id, + &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias) { Err(e) => { self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias); @@ -4406,60 +4580,31 @@ where } fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { + let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap(); + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) .ok_or_else(|| { debug_assert!(false); MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id) })?; - let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = { - let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap(); - let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); - let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove()) }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)) - } - }; - // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the peer_state - // lock before watch_channel - match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) { - ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {}, - ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => { - // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the - // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the - // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for - // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway. - // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor - // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond - // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain). - let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false); - assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty()); - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id)); - }, - ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => { - // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor - // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't - // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready - // until we have persisted our monitor. - chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()); - channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now - }, - } - // It's safe to unwrap as we've held the `per_peer_state` read lock since checking that the - // peer exists, despite the inner PeerState potentially having no channels after removing - // the channel above. - let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); - let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + }; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { - return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id)) + Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id)) }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { - let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap(); - match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) { + match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => { return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close( "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(), @@ -4469,63 +4614,67 @@ where i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id()); } } + + // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor + // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't + // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready + // until we have persisted our monitor. + let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id; peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), msg: funding_msg, }); - if let Some(msg) = channel_ready { - send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg); + + let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor); + + let chan = e.insert(chan); + let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, + per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) }); + + // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the + // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the + // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for + // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway. + // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor + // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond + // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain). + if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res { + res.0 = None; } - e.insert(chan); + res } } - Ok(()) } fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let funding_tx = { - let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap(); - let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); - let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) - .ok_or_else(|| { - debug_assert!(false); - MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) - })?; + let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap(); + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + .ok_or_else(|| { + debug_assert!(false); + MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) + })?; - let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); - let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; - match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) { - Ok(update) => update, - Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan), - }; - match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) { - ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {}, - e => { - let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED); - if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res { - // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on - // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the - // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied. - if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish { - shutdown_finish.0.take(); - } - } - return res - }, - } - if let Some(msg) = channel_ready { - send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg); + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; + match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { + let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, + chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan); + let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor); + let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan); + if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res { + // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on + // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the + // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied. + if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish { + shutdown_finish.0.take(); } - funding_tx - }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) - } - }; - log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid()); - self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx); - Ok(()) + } + res + }, + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id)) + } } fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { @@ -4590,27 +4739,27 @@ where if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" }); } - let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry); + let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo(); + let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, + chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry); dropped_htlcs = htlcs; - // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary. - if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update { - let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update); - let (result, is_permanent) = - handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE); - if is_permanent { - remove_channel!(self, chan_entry); - break result; - } - } - if let Some(msg) = shutdown { + // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor` + // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a + // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update. peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id: *counterparty_node_id, msg, }); } + // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary. + if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt { + let update_id = monitor_update.update_id; + let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update); + break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry); + } break Ok(()); }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) @@ -4622,8 +4771,7 @@ where self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver); } - let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id); - Ok(()) + result } fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { @@ -4797,40 +4945,12 @@ where let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) = - match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) { - Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan), - Err((Some(update), e)) => { - assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update()); - let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &update); - try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan); - unreachable!(); - }, - Ok(res) => res - }; - let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update); - if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) { - return Err(e); - } - - peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { - node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), - msg: revoke_and_ack, - }); - if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed { - peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), - updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { - update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(), - update_fee: None, - commitment_signed: msg, - }, - }); - } - Ok(()) + let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo(); + let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan); + let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update); + let update_id = monitor_update.update_id; + handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, + peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) }, hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } @@ -4934,71 +5054,29 @@ where } fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { - let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new(); - let res = loop { + let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = { let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); - let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) + let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) .ok_or_else(|| { debug_assert!(false); MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id) - })?; - let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?; let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => { - let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update(); - let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self, - chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan); - htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs; - let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &raa_updates.monitor_update); - if was_paused_for_mon_update { - assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed); - assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none()); - assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty()); - assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty()); - assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty()); - break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned())); - } - if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed { - if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, - RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, - raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false, - raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs, - raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) { - break Err(e); - } else { unreachable!(); } - } - if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update { - peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(), - updates, - }); - } - break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs, - raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, - chan.get().get_short_channel_id() - .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()), - chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), - chan.get().get_user_id())) + let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo(); + let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan); + let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update); + let update_id = monitor_update.update_id; + let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, + peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan); + (htlcs_to_fail, res) }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } }; self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id); - match res { - Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs, - short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) => - { - for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) { - let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() }; - self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver); - } - self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]); - self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs); - Ok(()) - }, - Err(e) => Err(e) - } + res } fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { @@ -5151,8 +5229,10 @@ where Ok(()) } - /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed. + /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed. fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool { + debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock + let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events(); let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty(); @@ -5230,7 +5310,13 @@ where /// update events as a separate process method here. #[cfg(fuzzing)] pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) { - self.process_pending_monitor_events(); + PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || { + if self.process_pending_monitor_events() { + NotifyOption::DoPersist + } else { + NotifyOption::SkipPersist + } + }); } /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible. @@ -5240,50 +5326,45 @@ where let mut has_monitor_update = false; let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new(); let mut handle_errors = Vec::new(); - { - let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an + // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the + // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we + // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update. + 'peer_loop: loop { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { - let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); - let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; - let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events; - peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| { - match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) { - Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => { - if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() { - failed_htlcs.push(( - holding_cell_failed_htlcs, - *channel_id, - chan.get_counterparty_node_id() - )); - } - if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt { - match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) { - ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => { - pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { - node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), - updates: commitment_update, - }); - }, - e => { - has_monitor_update = true; - let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY); - handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res)); - if close_channel { return false; } - }, - } + 'chan_loop: loop { + let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock; + for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() { + let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id(); + let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo(); + let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) = + chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger); + if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() { + failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id)); + } + if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt { + has_monitor_update = true; + + let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel( + funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update); + let update_id = monitor_update.update_id; + let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id; + let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, + peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, + peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id)); + if res.is_err() { + handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res)); } - true - }, - Err(e) => { - let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id); - handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res))); - // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us - !close_channel + continue 'peer_loop; } } - }); + break 'chan_loop; + } } + break 'peer_loop; } let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty(); @@ -6246,13 +6327,13 @@ where let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id); } - fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) { + fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) { let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); let mut failed_channels = Vec::new(); let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap(); let remove_peer = { - log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.", - log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" }); + log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.", + log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)); if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) { let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; @@ -6294,7 +6375,7 @@ where debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect"); peer_state.is_connected = false; peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) - } else { true } + } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true } }; if remove_peer { per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id); @@ -6306,38 +6387,57 @@ where } } - fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> { + fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> { if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() { - log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)); + log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)); return Err(()); } - log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)); - let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier); + // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the + // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of + // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new + // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them. + let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected); + let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS; + { let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap(); match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) { hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { + if inbound_peer_limited { + return Err(()); + } e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState { channel_by_id: HashMap::new(), latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(), pending_msg_events: Vec::new(), + monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(), is_connected: true, })); }, hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => { let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap(); peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone(); + + let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(); + if inbound_peer_limited && + Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) == + peer_state.channel_by_id.len() + { + return Err(()); + } + debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice"); peer_state.is_connected = true; }, } } - let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)); + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock; @@ -6456,8 +6556,8 @@ pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelType /// [`ChannelManager`]. pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures { // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we - // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for - // ErroringMessageHandler. + // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for + // [`ErroringMessageHandler`]. let mut features = InitFeatures::empty(); features.set_data_loss_protect_optional(); features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional(); @@ -6531,6 +6631,7 @@ impl Writeable for ChannelDetails { (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option), (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option), (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option), + (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option), }); Ok(()) } @@ -6566,6 +6667,7 @@ impl Readable for ChannelDetails { (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option), (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option), (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option), + (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option), }); // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with @@ -6599,6 +6701,7 @@ impl Readable for ChannelDetails { is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(), inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, + feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, }) } } @@ -6725,7 +6828,9 @@ impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC { (0, self.prev_hop, required), (1, self.total_msat, required), (2, self.value, required), + (3, self.sender_intended_value, required), (4, payment_data, option), + (5, self.total_value_received, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required), (8, keysend_preimage, option), }); @@ -6735,17 +6840,21 @@ impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC { impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC { fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result { - let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None); + let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None); let mut value = 0; + let mut sender_intended_value = None; let mut payment_data: Option = None; let mut cltv_expiry = 0; + let mut total_value_received = None; let mut total_msat = None; let mut keysend_preimage: Option = None; read_tlv_fields!(reader, { (0, prev_hop, required), (1, total_msat, option), (2, value, required), + (3, sender_intended_value, option), (4, payment_data, option), + (5, total_value_received, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required), (8, keysend_preimage, option) }); @@ -6773,6 +6882,8 @@ impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC { prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(), timer_ticks: 0, value, + sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value), + total_value_received, total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(), onion_payload, cltv_expiry, @@ -6785,32 +6896,40 @@ impl Readable for HTLCSource { let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?; match id { 0 => { - let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None); + let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None); let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0; - let mut path = Some(Vec::new()); + let mut path: Option> = Some(Vec::new()); let mut payment_id = None; let mut payment_secret = None; - let mut payment_params = None; + let mut payment_params: Option = None; read_tlv_fields!(reader, { (0, session_priv, required), (1, payment_id, option), (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required), (3, payment_secret, option), (4, path, vec_type), - (5, payment_params, option), + (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)), }); if payment_id.is_none() { // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes // instead. payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref())); } + if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() { + return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); + } + let path = path.unwrap(); + if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() { + if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 { + params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta; + } + } Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(), first_hop_htlc_msat, - path: path.unwrap(), + path, payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(), payment_secret, - payment_params, }) } 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)), @@ -6822,7 +6941,7 @@ impl Readable for HTLCSource { impl Writeable for HTLCSource { fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> { match self { - HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => { + HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret } => { 0u8.write(writer)?; let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id); write_tlv_fields!(writer, { @@ -6831,7 +6950,7 @@ impl Writeable for HTLCSource { (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required), (3, payment_secret, option), (4, *path, vec_type), - (5, payment_params, option), + (5, None::, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 }); } HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => { @@ -6951,10 +7070,17 @@ where htlc_purposes.push(purpose); } + let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None; + let mut peer_states = Vec::new(); + for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { + // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance + // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any + // per_peer_state lock at all. + peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self()); + } + (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?; - for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() { - let peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap(); - let peer_state = &*peer_state_lock; + for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) { // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with @@ -6962,6 +7088,11 @@ where if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) { peer_pubkey.write(writer)?; peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?; + if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() { + monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer + .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new) + .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions)); + } } } @@ -7039,8 +7170,6 @@ where // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it. pending_claiming_payments = None; - } else { - debug_assert!(false, "While we have code to serialize pending_claiming_payments, the map should always be empty until a later PR"); } write_tlv_fields!(writer, { @@ -7049,6 +7178,7 @@ where (3, pending_outbound_payments, required), (4, pending_claiming_payments, option), (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required), + (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option), (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required), (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type), (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required), @@ -7150,7 +7280,7 @@ where /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in /// this struct. /// - /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings + /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings pub channel_monitors: HashMap::Signer>>, } @@ -7225,6 +7355,7 @@ where let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128)); let mut channel_closures = Vec::new(); + let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new(); for _ in 0..channel_count { let mut channel: Channel<::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, ( &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config) @@ -7254,9 +7385,11 @@ where log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast."); log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id()); - let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true); + let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true); + if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update { + pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate(monitor_update)); + } failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs); - monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger); channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(), @@ -7321,10 +7454,13 @@ where } } - for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() { + for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() { if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) { - log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id())); - monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger); + let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate { + update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID, + updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }], + }; + pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((*funding_txo, monitor_update))); } } @@ -7361,6 +7497,7 @@ where channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()), latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?, pending_msg_events: Vec::new(), + monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(), is_connected: false, }; per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state)); @@ -7376,10 +7513,17 @@ where } let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::())); for _ in 0..background_event_count { match ::read(reader)? { - 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))), + 0 => { + let (funding_txo, monitor_update): (OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate) = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?); + if pending_background_events.iter().find(|e| { + let BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((pending_funding_txo, pending_monitor_update)) = e; + *pending_funding_txo == funding_txo && *pending_monitor_update == monitor_update + }).is_none() { + pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update))); + } + } _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), } } @@ -7417,12 +7561,14 @@ where let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None; let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None; let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new()); + let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new()); read_tlv_fields!(reader, { (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option), (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option), (3, pending_outbound_payments, option), (4, pending_claiming_payments, option), (5, received_network_pubkey, option), + (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option), (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option), (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type), (11, probing_cookie_secret, option), @@ -7435,6 +7581,10 @@ where probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()); } + if !channel_closures.is_empty() { + pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures); + } + if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() { pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat); } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() { @@ -7443,7 +7593,13 @@ where outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs }); } pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds); - } else { + } + let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments { + pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()), + retry_lock: Mutex::new(()) + }; + + { // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a @@ -7454,16 +7610,17 @@ where // 0.0.102+ for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() { if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() { - for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() { + for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() { if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source { if path.is_empty() { log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment"); return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } + let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat; let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32]; session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]); - match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) { + match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path); log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}", @@ -7490,48 +7647,64 @@ where } } } - for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() { - if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source { - let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| { - info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint && - info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id - }; - // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's - // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we - // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or - // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after - // the monitor was when forwarding the payment. - forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| { - forwards.retain(|forward| { - if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward { - if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) { - log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}", - log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id())); - false + for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() { + match htlc_source { + HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => { + let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| { + info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint && + info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id + }; + // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's + // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we + // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or + // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after + // the monitor was when forwarding the payment. + forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| { + forwards.retain(|forward| { + if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward { + if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) { + log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}", + log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id())); + false + } else { true } } else { true } + }); + !forwards.is_empty() + }); + pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| { + if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) { + log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}", + log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id())); + pending_events_read.retain(|event| { + if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event { + intercepted_id != ev_id + } else { true } + }); + false } else { true } }); - !forwards.is_empty() - }); - pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| { - if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) { - log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}", - log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id())); - pending_events_read.retain(|event| { - if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event { - intercepted_id != ev_id - } else { true } - }); - false - } else { true } - }); + }, + HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => { + if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt { + let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read); + // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here, + // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever. + // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're + // force-closing for being stale that's okay. + // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming, + // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating + // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the + // `ChannelMonitor` is removed. + pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger); + pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap(); + } + }, } } } } } - let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments { pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()), retry_lock: Mutex::new(()) }; if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() { // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they @@ -7589,10 +7762,6 @@ where let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()); - if !channel_closures.is_empty() { - pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures); - } - let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) { Ok(key) => key, Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) @@ -7689,6 +7858,15 @@ where } } + for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() { + if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) { + peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions; + } else { + log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id); + return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); + } + } + let channel_manager = ChannelManager { genesis_hash, fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator, @@ -7720,7 +7898,7 @@ where per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state), pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read), - pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read), + pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events), total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()), persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(), @@ -7753,6 +7931,7 @@ mod tests { use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey}; use core::time::Duration; use core::sync::atomic::Ordering; + use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason}; use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret}; use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId}; use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*; @@ -7760,7 +7939,6 @@ mod tests { use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler; use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route}; use crate::util::errors::APIError; - use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason}; use crate::util::test_utils; use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig; use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource; @@ -7786,8 +7964,10 @@ mod tests { // to connect messages with new values chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2; chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2; - let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone(); - let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone(); + let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty( + &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap(); + let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty( + &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap(); // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1))); @@ -7863,7 +8043,7 @@ mod tests { // indicates there are more HTLCs coming. let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match. let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap(); - nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); @@ -7893,7 +8073,7 @@ mod tests { expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true); // Send the second half of the original MPP payment. - nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap(); + nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); @@ -7985,7 +8165,6 @@ mod tests { let route_params = RouteParameters { payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV), final_value_msat: 100_000, - final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV, }; let route = find_route( &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph, @@ -8076,7 +8255,6 @@ mod tests { let route_params = RouteParameters { payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40), final_value_msat: 10_000, - final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40, }; let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone(); let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels(); @@ -8101,7 +8279,7 @@ mod tests { assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]); - nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1); + nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1); } #[test] @@ -8119,7 +8297,6 @@ mod tests { let route_params = RouteParameters { payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40), final_value_msat: 10_000, - final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40, }; let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone(); let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels(); @@ -8145,7 +8322,7 @@ mod tests { assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]); - nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1); + nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1); } #[test] @@ -8173,7 +8350,8 @@ mod tests { match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() { PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => { - assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) }, + assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) + }, _ => panic!("unexpected error") } } @@ -8187,8 +8365,8 @@ mod tests { let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); - nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); - nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); + nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true); @@ -8233,7 +8411,7 @@ mod tests { match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) { Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"), Err(()) => { - nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1); + nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1); } } @@ -8273,10 +8451,10 @@ mod tests { let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1); assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id)); - - assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0); } + assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0); + let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg); @@ -8284,7 +8462,9 @@ mod tests { let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1); assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id)); + } + { // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as // as it has the funding transaction. let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap(); @@ -8314,7 +8494,9 @@ mod tests { let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1); assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id)); + } + { // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is @@ -8408,6 +8590,213 @@ mod tests { check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key); } + #[test] + fn test_connection_limiting() { + // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly. + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us + + nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); + let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + + let mut funding_tx = None; + for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER { + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg); + let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + + if idx == 0 { + nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel); + let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42); + funding_tx = Some(tx.clone()); + nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap(); + let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + + nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + + nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + } + open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); + } + + // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected + open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg); + assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id, + open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id); + + // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded, + // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS + // limit. + let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS); + for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS { + let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx, + &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap()); + peer_pks.push(random_pk); + nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init { + features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap(); + } + let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx, + &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap()); + nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init { + features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err(); + + // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from + // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers. + nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1); + for ev in chan_closed_events { + if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); } + } + nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init { + features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap(); + nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { + features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err(); + + // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed... + nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { + features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap(); + nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + + // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around. + // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them + // open channels. + assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1); + for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 { + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg); + get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]); + open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); + } + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg); + assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id, + open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id); + + // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed + nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); + get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk); + + // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now + // "protected" and can connect again. + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap()); + nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { + features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap(); + get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + + // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with + // last_random_pk. + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg); + get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk); + } + + #[test] + fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() { + // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us + + nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); + let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + + for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER { + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg); + get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); + } + + // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be + // rejected. + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg); + assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id, + open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id); + + // but we can still open an outbound channel. + nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); + get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + + // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail. + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg); + assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id, + open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id); + } + + #[test] + fn test_0conf_limiting() { + // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance + // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf. + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let mut settings = test_default_channel_config(); + settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true; + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us + + nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); + let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + + // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge + for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 { + let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx, + &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap()); + nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init { + features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap(); + + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg); + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + match events[0] { + Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => { + nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap(); + } + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk); + open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(); + } + + // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail. + let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx, + &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap()); + nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init { + features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap(); + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg); + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + match events[0] { + Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => { + match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) { + Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => + assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"), + _ => panic!(), + } + } + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id, + open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id); + + // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine. + nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg); + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + match events[0] { + Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => { + nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap(); + } + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk); + } + #[cfg(anchors)] #[test] fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() { @@ -8435,7 +8824,7 @@ mod tests { _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } - let error_msg = get_err_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg); let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); @@ -8450,6 +8839,7 @@ pub mod bench { use crate::chain::Listen; use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist}; use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner}; + use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider}; use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId}; use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*; use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init}; @@ -8457,7 +8847,6 @@ pub mod bench { use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route}; use crate::util::test_utils; use crate::util::config::UserConfig; - use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider}; use bitcoin::hashes::Hash; use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; @@ -8488,13 +8877,12 @@ pub mod bench { // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync // calls per node. let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet; - let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(); let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))}; let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }; let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned()); let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new()); - let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a)), &scorer); + let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer); let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default(); config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1; @@ -8504,7 +8892,7 @@ pub mod bench { let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42); let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters { network, - best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network), + best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network), }); let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a }; @@ -8514,12 +8902,12 @@ pub mod bench { let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42); let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters { network, - best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network), + best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network), }); let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b }; - node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap(); - node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap(); + node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap(); + node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap(); node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap(); node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id())); node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id())); @@ -8538,7 +8926,7 @@ pub mod bench { assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]); let block = Block { - header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }, + header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }, txdata: vec![tx], }; Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1); @@ -8577,7 +8965,7 @@ pub mod bench { _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } - let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a); + let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a); let mut payment_count: u64 = 0; macro_rules! send_payment { @@ -8602,7 +8990,7 @@ pub mod bench { let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap()); $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]); $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); - let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id()); + let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id()); $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa); $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs); $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id())); @@ -8621,7 +9009,7 @@ pub mod bench { _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"), } - let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id()); + let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id()); $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa); $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs); $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));