X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannelmonitor.rs;h=1bc8c76b49e82765f73e550c41e17c3243a027fc;hb=39b62335b737e0ad40fc76aefb3d5d24ef64497a;hp=20e8a2fdabe4cbad97cd816fd2b0d35e7e8526a9;hpb=3670dd086ca43295d186d3b957fa99a9d1c458f0;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs index 20e8a2fd..1bc8c76b 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs @@ -31,13 +31,13 @@ use secp256k1; use ln::msgs::DecodeError; use ln::chan_utils; -use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType}; +use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType}; use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash}; use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT}; use chain::transaction::OutPoint; use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys}; use util::logger::Logger; -use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, U48}; +use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48}; use util::{byte_utils, events}; use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet}; @@ -45,6 +45,45 @@ use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex}; use std::{hash,cmp, mem}; use std::ops::Deref; +/// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the +/// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of. +#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))] +#[derive(Clone)] +#[must_use] +pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate { + pub(super) updates: Vec, + /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this + /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly + /// increasing and increase by one for each new update. + /// + /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned + /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given + /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called. + pub update_id: u64, +} + +impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate { + fn write(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { + self.update_id.write(w)?; + (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?; + for update_step in self.updates.iter() { + update_step.write(w)?; + } + Ok(()) + } +} +impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate { + fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result { + let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?; + let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?; + let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::std::mem::size_of::())); + for _ in 0..len { + updates.push(Readable::read(r)?); + } + Ok(Self { update_id, updates }) + } +} + /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update. #[derive(Clone)] pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr { @@ -52,13 +91,13 @@ pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr { /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future). /// /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or - /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party. - /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore - /// the channel to an operational state. + /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party. Once the update(s) which failed + /// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to + /// restore the channel to an operational state. /// - /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be - /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should - /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP. + /// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If + /// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before + /// writing out the latest ChannelManager state. /// /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting @@ -69,8 +108,15 @@ pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr { /// been "frozen". /// /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call - /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal - /// channel operation. + /// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel + /// operation. + /// + /// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call + /// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along + /// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a + /// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the + /// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at + /// reload-time. /// /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all @@ -85,9 +131,9 @@ pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr { } /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is -/// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this -/// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was -/// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates. +/// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this +/// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was +/// corrupted. /// Contains a human-readable error message. #[derive(Debug)] pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str); @@ -104,7 +150,7 @@ impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source }); /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing -/// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote +/// events to it, while also taking any add/update_monitor events and passing them to some remote /// server(s). /// /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the @@ -118,7 +164,7 @@ impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source }); /// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify /// all registered listeners in one go. pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync { - /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`. + /// Adds a monitor for the given `funding_txo`. /// /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected @@ -129,8 +175,22 @@ pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync { /// any spends of any of the outputs. /// /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to - /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in funds loss. - fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>; + /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS. + fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>; + + /// Updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`. + /// + /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with + /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected + /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it. + /// + /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in + /// monitor.get_watch_outputs() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about + /// any spends of any of the outputs. + /// + /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to + /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS. + fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>; /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated /// with success or failure. @@ -152,33 +212,31 @@ pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync { /// /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation. -pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface { +pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor + where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator +{ #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly pub monitors: Mutex>>, #[cfg(not(test))] monitors: Mutex>>, chain_monitor: Arc, broadcaster: T, - pending_events: Mutex>, logger: Arc, - fee_estimator: Arc + fee_estimator: F } -impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor - where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface +impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send> + ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor + where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator { fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) { let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash(); - let mut new_events: Vec = Vec::with_capacity(0); { let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap(); for monitor in monitors.values_mut() { - let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator); - if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 { - new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs { - outputs: spendable_outputs, - }); - } + let txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator); for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs { for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() { @@ -187,8 +245,6 @@ impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + } } } - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - pending_events.append(&mut new_events); } fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) { @@ -200,17 +256,17 @@ impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + } } -impl SimpleManyChannelMonitor - where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface +impl SimpleManyChannelMonitor + where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator { /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain /// interface with which to register to receive notifications. - pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc, broadcaster: T, logger: Arc, feeest: Arc) -> SimpleManyChannelMonitor { + pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc, broadcaster: T, logger: Arc, feeest: F) -> SimpleManyChannelMonitor { let res = SimpleManyChannelMonitor { monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), chain_monitor, broadcaster, - pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), logger, fee_estimator: feeest, }; @@ -219,14 +275,11 @@ impl) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { + pub fn add_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap(); - match monitors.get_mut(&key) { - Some(orig_monitor) => { - log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage)); - return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor); - }, - None => {} + let entry = match monitors.entry(key) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Channel monitor for given key is already present")), + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => e, }; match monitor.key_storage { Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => { @@ -250,16 +303,36 @@ impl Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { + let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap(); + match monitors.get_mut(&key) { + Some(orig_monitor) => { + log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(orig_monitor.key_storage)); + orig_monitor.update_monitor(update) + }, + None => Err(MonitorUpdateError("No such monitor registered")) + } + } } -impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor - where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface +impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor + where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator { - fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> { - match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) { + fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> { + match self.add_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) { + Ok(_) => Ok(()), + Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure), + } + } + + fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> { + match self.update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, update) { Ok(_) => Ok(()), Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure), } @@ -274,14 +347,16 @@ impl ManyChannelMonitor events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor - where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface +impl events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor + where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator { fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec { - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - let mut ret = Vec::new(); - mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events); - ret + let mut pending_events = Vec::new(); + for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() { + pending_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_events()); + } + pending_events } } @@ -314,7 +389,6 @@ pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3; /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint. pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6; -#[derive(Clone)] enum Storage { Local { keys: ChanSigner, @@ -569,13 +643,153 @@ impl Readable for ClaimTxBumpMaterial { const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; +#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))] +#[derive(Clone)] +pub(super) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep { + LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { + // TODO: We really need to not be generating a fully-signed transaction in Channel and + // passing it here, we need to hold off so that the ChanSigner can enforce a + // only-sign-local-state-for-broadcast once invariant: + commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, + local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, + feerate_per_kw: u64, + htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option, Option)>, + }, + LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { + unsigned_commitment_tx: Transaction, // TODO: We should actually only need the txid here + htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option>)>, + commitment_number: u64, + their_revocation_point: PublicKey, + }, + PaymentPreimage { + payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, + }, + CommitmentSecret { + idx: u64, + secret: [u8; 32], + }, + /// Indicates our channel is likely a stale version, we're closing, but this update should + /// allow us to spend what is ours if our counterparty broadcasts their latest state. + RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { + their_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, + }, +} + +impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep { + fn write(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { + match self { + &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref local_keys, ref feerate_per_kw, ref htlc_outputs } => { + 0u8.write(w)?; + commitment_tx.write(w)?; + local_keys.write(w)?; + feerate_per_kw.write(w)?; + (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?; + for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() { + output.write(w)?; + signature.write(w)?; + source.write(w)?; + } + } + &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { ref unsigned_commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => { + 1u8.write(w)?; + unsigned_commitment_tx.write(w)?; + commitment_number.write(w)?; + their_revocation_point.write(w)?; + (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?; + for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() { + output.write(w)?; + match source { + &None => 0u8.write(w)?, + &Some(ref s) => { + 1u8.write(w)?; + s.write(w)?; + }, + } + } + }, + &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => { + 2u8.write(w)?; + payment_preimage.write(w)?; + }, + &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => { + 3u8.write(w)?; + idx.write(w)?; + secret.write(w)?; + }, + &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { ref their_current_per_commitment_point } => { + 4u8.write(w)?; + their_current_per_commitment_point.write(w)?; + }, + } + Ok(()) + } +} +impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep { + fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result { + match Readable::read(r)? { + 0u8 => { + Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { + commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?, + local_keys: Readable::read(r)?, + feerate_per_kw: Readable::read(r)?, + htlc_outputs: { + let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?; + let mut res = Vec::new(); + for _ in 0..len { + res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?)); + } + res + }, + }) + }, + 1u8 => { + Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { + unsigned_commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?, + commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?, + their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?, + htlc_outputs: { + let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?; + let mut res = Vec::new(); + for _ in 0..len { + res.push((Readable::read(r)?, as Readable>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o)))); + } + res + }, + }) + }, + 2u8 => { + Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { + payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?, + }) + }, + 3u8 => { + Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { + idx: Readable::read(r)?, + secret: Readable::read(r)?, + }) + }, + 4u8 => { + Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { + their_current_per_commitment_point: Readable::read(r)?, + }) + }, + _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), + } + } +} + /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs. /// /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date /// information and are actively monitoring the chain. -#[derive(Clone)] +/// +/// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by +/// get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and +/// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events +/// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state. pub struct ChannelMonitor { + latest_update_id: u64, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64, key_storage: Storage, @@ -589,7 +803,7 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor { our_to_self_delay: u16, their_to_self_delay: Option, - old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49], + commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap>)>>, /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain. /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are @@ -617,6 +831,7 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor { payment_preimages: HashMap, pending_htlcs_updated: Vec, + pending_events: Vec, destination_script: Script, // Thanks to data loss protection, we may be able to claim our non-htlc funds @@ -664,14 +879,13 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor { // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way. - // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep + // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through // the full block_connected). pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash, secp_ctx: Secp256k1, //TODO: dedup this a bit... logger: Arc, } - macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee { ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => { { @@ -712,7 +926,8 @@ macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee { /// underlying object impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor { fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool { - if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor || + if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id || + self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor || self.key_storage != other.key_storage || self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key || self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key || @@ -721,6 +936,7 @@ impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor { self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points || self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay || self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay || + self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets || self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints || self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain || self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number || @@ -729,6 +945,7 @@ impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor { self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx || self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages || self.pending_htlcs_updated != other.pending_htlcs_updated || + self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly self.destination_script != other.destination_script || self.to_remote_rescue != other.to_remote_rescue || self.pending_claim_requests != other.pending_claim_requests || @@ -738,11 +955,6 @@ impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor { { false } else { - for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) { - if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx { - return false - } - } true } } @@ -756,6 +968,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?; writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?; + self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?; + // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now: U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?; @@ -823,10 +1037,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?; writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?; - for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() { - writer.write_all(secret)?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?; - } + self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?; macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment { ($htlc_output: expr) => { @@ -922,6 +1133,11 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { data.write(writer)?; } + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?; + for event in self.pending_events.iter() { + event.write(writer)?; + } + self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?; self.destination_script.write(writer)?; if let Some((ref to_remote_script, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue { @@ -1005,32 +1221,45 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } impl ChannelMonitor { - pub(super) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, funding_key: &SecretKey, revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc) -> ChannelMonitor { + pub(super) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, + our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script), + their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, + their_to_self_delay: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, + commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64, + logger: Arc) -> ChannelMonitor { + + assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48)); + let funding_key = keys.funding_key().clone(); + let revocation_base_key = keys.revocation_base_key().clone(); + let htlc_base_key = keys.htlc_base_key().clone(); + let delayed_payment_base_key = keys.delayed_payment_base_key().clone(); + let payment_base_key = keys.payment_base_key().clone(); ChannelMonitor { - commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0, + latest_update_id: 0, + commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, key_storage: Storage::Local { keys, - funding_key: funding_key.clone(), - revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(), - htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(), - delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(), - payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(), + funding_key, + revocation_base_key, + htlc_base_key, + delayed_payment_base_key, + payment_base_key, shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(), - funding_info: None, + funding_info: Some(funding_info), current_remote_commitment_txid: None, prev_remote_commitment_txid: None, }, - their_htlc_base_key: None, - their_delayed_payment_base_key: None, - funding_redeemscript: None, - channel_value_satoshis: None, + their_htlc_base_key: Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone()), + their_delayed_payment_base_key: Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone()), + funding_redeemscript: Some(funding_redeemscript), + channel_value_satoshis: Some(channel_value_satoshis), their_cur_revocation_points: None, our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay, - their_to_self_delay: None, + their_to_self_delay: Some(their_to_self_delay), - old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], + commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(), remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(), remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(), remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(), @@ -1041,8 +1270,9 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { payment_preimages: HashMap::new(), pending_htlcs_updated: Vec::new(), + pending_events: Vec::new(), - destination_script: destination_script, + destination_script: destination_script.clone(), to_remote_rescue: None, pending_claim_requests: HashMap::new(), @@ -1097,48 +1327,16 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { current_height + 15 } - #[inline] - fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 { - for i in 0..48 { - if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) { - return i - } - } - 48 - } - - #[inline] - fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] { - let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret; - for i in 0..bits { - let bitpos = bits - 1 - i; - if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) { - res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7); - res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner(); - } - } - res - } - /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key). pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { - let pos = ChannelMonitor::::place_secret(idx); - for i in 0..pos { - let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize]; - if ChannelMonitor::::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret { - return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one")); - } + if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) { + return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one")); } - if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx { - return Ok(()); - } - self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx); // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs. - // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here. if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage { if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() { for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() { @@ -1246,8 +1444,10 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated. /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called. - pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option, Option)>) { - assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some()); + pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option, Option)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { + if self.their_to_self_delay.is_none() { + return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Got a local commitment tx info update before we'd set basic information about the channel")); + } self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take(); self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx { txid: commitment_tx.txid(), @@ -1260,6 +1460,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs, }); + Ok(()) } /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all @@ -1268,106 +1469,56 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone()); } - /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor. - /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the - /// chain for new blocks/transactions. - pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { - match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => { - if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); } - let our_funding_info = funding_info; - if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage { - if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); } - // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially - // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey. - if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 { - return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!")); - } - } else { - return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !")); - } - }, - Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { - if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage { - unimplemented!(); - } else { - return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !")); - } - }, - } - let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret(); - let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret(); - if our_min_secret > other_min_secret { - self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?; - } - if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { - if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { - let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor); - let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor); - if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number { - self.key_storage = other.key_storage; - } - } - } - // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of - // local transactions to decide how to merge - if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret { - self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points; - for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() { - self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs); - } - if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx { - self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx); - } - if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { - self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx); - } - self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages; - self.to_remote_rescue = other.to_remote_rescue; - } - - self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number); + /// Used in Channel to cheat wrt the update_ids since it plays games, will be removed soon! + pub(super) fn update_monitor_ooo(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { + for update in updates.updates.drain(..) { + match update { + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, local_keys, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs } => + self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, local_keys, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs)?, + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } => + self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point), + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => + self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage), + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => + self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?, + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { their_current_per_commitment_point } => + self.provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(their_current_per_commitment_point), + } + } + self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id; Ok(()) } - /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is - /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to - /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it - /// provides slightly better privacy. - /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former - /// value as key to add_update_monitor. - pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) { - match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => { - *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info); - }, - Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { - panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?"); - } - } - } - - /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx - /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits - pub(super) fn set_basic_channel_info(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, their_to_self_delay: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) { - self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone()); - self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone()); - self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay); - self.funding_redeemscript = Some(funding_redeemscript); - self.channel_value_satoshis = Some(channel_value_satoshis); - assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48)); - self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor; + /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel + /// itself. + /// + /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id. + pub fn update_monitor(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { + if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id { + panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!"); + } + for update in updates.updates.drain(..) { + match update { + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, local_keys, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs } => + self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, local_keys, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs)?, + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } => + self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point), + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => + self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage), + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => + self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?, + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { their_current_per_commitment_point } => + self.provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(their_current_per_commitment_point), + } + } + self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id; + Ok(()) } - pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) { - match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => { - *funding_info = None; - }, - Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { - panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?"); - }, - } + /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this + /// ChannelMonitor. + pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 { + self.latest_update_id } /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for. @@ -1413,26 +1564,25 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { ret } + /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list + /// in the process. + /// + /// This is called by ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to + /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do + /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors. + pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec { + let mut ret = Vec::new(); + mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events); + ret + } + /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> { - for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() { - if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 { - return Some(ChannelMonitor::::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx)) - } - } - assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret()); - None + self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx) } pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 { - //TODO This can be optimized? - let mut min = 1 << 48; - for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() { - if idx < min { - min = idx; - } - } - min + self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() } pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 { @@ -1451,7 +1601,9 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions. /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of /// revoked remote commitment tx - fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec, (Sha256dHash, Vec), Vec) { + fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: F) -> (Vec, (Sha256dHash, Vec), Vec) + where F::Target: FeeEstimator + { // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new(); @@ -2026,7 +2178,9 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key - fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option, Option) { + fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, fee_estimator: F) -> (Option, Option) + where F::Target: FeeEstimator + { //TODO: send back new outputs to guarantee pending_claim_request consistency if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 { return (None, None) @@ -2396,8 +2550,9 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// Eventually this should be pub and, roughly, implement ChainListener, however this requires /// &mut self, as well as returns new spendable outputs and outpoints to watch for spending of /// on-chain. - fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec)>, Vec) - where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface + fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F)-> Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec)> + where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator { for tx in txn_matched { let mut output_val = 0; @@ -2430,7 +2585,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { }; if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) { if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 { - let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height, fee_estimator); + let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height, &*fee_estimator); txn = remote_txn; spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output); if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() { @@ -2452,7 +2607,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } else { if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) { - let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, fee_estimator); + let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &*fee_estimator); if let Some(tx) = tx { txn.push(tx); } @@ -2612,7 +2767,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { for first_claim_txid in bump_candidates.iter() { if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate)) = { if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get(first_claim_txid) { - if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, fee_estimator) { + if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, &*fee_estimator) { broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx); Some((new_timer, new_feerate)) } else { None } @@ -2628,11 +2783,19 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { for &(ref txid, ref output_scripts) in watch_outputs.iter() { self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect()); } - (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs) + + if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 { + self.pending_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs { + outputs: spendable_outputs, + }); + } + + watch_outputs } - fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) - where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface + fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F) + where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator { log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height); let mut bump_candidates = HashMap::new(); @@ -2658,7 +2821,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } for (_, claim_material) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() { - if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, fee_estimator) { + if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, &*fee_estimator) { claim_material.height_timer = new_timer; claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate; broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx); @@ -2888,7 +3051,9 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize coutnerparty onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock expiration /// (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may stuck in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or Child-Pay-For-Parent. - fn bump_claim_tx(&self, height: u32, cached_claim_datas: &ClaimTxBumpMaterial, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Option<(u32, u64, Transaction)> { + fn bump_claim_tx(&self, height: u32, cached_claim_datas: &ClaimTxBumpMaterial, fee_estimator: F) -> Option<(u32, u64, Transaction)> + where F::Target: FeeEstimator + { if cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.len() == 0 { return None } // But don't prune pending claiming request yet, we may have to resurrect HTLCs let mut inputs = Vec::new(); for outp in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.keys() { @@ -3044,6 +3209,7 @@ impl> ReadableArgs>::read(reader)?.0; let key_storage = match >::read(reader)? { @@ -3103,11 +3269,7 @@ impl> ReadableArgs = Some(Readable::read(reader)?); - let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49]; - for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() { - *secret = Readable::read(reader)?; - *idx = Readable::read(reader)?; - } + let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?; macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment { () => { @@ -3230,6 +3392,14 @@ impl> ReadableArgs())); + for _ in 0..pending_events_len { + if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? { + pending_events.push(event); + } + } + let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?; let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?; let to_remote_rescue = match >::read(reader)? { @@ -3308,6 +3478,7 @@ impl> ReadableArgs> ReadableArgs> ReadableArgs = Vec::new(); - let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor; - let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); - let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new()); - - macro_rules! test_secrets { - () => { - let mut idx = 281474976710655; - for secret in secrets.iter() { - assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret); - idx -= 1; - } - assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1); - assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none()); - }; - } - - let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new( - &secp_ctx, - SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), - SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), - SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), - SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), - SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), - [41; 32], - 0, - ); - - { - // insert_secret correct sequence - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); - secrets.clear(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - } - - { - // insert_secret #1 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); - secrets.clear(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, - "Previous secret did not match new one"); - } - - { - // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect) - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); - secrets.clear(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, - "Previous secret did not match new one"); - } - - { - // insert_secret #3 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); - secrets.clear(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, - "Previous secret did not match new one"); - } - - { - // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect) - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); - secrets.clear(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, - "Previous secret did not match new one"); - } - - { - // insert_secret #5 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); - secrets.clear(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, - "Previous secret did not match new one"); - } - - { - // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect) - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); - secrets.clear(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, - "Previous secret did not match new one"); - } - - { - // insert_secret #7 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); - secrets.clear(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, - "Previous secret did not match new one"); - } - - { - // insert_secret #8 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); - secrets.clear(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, - "Previous secret did not match new one"); - } - } - #[test] fn test_prune_preimages() { let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); @@ -3821,10 +3627,16 @@ mod tests { // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the // old state. - let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); + let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys, + &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(), + (OutPoint { txid: Sha256dHash::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()), + &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()), + &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), + 0, Script::new(), 46, 0, logger.clone()); + monitor.their_to_self_delay = Some(10); - monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])); + monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap(); monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key); monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key); monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key); @@ -3850,7 +3662,7 @@ mod tests { // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the // previous commitment tx's preimages too - monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])); + monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap(); secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap(); assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12); @@ -3858,7 +3670,7 @@ mod tests { test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor); // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10 - monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])); + monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap(); secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap(); assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);