X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannelmonitor.rs;h=49168627f5448647f8bc150fdce7aa72a862b738;hb=b9707da1382bcebe066c0c26b15a975991bf81e2;hp=4987f8f3b381e1f414f479d146f0d716ee19da81;hpb=bf74bb625fb92f3a0345bee31fca97487e3aa6e7;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs index 4987f8f3..49168627 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs @@ -1,3 +1,12 @@ +// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control +// history. +// +// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 or the MIT license +// , at your option. +// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these +// licenses. + //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives //! here. //! @@ -17,33 +26,33 @@ use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint; use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder}; use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; use bitcoin::consensus::encode; -use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash; -use bitcoin_hashes::Hash; -use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; -use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160; -use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash; +use bitcoin::hashes::Hash; +use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; +use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash}; -use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature}; -use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey}; -use secp256k1; +use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature}; +use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey}; +use bitcoin::secp256k1; use ln::msgs::DecodeError; use ln::chan_utils; use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType}; use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash}; -use ln::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler; +use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors}; use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator}; use chain::transaction::OutPoint; use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys}; use util::logger::Logger; -use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48}; +use util::ser::{Readable, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48}; use util::{byte_utils, events}; +use util::events::Event; use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map}; -use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex}; +use std::sync::Mutex; use std::{hash,cmp, mem}; use std::ops::Deref; +use std::io::Error; /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of. @@ -140,6 +149,16 @@ pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr { #[derive(Debug)] pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str); +/// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager. +#[derive(PartialEq)] +pub enum MonitorEvent { + /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate. + HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate), + + /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was broadcasted. + CommitmentTxBroadcasted(OutPoint), +} + /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel. #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] @@ -150,66 +169,6 @@ pub struct HTLCUpdate { } impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source }); -/// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between -/// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing -/// events to it, while also taking any add/update_monitor events and passing them to some remote -/// server(s). -/// -/// In general, you must always have at least one local copy in memory, which must never fail to -/// update (as it is responsible for broadcasting the latest state in case the channel is closed), -/// and then persist it to various on-disk locations. If, for some reason, the in-memory copy fails -/// to update (eg out-of-memory or some other condition), you must immediately shut down without -/// taking any further action such as writing the current state to disk. This should likely be -/// accomplished via panic!() or abort(). -/// -/// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the -/// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If -/// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions -/// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel! -/// -/// User needs to notify implementors of ManyChannelMonitor when a new block is connected or -/// disconnected using their `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. However, rather -/// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the -/// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify -/// all registered listeners in one go. -pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync { - /// Adds a monitor for the given `funding_txo`. - /// - /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with - /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected - /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it. - /// - /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in - /// monitor.get_outputs_to_watch() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about - /// any spends of any of the outputs. - /// - /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to - /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS. - fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>; - - /// Updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`. - /// - /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with - /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected - /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it. - /// - /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in - /// monitor.get_watch_outputs() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about - /// any spends of any of the outputs. - /// - /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to - /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS. - fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>; - - /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated - /// with success or failure. - /// - /// You should probably just call through to - /// ChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() for each ChannelMonitor and return - /// the full list. - fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec; -} - /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a /// watchtower or watch our own channels. /// @@ -221,31 +180,33 @@ pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync { /// /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation. -pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor +pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - F::Target: FeeEstimator + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, + C::Target: ChainWatchInterface, { - #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly + /// The monitors pub monitors: Mutex>>, - #[cfg(not(test))] - monitors: Mutex>>, - chain_monitor: Arc, + chain_monitor: C, broadcaster: T, - logger: Arc, + logger: L, fee_estimator: F } -impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send> - ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor +impl + ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - F::Target: FeeEstimator + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, + C::Target: ChainWatchInterface, { - fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) { - let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash(); + fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[usize]) { + let block_hash = header.block_hash(); { let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap(); for monitor in monitors.values_mut() { - let txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator); + let txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger); for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs { for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() { @@ -257,21 +218,23 @@ impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + } fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) { - let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash(); + let block_hash = header.block_hash(); let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap(); for monitor in monitors.values_mut() { - monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator); + monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger); } } } -impl SimpleManyChannelMonitor +impl SimpleManyChannelMonitor where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - F::Target: FeeEstimator + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, + C::Target: ChainWatchInterface, { /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain /// interface with which to register to receive notifications. - pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc, broadcaster: T, logger: Arc, feeest: F) -> SimpleManyChannelMonitor { + pub fn new(chain_monitor: C, broadcaster: T, logger: L, feeest: F) -> SimpleManyChannelMonitor { let res = SimpleManyChannelMonitor { monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), chain_monitor, @@ -290,12 +253,15 @@ impl return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Channel monitor for given key is already present")), hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => e, }; - log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(monitor.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()[..])); - self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&monitor.funding_info.0.txid, &monitor.funding_info.1); - self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((monitor.funding_info.0.txid, monitor.funding_info.0.index as u32), &monitor.funding_info.1); - for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() { - for (idx, script) in outputs.iter().enumerate() { - self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((*txid, idx as u32), script); + { + let funding_txo = monitor.get_funding_txo(); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.0.to_channel_id()[..])); + self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&funding_txo.0.txid, &funding_txo.1); + self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((funding_txo.0.txid, funding_txo.0.index as u32), &funding_txo.1); + for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() { + for (idx, script) in outputs.iter().enumerate() { + self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((*txid, idx as u32), script); + } } } entry.insert(monitor); @@ -307,18 +273,22 @@ impl { - log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(orig_monitor)); - orig_monitor.update_monitor(update, &self.broadcaster) + log_trace!(self.logger, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(orig_monitor)); + orig_monitor.update_monitor(update, &self.broadcaster, &self.logger) }, None => Err(MonitorUpdateError("No such monitor registered")) } } } -impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor +impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - F::Target: FeeEstimator + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, + C::Target: ChainWatchInterface, { + type Keys = ChanSigner; + fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> { match self.add_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) { Ok(_) => Ok(()), @@ -333,20 +303,22 @@ impl Ma } } - fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec { - let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::new(); + fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec { + let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::new(); for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() { - pending_htlcs_updated.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated()); + pending_monitor_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()); } - pending_htlcs_updated + pending_monitor_events } } -impl events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor +impl events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - F::Target: FeeEstimator + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, + C::Target: ChainWatchInterface, { - fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec { + fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec { let mut pending_events = Vec::new(); for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() { pending_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_events()); @@ -409,34 +381,94 @@ pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_ #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] struct LocalSignedTx { /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster - txid: Sha256dHash, + txid: Txid, revocation_key: PublicKey, a_htlc_key: PublicKey, b_htlc_key: PublicKey, delayed_payment_key: PublicKey, per_commitment_point: PublicKey, - feerate_per_kw: u64, + feerate_per_kw: u32, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option, Option)>, } +/// We use this to track remote commitment transactions and htlcs outputs and +/// use it to generate any justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions. +#[derive(PartialEq)] +struct RemoteCommitmentTransaction { + remote_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, + remote_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, + on_remote_tx_csv: u16, + per_htlc: HashMap> +} + +impl Writeable for RemoteCommitmentTransaction { + fn write(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { + self.remote_delayed_payment_base_key.write(w)?; + self.remote_htlc_base_key.write(w)?; + w.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_remote_tx_csv))?; + w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?; + for (ref txid, ref htlcs) in self.per_htlc.iter() { + w.write_all(&txid[..])?; + w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlcs.len() as u64))?; + for &ref htlc in htlcs.iter() { + htlc.write(w)?; + } + } + Ok(()) + } +} +impl Readable for RemoteCommitmentTransaction { + fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result { + let remote_commitment_transaction = { + let remote_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(r)?; + let remote_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(r)?; + let on_remote_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(r)?; + let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?; + let mut per_htlc = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_htlc_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64)); + for _ in 0..per_htlc_len { + let txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?; + let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?; + let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32)); + for _ in 0..htlcs_count { + let htlc = Readable::read(r)?; + htlcs.push(htlc); + } + if let Some(_) = per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs) { + return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); + } + } + RemoteCommitmentTransaction { + remote_delayed_payment_base_key, + remote_htlc_base_key, + on_remote_tx_csv, + per_htlc, + } + }; + Ok(remote_commitment_transaction) + } +} + /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] pub(crate) enum InputMaterial { Revoked { - witness_script: Script, - pubkey: Option, - key: SecretKey, - is_htlc: bool, + per_commitment_point: PublicKey, + remote_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, + remote_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, + per_commitment_key: SecretKey, + input_descriptor: InputDescriptors, amount: u64, + htlc: Option, + on_remote_tx_csv: u16, }, RemoteHTLC { - witness_script: Script, - key: SecretKey, + per_commitment_point: PublicKey, + remote_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, + remote_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, preimage: Option, - amount: u64, - locktime: u32, + htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment }, LocalHTLC { preimage: Option, @@ -450,21 +482,24 @@ pub(crate) enum InputMaterial { impl Writeable for InputMaterial { fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { match self { - &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref witness_script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => { + &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref per_commitment_point, ref remote_delayed_payment_base_key, ref remote_htlc_base_key, ref per_commitment_key, ref input_descriptor, ref amount, ref htlc, ref on_remote_tx_csv} => { writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; - witness_script.write(writer)?; - pubkey.write(writer)?; - writer.write_all(&key[..])?; - is_htlc.write(writer)?; + per_commitment_point.write(writer)?; + remote_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?; + remote_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?; + writer.write_all(&per_commitment_key[..])?; + input_descriptor.write(writer)?; writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?; + htlc.write(writer)?; + on_remote_tx_csv.write(writer)?; }, - &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref witness_script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => { + &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref per_commitment_point, ref remote_delayed_payment_base_key, ref remote_htlc_base_key, ref preimage, ref htlc} => { writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; - witness_script.write(writer)?; - key.write(writer)?; + per_commitment_point.write(writer)?; + remote_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?; + remote_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?; preimage.write(writer)?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(*locktime))?; + htlc.write(writer)?; }, &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => { writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?; @@ -484,31 +519,37 @@ impl Readable for InputMaterial { fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result { let input_material = match ::read(reader)? { 0 => { - let witness_script = Readable::read(reader)?; - let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?; - let key = Readable::read(reader)?; - let is_htlc = Readable::read(reader)?; + let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?; + let remote_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?; + let remote_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?; + let per_commitment_key = Readable::read(reader)?; + let input_descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?; let amount = Readable::read(reader)?; + let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?; + let on_remote_tx_csv = Readable::read(reader)?; InputMaterial::Revoked { - witness_script, - pubkey, - key, - is_htlc, - amount + per_commitment_point, + remote_delayed_payment_base_key, + remote_htlc_base_key, + per_commitment_key, + input_descriptor, + amount, + htlc, + on_remote_tx_csv } }, 1 => { - let witness_script = Readable::read(reader)?; - let key = Readable::read(reader)?; + let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?; + let remote_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?; + let remote_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?; let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?; - let amount = Readable::read(reader)?; - let locktime = Readable::read(reader)?; + let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?; InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { - witness_script, - key, + per_commitment_point, + remote_delayed_payment_base_key, + remote_htlc_base_key, preimage, - amount, - locktime + htlc } }, 2 => { @@ -590,11 +631,6 @@ pub(super) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep { idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], }, - /// Indicates our channel is likely a stale version, we're closing, but this update should - /// allow us to spend what is ours if our counterparty broadcasts their latest state. - RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { - their_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, - }, /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest local /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed. ChannelForceClosed { @@ -637,12 +673,8 @@ impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep { idx.write(w)?; secret.write(w)?; }, - &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { ref their_current_per_commitment_point } => { - 4u8.write(w)?; - their_current_per_commitment_point.write(w)?; - }, &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { ref should_broadcast } => { - 5u8.write(w)?; + 4u8.write(w)?; should_broadcast.write(w)?; }, } @@ -692,11 +724,6 @@ impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep { }) }, 4u8 => { - Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { - their_current_per_commitment_point: Readable::read(r)?, - }) - }, - 5u8 => { Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: Readable::read(r)? }) @@ -713,7 +740,7 @@ impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep { /// information and are actively monitoring the chain. /// /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by -/// get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and +/// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state. pub struct ChannelMonitor { @@ -721,33 +748,31 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor { commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64, destination_script: Script, - broadcasted_local_revokable_script: Option<(Script, SecretKey, Script)>, - broadcasted_remote_payment_script: Option<(Script, SecretKey)>, + broadcasted_local_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>, + remote_payment_script: Script, shutdown_script: Script, keys: ChanSigner, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script), - current_remote_commitment_txid: Option, - prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option, + current_remote_commitment_txid: Option, + prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option, - their_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, - their_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, + remote_tx_cache: RemoteCommitmentTransaction, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option)>, - our_to_self_delay: u16, - their_to_self_delay: u16, + on_local_tx_csv: u16, commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, - remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap>)>>, + remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap>)>>, /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain. /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions. - remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap)>, + remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap)>, /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster. /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small). @@ -770,8 +795,8 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor { payment_preimages: HashMap, - pending_htlcs_updated: Vec, - pending_events: Vec, + pending_monitor_events: Vec, + pending_events: Vec, // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce @@ -782,7 +807,7 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor { // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly. - outputs_to_watch: HashMap>, + outputs_to_watch: HashMap>, #[cfg(test)] pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler, @@ -804,9 +829,72 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor { // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through // the full block_connected). - pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash, + last_block_hash: BlockHash, secp_ctx: Secp256k1, //TODO: dedup this a bit... - logger: Arc, +} + +/// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between +/// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing +/// events to it, while also taking any add/update_monitor events and passing them to some remote +/// server(s). +/// +/// In general, you must always have at least one local copy in memory, which must never fail to +/// update (as it is responsible for broadcasting the latest state in case the channel is closed), +/// and then persist it to various on-disk locations. If, for some reason, the in-memory copy fails +/// to update (eg out-of-memory or some other condition), you must immediately shut down without +/// taking any further action such as writing the current state to disk. This should likely be +/// accomplished via panic!() or abort(). +/// +/// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the +/// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If +/// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions +/// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel! +/// +/// User needs to notify implementors of ManyChannelMonitor when a new block is connected or +/// disconnected using their `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. However, rather +/// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the +/// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify +/// all registered listeners in one go. +pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync { + /// The concrete type which signs for transactions and provides access to our channel public + /// keys. + type Keys: ChannelKeys; + + /// Adds a monitor for the given `funding_txo`. + /// + /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with + /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected + /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it. + /// + /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in + /// monitor.get_outputs_to_watch() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about + /// any spends of any of the outputs. + /// + /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to + /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS. + fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>; + + /// Updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`. + /// + /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with + /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected + /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it. + /// + /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in + /// monitor.get_watch_outputs() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about + /// any spends of any of the outputs. + /// + /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to + /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS. + fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>; + + /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated + /// with success or failure. + /// + /// You should probably just call through to + /// ChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events() for each ChannelMonitor and return + /// the full list. + fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec; } #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] @@ -818,18 +906,16 @@ impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor { self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor || self.destination_script != other.destination_script || self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_local_revokable_script || - self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script != other.broadcasted_remote_payment_script || + self.remote_payment_script != other.remote_payment_script || self.keys.pubkeys() != other.keys.pubkeys() || self.funding_info != other.funding_info || self.current_remote_commitment_txid != other.current_remote_commitment_txid || self.prev_remote_commitment_txid != other.prev_remote_commitment_txid || - self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key || - self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key || + self.remote_tx_cache != other.remote_tx_cache || self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript || self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis || self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points || - self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay || - self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay || + self.on_local_tx_csv != other.on_local_tx_csv || self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets || self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints || self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain || @@ -839,7 +925,7 @@ impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor { self.current_local_commitment_number != other.current_local_commitment_number || self.current_local_commitment_tx != other.current_local_commitment_tx || self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages || - self.pending_htlcs_updated != other.pending_htlcs_updated || + self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events || self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf || self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch || @@ -861,7 +947,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the /// best chain) upon deserializing the object! - pub fn write_for_disk(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { + pub fn write_for_disk(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> { //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it. writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?; @@ -882,13 +968,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; } - if let Some(ref broadcasted_remote_payment_script) = self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script { - writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; - broadcasted_remote_payment_script.0.write(writer)?; - broadcasted_remote_payment_script.1.write(writer)?; - } else { - writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; - } + self.remote_payment_script.write(writer)?; self.shutdown_script.write(writer)?; self.keys.write(writer)?; @@ -898,8 +978,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { self.current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?; self.prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?; - writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.serialize())?; - writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.serialize())?; + self.remote_tx_cache.write(writer)?; self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?; self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?; @@ -921,8 +1000,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { }, } - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay))?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_local_tx_csv))?; self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?; @@ -971,7 +1049,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?; writer.write_all(&$local_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?; writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?; for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output); @@ -1003,9 +1081,15 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?; } - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_htlcs_updated.len() as u64))?; - for data in self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter() { - data.write(writer)?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_monitor_events.len() as u64))?; + for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() { + match event { + MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => { + 0u8.write(writer)?; + upd.write(writer)?; + }, + MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(_) => 1u8.write(writer)? + } } writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?; @@ -1053,21 +1137,24 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { impl ChannelMonitor { pub(super) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, - our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script), - their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, - their_to_self_delay: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, + on_remote_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script), + remote_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, + on_local_tx_csv: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64, - initial_local_commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, - logger: Arc) -> ChannelMonitor { + initial_local_commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction) -> ChannelMonitor { assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48)); - let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize()); + let our_channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize()); let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script(); + let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize()); + let remote_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script(); - let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys.clone(), their_to_self_delay, logger.clone()); + let remote_tx_cache = RemoteCommitmentTransaction { remote_delayed_payment_base_key: *remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: *remote_htlc_base_key, on_remote_tx_csv, per_htlc: HashMap::new() }; - let local_tx_sequence = initial_local_commitment_tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64; - let local_tx_locktime = initial_local_commitment_tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64; + let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys.clone(), on_local_tx_csv); + + let local_tx_sequence = initial_local_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64; + let local_tx_locktime = initial_local_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64; let local_commitment_tx = LocalSignedTx { txid: initial_local_commitment_tx.txid(), revocation_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.revocation_key, @@ -1091,7 +1178,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { destination_script: destination_script.clone(), broadcasted_local_revokable_script: None, - broadcasted_remote_payment_script: None, + remote_payment_script, shutdown_script, keys, @@ -1099,14 +1186,12 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { current_remote_commitment_txid: None, prev_remote_commitment_txid: None, - their_htlc_base_key: their_htlc_base_key.clone(), - their_delayed_payment_base_key: their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone(), + remote_tx_cache, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis, their_cur_revocation_points: None, - our_to_self_delay, - their_to_self_delay, + on_local_tx_csv, commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(), remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(), @@ -1119,7 +1204,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { current_local_commitment_number: 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx_sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx_locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor), payment_preimages: HashMap::new(), - pending_htlcs_updated: Vec::new(), + pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(), pending_events: Vec::new(), onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(), @@ -1132,7 +1217,6 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { last_block_hash: Default::default(), secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(), - logger, } } @@ -1191,7 +1275,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible. /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers. - pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) { + pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger { // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close. // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of @@ -1201,11 +1285,11 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(); - log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len()); - log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx)); + log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len()); + log_trace!(logger, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx)); self.prev_remote_commitment_txid = self.current_remote_commitment_txid.take(); self.current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid); - self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs); + self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs.clone()); self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number; //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff match self.their_cur_revocation_points { @@ -1226,31 +1310,27 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None)); } } - } - - pub(super) fn provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) { - if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().payment_basepoint) { - let to_remote_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0) - .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&payment_key.serialize())[..]) - .into_script(); - if let Ok(to_remote_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &self.keys.payment_base_key()) { - self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script = Some((to_remote_script, to_remote_key)); + let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len()); + for htlc in htlc_outputs { + if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() { + htlcs.push(htlc.0); } } + self.remote_tx_cache.per_htlc.insert(new_txid, htlcs); } /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated. - /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called. + /// Panics if set_on_local_tx_csv has never been called. pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option, Option)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { if self.local_tx_signed { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("A local commitment tx has already been signed, no new local commitment txn can be sent to our counterparty")); } let txid = commitment_tx.txid(); - let sequence = commitment_tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64; - let locktime = commitment_tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64; + let sequence = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64; + let locktime = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64; let mut new_local_commitment_tx = LocalSignedTx { txid, revocation_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.revocation_key, @@ -1281,43 +1361,23 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone()); } - pub(super) fn broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(&mut self, broadcaster: &B) + pub(super) fn broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L) where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + L::Target: Logger, { - for tx in self.get_latest_local_commitment_txn().iter() { + for tx in self.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(logger).iter() { broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx); } - } - - /// Used in Channel to cheat wrt the update_ids since it plays games, will be removed soon! - pub(super) fn update_monitor_ooo(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { - for update in updates.updates.drain(..) { - match update { - ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => { - if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); } - self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)? - }, - ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } => - self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point), - ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => - self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage), - ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => - self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?, - ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { their_current_per_commitment_point } => - self.provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(their_current_per_commitment_point), - ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => {}, - } - } - self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id; - Ok(()) + self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0)); } /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel /// itself. /// /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id. - pub fn update_monitor(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> + pub fn update_monitor(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + L::Target: Logger, { if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id { panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!"); @@ -1329,19 +1389,17 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)? }, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } => - self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point), + self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger), ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage), ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?, - ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { their_current_per_commitment_point } => - self.provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(their_current_per_commitment_point), ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => { self.lockdown_from_offchain = true; if should_broadcast { - self.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(broadcaster); + self.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger); } else { - log_error!(self, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take"); + log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take"); } } } @@ -1357,13 +1415,13 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for. - pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> OutPoint { - self.funding_info.0 + pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) { + &self.funding_info } /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected(). - pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap> { + pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap> { &self.outputs_to_watch } @@ -1371,7 +1429,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!). - pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> { + pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, &Script)> { let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2); for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() { for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() { @@ -1382,10 +1440,10 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by - /// ChannelManager via ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(). - pub fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&mut self) -> Vec { + /// ChannelManager via ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(). + pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec { let mut ret = Vec::new(); - mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_htlcs_updated); + mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events); ret } @@ -1395,7 +1453,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// This is called by ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors. - pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec { + pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec { let mut ret = Vec::new(); mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events); ret @@ -1424,7 +1482,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions. /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of /// revoked remote commitment tx - fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec, (Sha256dHash, Vec)) { + fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec, (Txid, Vec)) where L::Target: Logger { // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new(); @@ -1448,27 +1506,16 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret)); let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key); let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)); - let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.keys.revocation_base_key())); - let b_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint)); - let local_payment_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.payment_base_key())); - let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key)); - let a_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_htlc_base_key)); + let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key)); - let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key); + let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv, &delayed_key); let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(); - self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script = { - // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the - // script_pubkey version - let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_payment_key).serialize()); - Some((Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script(), local_payment_key)) - }; - // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_local & to_remote) for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { - let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { witness_script: revokeable_redeemscript.clone(), pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: outp.value }; - claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data}); + let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: outp.value, htlc: None, on_remote_tx_csv: self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv}; + claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data}); } } @@ -1476,13 +1523,11 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option { for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() { if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index { - let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey); if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() || - tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 || - tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() { + tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 { return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user } - let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { witness_script: expected_script, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value }; + let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc: Some(htlc.clone()), on_remote_tx_csv: self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv}; claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data }); } } @@ -1491,7 +1536,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction! - log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len()); + log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len()); watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone()); self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect())); @@ -1500,7 +1545,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) { for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() { if let &Some(ref source) = source_option { - log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { let e = entry.get_mut(); @@ -1542,7 +1587,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone()); self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect())); - log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid); + log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid); macro_rules! check_htlc_fails { ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => { @@ -1563,7 +1608,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { continue $id; } } - log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx); + log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx); match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { let e = entry.get_mut(); @@ -1600,32 +1645,24 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None } } else { None }; if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option { - let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)); - let b_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint)); - let htlc_privkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.htlc_base_key())); - let a_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.their_htlc_base_key)); - let local_payment_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.payment_base_key())); - - self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script = { + self.remote_payment_script = { // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the // script_pubkey version - let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_payment_key).serialize()); - Some((Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script(), local_payment_key)) + let payment_hash160 = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize()); + Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script() }; // Then, try to find htlc outputs for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() { if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index { - let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey); if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() || - tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 || - tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() { + tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 { return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user } let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None }; let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true }; if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered { - let witness_data = InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { witness_script: expected_script, key: htlc_privkey, preimage, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: htlc.cltv_expiry }; + let witness_data = InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { per_commitment_point: *revocation_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, preimage, htlc: htlc.clone() }; claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data }); } } @@ -1637,7 +1674,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key - fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32) -> (Vec, Option<(Sha256dHash, Vec)>) { + fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec, Option<(Txid, Vec)>) where L::Target: Logger { let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 { return (Vec::new(), None) @@ -1655,30 +1692,34 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); }; let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret)); let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key); - let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)); - let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.keys.revocation_base_key())); - let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key)); - let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key); - - log_trace!(self, "Remote HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0); - let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { witness_script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value }; - let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data }); + + log_trace!(logger, "Remote HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0); + let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, remote_delayed_payment_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_delayed_payment_base_key, remote_htlc_base_key: self.remote_tx_cache.remote_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: tx.output[0].value, htlc: None, on_remote_tx_csv: self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv }; + let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.remote_tx_cache.on_remote_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data }); (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, tx.output.clone()))) } - fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> (Vec, Vec, Option<(Script, SecretKey, Script)>) { + fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> (Vec, Vec, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) { let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len()); let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len()); - let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key); - let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, self.keys.delayed_payment_base_key()) { - Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), local_delayedkey, redeemscript)) - } else { None }; + let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.on_local_tx_csv, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key); + let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), local_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), local_tx.revocation_key.clone())); for &(ref htlc, _, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index { - let preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*preimage) } else { None }; - claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::std::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: local_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { preimage, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }}); + claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::std::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: local_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 }, + witness_data: InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { + preimage: if !htlc.offered { + if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { + Some(preimage.clone()) + } else { + // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage + continue; + } + } else { None }, + amount: htlc.amount_msat, + }}); watch_outputs.push(commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()); } } @@ -1689,14 +1730,14 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet) /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints. /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds. - fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec, (Sha256dHash, Vec)) { + fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec, (Txid, Vec)) where L::Target: Logger { let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); let mut claim_requests = Vec::new(); let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new(); macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf { ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => { - log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { let e = entry.get_mut(); @@ -1730,13 +1771,13 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { if self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid { is_local_tx = true; - log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim"); + log_trace!(logger, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim"); let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(tx, &self.current_local_commitment_tx); append_onchain_update!(res); } else if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx { if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid { is_local_tx = true; - log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim"); + log_trace!(logger, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim"); let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(tx, local_tx); append_onchain_update!(res); } @@ -1773,16 +1814,22 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you. /// In any-case, choice is up to the user. - pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&mut self) -> Vec { - log_trace!(self, "Getting signed latest local commitment transaction!"); + pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec where L::Target: Logger { + log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest local commitment transaction!"); self.local_tx_signed = true; if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_local_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) { let txid = commitment_tx.txid(); let mut res = vec![commitment_tx]; for htlc in self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { - if let Some(htlc_index) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index { - let preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(*preimage) } else { None }; - if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(txid, htlc_index, preimage) { + if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index { + let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered { + if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else { + // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage + continue; + } + } else { None }; + if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx( + &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) { res.push(htlc_tx); } } @@ -1797,16 +1844,22 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_local_commitment_txn used by our test framework /// to bypass LocalCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate /// revoked commitment transaction. - #[cfg(test)] - pub fn unsafe_get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&mut self) -> Vec { - log_trace!(self, "Getting signed copy of latest local commitment transaction!"); + #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))] + pub fn unsafe_get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec where L::Target: Logger { + log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest local commitment transaction!"); if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_local_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) { let txid = commitment_tx.txid(); let mut res = vec![commitment_tx]; for htlc in self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { - if let Some(htlc_index) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index { - let preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(*preimage) } else { None }; - if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(txid, htlc_index, preimage) { + if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index { + let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered { + if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else { + // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage + continue; + } + } else { None }; + if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx( + &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) { res.push(htlc_tx); } } @@ -1821,9 +1874,10 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// Eventually this should be pub and, roughly, implement ChainListener, however this requires /// &mut self, as well as returns new spendable outputs and outpoints to watch for spending of /// on-chain. - fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F)-> Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec)> + fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)-> Vec<(Txid, Vec)> where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - F::Target: FeeEstimator + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, { for tx in txn_matched { let mut output_val = 0; @@ -1834,7 +1888,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } - log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len()); + log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len()); let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new(); let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new(); for tx in txn_matched { @@ -1846,12 +1900,12 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output; if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 { if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 { - let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height); + let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height, &logger); if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() { watch_outputs.push(new_outputs); } if new_outpoints.is_empty() { - let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height); + let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height, &logger); if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() { watch_outputs.push(new_outputs); } @@ -1861,7 +1915,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } else { if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) { - let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height); + let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger); claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints); if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option { watch_outputs.push(new_outputs); @@ -1872,16 +1926,18 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus, // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check. - self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height); + self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger); - self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height); + self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger); } - let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(height); + let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(height, &logger); if should_broadcast { claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), vout: self.funding_info.0.index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::Funding { funding_redeemscript: self.funding_redeemscript.clone() }}); } if should_broadcast { + self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0)); if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_local_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) { + self.local_tx_signed = true; let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&commitment_tx, &self.current_local_commitment_tx); if !new_outputs.is_empty() { watch_outputs.push((self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs)); @@ -1893,23 +1949,24 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { for ev in events { match ev { OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => { - log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0)); - self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate { + log_trace!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0)); + self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate { payment_hash: htlc_update.1, payment_preimage: None, source: htlc_update.0, - }); + })); }, OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => { - log_trace!(self, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor)); - self.pending_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs { + log_trace!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor)); + self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs: vec![descriptor] }); } } } } - self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, &*broadcaster, &*fee_estimator); + + self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, &*broadcaster, &*fee_estimator, &*logger); self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone(); for &(ref txid, ref output_scripts) in watch_outputs.iter() { @@ -1919,23 +1976,24 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { watch_outputs } - fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F) + fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface, - F::Target: FeeEstimator + F::Target: FeeEstimator, + L::Target: Logger, { - log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height); + log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height); if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) { //We may discard: //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected } - self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator); + self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger); self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone(); } - pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool { + fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger { // We need to consider all HTLCs which are: // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or @@ -1975,7 +2033,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered; if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) || (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) { - log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry); + log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry); return true; } } @@ -2000,7 +2058,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC - fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) { + fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger { 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input { let mut payment_data = None; let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33) @@ -2017,12 +2075,12 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered; if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) || (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) { - log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!", + log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!", $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(), if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" }); } else { - log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}", + log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}", $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(), if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" }); @@ -2093,25 +2151,29 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data { let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]); if accepted_preimage_claim { - if !self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter().any(|update| update.source == source) { + if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any( + |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) { payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]); - self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate { + self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate { source, payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash - }); + })); } } else if offered_preimage_claim { - if !self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter().any(|update| update.source == source) { + if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any( + |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { + upd.source == source + } else { false }) { payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]); - self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate { + self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate { source, payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash - }); + })); } } else { - log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { let e = entry.get_mut(); @@ -2135,44 +2197,57 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own - fn is_paying_spendable_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) { + fn is_paying_spendable_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger { let mut spendable_output = None; for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us + if i > ::std::u16::MAX as usize { + // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the + // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not + // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who + // wishes to give us money for no reason. + // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere + // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's + // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently + // non-standard due to their size. + // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in + // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills + // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case. + continue; + } if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script { spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { - outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 }, + outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 }, output: outp.clone(), }); break; } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_local_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script { if broadcasted_local_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey { spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { - outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 }, - key: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.1, - witness_script: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.2.clone(), - to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay, - output: outp.clone(), - }); - break; - } - } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_remote_payment_script) = self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script { - if broadcasted_remote_payment_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey { - spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { - outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 }, - key: broadcasted_remote_payment_script.1, + outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 }, + per_commitment_point: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.1, + to_self_delay: self.on_local_tx_csv, output: outp.clone(), + key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(), + remote_revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.2.clone(), }); break; } + } else if self.remote_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey { + spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputRemotePayment { + outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 }, + output: outp.clone(), + key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(), + }); + break; } else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script { spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { - outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 }, + outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 }, output: outp.clone(), }); } } if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output { - log_trace!(self, "Maturing {} until {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + log_trace!(logger, "Maturing {} until {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) { hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { let e = entry.get_mut(); @@ -2188,8 +2263,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024; -impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) { - fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc) -> Result { +impl Readable for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor) { + fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result { macro_rules! unwrap_obj { ($key: expr) => { match $key { @@ -2212,22 +2287,14 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dH let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = match ::read(reader)? { 0 => { let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?; - let local_delayedkey = Readable::read(reader)?; + let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?; let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?; - Some((revokable_address, local_delayedkey, revokable_script)) - }, - 1 => { None }, - _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), - }; - let broadcasted_remote_payment_script = match ::read(reader)? { - 0 => { - let payment_address = Readable::read(reader)?; - let payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?; - Some((payment_address, payment_key)) + Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script)) }, 1 => { None }, _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), }; + let remote_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?; let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?; let keys = Readable::read(reader)?; @@ -2241,8 +2308,7 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dH let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?; let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?; - let their_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?; - let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?; + let remote_tx_cache = Readable::read(reader)?; let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?; let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?; @@ -2261,8 +2327,7 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dH } }; - let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let their_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let on_local_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?; let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?; @@ -2285,7 +2350,7 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dH let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64)); for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len { - let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?; + let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?; let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32)); for _ in 0..htlcs_count { @@ -2299,7 +2364,7 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dH let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32)); for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len { - let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?; + let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?; let commitment_number = ::read(reader)?.0; let outputs_count = ::read(reader)?; let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8)); @@ -2330,7 +2395,7 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dH let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?; let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?; let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?; - let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let feerate_per_kw: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128)); @@ -2375,21 +2440,26 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dH } } - let pending_htlcs_updated_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_htlcs_updated_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))); - for _ in 0..pending_htlcs_updated_len { - pending_htlcs_updated.push(Readable::read(reader)?); + let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))); + for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len { + let ev = match ::read(reader)? { + 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?), + 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_info.0), + _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) + }; + pending_monitor_events.push(ev); } let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::())); + let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::())); for _ in 0..pending_events_len { if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? { pending_events.push(event); } } - let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?; + let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?; let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128)); @@ -2420,7 +2490,7 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dH } let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::() + mem::size_of::>()))); + let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::() + mem::size_of::>()))); for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len { let txid = Readable::read(reader)?; let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; @@ -2432,7 +2502,7 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dH return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } } - let onchain_tx_handler = ReadableArgs::read(reader, logger.clone())?; + let onchain_tx_handler = Readable::read(reader)?; let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?; let local_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?; @@ -2443,7 +2513,7 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dH destination_script, broadcasted_local_revokable_script, - broadcasted_remote_payment_script, + remote_payment_script, shutdown_script, keys, @@ -2451,14 +2521,12 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dH current_remote_commitment_txid, prev_remote_commitment_txid, - their_htlc_base_key, - their_delayed_payment_base_key, + remote_tx_cache, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, their_cur_revocation_points, - our_to_self_delay, - their_to_self_delay, + on_local_tx_csv, commitment_secrets, remote_claimable_outpoints, @@ -2471,7 +2539,7 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dH current_local_commitment_number, payment_preimages, - pending_htlcs_updated, + pending_monitor_events, pending_events, onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf, @@ -2484,7 +2552,6 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dH last_block_hash, secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(), - logger, })) } } @@ -2496,10 +2563,10 @@ mod tests { use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType}; use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint; use bitcoin::util::bip143; - use bitcoin_hashes::Hash; - use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; - use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash; - use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex; + use bitcoin::hashes::Hash; + use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; + use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex; + use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid; use hex; use chain::transaction::OutPoint; use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash}; @@ -2508,9 +2575,8 @@ mod tests { use ln::chan_utils; use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction}; use util::test_utils::TestLogger; - use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey}; - use secp256k1::Secp256k1; - use rand::{thread_rng,Rng}; + use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey}; + use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1; use std::sync::Arc; use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys; @@ -2524,10 +2590,8 @@ mod tests { let mut preimages = Vec::new(); { - let mut rng = thread_rng(); - for _ in 0..20 { - let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]); - rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]); + for i in 0..20 { + let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]); let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner()); preimages.push((preimage, hash)); } @@ -2577,22 +2641,23 @@ mod tests { SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), [41; 32], 0, + (0, 0) ); // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the // old state. let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(), - (OutPoint { txid: Sha256dHash::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()), + (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), - 10, Script::new(), 46, 0, LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), logger.clone()); + 10, Script::new(), 46, 0, LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy()); monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap(); - monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key); - monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key); - monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key); - monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key); + monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger); + monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger); + monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger); + monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger); for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() { monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage); } @@ -2671,7 +2736,7 @@ mod tests { } let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(); - let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap(); + let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap(); // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };