X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannelmonitor.rs;h=514a95d27db9339edc8b78989a0477695ae102ab;hb=f2b7ccaa868a2b955b56164ba63da8744ffb6d40;hp=20e8a2fdabe4cbad97cd816fd2b0d35e7e8526a9;hpb=3670dd086ca43295d186d3b957fa99a9d1c458f0;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs index 20e8a2fd..514a95d2 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs @@ -12,13 +12,12 @@ //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices. use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader; -use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction}; +use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction}; use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint; use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder}; use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; use bitcoin::consensus::encode; use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash; -use bitcoin::util::bip143; use bitcoin_hashes::Hash; use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; @@ -31,20 +30,60 @@ use secp256k1; use ln::msgs::DecodeError; use ln::chan_utils; -use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType}; +use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType}; use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash}; -use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT}; +use ln::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler; +use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator}; use chain::transaction::OutPoint; use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys}; use util::logger::Logger; -use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, U48}; +use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48}; use util::{byte_utils, events}; -use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet}; +use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map}; use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex}; use std::{hash,cmp, mem}; use std::ops::Deref; +/// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the +/// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of. +#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))] +#[derive(Clone)] +#[must_use] +pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate { + pub(super) updates: Vec, + /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this + /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly + /// increasing and increase by one for each new update. + /// + /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned + /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given + /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called. + pub update_id: u64, +} + +impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate { + fn write(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { + self.update_id.write(w)?; + (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?; + for update_step in self.updates.iter() { + update_step.write(w)?; + } + Ok(()) + } +} +impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate { + fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result { + let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?; + let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?; + let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::std::mem::size_of::())); + for _ in 0..len { + updates.push(Readable::read(r)?); + } + Ok(Self { update_id, updates }) + } +} + /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update. #[derive(Clone)] pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr { @@ -52,13 +91,13 @@ pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr { /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future). /// /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or - /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party. - /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore - /// the channel to an operational state. + /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party. Once the update(s) which failed + /// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to + /// restore the channel to an operational state. /// - /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be - /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should - /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP. + /// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If + /// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before + /// writing out the latest ChannelManager state. /// /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting @@ -69,8 +108,15 @@ pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr { /// been "frozen". /// /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call - /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal - /// channel operation. + /// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel + /// operation. + /// + /// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call + /// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along + /// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a + /// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the + /// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at + /// reload-time. /// /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all @@ -85,9 +131,9 @@ pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr { } /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is -/// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this -/// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was -/// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates. +/// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this +/// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was +/// corrupted. /// Contains a human-readable error message. #[derive(Debug)] pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str); @@ -104,7 +150,7 @@ impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source }); /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing -/// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote +/// events to it, while also taking any add/update_monitor events and passing them to some remote /// server(s). /// /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the @@ -118,7 +164,7 @@ impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source }); /// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify /// all registered listeners in one go. pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync { - /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`. + /// Adds a monitor for the given `funding_txo`. /// /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected @@ -129,8 +175,22 @@ pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync { /// any spends of any of the outputs. /// /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to - /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in funds loss. - fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>; + /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS. + fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>; + + /// Updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`. + /// + /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with + /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected + /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it. + /// + /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in + /// monitor.get_watch_outputs() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about + /// any spends of any of the outputs. + /// + /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to + /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS. + fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>; /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated /// with success or failure. @@ -152,33 +212,31 @@ pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync { /// /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation. -pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface { +pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor + where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator +{ #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly pub monitors: Mutex>>, #[cfg(not(test))] monitors: Mutex>>, chain_monitor: Arc, broadcaster: T, - pending_events: Mutex>, logger: Arc, - fee_estimator: Arc + fee_estimator: F } -impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor - where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface +impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send> + ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor + where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator { fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) { let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash(); - let mut new_events: Vec = Vec::with_capacity(0); { let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap(); for monitor in monitors.values_mut() { - let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator); - if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 { - new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs { - outputs: spendable_outputs, - }); - } + let txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator); for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs { for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() { @@ -187,8 +245,6 @@ impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + } } } - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - pending_events.append(&mut new_events); } fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) { @@ -200,17 +256,17 @@ impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + } } -impl SimpleManyChannelMonitor - where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface +impl SimpleManyChannelMonitor + where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator { /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain /// interface with which to register to receive notifications. - pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc, broadcaster: T, logger: Arc, feeest: Arc) -> SimpleManyChannelMonitor { + pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc, broadcaster: T, logger: Arc, feeest: F) -> SimpleManyChannelMonitor { let res = SimpleManyChannelMonitor { monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), chain_monitor, broadcaster, - pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), logger, fee_estimator: feeest, }; @@ -219,14 +275,11 @@ impl) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { + pub fn add_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap(); - match monitors.get_mut(&key) { - Some(orig_monitor) => { - log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage)); - return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor); - }, - None => {} + let entry = match monitors.entry(key) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Channel monitor for given key is already present")), + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => e, }; match monitor.key_storage { Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => { @@ -250,16 +303,36 @@ impl Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { + let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap(); + match monitors.get_mut(&key) { + Some(orig_monitor) => { + log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(orig_monitor.key_storage)); + orig_monitor.update_monitor(update) + }, + None => Err(MonitorUpdateError("No such monitor registered")) + } + } } -impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor - where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface +impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor + where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator { - fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> { - match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) { + fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> { + match self.add_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) { + Ok(_) => Ok(()), + Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure), + } + } + + fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> { + match self.update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, update) { Ok(_) => Ok(()), Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure), } @@ -274,20 +347,22 @@ impl ManyChannelMonitor events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor - where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface +impl events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor + where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator { fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec { - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - let mut ret = Vec::new(); - mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events); - ret + let mut pending_events = Vec::new(); + for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() { + pending_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_events()); + } + pending_events } } /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction, /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction. -const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12; +pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12; /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the /// HTLC-Success transaction. /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a @@ -314,7 +389,6 @@ pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3; /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint. pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6; -#[derive(Clone)] enum Storage { Local { keys: ChanSigner, @@ -371,36 +445,27 @@ struct LocalSignedTx { htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option, Option)>, } -#[derive(PartialEq)] -enum InputDescriptors { - RevokedOfferedHTLC, - RevokedReceivedHTLC, - OfferedHTLC, - ReceivedHTLC, - RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output -} - /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] -enum InputMaterial { +pub(crate) enum InputMaterial { Revoked { - script: Script, + witness_script: Script, pubkey: Option, key: SecretKey, is_htlc: bool, amount: u64, }, RemoteHTLC { - script: Script, + witness_script: Script, key: SecretKey, preimage: Option, amount: u64, locktime: u32, }, LocalHTLC { - script: Script, + witness_script: Script, sigs: (Signature, Signature), preimage: Option, amount: u64, @@ -410,29 +475,25 @@ enum InputMaterial { impl Writeable for InputMaterial { fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { match self { - &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => { + &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref witness_script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => { writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; - script.write(writer)?; + witness_script.write(writer)?; pubkey.write(writer)?; writer.write_all(&key[..])?; - if *is_htlc { - writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; - } else { - writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; - } + is_htlc.write(writer)?; writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?; }, - &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => { + &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref witness_script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => { writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; - script.write(writer)?; + witness_script.write(writer)?; key.write(writer)?; preimage.write(writer)?; writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?; writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(*locktime))?; }, - &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref script, ref sigs, ref preimage, ref amount } => { + &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref witness_script, ref sigs, ref preimage, ref amount } => { writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?; - script.write(writer)?; + witness_script.write(writer)?; sigs.0.write(writer)?; sigs.1.write(writer)?; preimage.write(writer)?; @@ -443,21 +504,17 @@ impl Writeable for InputMaterial { } } -impl Readable for InputMaterial { - fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result { - let input_material = match >::read(reader)? { +impl Readable for InputMaterial { + fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result { + let input_material = match ::read(reader)? { 0 => { - let script = Readable::read(reader)?; + let witness_script = Readable::read(reader)?; let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?; let key = Readable::read(reader)?; - let is_htlc = match >::read(reader)? { - 0 => true, - 1 => false, - _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), - }; + let is_htlc = Readable::read(reader)?; let amount = Readable::read(reader)?; InputMaterial::Revoked { - script, + witness_script, pubkey, key, is_htlc, @@ -465,13 +522,13 @@ impl Readable for InputMaterial { } }, 1 => { - let script = Readable::read(reader)?; + let witness_script = Readable::read(reader)?; let key = Readable::read(reader)?; let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?; let amount = Readable::read(reader)?; let locktime = Readable::read(reader)?; InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { - script, + witness_script, key, preimage, amount, @@ -479,13 +536,13 @@ impl Readable for InputMaterial { } }, 2 => { - let script = Readable::read(reader)?; + let witness_script = Readable::read(reader)?; let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?; let our_sig = Readable::read(reader)?; let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?; let amount = Readable::read(reader)?; InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { - script, + witness_script, sigs: (their_sig, our_sig), preimage, amount @@ -497,85 +554,184 @@ impl Readable for InputMaterial { } } +/// ClaimRequest is a descriptor structure to communicate between detection +/// and reaction module. They are generated by ChannelMonitor while parsing +/// onchain txn leaked from a channel and handed over to OnchainTxHandler which +/// is responsible for opportunistic aggregation, selecting and enforcing +/// bumping logic, building and signing transactions. +pub(crate) struct ClaimRequest { + // Block height before which claiming is exclusive to one party, + // after reaching it, claiming may be contentious. + pub(crate) absolute_timelock: u32, + // Timeout tx must have nLocktime set which means aggregating multiple + // ones must take the higher nLocktime among them to satisfy all of them. + // Sadly it has few pitfalls, a) it takes longuer to get fund back b) CLTV_DELTA + // of a sooner-HTLC could be swallowed by the highest nLocktime of the HTLC set. + // Do simplify we mark them as non-aggregable. + pub(crate) aggregable: bool, + // Basic bitcoin outpoint (txid, vout) + pub(crate) outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint, + // Following outpoint type, set of data needed to generate transaction digest + // and satisfy witness program. + pub(crate) witness_data: InputMaterial +} + /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY) #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] enum OnchainEvent { - /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from - /// bump-txn candidate buffer. - Claim { - claim_request: Sha256dHash, - }, /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash), }, - /// Claim tx aggregate multiple claimable outpoints. One of the outpoint may be claimed by a remote party tx. - /// In this case, we need to drop the outpoint and regenerate a new claim tx. By safety, we keep tracking - /// the outpoint to be sure to resurect it back to the claim tx if reorgs happen. - ContentiousOutpoint { - outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint, - input_material: InputMaterial, - } } -/// Higher-level cache structure needed to re-generate bumped claim txn if needed -#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] -pub struct ClaimTxBumpMaterial { - // At every block tick, used to check if pending claiming tx is taking too - // much time for confirmation and we need to bump it. - height_timer: u32, - // Tracked in case of reorg to wipe out now-superflous bump material - feerate_previous: u64, - // Soonest timelocks among set of outpoints claimed, used to compute - // a priority of not feerate - soonest_timelock: u32, - // Cache of script, pubkey, sig or key to solve claimable outputs scriptpubkey. - per_input_material: HashMap, +const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; +const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; + +#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))] +#[derive(Clone)] +pub(super) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep { + LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { + // TODO: We really need to not be generating a fully-signed transaction in Channel and + // passing it here, we need to hold off so that the ChanSigner can enforce a + // only-sign-local-state-for-broadcast once invariant: + commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, + local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, + feerate_per_kw: u64, + htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option, Option)>, + }, + LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { + unsigned_commitment_tx: Transaction, // TODO: We should actually only need the txid here + htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option>)>, + commitment_number: u64, + their_revocation_point: PublicKey, + }, + PaymentPreimage { + payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, + }, + CommitmentSecret { + idx: u64, + secret: [u8; 32], + }, + /// Indicates our channel is likely a stale version, we're closing, but this update should + /// allow us to spend what is ours if our counterparty broadcasts their latest state. + RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { + their_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, + }, } -impl Writeable for ClaimTxBumpMaterial { - fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.height_timer))?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.feerate_previous))?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.soonest_timelock))?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_input_material.len() as u64))?; - for (outp, tx_material) in self.per_input_material.iter() { - outp.write(writer)?; - tx_material.write(writer)?; +impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep { + fn write(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { + match self { + &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref local_keys, ref feerate_per_kw, ref htlc_outputs } => { + 0u8.write(w)?; + commitment_tx.write(w)?; + local_keys.write(w)?; + feerate_per_kw.write(w)?; + (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?; + for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() { + output.write(w)?; + signature.write(w)?; + source.write(w)?; + } + } + &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { ref unsigned_commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => { + 1u8.write(w)?; + unsigned_commitment_tx.write(w)?; + commitment_number.write(w)?; + their_revocation_point.write(w)?; + (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?; + for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() { + output.write(w)?; + source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(w)?; + } + }, + &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => { + 2u8.write(w)?; + payment_preimage.write(w)?; + }, + &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => { + 3u8.write(w)?; + idx.write(w)?; + secret.write(w)?; + }, + &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { ref their_current_per_commitment_point } => { + 4u8.write(w)?; + their_current_per_commitment_point.write(w)?; + }, } Ok(()) } } - -impl Readable for ClaimTxBumpMaterial { - fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result { - let height_timer = Readable::read(reader)?; - let feerate_previous = Readable::read(reader)?; - let soonest_timelock = Readable::read(reader)?; - let per_input_material_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_input_material_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128)); - for _ in 0 ..per_input_material_len { - let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?; - let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?; - per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material); - } - Ok(Self { height_timer, feerate_previous, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }) +impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep { + fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result { + match Readable::read(r)? { + 0u8 => { + Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { + commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?, + local_keys: Readable::read(r)?, + feerate_per_kw: Readable::read(r)?, + htlc_outputs: { + let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?; + let mut res = Vec::new(); + for _ in 0..len { + res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?)); + } + res + }, + }) + }, + 1u8 => { + Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { + unsigned_commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?, + commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?, + their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?, + htlc_outputs: { + let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?; + let mut res = Vec::new(); + for _ in 0..len { + res.push((Readable::read(r)?, as Readable>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o)))); + } + res + }, + }) + }, + 2u8 => { + Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { + payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?, + }) + }, + 3u8 => { + Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { + idx: Readable::read(r)?, + secret: Readable::read(r)?, + }) + }, + 4u8 => { + Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { + their_current_per_commitment_point: Readable::read(r)?, + }) + }, + _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), + } } } -const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; -const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; - /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs. /// /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date /// information and are actively monitoring the chain. -#[derive(Clone)] +/// +/// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by +/// get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and +/// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events +/// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state. pub struct ChannelMonitor { + latest_update_id: u64, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64, key_storage: Storage, @@ -589,7 +745,7 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor { our_to_self_delay: u16, their_to_self_delay: Option, - old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49], + commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap>)>>, /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain. /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are @@ -617,40 +773,13 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor { payment_preimages: HashMap, pending_htlcs_updated: Vec, + pending_events: Vec, - destination_script: Script, // Thanks to data loss protection, we may be able to claim our non-htlc funds // back, this is the script we have to spend from but we need to // scan every commitment transaction for that to_remote_rescue: Option<(Script, SecretKey)>, - // Used to track claiming requests. If claim tx doesn't confirm before height timer expiration we need to bump - // it (RBF or CPFP). If an input has been part of an aggregate tx at first claim try, we need to keep it within - // another bumped aggregate tx to comply with RBF rules. We may have multiple claiming txn in the flight for the - // same set of outpoints. One of the outpoints may be spent by a transaction not issued by us. That's why at - // block connection we scan all inputs and if any of them is among a set of a claiming request we test for set - // equality between spending transaction and claim request. If true, it means transaction was one our claiming one - // after a security delay of 6 blocks we remove pending claim request. If false, it means transaction wasn't and - // we need to regenerate new claim request we reduced set of stil-claimable outpoints. - // Key is identifier of the pending claim request, i.e the txid of the initial claiming transaction generated by - // us and is immutable until all outpoint of the claimable set are post-anti-reorg-delay solved. - // Entry is cache of elements need to generate a bumped claiming transaction (see ClaimTxBumpMaterial) - #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization - pub pending_claim_requests: HashMap, - #[cfg(not(test))] - pending_claim_requests: HashMap, - - // Used to link outpoints claimed in a connected block to a pending claim request. - // Key is outpoint than monitor parsing has detected we have keys/scripts to claim - // Value is (pending claim request identifier, confirmation_block), identifier - // is txid of the initial claiming transaction and is immutable until outpoint is - // post-anti-reorg-delay solved, confirmaiton_block is used to erase entry if - // block with output gets disconnected. - #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization - pub claimable_outpoints: HashMap, - #[cfg(not(test))] - claimable_outpoints: HashMap, - // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type. @@ -662,9 +791,14 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor { // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly. outputs_to_watch: HashMap>, + #[cfg(test)] + pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler, + #[cfg(not(test))] + onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler, + // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way. - // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep + // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through // the full block_connected). pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash, @@ -672,47 +806,13 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor { logger: Arc, } -macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee { - ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => { - { - $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority); - let mut fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000; - if $value <= fee { - $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal); - fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000; - if $value <= fee { - $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background); - fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000; - if $value <= fee { - log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)", - fee, $value); - false - } else { - log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)", - $value); - $value -= fee; - true - } - } else { - log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)", - $value); - $value -= fee; - true - } - } else { - $value -= fee; - true - } - } - } -} - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the /// underlying object impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor { fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool { - if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor || + if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id || + self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor || self.key_storage != other.key_storage || self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key || self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key || @@ -721,6 +821,7 @@ impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor { self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points || self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay || self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay || + self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets || self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints || self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain || self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number || @@ -729,20 +830,13 @@ impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor { self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx || self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages || self.pending_htlcs_updated != other.pending_htlcs_updated || - self.destination_script != other.destination_script || + self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly self.to_remote_rescue != other.to_remote_rescue || - self.pending_claim_requests != other.pending_claim_requests || - self.claimable_outpoints != other.claimable_outpoints || self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf || self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch { false } else { - for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) { - if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx { - return false - } - } true } } @@ -756,21 +850,11 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?; writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?; + self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?; + // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now: U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?; - macro_rules! write_option { - ($thing: expr) => { - match $thing { - &Some(ref t) => { - 1u8.write(writer)?; - t.write(writer)?; - }, - &None => 0u8.write(writer)?, - } - } - } - match self.key_storage { Storage::Local { ref keys, ref funding_key, ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => { writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; @@ -823,10 +907,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?; writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?; - for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() { - writer.write_all(secret)?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?; - } + self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?; macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment { ($htlc_output: expr) => { @@ -844,7 +925,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?; for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() { serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output); - write_option!(htlc_source); + htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?; } } @@ -887,7 +968,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } else { 0u8.write(writer)?; } - write_option!(htlc_source); + htlc_source.write(writer)?; } } } @@ -922,8 +1003,12 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { data.write(writer)?; } + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?; + for event in self.pending_events.iter() { + event.write(writer)?; + } + self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?; - self.destination_script.write(writer)?; if let Some((ref to_remote_script, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue { writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; to_remote_script.write(writer)?; @@ -932,39 +1017,17 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; } - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64))?; - for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, claim_tx_data) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() { - ancestor_claim_txid.write(writer)?; - claim_tx_data.write(writer)?; - } - - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?; - for (ref outp, ref claim_and_height) in self.claimable_outpoints.iter() { - outp.write(writer)?; - claim_and_height.0.write(writer)?; - claim_and_height.1.write(writer)?; - } - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?; for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() { writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?; writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?; for ev in events.iter() { match *ev { - OnchainEvent::Claim { ref claim_request } => { - writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; - claim_request.write(writer)?; - }, OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => { - writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; + 0u8.write(writer)?; htlc_update.0.write(writer)?; htlc_update.1.write(writer)?; }, - OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { ref outpoint, ref input_material } => { - writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?; - outpoint.write(writer)?; - input_material.write(writer)?; - } } } } @@ -977,6 +1040,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { script.write(writer)?; } } + self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?; Ok(()) } @@ -1005,32 +1069,45 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } impl ChannelMonitor { - pub(super) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, funding_key: &SecretKey, revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc) -> ChannelMonitor { + pub(super) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, + our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script), + their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, + their_to_self_delay: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, + commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64, + logger: Arc) -> ChannelMonitor { + + assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48)); + let funding_key = keys.funding_key().clone(); + let revocation_base_key = keys.revocation_base_key().clone(); + let htlc_base_key = keys.htlc_base_key().clone(); + let delayed_payment_base_key = keys.delayed_payment_base_key().clone(); + let payment_base_key = keys.payment_base_key().clone(); ChannelMonitor { - commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0, + latest_update_id: 0, + commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, key_storage: Storage::Local { keys, - funding_key: funding_key.clone(), - revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(), - htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(), - delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(), - payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(), + funding_key, + revocation_base_key, + htlc_base_key, + delayed_payment_base_key, + payment_base_key, shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(), - funding_info: None, + funding_info: Some(funding_info), current_remote_commitment_txid: None, prev_remote_commitment_txid: None, }, - their_htlc_base_key: None, - their_delayed_payment_base_key: None, - funding_redeemscript: None, - channel_value_satoshis: None, + their_htlc_base_key: Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone()), + their_delayed_payment_base_key: Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone()), + funding_redeemscript: Some(funding_redeemscript), + channel_value_satoshis: Some(channel_value_satoshis), their_cur_revocation_points: None, our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay, - their_to_self_delay: None, + their_to_self_delay: Some(their_to_self_delay), - old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], + commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(), remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(), remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(), remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(), @@ -1041,104 +1118,31 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { payment_preimages: HashMap::new(), pending_htlcs_updated: Vec::new(), + pending_events: Vec::new(), - destination_script: destination_script, to_remote_rescue: None, - pending_claim_requests: HashMap::new(), - - claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(), - onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(), outputs_to_watch: HashMap::new(), + onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), logger.clone()), + last_block_hash: Default::default(), secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(), logger, } } - fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize { - let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags - for inp in inputs { - // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary - tx_weight += match inp { - // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script - &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => { - 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133 - }, - // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script - &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => { - 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139 - }, - // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script - &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => { - 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133 - }, - // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script - &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => { - 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139 - }, - // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script - &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => { - 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77 - }, - }; - } - tx_weight - } - - fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 { - if timelock_expiration <= current_height || timelock_expiration - current_height <= 3 { - return current_height + 1 - } else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 { - return current_height + 3 - } - current_height + 15 - } - - #[inline] - fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 { - for i in 0..48 { - if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) { - return i - } - } - 48 - } - - #[inline] - fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] { - let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret; - for i in 0..bits { - let bitpos = bits - 1 - i; - if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) { - res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7); - res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner(); - } - } - res - } - /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key). pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { - let pos = ChannelMonitor::::place_secret(idx); - for i in 0..pos { - let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize]; - if ChannelMonitor::::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret { - return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one")); - } + if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) { + return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one")); } - if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx { - return Ok(()); - } - self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx); // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs. - // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here. if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage { if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() { for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() { @@ -1246,8 +1250,10 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated. /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called. - pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option, Option)>) { - assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some()); + pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option, Option)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { + if self.their_to_self_delay.is_none() { + return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Got a local commitment tx info update before we'd set basic information about the channel")); + } self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take(); self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx { txid: commitment_tx.txid(), @@ -1260,6 +1266,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs, }); + Ok(()) } /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all @@ -1268,106 +1275,56 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone()); } - /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor. - /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the - /// chain for new blocks/transactions. - pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { - match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => { - if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); } - let our_funding_info = funding_info; - if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage { - if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); } - // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially - // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey. - if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 { - return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!")); - } - } else { - return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !")); - } - }, - Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { - if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage { - unimplemented!(); - } else { - return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !")); - } - }, - } - let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret(); - let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret(); - if our_min_secret > other_min_secret { - self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?; - } - if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { - if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { - let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor); - let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor); - if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number { - self.key_storage = other.key_storage; - } - } - } - // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of - // local transactions to decide how to merge - if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret { - self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points; - for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() { - self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs); - } - if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx { - self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx); - } - if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { - self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx); - } - self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages; - self.to_remote_rescue = other.to_remote_rescue; - } - - self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number); + /// Used in Channel to cheat wrt the update_ids since it plays games, will be removed soon! + pub(super) fn update_monitor_ooo(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { + for update in updates.updates.drain(..) { + match update { + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, local_keys, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs } => + self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, local_keys, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs)?, + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } => + self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point), + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => + self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage), + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => + self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?, + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { their_current_per_commitment_point } => + self.provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(their_current_per_commitment_point), + } + } + self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id; Ok(()) } - /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is - /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to - /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it - /// provides slightly better privacy. - /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former - /// value as key to add_update_monitor. - pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) { - match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => { - *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info); - }, - Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { - panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?"); - } - } - } - - /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx - /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits - pub(super) fn set_basic_channel_info(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, their_to_self_delay: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) { - self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone()); - self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone()); - self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay); - self.funding_redeemscript = Some(funding_redeemscript); - self.channel_value_satoshis = Some(channel_value_satoshis); - assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48)); - self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor; + /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel + /// itself. + /// + /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id. + pub fn update_monitor(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { + if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id { + panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!"); + } + for update in updates.updates.drain(..) { + match update { + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, local_keys, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs } => + self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, local_keys, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs)?, + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } => + self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point), + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => + self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage), + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => + self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?, + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { their_current_per_commitment_point } => + self.provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(their_current_per_commitment_point), + } + } + self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id; + Ok(()) } - pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) { - match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => { - *funding_info = None; - }, - Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { - panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?"); - }, - } + /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this + /// ChannelMonitor. + pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 { + self.latest_update_id } /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for. @@ -1413,26 +1370,25 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { ret } + /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list + /// in the process. + /// + /// This is called by ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to + /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do + /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors. + pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec { + let mut ret = Vec::new(); + mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events); + ret + } + /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> { - for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() { - if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 { - return Some(ChannelMonitor::::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx)) - } - } - assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret()); - None + self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx) } pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 { - //TODO This can be optimized? - let mut min = 1 << 48; - for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() { - if idx < min { - min = idx; - } - } - min + self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() } pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 { @@ -1451,10 +1407,10 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions. /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of /// revoked remote commitment tx - fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec, (Sha256dHash, Vec), Vec) { + fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec, (Sha256dHash, Vec), Vec) { // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast - let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new(); + let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new(); let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new(); let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new(); @@ -1465,7 +1421,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { ( $thing : expr ) => { match $thing { Ok(a) => a, - Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs) + Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs) } }; } @@ -1474,23 +1430,21 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() { let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap(); let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret)); - let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref keys, ref payment_base_key, .. } => { + let (revocation_pubkey, revocation_key, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref keys, ref revocation_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => { let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key); (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)), + ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key)), ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint)), Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key)))) }, - Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { - let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key); - (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)), - ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)), - None) + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { + unimplemented!() }, }; let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap())); let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key { - None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs), + None => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs), Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)), }; @@ -1504,25 +1458,11 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script()) } else { None }; - let mut total_value = 0; - let mut inputs = Vec::new(); - let mut inputs_info = Vec::new(); - let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new(); - + // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_local & to_remote) for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { - inputs.push(TxIn { - previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { - txid: commitment_txid, - vout: idx as u32, - }, - script_sig: Script::new(), - sequence: 0xfffffffd, - witness: Vec::new(), - }); - inputs_desc.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput); - inputs_info.push((None, outp.value, self.our_to_self_delay as u32)); - total_value += outp.value; + let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { witness_script: revokeable_redeemscript.clone(), pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: outp.value }; + claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data}); } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() { spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, @@ -1532,99 +1472,26 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } - macro_rules! sign_input { - ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => { - { - let (sig, redeemscript, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { - let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else { - let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0; - chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey) - }; - let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]); - let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key)); - (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript, revocation_key) - }, - Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { - unimplemented!(); - } - }; - $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); - $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); - if $htlc_idx.is_none() { - $input.witness.push(vec!(1)); - } else { - $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec()); - } - $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes()); - (redeemscript, revocation_key) - } - } - } - + // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option { - inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len()); - - for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() { + for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() { if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index { let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey); if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 || tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() { - return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user - } - let input = TxIn { - previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { - txid: commitment_txid, - vout: transaction_output_index, - }, - script_sig: Script::new(), - sequence: 0xfffffffd, - witness: Vec::new(), - }; - if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER { - inputs.push(input); - inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }); - inputs_info.push((Some(idx), tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry)); - total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value; - } else { - let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, - lock_time: 0, - input: vec![input], - output: vec!(TxOut { - script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), - value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, - }), - }; - let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]); - let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry); - let mut used_feerate; - if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) { - let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx); - let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000); - assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight()); - log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer); - let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1); - per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }); - match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((single_htlc_tx.txid(), height)); } - } - match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); } - } - txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); - } + return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user } + let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { witness_script: expected_script, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value }; + claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data }); } } } - if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours + // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken + if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction! - log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len()); + log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len()); watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone()); self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect())); @@ -1642,7 +1509,6 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => { return htlc_update.0 != **source }, - _ => return true } }); e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}); @@ -1666,58 +1532,6 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx } - if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx - - let outputs = vec!(TxOut { - script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), - value: total_value, - }); - let mut spend_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, - lock_time: 0, - input: inputs, - output: outputs, - }; - - let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]); - - let mut used_feerate; - if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) { - return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); - } - - let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx); - - let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len()); - let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX; - for info in inputs_info.iter() { - if info.2 <= soonest_timelock { - soonest_timelock = info.2; - } - } - let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock); - let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid(); - for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) { - let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.0, info.1); - log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer); - per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: if info.0.is_some() { Some(revocation_pubkey) } else { None }, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: if info.0.is_some() { true } else { false }, amount: info.1 }); - match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_txid, height)); } - } - } - match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_txid) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); } - } - - assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight()); - - spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { - outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, - output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(), - }); - txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx); } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option { // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is @@ -1759,7 +1573,6 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => { return htlc_update.0 != **source }, - _ => return true } }); e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}); @@ -1789,21 +1602,20 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None } } else { None }; if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option { - let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => { + let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, htlc_privkey) = match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref keys, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)), - ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint))) - }, - Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { - (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)), - ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key))) + ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint)), + ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key))) }, + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { unimplemented!() } }; let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key { - None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs), + None => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs), Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)), }; + // First, mark as spendable our to_remote output for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() { match self.key_storage { @@ -1822,192 +1634,23 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } - let mut total_value = 0; - let mut inputs = Vec::new(); - let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new(); - let mut inputs_info = Vec::new(); - - macro_rules! sign_input { - ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr, $idx: expr) => { - { - let (sig, redeemscript, htlc_key) = match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { - let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$idx as usize].0; - let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey); - let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]); - let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)); - (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript, htlc_key) - }, - Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { - unimplemented!(); - } - }; - $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); - $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); - $input.witness.push($preimage); - $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes()); - (redeemscript, htlc_key) - } - } - } - - for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() { + // Then, try to find htlc outputs + for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() { if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index { let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey); if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 || tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() { - return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user + return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user } - if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { - if htlc.offered { - let input = TxIn { - previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { - txid: commitment_txid, - vout: transaction_output_index, - }, - script_sig: Script::new(), - sequence: 0xff_ff_ff_fd, - witness: Vec::new(), - }; - if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER { - inputs.push(input); - inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }); - inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry, idx)); - total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value; - } else { - let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, - lock_time: 0, - input: vec![input], - output: vec!(TxOut { - script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), - value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, - }), - }; - let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]); - let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry); - let mut used_feerate; - if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) { - let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx); - let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec(), idx); - assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight()); - spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { - outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, - output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(), - }); - log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer); - let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1); - per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: 0 }); - match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((single_htlc_tx.txid(), height)); } - } - match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material}); } - } - txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); - } - } - } - } - if !htlc.offered { - // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the - // rest of the claim transaction, as above. - let input = TxIn { - previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { - txid: commitment_txid, - vout: transaction_output_index, - }, - script_sig: Script::new(), - sequence: 0xff_ff_ff_fd, - witness: Vec::new(), - }; - let mut timeout_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, - lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry, - input: vec![input], - output: vec!(TxOut { - script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), - value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, - }), - }; - let predicted_weight = timeout_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC]); - let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry); - let mut used_feerate; - if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, timeout_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) { - let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx); - let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0], idx); - assert!(predicted_weight >= timeout_tx.get_weight()); - //TODO: track SpendableOutputDescriptor - log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer); - let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1); - per_input_material.insert(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script : redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: htlc.cltv_expiry }); - match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((timeout_tx.txid(), height)); } - } - match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(timeout_tx.txid()) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); } - } - } - txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx); + let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None }; + let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true }; + if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered { + let witness_data = InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { witness_script: expected_script, key: htlc_privkey, preimage, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: htlc.cltv_expiry }; + claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data }); } } } - - if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx - - let outputs = vec!(TxOut { - script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), - value: total_value - }); - let mut spend_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, - lock_time: 0, - input: inputs, - output: outputs, - }; - - let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]); - - let mut used_feerate; - if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) { - return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); - } - - let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx); - - let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len()); - let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX; - for info in inputs_info.iter() { - if info.2 <= soonest_timelock { - soonest_timelock = info.2; - } - } - let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock); - let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid(); - for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) { - let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec(), info.3); - log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer); - per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*(info.0)), amount: info.1, locktime: 0}); - match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_txid, height)); } - } - } - match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_txid) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); } - } - assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight()); - spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { - outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, - output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(), - }); - txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx); } } } else if let Some((ref to_remote_rescue, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue { @@ -2021,120 +1664,51 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } } - - (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs) + (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs) } /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key - fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option, Option) { - //TODO: send back new outputs to guarantee pending_claim_request consistency - if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 { - return (None, None) + fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32) -> (Vec, Option<(Sha256dHash, Vec)>) { + let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); + if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 { + return (Vec::new(), None) } macro_rules! ignore_error { ( $thing : expr ) => { match $thing { Ok(a) => a, - Err(_) => return (None, None) + Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None) } }; } - let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); }; + let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); }; let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret)); let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key); - let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => { - ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)) - }, - Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { - ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)) + let (revocation_pubkey, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage { + Storage::Local { ref keys, ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { + (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)), + ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, revocation_base_key))) }, + Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { unimplemented!() } }; let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key { - None => return (None, None), + None => return (Vec::new(), None), Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)), }; let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key); - let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(); - let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers! - - let mut inputs = Vec::new(); - let mut amount = 0; - - if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout - inputs.push(TxIn { - previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { - txid: htlc_txid, - vout: 0, - }, - script_sig: Script::new(), - sequence: 0xfffffffd, - witness: Vec::new(), - }); - amount = tx.output[0].value; - } - - if !inputs.is_empty() { - let outputs = vec!(TxOut { - script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), - value: amount - }); - - let mut spend_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, - lock_time: 0, - input: inputs, - output: outputs, - }; - let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]); - let mut used_feerate; - if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) { - return (None, None); - } - let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx); - - let (sig, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { - let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]); - let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key)); - (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), revocation_key) - } - Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { - unimplemented!(); - } - }; - spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); - spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); - spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1)); - spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes()); - - assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight()); - let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }; - let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone(); - let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32); - log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer); - let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1); - per_input_material.insert(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value }); - match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_tx.txid(), height)); } - } - match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_tx.txid()) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, per_input_material }); } - } - (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output })) - } else { (None, None) } + log_trace!(self, "Remote HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0); + let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { witness_script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value }; + let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data }); + (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, tx.output.clone()))) } - fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, height: u32) -> (Vec, Vec, Vec, Vec<(Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial)>) { + fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey) -> (Vec, Vec, Vec) { let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len()); let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len()); let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len()); - let mut pending_claims = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len()); macro_rules! add_dynamic_output { ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => { @@ -2173,12 +1747,10 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { }; add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0); - let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry); let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1); - per_input_material.insert(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}); + per_input_material.insert(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { witness_script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}); //TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too - log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer); - pending_claims.push((htlc_timeout_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material })); + log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed", htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid); res.push(htlc_timeout_tx); } else { if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { @@ -2191,12 +1763,10 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { }; add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0); - let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry); let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1); - per_input_material.insert(htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}); + per_input_material.insert(htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { witness_script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}); //TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too - log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer); - pending_claims.push((htlc_success_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material })); + log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed", htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid); res.push(htlc_success_tx); } } @@ -2206,7 +1776,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } - (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs, pending_claims) + (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs) } /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet) @@ -2229,7 +1799,6 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => { return htlc_update.0 != $source }, - _ => return true } }); e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}); @@ -2246,12 +1815,6 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0); spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1); watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2); - for claim in $updates.3 { - match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(claim.0) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); } - } - } } } @@ -2275,7 +1838,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { assert!(local_tx.tx.has_local_sig()); match self.key_storage { Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => { - let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height); + let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key); append_onchain_update!(res); }, Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { } @@ -2299,7 +1862,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { assert!(local_tx.tx.has_local_sig()); match self.key_storage { Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => { - let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height); + let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key); append_onchain_update!(res); }, Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { } @@ -2379,7 +1942,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness().clone()]; match self.key_storage { Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => { - res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, 0).0); + res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key).0); // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do. // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation. }, @@ -2396,8 +1959,9 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// Eventually this should be pub and, roughly, implement ChainListener, however this requires /// &mut self, as well as returns new spendable outputs and outpoints to watch for spending of /// on-chain. - fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec)>, Vec) - where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface + fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F)-> Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec)> + where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator { for tx in txn_matched { let mut output_val = 0; @@ -2411,7 +1975,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len()); let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new(); let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new(); - let mut bump_candidates = HashSet::new(); + let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new(); for tx in txn_matched { if tx.input.len() == 1 { // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what), @@ -2419,7 +1983,6 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy // filters. let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output; - let mut txn: Vec = Vec::new(); let funding_txo = match self.key_storage { Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => { funding_info.clone() @@ -2430,120 +1993,43 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { }; if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) { if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 { - let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height, fee_estimator); - txn = remote_txn; + let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height); spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output); if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() { watch_outputs.push(new_outputs); } - if txn.is_empty() { + if new_outpoints.is_empty() { let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height); spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output); - txn = local_txn; + for tx in local_txn.iter() { + log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx)); + broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx); + } if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() { watch_outputs.push(new_outputs); } } + claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints); } - if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() { + if !funding_txo.is_none() && claimable_outpoints.is_empty() { if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(&tx) { spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output); } } } else { if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) { - let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, fee_estimator); - if let Some(tx) = tx { - txn.push(tx); - } - if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output { - spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output); + let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height); + claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints); + if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option { + watch_outputs.push(new_outputs); } } } - for tx in txn.iter() { - log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx)); - broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx); - } } // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus, // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check. self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height); - - // Scan all input to verify is one of the outpoint spent is of interest for us - let mut claimed_outputs_material = Vec::new(); - for inp in &tx.input { - if let Some(first_claim_txid_height) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&inp.previous_output) { - // If outpoint has claim request pending on it... - if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&first_claim_txid_height.0) { - //... we need to verify equality between transaction outpoints and claim request - // outpoints to know if transaction is the original claim or a bumped one issued - // by us. - let mut set_equality = true; - if claim_material.per_input_material.len() != tx.input.len() { - set_equality = false; - } else { - for (claim_inp, tx_inp) in claim_material.per_input_material.keys().zip(tx.input.iter()) { - if *claim_inp != tx_inp.previous_output { - set_equality = false; - } - } - } - - macro_rules! clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay { - () => { - let new_event = OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request: first_claim_txid_height.0.clone() }; - match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { - if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) { - entry.get_mut().push(new_event); - } - }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { - entry.insert(vec![new_event]); - } - } - } - } - - // If this is our transaction (or our counterparty spent all the outputs - // before we could anyway with same inputs order than us), wait for - // ANTI_REORG_DELAY and clean the RBF tracking map. - if set_equality { - clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!(); - } else { // If false, generate new claim request with update outpoint set - for input in tx.input.iter() { - if let Some(input_material) = claim_material.per_input_material.remove(&input.previous_output) { - claimed_outputs_material.push((input.previous_output, input_material)); - } - // If there are no outpoints left to claim in this request, drop it entirely after ANTI_REORG_DELAY. - if claim_material.per_input_material.is_empty() { - clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!(); - } - } - //TODO: recompute soonest_timelock to avoid wasting a bit on fees - bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid_height.0.clone()); - } - break; //No need to iterate further, either tx is our or their - } else { - panic!("Inconsistencies between pending_claim_requests map and claimable_outpoints map"); - } - } - } - for (outpoint, input_material) in claimed_outputs_material.drain(..) { - let new_event = OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material }; - match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { - if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) { - entry.get_mut().push(new_event); - } - }, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { - entry.insert(vec![new_event]); - } - } - } } let should_broadcast = if let Some(_) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) @@ -2564,7 +2050,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness()); match self.key_storage { Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => { - let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height); + let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key); spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output); if !new_outputs.is_empty() { watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs)); @@ -2581,15 +2067,6 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) { for ev in events { match ev { - OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request } => { - // We may remove a whole set of claim outpoints here, as these one may have - // been aggregated in a single tx and claimed so atomically - if let Some(bump_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&claim_request) { - for outpoint in bump_material.per_input_material.keys() { - self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint); - } - } - }, OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => { log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0)); self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate { @@ -2598,86 +2075,38 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { source: htlc_update.0, }); }, - OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, .. } => { - self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint); - } } } } - for (first_claim_txid, ref mut cached_claim_datas) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter_mut() { - if cached_claim_datas.height_timer == height { - bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid.clone()); - } - } - for first_claim_txid in bump_candidates.iter() { - if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate)) = { - if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get(first_claim_txid) { - if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, fee_estimator) { - broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx); - Some((new_timer, new_feerate)) - } else { None } - } else { unreachable!(); } - } { - if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(first_claim_txid) { - claim_material.height_timer = new_timer; - claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate; - } else { unreachable!(); } - } - } + let mut spendable_output = self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, &*broadcaster, &*fee_estimator); + spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output); + self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone(); for &(ref txid, ref output_scripts) in watch_outputs.iter() { self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect()); } - (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs) + + if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 { + self.pending_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs { + outputs: spendable_outputs, + }); + } + + watch_outputs } - fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) - where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface + fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F) + where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator { log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height); - let mut bump_candidates = HashMap::new(); - if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) { + if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) { //We may discard: //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected - //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output - //- resurect outpoint back in its claimable set and regenerate tx - for ev in events { - match ev { - OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material } => { - if let Some(ancestor_claimable_txid) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&outpoint) { - if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&ancestor_claimable_txid.0) { - claim_material.per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material); - // Using a HashMap guarantee us than if we have multiple outpoints getting - // resurrected only one bump claim tx is going to be broadcast - bump_candidates.insert(ancestor_claimable_txid.clone(), claim_material.clone()); - } - } - }, - _ => {}, - } - } - } - for (_, claim_material) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() { - if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, fee_estimator) { - claim_material.height_timer = new_timer; - claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate; - broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx); - } - } - for (ancestor_claim_txid, claim_material) in bump_candidates.drain() { - self.pending_claim_requests.insert(ancestor_claim_txid.0, claim_material); - } - //TODO: if we implement cross-block aggregated claim transaction we need to refresh set of outpoints and regenerate tx but - // right now if one of the outpoint get disconnected, just erase whole pending claim request. - let mut remove_request = Vec::new(); - self.claimable_outpoints.retain(|_, ref v| - if v.1 == height { - remove_request.push(v.0.clone()); - false - } else { true }); - for req in remove_request { - self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&req); } + + self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator); + self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone(); } @@ -2872,7 +2301,6 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => { return htlc_update.0 != source }, - _ => return true } }); e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}); @@ -2885,150 +2313,12 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } } - - /// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize coutnerparty onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock expiration - /// (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may stuck in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or Child-Pay-For-Parent. - fn bump_claim_tx(&self, height: u32, cached_claim_datas: &ClaimTxBumpMaterial, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Option<(u32, u64, Transaction)> { - if cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.len() == 0 { return None } // But don't prune pending claiming request yet, we may have to resurrect HTLCs - let mut inputs = Vec::new(); - for outp in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.keys() { - inputs.push(TxIn { - previous_output: *outp, - script_sig: Script::new(), - sequence: 0xfffffffd, - witness: Vec::new(), - }); - } - let mut bumped_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, - lock_time: 0, - input: inputs, - output: vec![TxOut { - script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), - value: 0 - }], - }; - - macro_rules! RBF_bump { - ($amount: expr, $old_feerate: expr, $fee_estimator: expr, $predicted_weight: expr) => { - { - let mut used_feerate; - // If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee... - let new_fee = if $old_feerate < $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) { - let mut value = $amount; - if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, $fee_estimator, value, $predicted_weight, used_feerate) { - // Overflow check is done in subtract_high_prio_fee - $amount - value - } else { - log_trace!(self, "Can't new-estimation bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount); - return None; - } - // ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number) - } else { - let fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 750; - if $amount <= fee { - log_trace!(self, "Can't 25% bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount); - return None; - } - fee - }; - - let previous_fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000; - let min_relay_fee = MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT * $predicted_weight / 1000; - // BIP 125 Opt-in Full Replace-by-Fee Signaling - // * 3. The replacement transaction pays an absolute fee of at least the sum paid by the original transactions. - // * 4. The replacement transaction must also pay for its own bandwidth at or above the rate set by the node's minimum relay fee setting. - let new_fee = if new_fee < previous_fee + min_relay_fee { - new_fee + previous_fee + min_relay_fee - new_fee - } else { - new_fee - }; - Some((new_fee, new_fee * 1000 / $predicted_weight)) - } - } - } - - let new_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, cached_claim_datas.soonest_timelock); - let mut inputs_witnesses_weight = 0; - let mut amt = 0; - for per_outp_material in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.values() { - match per_outp_material { - &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref is_htlc, ref amount, .. } => { - inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if !is_htlc { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC] } else { unreachable!() }); - amt += *amount; - }, - &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount, .. } => { - inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if preimage.is_some() { &[InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC] } else { &[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC] }); - amt += *amount; - }, - &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => { return None; } - } - } - - let predicted_weight = bumped_tx.get_weight() + inputs_witnesses_weight; - let new_feerate; - if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = RBF_bump!(amt, cached_claim_datas.feerate_previous, fee_estimator, predicted_weight as u64) { - // If new computed fee is superior at the whole claimable amount burn all in fees - if new_fee > amt { - bumped_tx.output[0].value = 0; - } else { - bumped_tx.output[0].value = amt - new_fee; - } - new_feerate = feerate; - } else { - return None; - } - assert!(new_feerate != 0); - - for (i, (outp, per_outp_material)) in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.iter().enumerate() { - match per_outp_material { - &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount } => { - let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx); - let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]); - let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key); - bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); - bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); - if *is_htlc { - bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(pubkey.unwrap().clone().serialize().to_vec()); - } else { - bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1)); - } - bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes()); - log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Penalty Transaction {} claiming revoked {} output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if !is_htlc { "to_local" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { "offered" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { "received" } else { "" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate); - }, - &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => { - if !preimage.is_some() { bumped_tx.lock_time = *locktime }; - let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx); - let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]); - let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key); - bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); - bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); - if let &Some(preimage) = preimage { - bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(preimage.clone().0.to_vec()); - } else { - bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![0]); - } - bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes()); - log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Claim Transaction {} claiming remote {} htlc output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if preimage.is_some() { "offered" } else { "received" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate); - }, - &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => { - //TODO : Given that Local Commitment Transaction and HTLC-Timeout/HTLC-Success are counter-signed by peer, we can't - // RBF them. Need a Lightning specs change and package relay modification : - // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-November/016518.html - return None; - } - } - } - assert!(predicted_weight >= bumped_tx.get_weight()); - Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bumped_tx)) - } } const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024; -impl> ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) { - fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc) -> Result { - let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); +impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) { + fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc) -> Result { macro_rules! unwrap_obj { ($key: expr) => { match $key { @@ -3044,9 +2334,10 @@ impl> ReadableArgs>::read(reader)?.0; + let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = ::read(reader)?.0; - let key_storage = match >::read(reader)? { + let key_storage = match ::read(reader)? { 0 => { let keys = Readable::read(reader)?; let funding_key = Readable::read(reader)?; @@ -3086,7 +2377,7 @@ impl> ReadableArgs>::read(reader)?.0; + let first_idx = ::read(reader)?.0; if first_idx == 0 { None } else { @@ -3103,11 +2394,7 @@ impl> ReadableArgs = Some(Readable::read(reader)?); - let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49]; - for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() { - *secret = Readable::read(reader)?; - *idx = Readable::read(reader)?; - } + let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?; macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment { () => { @@ -3132,7 +2419,7 @@ impl> ReadableArgs as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o)))); + htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o)))); } if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); @@ -3143,8 +2430,8 @@ impl> ReadableArgs>::read(reader)?.0; - let outputs_count = >::read(reader)?; + let commitment_number = ::read(reader)?.0; + let outputs_count = ::read(reader)?; let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8)); for _ in 0..outputs_count { outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?); @@ -3158,7 +2445,7 @@ impl> ReadableArgs>::read(reader)?.0; + let commitment_number = ::read(reader)?.0; if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } @@ -3167,7 +2454,7 @@ impl> ReadableArgs { { - let tx = >::read(reader)?; + let tx = ::read(reader)?; let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?; let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?; let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?; @@ -3179,7 +2466,7 @@ impl> ReadableArgs>::read(reader)? { + let sigs = match ::read(reader)? { 0 => None, 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?), _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), @@ -3196,7 +2483,7 @@ impl> ReadableArgs>::read(reader)? { + let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match ::read(reader)? { 0 => None, 1 => { Some(read_local_tx!()) @@ -3204,7 +2491,7 @@ impl> ReadableArgs return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), }; - let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match >::read(reader)? { + let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match ::read(reader)? { 0 => None, 1 => { Some(read_local_tx!()) @@ -3212,7 +2499,7 @@ impl> ReadableArgs return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), }; - let current_remote_commitment_number = >::read(reader)?.0; + let current_remote_commitment_number = ::read(reader)?.0; let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32)); @@ -3230,9 +2517,16 @@ impl> ReadableArgs())); + for _ in 0..pending_events_len { + if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? { + pending_events.push(event); + } + } + let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?; - let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?; - let to_remote_rescue = match >::read(reader)? { + let to_remote_rescue = match ::read(reader)? { 0 => None, 1 => { let to_remote_script = Readable::read(reader)?; @@ -3242,21 +2536,6 @@ impl> ReadableArgs return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), }; - let pending_claim_requests_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let mut pending_claim_requests = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128)); - for _ in 0..pending_claim_requests_len { - pending_claim_requests.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?); - } - - let claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let mut claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128)); - for _ in 0..claimable_outpoints_len { - let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?; - let ancestor_claim_txid = Readable::read(reader)?; - let height = Readable::read(reader)?; - claimable_outpoints.insert(outpoint, (ancestor_claim_txid, height)); - } - let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128)); for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len { @@ -3264,28 +2543,14 @@ impl> ReadableArgs>::read(reader)? { + let ev = match ::read(reader)? { 0 => { - let claim_request = Readable::read(reader)?; - OnchainEvent::Claim { - claim_request - } - }, - 1 => { let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?; let hash = Readable::read(reader)?; OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash) } }, - 2 => { - let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?; - let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?; - OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { - outpoint, - input_material - } - } _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), }; events.push(ev); @@ -3306,8 +2571,10 @@ impl> ReadableArgs> ReadableArgs> ReadableArgs = Vec::new(); - let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor; - let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); - let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new()); - - macro_rules! test_secrets { - () => { - let mut idx = 281474976710655; - for secret in secrets.iter() { - assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret); - idx -= 1; - } - assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1); - assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none()); - }; - } - - let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new( - &secp_ctx, - SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), - SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), - SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), - SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), - SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), - [41; 32], - 0, - ); - - { - // insert_secret correct sequence - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); - secrets.clear(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - } - - { - // insert_secret #1 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); - secrets.clear(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, - "Previous secret did not match new one"); - } - - { - // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect) - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); - secrets.clear(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, - "Previous secret did not match new one"); - } - - { - // insert_secret #3 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); - secrets.clear(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, - "Previous secret did not match new one"); - } - - { - // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect) - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); - secrets.clear(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, - "Previous secret did not match new one"); - } - - { - // insert_secret #5 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); - secrets.clear(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, - "Previous secret did not match new one"); - } - - { - // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect) - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); - secrets.clear(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, - "Previous secret did not match new one"); - } - - { - // insert_secret #7 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); - secrets.clear(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, - "Previous secret did not match new one"); - } - - { - // insert_secret #8 incorrect - monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); - secrets.clear(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap()); - monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap(); - test_secrets!(); - - secrets.push([0; 32]); - secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap()); - assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0, - "Previous secret did not match new one"); - } - } - #[test] fn test_prune_preimages() { let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); @@ -3821,10 +2720,16 @@ mod tests { // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the // old state. - let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone()); + let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys, + &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(), + (OutPoint { txid: Sha256dHash::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()), + &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()), + &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), + 0, Script::new(), 46, 0, logger.clone()); + monitor.their_to_self_delay = Some(10); - monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])); + monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap(); monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key); monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key); monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key); @@ -3850,7 +2755,7 @@ mod tests { // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the // previous commitment tx's preimages too - monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])); + monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap(); secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap(); assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12); @@ -3858,7 +2763,7 @@ mod tests { test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor); // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10 - monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])); + monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap(); secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap(); assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5); @@ -3932,7 +2837,7 @@ mod tests { for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() { sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs); } - assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs)); + assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs)); // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs claim_tx.input.clear(); @@ -3954,7 +2859,7 @@ mod tests { for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() { sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs); } - assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs)); + assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs)); // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output claim_tx.input.clear(); @@ -3974,7 +2879,7 @@ mod tests { for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() { sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs); } - assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs)); + assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs)); } // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.