X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannelmonitor.rs;h=7de5e7c43d82df2c8e053dc983173bd761529928;hb=359b3d5702b585a67e4e6d4044c35caf86bd787d;hp=dc385f6b63f1f15f5815836f267bbac7f68e2927;hpb=1ec0c14fce2766c803bf6de04e71b7e0766e51c2;p=rust-lightning diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs index dc385f6b..da8ba03a 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs @@ -12,13 +12,12 @@ //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices. use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader; -use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction}; +use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction}; use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint; use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder}; use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; -use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable}; +use bitcoin::consensus::encode; use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash; -use bitcoin::util::bip143; use bitcoin_hashes::Hash; use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; @@ -31,19 +30,59 @@ use secp256k1; use ln::msgs::DecodeError; use ln::chan_utils; -use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment; +use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType}; use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash}; -use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT}; -use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget}; +use ln::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler; +use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator}; use chain::transaction::OutPoint; -use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor; +use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys}; use util::logger::Logger; -use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48}; +use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48}; use util::{byte_utils, events}; use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map}; use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex}; use std::{hash,cmp, mem}; +use std::ops::Deref; + +/// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the +/// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of. +#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))] +#[derive(Clone)] +#[must_use] +pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate { + pub(super) updates: Vec, + /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this + /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly + /// increasing and increase by one for each new update. + /// + /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned + /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given + /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called. + pub update_id: u64, +} + +impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate { + fn write(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { + self.update_id.write(w)?; + (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?; + for update_step in self.updates.iter() { + update_step.write(w)?; + } + Ok(()) + } +} +impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate { + fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result { + let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?; + let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?; + let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::std::mem::size_of::())); + for _ in 0..len { + updates.push(Readable::read(r)?); + } + Ok(Self { update_id, updates }) + } +} /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update. #[derive(Clone)] @@ -52,13 +91,13 @@ pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr { /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future). /// /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or - /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party. - /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore - /// the channel to an operational state. + /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party. Once the update(s) which failed + /// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to + /// restore the channel to an operational state. /// - /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be - /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should - /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP. + /// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If + /// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before + /// writing out the latest ChannelManager state. /// /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting @@ -69,8 +108,15 @@ pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr { /// been "frozen". /// /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call - /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal - /// channel operation. + /// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel + /// operation. + /// + /// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call + /// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along + /// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a + /// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the + /// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at + /// reload-time. /// /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all @@ -78,48 +124,90 @@ pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr { TemporaryFailure, /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed - /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question. + /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question (which will generate one + /// final ChannelMonitorUpdate which must be delivered to at least one ChannelMonitor copy). /// - /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor. + /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local persisted copy of the channel + /// monitor. PermanentFailure, } /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is -/// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this -/// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was -/// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates. +/// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this +/// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was +/// corrupted. /// Contains a human-readable error message. #[derive(Debug)] pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str); /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel. +#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] pub struct HTLCUpdate { pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash, pub(super) payment_preimage: Option, pub(super) source: HTLCSource } +impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source }); /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing -/// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote +/// events to it, while also taking any add/update_monitor events and passing them to some remote /// server(s). /// +/// In general, you must always have at least one local copy in memory, which must never fail to +/// update (as it is responsible for broadcasting the latest state in case the channel is closed), +/// and then persist it to various on-disk locations. If, for some reason, the in-memory copy fails +/// to update (eg out-of-memory or some other condition), you must immediately shut down without +/// taking any further action such as writing the current state to disk. This should likely be +/// accomplished via panic!() or abort(). +/// /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel! -pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync { - /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`. +/// +/// User needs to notify implementors of ManyChannelMonitor when a new block is connected or +/// disconnected using their `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. However, rather +/// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the +/// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify +/// all registered listeners in one go. +pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync { + /// Adds a monitor for the given `funding_txo`. + /// + /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with + /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected + /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it. /// - /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant - /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with - /// any spends of it. - fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>; + /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in + /// monitor.get_outputs_to_watch() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about + /// any spends of any of the outputs. + /// + /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to + /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS. + fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>; + + /// Updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`. + /// + /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with + /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected + /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it. + /// + /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in + /// monitor.get_watch_outputs() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about + /// any spends of any of the outputs. + /// + /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to + /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS. + fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>; /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated - /// with success or failure backward - fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec; + /// with success or failure. + /// + /// You should probably just call through to + /// ChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() for each ChannelMonitor and return + /// the full list. + fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec; } /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a @@ -133,168 +221,143 @@ pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync { /// /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation. -pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor { +pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor + where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator +{ #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly - pub monitors: Mutex>, + pub monitors: Mutex>>, #[cfg(not(test))] - monitors: Mutex>, + monitors: Mutex>>, chain_monitor: Arc, - broadcaster: Arc, - pending_events: Mutex>, - pending_htlc_updated: Mutex)>>>, + broadcaster: T, logger: Arc, - fee_estimator: Arc + fee_estimator: F } -impl ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor { +impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send> + ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor + where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator +{ fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) { let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash(); - let mut new_events: Vec = Vec::with_capacity(0); - let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new(); { let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap(); for monitor in monitors.values_mut() { - let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator); - if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 { - new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs { - outputs: spendable_outputs, - }); - } + let txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator); for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs { for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() { self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey); } } - htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated); - } - } - { - // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward - let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap(); - for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) { - match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { - // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so - // we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given - // (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair. - let mut existing_claim = false; - e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| { - if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 { - if htlc_data.1.is_some() { - existing_claim = true; - true - } else { false } - } else { true } - }); - if !existing_claim { - e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1)); - } - } - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { - e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]); - } - } } } - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - pending_events.append(&mut new_events); } fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) { let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash(); let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap(); for monitor in monitors.values_mut() { - monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash); + monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator); } } } -impl SimpleManyChannelMonitor { +impl SimpleManyChannelMonitor + where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator +{ /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain /// interface with which to register to receive notifications. - pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc, broadcaster: Arc, logger: Arc, feeest: Arc) -> Arc> { - let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor { + pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc, broadcaster: T, logger: Arc, feeest: F) -> SimpleManyChannelMonitor { + let res = SimpleManyChannelMonitor { monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), chain_monitor, broadcaster, - pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), - pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()), logger, fee_estimator: feeest, - }); + }; res } /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key. - pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { + pub fn add_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap(); - match monitors.get_mut(&key) { - Some(orig_monitor) => { - log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage)); - return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor); - }, - None => {} + let entry = match monitors.entry(key) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Channel monitor for given key is already present")), + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => e, }; - match monitor.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => { - match funding_info { - &None => { - return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !")); - }, - &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => { - log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..])); - self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script); - self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script); - }, - } - }, - Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { - self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(); + log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(monitor.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()[..])); + self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&monitor.funding_info.0.txid, &monitor.funding_info.1); + self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((monitor.funding_info.0.txid, monitor.funding_info.0.index as u32), &monitor.funding_info.1); + for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() { + for (idx, script) in outputs.iter().enumerate() { + self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((*txid, idx as u32), script); } } - monitors.insert(key, monitor); + entry.insert(monitor); Ok(()) } + + /// Updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key. + pub fn update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { + let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap(); + match monitors.get_mut(&key) { + Some(orig_monitor) => { + log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(orig_monitor)); + orig_monitor.update_monitor(update, &self.broadcaster) + }, + None => Err(MonitorUpdateError("No such monitor registered")) + } + } } -impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor { - fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> { - match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) { +impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor + where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator +{ + fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> { + match self.add_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) { Ok(_) => Ok(()), Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure), } } - fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec { - let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap(); - let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len()); - for (k, v) in updated.drain() { - for htlc_data in v { - pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate { - payment_hash: k, - payment_preimage: htlc_data.1, - source: htlc_data.0, - }); - } + fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> { + match self.update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, update) { + Ok(_) => Ok(()), + Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure), + } + } + + fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec { + let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::new(); + for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() { + pending_htlcs_updated.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated()); } pending_htlcs_updated } } -impl events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor { +impl events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor + where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator +{ fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec { - let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); - let mut ret = Vec::new(); - mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events); - ret + let mut pending_events = Vec::new(); + for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() { + pending_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_events()); + } + pending_events } } /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction, /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction. -const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12; +pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12; /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the /// HTLC-Success transaction. /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a @@ -320,114 +383,359 @@ pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3; /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint. pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6; - -#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] -enum Storage { - Local { - revocation_base_key: SecretKey, - htlc_base_key: SecretKey, - delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey, - payment_base_key: SecretKey, - shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey, - prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option, - latest_per_commitment_point: Option, - funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>, - current_remote_commitment_txid: Option, - prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option, - }, - Watchtower { - revocation_base_key: PublicKey, - htlc_base_key: PublicKey, - } -} +/// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we +/// refuse to accept a new HTLC. +/// +/// This is used for a few separate purposes: +/// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are +/// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will +/// fail this HTLC, +/// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race +/// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it, +/// 3) if we are waiting on a connection or a channel state update to send an HTLC to a peer, and +/// that HTLC expires within this many blocks, we will simply fail the HTLC instead. +/// +/// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit +/// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage. +/// +/// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately +/// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user +/// providing us the preimage (which would claim it). +/// +/// (3) is about our counterparty - we don't want to relay an HTLC to a counterparty when they may +/// end up force-closing the channel on us to claim it. +pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS; #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] struct LocalSignedTx { /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster txid: Sha256dHash, - tx: Transaction, revocation_key: PublicKey, a_htlc_key: PublicKey, b_htlc_key: PublicKey, delayed_payment_key: PublicKey, + per_commitment_point: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u64, - htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option)>, -} - -#[derive(PartialEq)] -enum InputDescriptors { - RevokedOfferedHTLC, - RevokedReceivedHTLC, - OfferedHTLC, - ReceivedHTLC, - RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output + htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option, Option)>, } /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] -enum TxMaterial { +pub(crate) enum InputMaterial { Revoked { - script: Script, + witness_script: Script, pubkey: Option, key: SecretKey, is_htlc: bool, amount: u64, }, RemoteHTLC { - script: Script, + witness_script: Script, key: SecretKey, preimage: Option, amount: u64, + locktime: u32, }, LocalHTLC { - script: Script, - sigs: (Signature, Signature), preimage: Option, amount: u64, + }, + Funding {} +} + +impl Writeable for InputMaterial { + fn write(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { + match self { + &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref witness_script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => { + writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; + witness_script.write(writer)?; + pubkey.write(writer)?; + writer.write_all(&key[..])?; + is_htlc.write(writer)?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?; + }, + &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref witness_script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => { + writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; + witness_script.write(writer)?; + key.write(writer)?; + preimage.write(writer)?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(*locktime))?; + }, + &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => { + writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?; + preimage.write(writer)?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?; + }, + &InputMaterial::Funding {} => { + writer.write_all(&[3; 1])?; + } + } + Ok(()) + } +} + +impl Readable for InputMaterial { + fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result { + let input_material = match ::read(reader)? { + 0 => { + let witness_script = Readable::read(reader)?; + let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?; + let key = Readable::read(reader)?; + let is_htlc = Readable::read(reader)?; + let amount = Readable::read(reader)?; + InputMaterial::Revoked { + witness_script, + pubkey, + key, + is_htlc, + amount + } + }, + 1 => { + let witness_script = Readable::read(reader)?; + let key = Readable::read(reader)?; + let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?; + let amount = Readable::read(reader)?; + let locktime = Readable::read(reader)?; + InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { + witness_script, + key, + preimage, + amount, + locktime + } + }, + 2 => { + let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?; + let amount = Readable::read(reader)?; + InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { + preimage, + amount, + } + }, + 3 => { + InputMaterial::Funding {} + } + _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), + }; + Ok(input_material) } } +/// ClaimRequest is a descriptor structure to communicate between detection +/// and reaction module. They are generated by ChannelMonitor while parsing +/// onchain txn leaked from a channel and handed over to OnchainTxHandler which +/// is responsible for opportunistic aggregation, selecting and enforcing +/// bumping logic, building and signing transactions. +pub(crate) struct ClaimRequest { + // Block height before which claiming is exclusive to one party, + // after reaching it, claiming may be contentious. + pub(crate) absolute_timelock: u32, + // Timeout tx must have nLocktime set which means aggregating multiple + // ones must take the higher nLocktime among them to satisfy all of them. + // Sadly it has few pitfalls, a) it takes longuer to get fund back b) CLTV_DELTA + // of a sooner-HTLC could be swallowed by the highest nLocktime of the HTLC set. + // Do simplify we mark them as non-aggregable. + pub(crate) aggregable: bool, + // Basic bitcoin outpoint (txid, vout) + pub(crate) outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint, + // Following outpoint type, set of data needed to generate transaction digest + // and satisfy witness program. + pub(crate) witness_data: InputMaterial +} + /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY) #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)] enum OnchainEvent { - /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from - /// bump-txn candidate buffer. - Claim { - outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint, - }, /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash), }, + MaturingOutput { + descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor, + }, } const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1; +#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))] +#[derive(Clone)] +pub(super) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep { + LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { + commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, + htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option, Option)>, + }, + LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { + unsigned_commitment_tx: Transaction, // TODO: We should actually only need the txid here + htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option>)>, + commitment_number: u64, + their_revocation_point: PublicKey, + }, + PaymentPreimage { + payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, + }, + CommitmentSecret { + idx: u64, + secret: [u8; 32], + }, + /// Indicates our channel is likely a stale version, we're closing, but this update should + /// allow us to spend what is ours if our counterparty broadcasts their latest state. + RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { + their_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, + }, + /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest local + /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed. + ChannelForceClosed { + /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest local commitment transaction as we + /// think we've fallen behind! + should_broadcast: bool, + }, +} + +impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep { + fn write(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { + match self { + &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs } => { + 0u8.write(w)?; + commitment_tx.write(w)?; + (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?; + for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() { + output.write(w)?; + signature.write(w)?; + source.write(w)?; + } + } + &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { ref unsigned_commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => { + 1u8.write(w)?; + unsigned_commitment_tx.write(w)?; + commitment_number.write(w)?; + their_revocation_point.write(w)?; + (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?; + for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() { + output.write(w)?; + source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(w)?; + } + }, + &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => { + 2u8.write(w)?; + payment_preimage.write(w)?; + }, + &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => { + 3u8.write(w)?; + idx.write(w)?; + secret.write(w)?; + }, + &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { ref their_current_per_commitment_point } => { + 4u8.write(w)?; + their_current_per_commitment_point.write(w)?; + }, + &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { ref should_broadcast } => { + 5u8.write(w)?; + should_broadcast.write(w)?; + }, + } + Ok(()) + } +} +impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep { + fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result { + match Readable::read(r)? { + 0u8 => { + Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { + commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?, + htlc_outputs: { + let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?; + let mut res = Vec::new(); + for _ in 0..len { + res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?)); + } + res + }, + }) + }, + 1u8 => { + Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { + unsigned_commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?, + commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?, + their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?, + htlc_outputs: { + let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?; + let mut res = Vec::new(); + for _ in 0..len { + res.push((Readable::read(r)?, as Readable>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o)))); + } + res + }, + }) + }, + 2u8 => { + Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { + payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?, + }) + }, + 3u8 => { + Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { + idx: Readable::read(r)?, + secret: Readable::read(r)?, + }) + }, + 4u8 => { + Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { + their_current_per_commitment_point: Readable::read(r)?, + }) + }, + 5u8 => { + Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { + should_broadcast: Readable::read(r)? + }) + }, + _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), + } + } +} + /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs. /// /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date /// information and are actively monitoring the chain. -#[derive(Clone)] -pub struct ChannelMonitor { +/// +/// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by +/// get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and +/// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events +/// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state. +pub struct ChannelMonitor { + latest_update_id: u64, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64, - key_storage: Storage, - their_htlc_base_key: Option, - their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option, + destination_script: Script, + broadcasted_local_revokable_script: Option<(Script, SecretKey, Script)>, + broadcasted_remote_payment_script: Option<(Script, SecretKey)>, + shutdown_script: Script, + + keys: ChanSigner, + funding_info: (OutPoint, Script), + current_remote_commitment_txid: Option, + prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option, + + their_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, + their_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, + funding_redeemscript: Script, + channel_value_satoshis: u64, // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option)>, our_to_self_delay: u16, - their_to_self_delay: Option, + their_to_self_delay: u16, - old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49], + commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap>)>>, /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain. /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are @@ -446,36 +754,42 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor { // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers. prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option, - current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option, + current_local_commitment_tx: LocalSignedTx, // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during // deserialization current_remote_commitment_number: u64, + // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during + // deserialization + current_local_commitment_number: u64, payment_preimages: HashMap, - destination_script: Script, - // Thanks to data loss protection, we may be able to claim our non-htlc funds - // back, this is the script we have to spend from but we need to - // scan every commitment transaction for that - to_remote_rescue: Option<(Script, SecretKey)>, - - // Used to track outpoint in the process of being claimed by our transactions. We need to scan all transactions - // for inputs spending this. If height timer (u32) is expired and claim tx hasn't reached enough confirmations - // before, use TxMaterial to regenerate a new claim tx with a satoshis-per-1000-weight-units higher than last - // one (u64), if timelock expiration (u32) is near, decrease height timer, the in-between bumps delay. - // Last field cached (u32) is height of outpoint confirmation, which is needed to flush this tracker - // in case of reorgs, given block timer are scaled on timer expiration we can't deduce from it original height. - our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf: HashMap, + pending_htlcs_updated: Vec, + pending_events: Vec, // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type. onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap>, + // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring + // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably + // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more + // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly. + outputs_to_watch: HashMap>, + + #[cfg(test)] + pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler, + #[cfg(not(test))] + onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler, + + // Used to detect programming bug due to unsafe monitor update sequence { ChannelForceClosed, LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo } + lockdown_from_offchain: bool, + // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way. - // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep + // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through // the full block_connected). pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash, @@ -483,222 +797,354 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor { logger: Arc, } -macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee { - ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $spent_txid: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => { - { - $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority); - let mut fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000; - if $value <= fee { - $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal); - fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000; - if $value <= fee { - $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background); - fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000; - if $value <= fee { - log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx spending {} as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)", - $spent_txid, fee, $value); - false - } else { - log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)", - $spent_txid, $value); - $value -= fee; - true - } - } else { - log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)", - $spent_txid, $value); - $value -= fee; - true - } - } else { - $value -= fee; - true - } - } - } -} - #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))] /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the /// underlying object -impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor { +impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor { fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool { - if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor || - self.key_storage != other.key_storage || + if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id || + self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor || + self.destination_script != other.destination_script || + self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_local_revokable_script || + self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script != other.broadcasted_remote_payment_script || + self.keys.pubkeys() != other.keys.pubkeys() || + self.funding_info != other.funding_info || + self.current_remote_commitment_txid != other.current_remote_commitment_txid || + self.prev_remote_commitment_txid != other.prev_remote_commitment_txid || self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key || self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key || + self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript || + self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis || self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points || self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay || self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay || + self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets || self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints || self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain || self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number || self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx || self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number || - self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx || + self.current_local_commitment_number != other.current_local_commitment_number || + self.current_local_commitment_tx != other.current_local_commitment_tx || self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages || - self.destination_script != other.destination_script || - self.to_remote_rescue != other.to_remote_rescue || - self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf != other.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf || - self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf + self.pending_htlcs_updated != other.pending_htlcs_updated || + self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly + self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf || + self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch { false } else { - for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) { - if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx { - return false - } - } true } } } -impl ChannelMonitor { - pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc) -> ChannelMonitor { - ChannelMonitor { - commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0, - - key_storage: Storage::Local { - revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(), - htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(), - delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(), - payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(), - shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(), - prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None, - latest_per_commitment_point: None, - funding_info: None, - current_remote_commitment_txid: None, - prev_remote_commitment_txid: None, - }, - their_htlc_base_key: None, - their_delayed_payment_base_key: None, - their_cur_revocation_points: None, +impl ChannelMonitor { + /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk. + /// + /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which + /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along + /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the + /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the + /// best chain) upon deserializing the object! + pub fn write_for_disk(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { + //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy + //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it. + writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?; + writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?; - our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay, - their_to_self_delay: None, + self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?; - old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], - remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(), - remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(), - remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(), + // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now: + U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?; - prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None, - current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None, - current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48, + self.destination_script.write(writer)?; + if let Some(ref broadcasted_local_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script { + writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; + broadcasted_local_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?; + broadcasted_local_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?; + broadcasted_local_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?; + } else { + writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; + } - payment_preimages: HashMap::new(), - destination_script: destination_script, - to_remote_rescue: None, + if let Some(ref broadcasted_remote_payment_script) = self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script { + writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; + broadcasted_remote_payment_script.0.write(writer)?; + broadcasted_remote_payment_script.1.write(writer)?; + } else { + writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; + } + self.shutdown_script.write(writer)?; - our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf: HashMap::new(), + self.keys.write(writer)?; + writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?; + self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?; + self.current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?; + self.prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?; - onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(), + writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.serialize())?; + writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.serialize())?; + self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?; + self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?; - last_block_hash: Default::default(), - secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(), - logger, + match self.their_cur_revocation_points { + Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => { + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?; + writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?; + match second_option { + Some(second_pubkey) => { + writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?; + }, + None => { + writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?; + }, + } + }, + None => { + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?; + }, } - } - fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize { - let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags - for inp in inputs { - // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary - tx_weight += match inp { - // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script - &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => { - 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133 - }, - // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script - &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => { - 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139 - }, - // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script - &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => { - 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133 - }, - // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script - &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => { - 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139 - }, - // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script - &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => { - 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77 - }, - }; - } - tx_weight - } + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay))?; - fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 { - if timelock_expiration <= current_height || timelock_expiration - current_height <= 3 { - return current_height + 1 - } else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 { - return current_height + 3 - } - current_height + 15 - } + self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?; - #[inline] - fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 { - for i in 0..48 { - if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) { - return i + macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment { + ($htlc_output: expr) => { + writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?; + writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?; + $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?; } } - 48 - } - #[inline] - fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] { - let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret; - for i in 0..bits { - let bitpos = bits - 1 - i; - if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) { - res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7); - res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner(); + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?; + for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() { + writer.write_all(&txid[..])?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?; + for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() { + serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output); + htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?; } } - res - } - /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither - /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote - /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key). - pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { - let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx); - for i in 0..pos { - let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize]; - if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret { - return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one")); + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?; + for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() { + writer.write_all(&txid[..])?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?; + (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?; + for script in txouts.iter() { + script.write(writer)?; } } - if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx { - return Ok(()); - } - self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx); - // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill - // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs. - // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here. - if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage { - if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() { - for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() { - *source = None; - } - } + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?; + for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() { + writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?; } - if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() { - let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !"); - let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref(); - let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret(); - let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number; - - self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| { - for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs { - if k == htlc.payment_hash { + macro_rules! serialize_local_tx { + ($local_tx: expr) => { + $local_tx.txid.write(writer)?; + writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?; + writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?; + writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?; + writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?; + writer.write_all(&$local_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?; + + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?; + for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { + serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output); + if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig { + 1u8.write(writer)?; + writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?; + } else { + 0u8.write(writer)?; + } + htlc_source.write(writer)?; + } + } + } + + if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx { + writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; + serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx); + } else { + writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; + } + + serialize_local_tx!(self.current_local_commitment_tx); + + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_local_commitment_number))?; + + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?; + for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() { + writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?; + } + + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_htlcs_updated.len() as u64))?; + for data in self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter() { + data.write(writer)?; + } + + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?; + for event in self.pending_events.iter() { + event.write(writer)?; + } + + self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?; + + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?; + for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() { + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?; + writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?; + for ev in events.iter() { + match *ev { + OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => { + 0u8.write(writer)?; + htlc_update.0.write(writer)?; + htlc_update.1.write(writer)?; + }, + OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { ref descriptor } => { + 1u8.write(writer)?; + descriptor.write(writer)?; + }, + } + } + } + + (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?; + for (txid, output_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() { + txid.write(writer)?; + (output_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?; + for script in output_scripts.iter() { + script.write(writer)?; + } + } + self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?; + + self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?; + + Ok(()) + } +} + +impl ChannelMonitor { + pub(super) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, + our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script), + their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, + their_to_self_delay: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, + commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64, + initial_local_commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, + logger: Arc) -> ChannelMonitor { + + assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48)); + let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize()); + let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script(); + + let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys.clone(), their_to_self_delay, logger.clone()); + + let local_tx_sequence = initial_local_commitment_tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64; + let local_tx_locktime = initial_local_commitment_tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64; + let local_commitment_tx = LocalSignedTx { + txid: initial_local_commitment_tx.txid(), + revocation_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.revocation_key, + a_htlc_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.a_htlc_key, + b_htlc_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.b_htlc_key, + delayed_payment_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, + per_commitment_point: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.per_commitment_point, + feerate_per_kw: initial_local_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw, + htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions + }; + // Returning a monitor error before updating tracking points means in case of using + // a concurrent watchtower implementation for same channel, if this one doesn't + // reject update as we do, you MAY have the latest local valid commitment tx onchain + // for which you want to spend outputs. We're NOT robust again this scenario right + // now but we should consider it later. + onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_local_tx(initial_local_commitment_tx).unwrap(); + + ChannelMonitor { + latest_update_id: 0, + commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, + + destination_script: destination_script.clone(), + broadcasted_local_revokable_script: None, + broadcasted_remote_payment_script: None, + shutdown_script, + + keys, + funding_info, + current_remote_commitment_txid: None, + prev_remote_commitment_txid: None, + + their_htlc_base_key: their_htlc_base_key.clone(), + their_delayed_payment_base_key: their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone(), + funding_redeemscript, + channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis, + their_cur_revocation_points: None, + + our_to_self_delay, + their_to_self_delay, + + commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(), + remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(), + remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(), + remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(), + + prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None, + current_local_commitment_tx: local_commitment_tx, + current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48, + current_local_commitment_number: 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx_sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx_locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor), + + payment_preimages: HashMap::new(), + pending_htlcs_updated: Vec::new(), + pending_events: Vec::new(), + + onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(), + outputs_to_watch: HashMap::new(), + + onchain_tx_handler, + + lockdown_from_offchain: false, + + last_block_hash: Default::default(), + secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(), + logger, + } + } + + /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither + /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote + /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key). + pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { + if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) { + return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one")); + } + + // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill + // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs. + if let Some(txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() { + for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() { + *source = None; + } + } + + if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() { + let cur_local_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_local_commitment_tx; + let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref(); + let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret(); + let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number; + + self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| { + for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { + if k == htlc.payment_hash { return true } } @@ -741,10 +1187,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(); log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len()); log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx)); - if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage { - *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take(); - *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid); - } + self.prev_remote_commitment_txid = self.current_remote_commitment_txid.take(); + self.current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid); self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs); self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number; //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff @@ -769,18 +1213,13 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } pub(super) fn provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) { - match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => { - if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_base_key)) { - let to_remote_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0) - .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&payment_key.serialize())[..]) - .into_script(); - if let Ok(to_remote_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &payment_base_key) { - self.to_remote_rescue = Some((to_remote_script, to_remote_key)); - } - } - }, - Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {} + if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().payment_basepoint) { + let to_remote_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0) + .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&payment_key.serialize())[..]) + .into_script(); + if let Ok(to_remote_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &self.keys.payment_base_key()) { + self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script = Some((to_remote_script, to_remote_key)); + } } } @@ -789,27 +1228,32 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated. /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called. - /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in - /// case of onchain HTLC tx - pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option)>) { - assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some()); - self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take(); - self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx { - txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(), - tx: signed_commitment_tx, - revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key, - a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key, - b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key, - delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, - feerate_per_kw, - htlc_outputs, - }); - - if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage { - *latest_per_commitment_point = Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point); - } else { - panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?"); - } + pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option, Option)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { + let txid = commitment_tx.txid(); + let sequence = commitment_tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64; + let locktime = commitment_tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64; + let mut new_local_commitment_tx = LocalSignedTx { + txid, + revocation_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.revocation_key, + a_htlc_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.a_htlc_key, + b_htlc_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.b_htlc_key, + delayed_payment_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, + per_commitment_point: commitment_tx.local_keys.per_commitment_point, + feerate_per_kw: commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw, + htlc_outputs: htlc_outputs, + }; + // Returning a monitor error before updating tracking points means in case of using + // a concurrent watchtower implementation for same channel, if this one doesn't + // reject update as we do, you MAY have the latest local valid commitment tx onchain + // for which you want to spend outputs. We're NOT robust again this scenario right + // now but we should consider it later. + if let Err(_) = self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_local_tx(commitment_tx) { + return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Local commitment signed has already been signed, no further update of LOCAL commitment transaction is allowed")); + } + self.current_local_commitment_number = 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor); + mem::swap(&mut new_local_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_local_commitment_tx); + self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_local_commitment_tx); + Ok(()) } /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all @@ -818,125 +1262,90 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone()); } - /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor. - /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the - /// chain for new blocks/transactions. - pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { - match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => { - if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); } - let our_funding_info = funding_info; - if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage { - if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); } - // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially - // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey. - if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 { - return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!")); - } - } else { - return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !")); - } - }, - Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { - if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage { - unimplemented!(); - } else { - return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !")); - } - }, - } - let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret(); - let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret(); - if our_min_secret > other_min_secret { - self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?; - } - if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { - if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { - let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor); - let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor); - if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number { - self.key_storage = other.key_storage; - } - } - } - // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of - // local transactions to decide how to merge - if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret { - self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points; - for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() { - self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs); - } - if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx { - self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx); - } - if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { - self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx); - } - self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages; - self.to_remote_rescue = other.to_remote_rescue; + pub(super) fn broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(&mut self, broadcaster: &B) + where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + { + for tx in self.get_latest_local_commitment_txn().iter() { + broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx); } - - self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number); - Ok(()) } - /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits - pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) { - assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48)); - self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor; + /// Used in Channel to cheat wrt the update_ids since it plays games, will be removed soon! + pub(super) fn update_monitor_ooo(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> { + for update in updates.updates.drain(..) { + match update { + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => { + if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); } + self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)? + }, + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } => + self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point), + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => + self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage), + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => + self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?, + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { their_current_per_commitment_point } => + self.provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(their_current_per_commitment_point), + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => {}, + } + } + self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id; + Ok(()) } - /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is - /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to - /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it - /// provides slightly better privacy. - /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former - /// value as key to add_update_monitor. - pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) { - match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => { - *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info); - }, - Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { - panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?"); + /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel + /// itself. + /// + /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id. + pub fn update_monitor(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> + where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + { + if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id { + panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!"); + } + for update in updates.updates.drain(..) { + match update { + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => { + if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); } + self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)? + }, + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } => + self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point), + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => + self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage), + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => + self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?, + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { their_current_per_commitment_point } => + self.provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(their_current_per_commitment_point), + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => { + self.lockdown_from_offchain = true; + if should_broadcast { + self.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(broadcaster); + } else { + log_error!(self, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take"); + } + } } } + self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id; + Ok(()) } - /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx - pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) { - self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone()); - self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone()); - } - - pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) { - self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay); + /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this + /// ChannelMonitor. + pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 { + self.latest_update_id } - pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) { - match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => { - *funding_info = None; - }, - Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { - panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?"); - }, - } + /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for. + pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> OutPoint { + self.funding_info.0 } - /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for. - pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option { - match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => { - match funding_info { - &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint), - &None => None - } - }, - Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { - return None; - } - } + /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the + /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected(). + pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap> { + &self.outputs_to_watch } /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of. @@ -953,290 +1362,33 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { res } - /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns - fn write(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { - //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy - //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it. - writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?; - writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?; - - // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now: - U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?; - - macro_rules! write_option { - ($thing: expr) => { - match $thing { - &Some(ref t) => { - 1u8.write(writer)?; - t.write(writer)?; - }, - &None => 0u8.write(writer)?, - } - } - } - - match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => { - writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; - writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?; - writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?; - writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?; - writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?; - writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?; - prev_latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?; - latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?; - match funding_info { - &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => { - writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?; - script.write(writer)?; - }, - &None => { - debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !"); - }, - } - current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?; - prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?; - }, - Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(), - } - - writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?; - writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?; - - match self.their_cur_revocation_points { - Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => { - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?; - writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?; - match second_option { - Some(second_pubkey) => { - writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?; - }, - None => { - writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?; - }, - } - }, - None => { - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?; - }, - } - - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?; - - for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() { - writer.write_all(secret)?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?; - } - - macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment { - ($htlc_output: expr) => { - writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?; - writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?; - $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?; - } - } - - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?; - for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() { - writer.write_all(&txid[..])?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?; - for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() { - serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output); - write_option!(htlc_source); - } - } - - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?; - for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() { - writer.write_all(&txid[..])?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?; - (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?; - for script in txouts.iter() { - script.write(writer)?; - } - } - - if for_local_storage { - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?; - for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() { - writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?; - } - } else { - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?; - } - - macro_rules! serialize_local_tx { - ($local_tx: expr) => { - if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) { - match e { - encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e), - _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"), - } - } - - writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?; - writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?; - writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?; - writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?; - - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?; - for &(ref htlc_output, ref sigs, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { - serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output); - if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs { - 1u8.write(writer)?; - writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?; - writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact())?; - } else { - 0u8.write(writer)?; - } - write_option!(htlc_source); - } - } - } - - if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx { - writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; - serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx); - } else { - writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; - } - - if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { - writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; - serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx); - } else { - writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; - } - - if for_local_storage { - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?; - } else { - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?; - } - - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?; - for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() { - writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?; - } - - self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?; - self.destination_script.write(writer)?; - if let Some((ref to_remote_script, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue { - writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; - to_remote_script.write(writer)?; - local_key.write(writer)?; - } else { - writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; - } - - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.len() as u64))?; - for (ref outpoint, claim_tx_data) in self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.iter() { - outpoint.write(writer)?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.0))?; - match claim_tx_data.1 { - TxMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => { - writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; - script.write(writer)?; - pubkey.write(writer)?; - writer.write_all(&key[..])?; - if *is_htlc { - writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; - } else { - writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; - } - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?; - }, - TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount } => { - writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; - script.write(writer)?; - key.write(writer)?; - preimage.write(writer)?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?; - }, - TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref script, ref sigs, ref preimage, ref amount } => { - writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?; - script.write(writer)?; - sigs.0.write(writer)?; - sigs.1.write(writer)?; - preimage.write(writer)?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?; - } - } - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(claim_tx_data.2))?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.3))?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.4))?; - } - - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?; - for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() { - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?; - writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?; - for ev in events.iter() { - match *ev { - OnchainEvent::Claim { ref outpoint } => { - writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?; - outpoint.write(writer)?; - }, - OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => { - writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?; - htlc_update.0.write(writer)?; - htlc_update.1.write(writer)?; - } - } - } - } - - Ok(()) - } - - /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk. - /// - /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which - /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along - /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest - /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the - /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object! - pub fn write_for_disk(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { - self.write(writer, true) + /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by + /// ChannelManager via ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(). + pub fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&mut self) -> Vec { + let mut ret = Vec::new(); + mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_htlcs_updated); + ret } - /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower + /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list + /// in the process. /// - /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which - /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along - /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest - /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the - /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object! - pub fn write_for_watchtower(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { - self.write(writer, false) + /// This is called by ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to + /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do + /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors. + pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec { + let mut ret = Vec::new(); + mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events); + ret } /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> { - for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() { - if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 { - return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx)) - } - } - assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret()); - None + self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx) } pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 { - //TODO This can be optimized? - let mut min = 1 << 48; - for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() { - if idx < min { - min = idx; - } - } - min + self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() } pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 { @@ -1244,9 +1396,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 { - if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { - 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor) - } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff } + self.current_local_commitment_number } /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and @@ -1255,12 +1405,11 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions. /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of /// revoked remote commitment tx - fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec, (Sha256dHash, Vec), Vec) { + fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec, (Sha256dHash, Vec)) { // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast - let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new(); + let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new(); let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new(); - let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new(); let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers! let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid); @@ -1269,7 +1418,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { ( $thing : expr ) => { match $thing { Ok(a) => a, - Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs) + Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)) } }; } @@ -1278,150 +1427,52 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() { let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap(); let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret)); - let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => { - let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key); - (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))), - ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))), - Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key)))) - }, - Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { - let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key); - (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)), - ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)), - None) - }, - }; - let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap())); - let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key { - None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs), - Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)), - }; + let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key); + let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)); + let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.keys.revocation_base_key())); + let b_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint)); + let local_payment_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.payment_base_key())); + let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key)); + let a_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_htlc_base_key)); let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key); let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(); - let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key { + self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script = { // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the - // script_pubkey version. - let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize()); - Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script()) - } else { None }; - - let mut total_value = 0; - let mut inputs = Vec::new(); - let mut inputs_info = Vec::new(); - let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new(); + // script_pubkey version + let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_payment_key).serialize()); + Some((Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script(), local_payment_key)) + }; + // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_local & to_remote) for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { - inputs.push(TxIn { - previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { - txid: commitment_txid, - vout: idx as u32, - }, - script_sig: Script::new(), - sequence: 0xfffffffd, - witness: Vec::new(), - }); - inputs_desc.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput); - inputs_info.push((None, outp.value, self.our_to_self_delay as u32)); - total_value += outp.value; - } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() { - spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { - outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, - key: local_payment_key.unwrap(), - output: outp.clone(), - }); - } - } - - macro_rules! sign_input { - ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => { - { - let (sig, redeemscript, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { - let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else { - let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0; - chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey) - }; - let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]); - let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key)); - (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript, revocation_key) - }, - Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { - unimplemented!(); - } - }; - $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); - $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); - if $htlc_idx.is_none() { - $input.witness.push(vec!(1)); - } else { - $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec()); - } - $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes()); - (redeemscript, revocation_key) - } + let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { witness_script: revokeable_redeemscript.clone(), pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: outp.value }; + claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data}); } } + // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option { - inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len()); - - for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() { + for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() { if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index { let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey); if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 || tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() { - return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user - } - let input = TxIn { - previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { - txid: commitment_txid, - vout: transaction_output_index, - }, - script_sig: Script::new(), - sequence: 0xfffffffd, - witness: Vec::new(), - }; - if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER { - inputs.push(input); - inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }); - inputs_info.push((Some(idx), tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry)); - total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value; - } else { - let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, - lock_time: 0, - input: vec![input], - output: vec!(TxOut { - script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), - value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, - }), - }; - let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]); - let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry); - let mut used_feerate; - if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) { - let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx); - let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000); - assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight()); - match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); } - } - txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); - } + return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user } + let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { witness_script: expected_script, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value }; + claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data }); } } } - if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours + // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken + if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction! - log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len()); + log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len()); watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone()); self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect())); @@ -1439,7 +1490,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => { return htlc_update.0 != **source }, - _ => return true + _ => true } }); e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}); @@ -1453,53 +1504,14 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } } - if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage { - if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid { - check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current"); - } - if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid { - check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote"); - } + if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid { + check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current"); } - // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx - } - if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx - - let outputs = vec!(TxOut { - script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), - value: total_value, - }); - let mut spend_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, - lock_time: 0, - input: inputs, - output: outputs, - }; - - let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]); - - let mut used_feerate; - if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) { - return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); - } - - let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx); - - for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) { - let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.0, info.1); - let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, info.2); - match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(input.previous_output.clone()) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: if info.0.is_some() { Some(revocation_pubkey) } else { None }, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: if info.0.is_some() { true } else { false }, amount: info.1 }, used_feerate, if !info.0.is_some() { height + info.2 } else { info.2 }, height)); } + if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid { + check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote"); } + // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx } - assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight()); - - spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { - outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, - output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(), - }); - txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx); } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option { // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is @@ -1541,7 +1553,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => { return htlc_update.0 != **source }, - _ => return true + _ => true } }); e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}); @@ -1555,13 +1567,11 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } } - if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage { - if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid { - check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop); - } - if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid { - check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop); - } + if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid { + check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop); + } + if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid { + check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop); } if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points { @@ -1571,404 +1581,98 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None } } else { None }; if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option { - let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { - (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))), - ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key)))) - }, - Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { - (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)), - ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key))) - }, - }; - let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key { - None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs), - Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)), + let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)); + let b_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint)); + let htlc_privkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.htlc_base_key())); + let a_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.their_htlc_base_key)); + let local_payment_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.payment_base_key())); + + self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script = { + // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the + // script_pubkey version + let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_payment_key).serialize()); + Some((Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script(), local_payment_key)) }; - for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { - if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() { - match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => { - if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) { - spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { - outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, - key: local_key, - output: outp.clone(), - }); - } - }, - Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {} - } - break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable - } - } - - let mut total_value = 0; - let mut inputs = Vec::new(); - let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new(); - let mut inputs_info = Vec::new(); - - macro_rules! sign_input { - ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => { - { - let (sig, redeemscript, htlc_key) = match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => { - let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0; - let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey); - let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]); - let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)); - (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript, htlc_key) - }, - Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { - unimplemented!(); - } - }; - $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); - $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); - $input.witness.push($preimage); - $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes()); - (redeemscript, htlc_key) - } - } - } - - for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() { + // Then, try to find htlc outputs + for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() { if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index { let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey); if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 || tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() { - return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user - } - if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { - if htlc.offered { - let input = TxIn { - previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { - txid: commitment_txid, - vout: transaction_output_index, - }, - script_sig: Script::new(), - sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input - witness: Vec::new(), - }; - if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER { - inputs.push(input); - inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }); - inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry)); - total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value; - } else { - let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, - lock_time: 0, - input: vec![input], - output: vec!(TxOut { - script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), - value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, - }), - }; - let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]); - let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry); - let mut used_feerate; - if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) { - let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx); - let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec()); - assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight()); - spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { - outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, - output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(), - }); - match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); } - } - txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); - } - } - } + return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user + } + let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None }; + let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true }; + if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered { + let witness_data = InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { witness_script: expected_script, key: htlc_privkey, preimage, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: htlc.cltv_expiry }; + claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data }); } - if !htlc.offered { - // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the - // rest of the claim transaction, as above. - let input = TxIn { - previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { - txid: commitment_txid, - vout: transaction_output_index, - }, - script_sig: Script::new(), - sequence: idx as u32, - witness: Vec::new(), - }; - let mut timeout_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, - lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry, - input: vec![input], - output: vec!(TxOut { - script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), - value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, - }), - }; - let predicted_weight = timeout_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC]); - let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry); - let mut used_feerate; - if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, timeout_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) { - let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx); - let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]); - assert!(predicted_weight >= timeout_tx.get_weight()); - //TODO: track SpendableOutputDescriptor - match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script : redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); } - } - } - txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx); - } - } - } - - if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx - - let outputs = vec!(TxOut { - script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), - value: total_value - }); - let mut spend_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, - lock_time: 0, - input: inputs, - output: outputs, - }; - - let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]); - - let mut used_feerate; - if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) { - return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); - } - - let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx); - - for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) { - let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec()); - let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, info.2); - match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(input.previous_output.clone()) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*(info.0)), amount: info.1}, used_feerate, info.2, height)); } - } - } - assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight()); - spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { - outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, - output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(), - }); - txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx); - } - } - } else if let Some((ref to_remote_rescue, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue { - for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { - if to_remote_rescue == &outp.script_pubkey { - spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { - outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, - key: local_key.clone(), - output: outp.clone(), - }); - } - } - } - - (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs) - } - - /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key - fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option, Option) { - if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 { - return (None, None) - } - - macro_rules! ignore_error { - ( $thing : expr ) => { - match $thing { - Ok(a) => a, - Err(_) => return (None, None) - } - }; - } - - let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); }; - let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret)); - let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key); - let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { - ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))) - }, - Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { - ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)) - }, - }; - let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key { - None => return (None, None), - Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)), - }; - let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key); - let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(); - let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers! - - let mut inputs = Vec::new(); - let mut amount = 0; - - if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout - inputs.push(TxIn { - previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { - txid: htlc_txid, - vout: 0, - }, - script_sig: Script::new(), - sequence: 0xfffffffd, - witness: Vec::new(), - }); - amount = tx.output[0].value; - } - - if !inputs.is_empty() { - let outputs = vec!(TxOut { - script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(), - value: amount - }); - - let mut spend_tx = Transaction { - version: 2, - lock_time: 0, - input: inputs, - output: outputs, - }; - let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]); - let mut used_feerate; - if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) { - return (None, None); - } - - let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx); - - let (sig, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => { - let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]); - let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key)); - (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), revocation_key) - } - Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { - unimplemented!(); - } - }; - spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); - spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); - spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1)); - spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes()); - - assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight()); - let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }; - let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone(); - let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap() as u32); // We can safely unwrap given we are past channel opening - match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value }, used_feerate, height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, height)); } - } - (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output })) - } else { (None, None) } - } - - fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option, height: u32) -> (Vec, Vec, Vec, Vec<(BitcoinOutPoint, (u32, TxMaterial, u64, u32, u32))>) { - let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len()); - let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len()); - let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len()); - let mut pending_claims = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len()); - - macro_rules! add_dynamic_output { - ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => { - if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point { - if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key { - if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) { - spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { - outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout }, - key: local_delayedkey, - witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key), - to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay, - output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(), - }); } } } } } + (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)) + } + /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key + fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32) -> (Vec, Option<(Sha256dHash, Vec)>) { + let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); + if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 { + return (Vec::new(), None) + } - let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key); - let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(); - for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() { - if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { - add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32); - break; - } + macro_rules! ignore_error { + ( $thing : expr ) => { + match $thing { + Ok(a) => a, + Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None) + } + }; } - for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { - if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index { - if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs { - if htlc.offered { - log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions"); - let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key); - - htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy - - htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); - htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8); - htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); - htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8); - - htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); - let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key); - htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes()); - - add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0); - let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry); - pending_claims.push((htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone(), (height_timer, TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}, 0, htlc.cltv_expiry, height))); - res.push(htlc_timeout_tx); - } else { - if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { - log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions"); - let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key); + let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); }; + let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret)); + let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key); + let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)); + let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.keys.revocation_base_key())); + let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key)); + let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key); - htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy + log_trace!(self, "Remote HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0); + let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { witness_script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value }; + let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data }); + (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, tx.output.clone()))) + } - htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); - htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8); - htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec()); - htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8); + fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> (Vec, Vec, Option<(Script, SecretKey, Script)>) { + let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len()); + let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len()); - htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec()); - let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key); - htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes()); + let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key); + let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, self.keys.delayed_payment_base_key()) { + Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), local_delayedkey, redeemscript)) + } else { None }; - add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0); - let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry); - pending_claims.push((htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone(), (height_timer, TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}, 0, htlc.cltv_expiry, height))); - res.push(htlc_success_tx); - } - } - watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()); - } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") } + for &(ref htlc, _, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { + if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index { + let preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*preimage) } else { None }; + claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::std::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: local_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { preimage, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }}); + watch_outputs.push(commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()); } } - (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs, pending_claims) + (claim_requests, watch_outputs, broadcasted_local_revokable_script) } /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet) /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints. /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds. - fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec, Vec, (Sha256dHash, Vec)) { + fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec, (Sha256dHash, Vec)) { let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); - let mut local_txn = Vec::new(); - let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new(); + let mut claim_requests = Vec::new(); let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new(); macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf { @@ -1982,7 +1686,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => { return htlc_update.0 != $source }, - _ => return true + _ => true } }); e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}); @@ -1996,47 +1700,26 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { macro_rules! append_onchain_update { ($updates: expr) => { - local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0); - spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1); - watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2); - for claim in $updates.3 { - match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(claim.0) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); } - } - } + claim_requests = $updates.0; + watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1); + self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script = $updates.2; } } // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward let mut is_local_tx = false; - if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { - if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid { - is_local_tx = true; - log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim"); - match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => { - append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height)); - }, - Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { - append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height)); - } - } - } - } - if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx { + if self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid { + is_local_tx = true; + log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim"); + let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(tx, &self.current_local_commitment_tx); + append_onchain_update!(res); + } else if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx { if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid { is_local_tx = true; log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim"); - match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => { - append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height)); - }, - Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { - append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height)); - } - } + let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(tx, local_tx); + append_onchain_update!(res); } } @@ -2053,40 +1736,13 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } if is_local_tx { - if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { - fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx); - } + fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(self.current_local_commitment_tx); if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx { fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx); } } - (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)) - } - - /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain. - fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option { - if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 { - match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => { - let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize()); - let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script(); - for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { - if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey { - return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { - outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 }, - output: output.clone(), - }); - } - } - } - Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { - //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it - // comes back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction - } - } - } - None + (claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)) } /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of @@ -2098,27 +1754,69 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you. /// In any-case, choice is up to the user. - pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec { - if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { - let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()]; - match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => { - res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), 0).0); - // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do. - // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation. - }, - _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"), - }; - res - } else { - Vec::new() + pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&mut self) -> Vec { + log_trace!(self, "Getting signed latest local commitment transaction!"); + if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_local_tx() { + let txid = commitment_tx.txid(); + let mut res = vec![commitment_tx]; + for htlc in self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { + if let Some(htlc_index) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index { + let preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(*preimage) } else { None }; + if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(txid, htlc_index, preimage) { + res.push(htlc_tx); + } + } + } + // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do. + // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation. + return res + } + Vec::new() + } + + /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_local_commitment_txn used by our test framework + /// to bypass LocalCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate + /// revoked commitment transaction. + #[cfg(test)] + pub fn unsafe_get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&mut self) -> Vec { + log_trace!(self, "Getting signed copy of latest local commitment transaction!"); + if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_local_tx() { + let txid = commitment_tx.txid(); + let mut res = vec![commitment_tx]; + for htlc in self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() { + if let Some(htlc_index) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index { + let preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(*preimage) } else { None }; + if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(txid, htlc_index, preimage) { + res.push(htlc_tx); + } + } + } + return res } + Vec::new() } - fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec)>, Vec, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option, PaymentHash)>) { + /// Called by SimpleManyChannelMonitor::block_connected, which implements + /// ChainListener::block_connected. + /// Eventually this should be pub and, roughly, implement ChainListener, however this requires + /// &mut self, as well as returns new spendable outputs and outpoints to watch for spending of + /// on-chain. + fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F)-> Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec)> + where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator + { + for tx in txn_matched { + let mut output_val = 0; + for out in tx.output.iter() { + if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); } + output_val += out.value; + if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); } + } + } + + log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len()); let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new(); - let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new(); - let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new(); + let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new(); for tx in txn_matched { if tx.input.len() == 1 { // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what), @@ -2126,142 +1824,94 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy // filters. let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output; - let mut txn: Vec = Vec::new(); - let funding_txo = match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => { - funding_info.clone() - } - Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { - unimplemented!(); - } - }; - if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) { + if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 { if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 { - let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height, fee_estimator); - txn = remote_txn; - spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output); + let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height); if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() { watch_outputs.push(new_outputs); } - if txn.is_empty() { - let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height); - spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output); - txn = local_txn; + if new_outpoints.is_empty() { + let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height); if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() { watch_outputs.push(new_outputs); } + claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints); } - } - if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() { - if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) { - spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output); - } + claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints); } } else { if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) { - let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number, height, fee_estimator); - if let Some(tx) = tx { - txn.push(tx); - } - if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output { - spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output); + let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height); + claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints); + if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option { + watch_outputs.push(new_outputs); } } } - for tx in txn.iter() { - broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx); - } } // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus, // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check. - let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx, height); - if updated.len() > 0 { - htlc_updated.append(&mut updated); - } - for inp in &tx.input { - if self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.contains_key(&inp.previous_output) { - match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { - let e = entry.get_mut(); - e.retain(|ref event| { - match **event { - OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint } => { - return outpoint != inp.previous_output - }, - _ => return true - } - }); - e.push(OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint: inp.previous_output.clone()}); - } - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { - entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint: inp.previous_output.clone()}]); - } - } - } - } + self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height); + + self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height); } - let mut pending_claims = Vec::new(); - if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { - if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) { - broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx); - match self.key_storage { - Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => { - let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, mut pending_txn) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height); - spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output); - pending_claims.append(&mut pending_txn); - if !new_outputs.is_empty() { - watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs)); - } - for tx in txs { - broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx); - } - }, - Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { - let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, mut pending_txn) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None, height); - spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output); - pending_claims.append(&mut pending_txn); - if !new_outputs.is_empty() { - watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs)); - } - for tx in txs { - broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx); - } - } - } - } + let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(height); + if should_broadcast { + claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), vout: self.funding_info.0.index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::Funding {}}); } - for claim in pending_claims { - match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(claim.0) { - hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {}, - hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); } + if should_broadcast { + if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_local_tx() { + let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&commitment_tx, &self.current_local_commitment_tx); + if !new_outputs.is_empty() { + watch_outputs.push((self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs)); + } + claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints); } } if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) { for ev in events { match ev { - OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint } => { - self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.remove(&outpoint); - }, OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => { log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0)); - htlc_updated.push((htlc_update.0, None, htlc_update.1)); + self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate { + payment_hash: htlc_update.1, + payment_preimage: None, + source: htlc_update.0, + }); }, + OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => { + log_trace!(self, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor)); + self.pending_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs { + outputs: vec![descriptor] + }); + } } } } - //TODO: iter on buffered TxMaterial in our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf, if block timer is expired generate a bumped claim tx (RBF or CPFP accordingly) + self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, &*broadcaster, &*fee_estimator); + self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone(); - (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated) + for &(ref txid, ref output_scripts) in watch_outputs.iter() { + self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect()); + } + + watch_outputs } - fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash) { + fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F) + where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface, + F::Target: FeeEstimator + { + log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height); if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) { //We may discard: //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected - //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output + //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected } - self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.retain(|_, ref mut v| if v.3 == height { false } else { true }); + + self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator); + self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone(); } @@ -2312,20 +1962,16 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } - if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { - scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true); - } + scan_commitment!(self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true); - if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage { - if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid { - if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) { - scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false); - } + if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid { + if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) { + scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false); } - if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid { - if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) { - scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false); - } + } + if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid { + if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) { + scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false); } } @@ -2334,15 +1980,13 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC - fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option, PaymentHash)> { - let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new(); - + fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) { 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input { let mut payment_data = None; - let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33) - || (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33); - let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT; - let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT; + let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33) + || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33); + let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC); + let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC); macro_rules! log_claim { ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => { @@ -2368,7 +2012,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote { ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => { - if let &Some(txid) = $remote_txid { + if let Some(txid) = $remote_txid { for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() { if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat { if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source { @@ -2395,13 +2039,9 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender. payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash)); } else if !$local_tx { - if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage { - check_htlc_valid_remote!(current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output); - } + check_htlc_valid_remote!(self.current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output); if payment_data.is_none() { - if let Storage::Local { ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage { - check_htlc_valid_remote!(prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output); - } + check_htlc_valid_remote!(self.prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output); } } if payment_data.is_none() { @@ -2413,11 +2053,9 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } - if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx { - if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid { - scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())), - "our latest local commitment tx", true); - } + if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid { + scan_commitment!(self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())), + "our latest local commitment tx", true); } if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx { if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid { @@ -2435,11 +2073,23 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data { let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]); if accepted_preimage_claim { - payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]); - htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash)); + if !self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter().any(|update| update.source == source) { + payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]); + self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate { + source, + payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), + payment_hash + }); + } } else if offered_preimage_claim { - payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]); - htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash)); + if !self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter().any(|update| update.source == source) { + payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]); + self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate { + source, + payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), + payment_hash + }); + } } else { log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) { @@ -2450,7 +2100,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => { return htlc_update.0 != source }, - _ => return true + _ => true } }); e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}); @@ -2462,15 +2112,64 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { } } } - htlc_updated + } + + /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own + fn is_paying_spendable_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) { + let mut spendable_output = None; + for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us + if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script { + spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { + outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 }, + output: outp.clone(), + }); + break; + } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_local_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script { + if broadcasted_local_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey { + spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { + outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 }, + key: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.1, + witness_script: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.2.clone(), + to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay, + output: outp.clone(), + }); + break; + } + } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_remote_payment_script) = self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script { + if broadcasted_remote_payment_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey { + spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { + outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 }, + key: broadcasted_remote_payment_script.1, + output: outp.clone(), + }); + break; + } + } else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script { + spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { + outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 }, + output: outp.clone(), + }); + } + } + if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output { + log_trace!(self, "Maturing {} until {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); + match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) { + hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { + let e = entry.get_mut(); + e.push(OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output }); + } + hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { + entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output }]); + } + } + } } } const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024; -impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) { - fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc) -> Result { - let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); +impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) { + fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc) -> Result { macro_rules! unwrap_obj { ($key: expr) => { match $key { @@ -2486,47 +2185,49 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion); } - let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = >::read(reader)?.0; + let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = ::read(reader)?.0; - let key_storage = match >::read(reader)? { + let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?; + let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = match ::read(reader)? { 0 => { - let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?; - let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?; - let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?; - let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?; - let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?; - let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?; - let latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?; - // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of - // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with. - let outpoint = OutPoint { - txid: Readable::read(reader)?, - index: Readable::read(reader)?, - }; - let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?)); - let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?; - let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?; - Storage::Local { - revocation_base_key, - htlc_base_key, - delayed_payment_base_key, - payment_base_key, - shutdown_pubkey, - prev_latest_per_commitment_point, - latest_per_commitment_point, - funding_info, - current_remote_commitment_txid, - prev_remote_commitment_txid, - } + let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?; + let local_delayedkey = Readable::read(reader)?; + let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?; + Some((revokable_address, local_delayedkey, revokable_script)) }, + 1 => { None }, _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), }; + let broadcasted_remote_payment_script = match ::read(reader)? { + 0 => { + let payment_address = Readable::read(reader)?; + let payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?; + Some((payment_address, payment_key)) + }, + 1 => { None }, + _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), + }; + let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?; + + let keys = Readable::read(reader)?; + // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of + // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with. + let outpoint = OutPoint { + txid: Readable::read(reader)?, + index: Readable::read(reader)?, + }; + let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?); + let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?; + let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?; - let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?); - let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?); + let their_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?; + let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?; + let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?; + let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?; let their_cur_revocation_points = { - let first_idx = >::read(reader)?.0; + let first_idx = ::read(reader)?.0; if first_idx == 0 { None } else { @@ -2541,13 +2242,9 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM }; let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let their_to_self_delay: Option = Some(Readable::read(reader)?); + let their_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49]; - for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() { - *secret = Readable::read(reader)?; - *idx = Readable::read(reader)?; - } + let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?; macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment { () => { @@ -2572,7 +2269,7 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32)); for _ in 0..htlcs_count { - htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o)))); + htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o)))); } if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); @@ -2583,8 +2280,8 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32)); for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len { let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?; - let commitment_number = >::read(reader)?.0; - let outputs_count = >::read(reader)?; + let commitment_number = ::read(reader)?.0; + let outputs_count = ::read(reader)?; let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8)); for _ in 0..outputs_count { outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?); @@ -2598,7 +2295,7 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32)); for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len { let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?; - let commitment_number = >::read(reader)?.0; + let commitment_number = ::read(reader)?.0; if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); } @@ -2607,63 +2304,46 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM macro_rules! read_local_tx { () => { { - let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) { - Ok(tx) => tx, - Err(e) => match e { - encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)), - _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), - }, - }; - - if tx.input.is_empty() { - // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case. - return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); - } - + let txid = Readable::read(reader)?; let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?; let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?; let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?; let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?; + let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?; let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128)); for _ in 0..htlcs_len { let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!(); - let sigs = match >::read(reader)? { + let sigs = match ::read(reader)? { 0 => None, - 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)), + 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?), _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), }; htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?)); } LocalSignedTx { - txid: tx.txid(), - tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, + txid, + revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs: htlcs } } } } - let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match >::read(reader)? { - 0 => None, - 1 => { - Some(read_local_tx!()) - }, - _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), - }; - - let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match >::read(reader)? { + let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match ::read(reader)? { 0 => None, 1 => { Some(read_local_tx!()) }, _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), }; + let current_local_commitment_tx = read_local_tx!(); - let current_remote_commitment_number = >::read(reader)?.0; + let current_remote_commitment_number = ::read(reader)?.0; + let current_local_commitment_number = ::read(reader)?.0; let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32)); @@ -2675,75 +2355,22 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM } } - let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?; - let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?; - let to_remote_rescue = match >::read(reader)? { - 0 => None, - 1 => { - let to_remote_script = Readable::read(reader)?; - let local_key = Readable::read(reader)?; - Some((to_remote_script, local_key)) - } - _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), - }; + let pending_htlcs_updated_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_htlcs_updated_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))); + for _ in 0..pending_htlcs_updated_len { + pending_htlcs_updated.push(Readable::read(reader)?); + } - let our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; - let mut our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128)); - for _ in 0..our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len { - let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?; - let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?; - let tx_material = match >::read(reader)? { - 0 => { - let script = Readable::read(reader)?; - let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?; - let key = Readable::read(reader)?; - let is_htlc = match >::read(reader)? { - 0 => true, - 1 => false, - _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), - }; - let amount = Readable::read(reader)?; - TxMaterial::Revoked { - script, - pubkey, - key, - is_htlc, - amount - } - }, - 1 => { - let script = Readable::read(reader)?; - let key = Readable::read(reader)?; - let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?; - let amount = Readable::read(reader)?; - TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { - script, - key, - preimage, - amount - } - }, - 2 => { - let script = Readable::read(reader)?; - let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?; - let our_sig = Readable::read(reader)?; - let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?; - let amount = Readable::read(reader)?; - TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { - script, - sigs: (their_sig, our_sig), - preimage, - amount - } - } - _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), - }; - let last_fee = Readable::read(reader)?; - let timelock_expiration = Readable::read(reader)?; - let height = Readable::read(reader)?; - our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.insert(outpoint, (height_target, tx_material, last_fee, timelock_expiration, height)); + let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::())); + for _ in 0..pending_events_len { + if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? { + pending_events.push(event); + } } + let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?; + let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128)); for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len { @@ -2751,20 +2378,20 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128)); for _ in 0..events_len { - let ev = match >::read(reader)? { + let ev = match ::read(reader)? { 0 => { - let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?; - OnchainEvent::Claim { - outpoint - } - }, - 1 => { let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?; let hash = Readable::read(reader)?; OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash) } }, + 1 => { + let descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?; + OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { + descriptor + } + }, _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue), }; events.push(ev); @@ -2772,41 +2399,72 @@ impl ReadableArgs> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events); } + let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::() + mem::size_of::>()))); + for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len { + let txid = Readable::read(reader)?; + let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?; + let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::