X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Fchannelmonitor.rs;h=bbcbe75c67bf43bc78c0069e734c11ecff3ee447;hb=ab7a0a54318cdd55bedc3a02604af200b16e2e2c;hp=e17111256ea016ae6df06abaa22fcb5b846f8043;hpb=d421816e8420a9402461bbc96588843a1519cdff;p=rust-lightning

diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs
index e1711125..bbcbe75c 100644
--- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
+use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
 
@@ -31,19 +31,58 @@ use secp256k1;
 
 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
 use ln::chan_utils;
-use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
+use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
-use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
+use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
 use util::logger::Logger;
-use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
+use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
 use util::{byte_utils, events};
 
-use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
+use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
+use std::ops::Deref;
+
+/// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
+/// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
+#[derive(Clone)]
+#[must_use]
+pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+	pub(super) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
+	/// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
+	/// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
+	/// increasing and increase by one for each new update.
+	///
+	/// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
+	/// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
+	/// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
+	pub update_id: u64,
+}
+
+impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+	fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+		self.update_id.write(w)?;
+		(self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
+		for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
+			update_step.write(w)?;
+		}
+		Ok(())
+	}
+}
+impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+	fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+		let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
+		let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
+		let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::std::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
+		for _ in 0..len {
+			updates.push(Readable::read(r)?);
+		}
+		Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
+	}
+}
 
 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
 #[derive(Clone)]
@@ -52,13 +91,13 @@ pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
 	/// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
 	///
 	/// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
-	/// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
-	/// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
-	/// the channel to an operational state.
+	/// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party. Once the update(s) which failed
+	/// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
+	/// restore the channel to an operational state.
 	///
-	/// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
-	/// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
-	/// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
+	/// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If
+	/// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before
+	/// writing out the latest ChannelManager state.
 	///
 	/// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
 	/// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
@@ -69,8 +108,15 @@ pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
 	/// been "frozen".
 	///
 	/// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
-	/// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
-	/// channel operation.
+	/// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel
+	/// operation.
+	///
+	/// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call
+	/// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along
+	/// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a
+	/// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the
+	/// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at
+	/// reload-time.
 	///
 	/// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
 	/// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
@@ -85,24 +131,26 @@ pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
 }
 
 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
-/// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
-/// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
-/// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
+/// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
+/// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
+/// corrupted.
 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
 #[derive(Debug)]
 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
 
 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
 	pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 	pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
 	pub(super) source: HTLCSource
 }
+impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
 
 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
-/// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
+/// events to it, while also taking any add/update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
 /// server(s).
 ///
 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
@@ -115,17 +163,42 @@ pub struct HTLCUpdate {
 /// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the
 /// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify
 /// all registered listeners in one go.
-pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
-	/// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
+pub trait ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys>: Send + Sync {
+	/// Adds a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
+	///
+	/// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
+	/// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
+	/// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
+	///
+	/// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
+	/// monitor.get_outputs_to_watch() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
+	/// any spends of any of the outputs.
+	///
+	/// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
+	/// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS.
+	fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
+
+	/// Updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
+	///
+	/// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
+	/// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
+	/// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
 	///
-	/// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
-	/// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
-	/// any spends of it.
-	fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
+	/// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
+	/// monitor.get_watch_outputs() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
+	/// any spends of any of the outputs.
+	///
+	/// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
+	/// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS.
+	fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
 
 	/// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
-	/// with success or failure backward
-	fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
+	/// with success or failure.
+	///
+	/// You should probably just call through to
+	/// ChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() for each ChannelMonitor and return
+	/// the full list.
+	fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
 }
 
 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
@@ -139,29 +212,28 @@ pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
 ///
 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
-pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
+pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref> where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface {
 	#[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
-	pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
+	pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
 	#[cfg(not(test))]
-	monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
+	monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
 	chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
-	broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
+	broadcaster: T,
 	pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
-	pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>)>>>,
 	logger: Arc<Logger>,
 	fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>
 }
 
-impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
-
+impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T>
+	where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface
+{
 	fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
 		let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
 		let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
-		let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new();
 		{
 			let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
 			for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
-				let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
+				let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
 				if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
 					new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
 						outputs: spendable_outputs,
@@ -173,35 +245,6 @@ impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelM
 						self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
 					}
 				}
-				htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated);
-			}
-		}
-		{
-			// ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward
-			let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
-			for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) {
-				match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) {
-					hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
-						// In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
-						// we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given
-						// (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair.
-						let mut existing_claim = false;
-						e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
-							if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 {
-								if htlc_data.1.is_some() {
-									existing_claim = true;
-									true
-								} else { false }
-							} else { true }
-						});
-						if !existing_claim {
-							e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1));
-						}
-					}
-					hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
-						e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]);
-					}
-				}
 			}
 		}
 		let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
@@ -217,32 +260,30 @@ impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelM
 	}
 }
 
-impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
+impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T>
+	where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface
+{
 	/// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
 	/// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
-	pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
-		let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
+	pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: T, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>) -> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T> {
+		let res = SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
 			monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
 			chain_monitor,
 			broadcaster,
 			pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
-			pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
 			logger,
 			fee_estimator: feeest,
-		});
+		};
 
 		res
 	}
 
 	/// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
-	pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
+	pub fn add_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
 		let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
-		match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
-			Some(orig_monitor) => {
-				log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
-				return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
-			},
-			None => {}
+		let entry = match monitors.entry(key) {
+			hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Channel monitor for given key is already present")),
+			hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => e,
 		};
 		match monitor.key_storage {
 			Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
@@ -261,36 +302,57 @@ impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>
 				self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
 			}
 		}
-		monitors.insert(key, monitor);
+		for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
+			for (idx, script) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
+				self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((*txid, idx as u32), script);
+			}
+		}
+		entry.insert(monitor);
 		Ok(())
 	}
+
+	/// Updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
+	pub fn update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
+		let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
+		match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
+			Some(orig_monitor) => {
+				log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(orig_monitor.key_storage));
+				orig_monitor.update_monitor(update)
+			},
+			None => Err(MonitorUpdateError("No such monitor registered"))
+		}
+	}
 }
 
-impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
-	fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
-		match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
+impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send> ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint, ChanSigner, T>
+	where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface
+{
+	fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
+		match self.add_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
 			Ok(_) => Ok(()),
 			Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
 		}
 	}
 
-	fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
-		let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
-		let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len());
-		for (k, v) in updated.drain() {
-			for htlc_data in v {
-				pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
-					payment_hash: k,
-					payment_preimage: htlc_data.1,
-					source: htlc_data.0,
-				});
-			}
+	fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
+		match self.update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, update) {
+			Ok(_) => Ok(()),
+			Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
+		}
+	}
+
+	fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
+		let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::new();
+		for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
+			pending_htlcs_updated.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated());
 		}
 		pending_htlcs_updated
 	}
 }
 
-impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
+impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T>
+	where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface
+{
 	fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
 		let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 		let mut ret = Vec::new();
@@ -328,16 +390,15 @@ pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
 
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-enum Storage {
+enum Storage<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
 	Local {
+		keys: ChanSigner,
+		funding_key: SecretKey,
 		revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
 		htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
 		delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
 		payment_base_key: SecretKey,
 		shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
-		prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
-		latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 		funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
 		current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
 		prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
@@ -348,17 +409,41 @@ enum Storage {
 	}
 }
 
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for Storage<ChanSigner> {
+	fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
+		match *self {
+			Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => {
+				let k = keys;
+				match *other {
+					Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => keys.pubkeys() == k.pubkeys(),
+					Storage::Watchtower { .. } => false,
+				}
+			},
+			Storage::Watchtower {ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key} => {
+				let (rbk, hbk) = (revocation_base_key, htlc_base_key);
+				match *other {
+					Storage::Local { .. } => false,
+					Storage::Watchtower {ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key} =>
+						revocation_base_key == rbk && htlc_base_key == hbk,
+				}
+			},
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 struct LocalSignedTx {
 	/// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
 	txid: Sha256dHash,
-	tx: Transaction,
+	tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction,
 	revocation_key: PublicKey,
 	a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 	b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 	delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
+	per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
 	feerate_per_kw: u64,
-	htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
+	htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
 }
 
 #[derive(PartialEq)]
@@ -513,7 +598,7 @@ enum OnchainEvent {
 
 /// Higher-level cache structure needed to re-generate bumped claim txn if needed
 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-struct ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
+pub struct ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
 	// At every block tick, used to check if pending claiming tx is taking too
 	// much time for confirmation and we need to bump it.
 	height_timer: u32,
@@ -559,25 +644,162 @@ impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
 
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub(super) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
+	LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
+		// TODO: We really need to not be generating a fully-signed transaction in Channel and
+		// passing it here, we need to hold off so that the ChanSigner can enforce a
+		// only-sign-local-state-for-broadcast once invariant:
+		commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction,
+		local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys,
+		feerate_per_kw: u64,
+		htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
+	},
+	LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
+		unsigned_commitment_tx: Transaction, // TODO: We should actually only need the txid here
+		htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
+		commitment_number: u64,
+		their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
+	},
+	PaymentPreimage {
+		payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
+	},
+	CommitmentSecret {
+		idx: u64,
+		secret: [u8; 32],
+	},
+	/// Indicates our channel is likely a stale version, we're closing, but this update should
+	/// allow us to spend what is ours if our counterparty broadcasts their latest state.
+	RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
+		their_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
+	},
+}
+
+impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
+	fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+		match self {
+			&ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref local_keys, ref feerate_per_kw, ref htlc_outputs } => {
+				0u8.write(w)?;
+				commitment_tx.write(w)?;
+				local_keys.write(w)?;
+				feerate_per_kw.write(w)?;
+				(htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
+				for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
+					output.write(w)?;
+					signature.write(w)?;
+					source.write(w)?;
+				}
+			}
+			&ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { ref unsigned_commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
+				1u8.write(w)?;
+				unsigned_commitment_tx.write(w)?;
+				commitment_number.write(w)?;
+				their_revocation_point.write(w)?;
+				(htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
+				for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
+					output.write(w)?;
+					match source {
+						&None => 0u8.write(w)?,
+						&Some(ref s) => {
+							1u8.write(w)?;
+							s.write(w)?;
+						},
+					}
+				}
+			},
+			&ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => {
+				2u8.write(w)?;
+				payment_preimage.write(w)?;
+			},
+			&ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => {
+				3u8.write(w)?;
+				idx.write(w)?;
+				secret.write(w)?;
+			},
+			&ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { ref their_current_per_commitment_point } => {
+				4u8.write(w)?;
+				their_current_per_commitment_point.write(w)?;
+			},
+		}
+		Ok(())
+	}
+}
+impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
+	fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+		match Readable::read(r)? {
+			0u8 => {
+				Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
+					commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
+					local_keys: Readable::read(r)?,
+					feerate_per_kw: Readable::read(r)?,
+					htlc_outputs: {
+						let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
+						let mut res = Vec::new();
+						for _ in 0..len {
+							res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?));
+						}
+						res
+					},
+				})
+			},
+			1u8 => {
+				Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
+					unsigned_commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
+					commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
+					their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?,
+					htlc_outputs: {
+						let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
+						let mut res = Vec::new();
+						for _ in 0..len {
+							res.push((Readable::read(r)?, <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable<R>>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o))));
+						}
+						res
+					},
+				})
+			},
+			2u8 => {
+				Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
+					payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?,
+				})
+			},
+			3u8 => {
+				Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
+					idx: Readable::read(r)?,
+					secret: Readable::read(r)?,
+				})
+			},
+			4u8 => {
+				Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
+					their_current_per_commitment_point: Readable::read(r)?,
+				})
+			},
+			_ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
 ///
 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub struct ChannelMonitor {
+pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
+	latest_update_id: u64,
 	commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
 
-	key_storage: Storage,
+	key_storage: Storage<ChanSigner>,
 	their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
 	their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
+	funding_redeemscript: Option<Script>,
+	channel_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
 	// first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
 	their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
 
 	our_to_self_delay: u16,
 	their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
 
-	old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
+	commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
 	remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
 	/// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
 	/// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
@@ -604,6 +826,8 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor {
 
 	payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
 
+	pending_htlcs_updated: Vec<HTLCUpdate>,
+
 	destination_script: Script,
 	// Thanks to data loss protection, we may be able to claim our non-htlc funds
 	// back, this is the script we have to spend from but we need to
@@ -621,6 +845,9 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor {
 	// Key is identifier of the pending claim request, i.e the txid of the initial claiming transaction generated by
 	// us and is immutable until all outpoint of the claimable set are post-anti-reorg-delay solved.
 	// Entry is cache of elements need to generate a bumped claiming transaction (see ClaimTxBumpMaterial)
+	#[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
+	pub pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
+	#[cfg(not(test))]
 	pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
 
 	// Used to link outpoints claimed in a connected block to a pending claim request.
@@ -629,6 +856,9 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor {
 	// is txid of the initial claiming transaction and is immutable until outpoint is
 	// post-anti-reorg-delay solved, confirmaiton_block is used to erase entry if
 	// block with output gets disconnected.
+	#[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
+	pub claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
+	#[cfg(not(test))]
 	claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
 
 	// Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
@@ -636,16 +866,21 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor {
 	// actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
 	onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
 
+	// If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
+	// interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
+	// be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
+	// Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
+	outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<Script>>,
+
 	// We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
 	// consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
-	// (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
+	// (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
 	// their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
 	// the full block_connected).
 	pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
 	secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
 	logger: Arc<Logger>,
 }
-
 macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
 	($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => {
 		{
@@ -684,15 +919,19 @@ macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
 /// underlying object
-impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
+impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
 	fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
-		if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
+		if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
+			self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
 			self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
 			self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
 			self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
+			self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
+			self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
 			self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
 			self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
 			self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
+			self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
 			self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
 			self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
 			self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
@@ -700,153 +939,392 @@ impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
 			self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
 			self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
 			self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
+			self.pending_htlcs_updated != other.pending_htlcs_updated ||
 			self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
 			self.to_remote_rescue != other.to_remote_rescue ||
 			self.pending_claim_requests != other.pending_claim_requests ||
 			self.claimable_outpoints != other.claimable_outpoints ||
-			self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf
+			self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
+			self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch
 		{
 			false
 		} else {
-			for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
-				if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
-					return false
-				}
-			}
 			true
 		}
 	}
 }
 
-impl ChannelMonitor {
-	pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
-		ChannelMonitor {
-			commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
-
-			key_storage: Storage::Local {
-				revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
-				htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
-				delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
-				payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
-				shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
-				prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
-				latest_per_commitment_point: None,
-				funding_info: None,
-				current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
-				prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
-			},
-			their_htlc_base_key: None,
-			their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
-			their_cur_revocation_points: None,
-
-			our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
-			their_to_self_delay: None,
-
-			old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
-			remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
-			remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
-			remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
+impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
+	/// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
+	fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+		//TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
+		//serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
+		writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
+		writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
 
-			prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
-			current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
-			current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
+		self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
 
-			payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
-			destination_script: destination_script,
-			to_remote_rescue: None,
+		// Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
+		U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
 
-			pending_claim_requests: HashMap::new(),
+		macro_rules! write_option {
+			($thing: expr) => {
+				match $thing {
+					&Some(ref t) => {
+						1u8.write(writer)?;
+						t.write(writer)?;
+					},
+					&None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
+				}
+			}
+		}
 
-			claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
+		match self.key_storage {
+			Storage::Local { ref keys, ref funding_key, ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
+				writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+				keys.write(writer)?;
+				writer.write_all(&funding_key[..])?;
+				writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
+				writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
+				writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
+				writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
+				writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
+				match funding_info  {
+					&Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
+						writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
+						writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
+						script.write(writer)?;
+					},
+					&None => {
+						debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
+					},
+				}
+				current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
+				prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
+			},
+			Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
+		}
 
-			onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
+		writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
+		writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
+		self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap().write(writer)?;
+		self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap().write(writer)?;
 
-			last_block_hash: Default::default(),
-			secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
-			logger,
+		match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
+			Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
+				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
+				writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
+				match second_option {
+					Some(second_pubkey) => {
+						writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
+					},
+					None => {
+						writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
+					},
+				}
+			},
+			None => {
+				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
+			},
 		}
-	}
 
-	fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize {
-		let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
-		for inp in inputs {
-			// We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
-			tx_weight +=  match inp {
-				// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
-				&InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
-					1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
-				},
-				// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
-				&InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
-					1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
-				},
-				// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig  + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
-				&InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
-					1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
-				},
-				// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
-				&InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
-					1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
-				},
-				// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
-				&InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
-					1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
-				},
-			};
-		}
-		tx_weight
-	}
+		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
+		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
 
-	fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 {
-		if timelock_expiration <= current_height || timelock_expiration - current_height <= 3 {
-			return current_height + 1
-		} else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 {
-			return current_height + 3
-		}
-		current_height + 15
-	}
+		self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
 
-	#[inline]
-	fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
-		for i in 0..48 {
-			if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
-				return i
+		macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
+			($htlc_output: expr) => {
+				writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
+				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
+				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
+				writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
+				$htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
 			}
 		}
-		48
-	}
 
-	#[inline]
-	fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
-		let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
-		for i in 0..bits {
-			let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
-			if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
-				res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
-				res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
+		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
+		for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
+			writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
+			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
+			for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
+				serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
+				write_option!(htlc_source);
 			}
 		}
-		res
-	}
 
-	/// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
-	/// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
-	/// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
-	pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
-		let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
-		for i in 0..pos {
-			let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
-			if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
-				return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
+		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
+		for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
+			writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
+			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
+			(txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+			for script in txouts.iter() {
+				script.write(writer)?;
 			}
 		}
-		if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
-			return Ok(());
-		}
-		self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
 
-		// Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
-		// events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
+		if for_local_storage {
+			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
+			for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
+				writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
+				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
+			}
+		} else {
+			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
+		}
+
+		macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
+			($local_tx: expr) => {
+				$local_tx.tx.write(writer)?;
+				writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
+				writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
+				writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
+				writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
+				writer.write_all(&$local_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
+
+				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
+				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
+				for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+					serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
+					if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
+						1u8.write(writer)?;
+						writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
+					} else {
+						0u8.write(writer)?;
+					}
+					write_option!(htlc_source);
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+		if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+			writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+			serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
+		} else {
+			writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+		}
+
+		if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+			writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+			serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
+		} else {
+			writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+		}
+
+		if for_local_storage {
+			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
+		} else {
+			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
+		}
+
+		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
+		for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
+			writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
+		}
+
+		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_htlcs_updated.len() as u64))?;
+		for data in self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter() {
+			data.write(writer)?;
+		}
+
+		self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
+		self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
+		if let Some((ref to_remote_script, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
+			writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+			to_remote_script.write(writer)?;
+			local_key.write(writer)?;
+		} else {
+			writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+		}
+
+		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64))?;
+		for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, claim_tx_data) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
+			ancestor_claim_txid.write(writer)?;
+			claim_tx_data.write(writer)?;
+		}
+
+		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
+		for (ref outp, ref claim_and_height) in self.claimable_outpoints.iter() {
+			outp.write(writer)?;
+			claim_and_height.0.write(writer)?;
+			claim_and_height.1.write(writer)?;
+		}
+
+		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
+		for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
+			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
+			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
+			for ev in events.iter() {
+				match *ev {
+					OnchainEvent::Claim { ref claim_request } => {
+						writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+						claim_request.write(writer)?;
+					},
+					OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
+						writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+						htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
+						htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
+					},
+					OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { ref outpoint, ref input_material } => {
+						writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
+						outpoint.write(writer)?;
+						input_material.write(writer)?;
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+		(self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+		for (txid, output_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
+			txid.write(writer)?;
+			(output_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+			for script in output_scripts.iter() {
+				script.write(writer)?;
+			}
+		}
+
+		Ok(())
+	}
+
+	/// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
+	///
+	/// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
+	/// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
+	/// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
+	/// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
+	/// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
+	pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+		self.write(writer, true)
+	}
+
+	/// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
+	///
+	/// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
+	/// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
+	/// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
+	/// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
+	/// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
+	pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+		self.write(writer, false)
+	}
+}
+
+impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
+	pub(super) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
+			our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
+			their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey,
+			their_to_self_delay: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
+			commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
+			logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
+
+		assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
+		let funding_key = keys.funding_key().clone();
+		let revocation_base_key = keys.revocation_base_key().clone();
+		let htlc_base_key = keys.htlc_base_key().clone();
+		let delayed_payment_base_key = keys.delayed_payment_base_key().clone();
+		let payment_base_key = keys.payment_base_key().clone();
+		ChannelMonitor {
+			latest_update_id: 0,
+			commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
+
+			key_storage: Storage::Local {
+				keys,
+				funding_key,
+				revocation_base_key,
+				htlc_base_key,
+				delayed_payment_base_key,
+				payment_base_key,
+				shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
+				funding_info: Some(funding_info),
+				current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
+				prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
+			},
+			their_htlc_base_key: Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone()),
+			their_delayed_payment_base_key: Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone()),
+			funding_redeemscript: Some(funding_redeemscript),
+			channel_value_satoshis: Some(channel_value_satoshis),
+			their_cur_revocation_points: None,
+
+			our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
+			their_to_self_delay: Some(their_to_self_delay),
+
+			commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
+			remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
+			remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
+			remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
+
+			prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
+			current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
+			current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
+
+			payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
+			pending_htlcs_updated: Vec::new(),
+
+			destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
+			to_remote_rescue: None,
+
+			pending_claim_requests: HashMap::new(),
+
+			claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
+
+			onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
+			outputs_to_watch: HashMap::new(),
+
+			last_block_hash: Default::default(),
+			secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
+			logger,
+		}
+	}
+
+	fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize {
+		let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
+		for inp in inputs {
+			// We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
+			tx_weight +=  match inp {
+				// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
+				&InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
+					1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
+				},
+				// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
+				&InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
+					1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
+				},
+				// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig  + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
+				&InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
+					1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
+				},
+				// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
+				&InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
+					1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
+				},
+				// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
+				&InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
+					1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
+				},
+			};
+		}
+		tx_weight
+	}
+
+	fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 {
+		if timelock_expiration <= current_height || timelock_expiration - current_height <= 3 {
+			return current_height + 1
+		} else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 {
+			return current_height + 3
+		}
+		current_height + 15
+	}
+
+	/// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
+	/// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
+	/// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
+	pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
+		if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
+			return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
+		}
+
+		// Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
+		// events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
 		// TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
 		if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
 			if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
@@ -936,8 +1414,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 
 	pub(super) fn provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
 		match self.key_storage {
-			Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
-				if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_base_key)) {
+			Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, ref keys, .. } => {
+				if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().payment_basepoint) {
 					let to_remote_script =  Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
 						.push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&payment_key.serialize())[..])
 						.into_script();
@@ -955,434 +1433,133 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 	/// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
 	/// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
 	/// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
-	/// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
-	/// case of onchain HTLC tx
-	pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
-		assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
+	pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
+		if self.their_to_self_delay.is_none() {
+			return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Got a local commitment tx info update before we'd set basic information about the channel"));
+		}
 		self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
 		self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
-			txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
-			tx: signed_commitment_tx,
+			txid: commitment_tx.txid(),
+			tx: commitment_tx,
 			revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
 			a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
 			b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
 			delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
+			per_commitment_point: local_keys.per_commitment_point,
 			feerate_per_kw,
 			htlc_outputs,
 		});
-
-		if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
-			*latest_per_commitment_point = Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point);
-		} else {
-			panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
-		}
+		Ok(())
 	}
 
 	/// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
 	/// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
 	pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
-		self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
-	}
-
-	/// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
-	/// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
-	/// chain for new blocks/transactions.
-	pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
-		match self.key_storage {
-			Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
-				if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
-				let our_funding_info = funding_info;
-				if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
-					if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
-					// We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially
-					// easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
-					if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
-						return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
-					}
-				} else {
-					return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
-				}
-			},
-			Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
-				if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
-					unimplemented!();
-				} else {
-					return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
-				}
-			},
-		}
-		let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
-		let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
-		if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
-			self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
-		}
-		if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
-			if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
-				let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
-				let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
-				if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
-					self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
-				}
-			}
-		}
-		// TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
-		// local transactions to decide how to merge
-		if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
-			self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
-			for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
-				self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
-			}
-			if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
-				self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
-			}
-			if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
-				self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
-			}
-			self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
-			self.to_remote_rescue = other.to_remote_rescue;
-		}
-
-		self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
-		Ok(())
-	}
-
-	/// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
-	pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
-		assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
-		self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
-	}
-
-	/// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
-	/// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
-	/// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
-	/// provides slightly better privacy.
-	/// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
-	/// value as key to add_update_monitor.
-	pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
-		match self.key_storage {
-			Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
-				*funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
-			},
-			Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
-				panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
-	/// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
-	pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
-		self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
-		self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
-	}
-
-	pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
-		self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
-	}
-
-	pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
-		match self.key_storage {
-			Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
-				*funding_info = None;
-			},
-			Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
-				panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
-			},
-		}
-	}
-
-	/// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
-	pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
-		match self.key_storage {
-			Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
-				match funding_info {
-					&Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
-					&None => None
-				}
-			},
-			Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
-				return None;
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
-	/// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
-	/// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
-	/// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
-	/// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
-	pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
-		let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
-		for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
-			for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
-				res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
-			}
-		}
-		res
-	}
-
-	/// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
-	fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
-		//TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
-		//serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
-		writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
-		writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
-
-		// Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
-		U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
-
-		macro_rules! write_option {
-			($thing: expr) => {
-				match $thing {
-					&Some(ref t) => {
-						1u8.write(writer)?;
-						t.write(writer)?;
-					},
-					&None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
-				}
-			}
-		}
-
-		match self.key_storage {
-			Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
-				writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
-				writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
-				writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
-				writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
-				writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
-				writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
-				prev_latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
-				latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
-				match funding_info  {
-					&Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
-						writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
-						writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
-						script.write(writer)?;
-					},
-					&None => {
-						debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
-					},
-				}
-				current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
-				prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
-			},
-			Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
-		}
-
-		writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
-		writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
-
-		match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
-			Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
-				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
-				writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
-				match second_option {
-					Some(second_pubkey) => {
-						writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
-					},
-					None => {
-						writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
-					},
-				}
-			},
-			None => {
-				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
-			},
-		}
-
-		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
-		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
-
-		for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
-			writer.write_all(secret)?;
-			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
-		}
-
-		macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
-			($htlc_output: expr) => {
-				writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
-				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
-				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
-				writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
-				$htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
-			}
-		}
-
-		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
-		for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
-			writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
-			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
-			for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
-				serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
-				write_option!(htlc_source);
-			}
-		}
-
-		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
-		for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
-			writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
-			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
-			(txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
-			for script in txouts.iter() {
-				script.write(writer)?;
-			}
-		}
-
-		if for_local_storage {
-			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
-			for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
-				writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
-				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
-			}
-		} else {
-			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
-		}
-
-		macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
-			($local_tx: expr) => {
-				if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
-					match e {
-						encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
-						_ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
-					}
-				}
-
-				writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
-				writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
-				writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
-				writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
-
-				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
-				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
-				for &(ref htlc_output, ref sigs, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
-					serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
-					if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
-						1u8.write(writer)?;
-						writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
-						writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact())?;
-					} else {
-						0u8.write(writer)?;
-					}
-					write_option!(htlc_source);
-				}
-			}
-		}
-
-		if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
-			writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
-			serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
-		} else {
-			writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
-		}
-
-		if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
-			writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
-			serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
-		} else {
-			writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
-		}
-
-		if for_local_storage {
-			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
-		} else {
-			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
-		}
-
-		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
-		for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
-			writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
-		}
+		self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
+	}
 
-		self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
-		self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
-		if let Some((ref to_remote_script, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
-			writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
-			to_remote_script.write(writer)?;
-			local_key.write(writer)?;
-		} else {
-			writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
-		}
+	/// Used in Channel to cheat wrt the update_ids since it plays games, will be removed soon!
+	pub(super) fn update_monitor_ooo(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
+		for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
+			match update {
+				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, local_keys, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs } =>
+					self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, local_keys, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs)?,
+				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
+					self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point),
+				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
+					self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
+				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
+					self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
+				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { their_current_per_commitment_point } =>
+					self.provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(their_current_per_commitment_point),
+			}
+		}
+		self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
+		Ok(())
+	}
 
-		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64))?;
-		for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, claim_tx_data) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
-			ancestor_claim_txid.write(writer)?;
-			claim_tx_data.write(writer)?;
-		}
+	/// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
+	/// itself.
+	///
+	/// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
+	pub fn update_monitor(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
+		if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
+			panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
+		}
+		for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
+			match update {
+				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, local_keys, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs } =>
+					self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, local_keys, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs)?,
+				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
+					self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point),
+				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
+					self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
+				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
+					self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
+				ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { their_current_per_commitment_point } =>
+					self.provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(their_current_per_commitment_point),
+			}
+		}
+		self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
+		Ok(())
+	}
 
-		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
-		for (ref outp, ref claim_and_height) in self.claimable_outpoints.iter() {
-			outp.write(writer)?;
-			claim_and_height.0.write(writer)?;
-			claim_and_height.1.write(writer)?;
-		}
+	/// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
+	/// ChannelMonitor.
+	pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
+		self.latest_update_id
+	}
 
-		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
-		for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
-			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
-			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
-			for ev in events.iter() {
-				match *ev {
-					OnchainEvent::Claim { ref claim_request } => {
-						writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
-						claim_request.write(writer)?;
-					},
-					OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
-						writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
-						htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
-						htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
-					},
-					OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { ref outpoint, ref input_material } => {
-						writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
-						outpoint.write(writer)?;
-						input_material.write(writer)?;
-					}
+	/// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
+	pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
+		match self.key_storage {
+			Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
+				match funding_info {
+					&Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
+					&None => None
 				}
+			},
+			Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
+				return None;
 			}
 		}
+	}
 
-		Ok(())
+	/// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
+	/// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
+	pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<Script>> {
+		&self.outputs_to_watch
 	}
 
-	/// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
-	///
-	/// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
-	/// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
-	/// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
-	/// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
-	/// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
-	pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
-		self.write(writer, true)
+	/// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
+	/// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
+	/// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
+	/// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
+	pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
+		let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
+		for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
+			for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
+				res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
+			}
+		}
+		res
 	}
 
-	/// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
-	///
-	/// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
-	/// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
-	/// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
-	/// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
-	/// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
-	pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
-		self.write(writer, false)
+	/// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
+	/// ChannelManager via ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated().
+	pub fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&mut self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
+		let mut ret = Vec::new();
+		mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_htlcs_updated);
+		ret
 	}
 
 	/// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
 	pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
-		for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
-			if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
-				return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
-			}
-		}
-		assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
-		None
+		self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
 	}
 
 	pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
-		//TODO This can be optimized?
-		let mut min = 1 << 48;
-		for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
-			if idx < min {
-				min = idx;
-			}
-		}
-		min
+		self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
 	}
 
 	pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
@@ -1391,7 +1568,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 
 	pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
 		if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
-			0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
+			0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
 		} else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
 	}
 
@@ -1425,10 +1602,10 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 			let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
 			let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
 			let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
-				Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
+				Storage::Local { ref keys, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
 					let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
-					(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
-					ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
+					(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)),
+					ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint)),
 					Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
 				},
 				Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
@@ -1740,9 +1917,9 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 					} else { None };
 				if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
 					let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
-						Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
-							(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
-							ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
+						Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => {
+							(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)),
+							ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint)))
 						},
 						Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
 							(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
@@ -1778,11 +1955,11 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 					let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
 
 					macro_rules! sign_input {
-						($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
+						($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr, $idx: expr) => {
 							{
 								let (sig, redeemscript, htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
 									Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
-										let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
+										let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$idx as usize].0;
 										let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
 										let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
 										let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
@@ -1817,13 +1994,13 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 											vout: transaction_output_index,
 										},
 										script_sig: Script::new(),
-										sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
+										sequence: 0xff_ff_ff_fd,
 										witness: Vec::new(),
 									};
 									if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
 										inputs.push(input);
 										inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
-										inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
+										inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry, idx));
 										total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
 									} else {
 										let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
@@ -1840,7 +2017,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 										let mut used_feerate;
 										if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
 											let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
-											let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
+											let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec(), idx);
 											assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
 											spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
 												outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
@@ -1871,7 +2048,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 										vout: transaction_output_index,
 									},
 									script_sig: Script::new(),
-									sequence: idx as u32,
+									sequence: 0xff_ff_ff_fd,
 									witness: Vec::new(),
 								};
 								let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
@@ -1888,7 +2065,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 								let mut used_feerate;
 								if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, timeout_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
 									let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
-									let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
+									let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0], idx);
 									assert!(predicted_weight >= timeout_tx.get_weight());
 									//TODO: track SpendableOutputDescriptor
 									log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
@@ -1940,7 +2117,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 					let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock);
 					let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid();
 					for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
-						let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec());
+						let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec(), info.3);
 						log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer);
 						per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*(info.0)), amount: info.1, locktime: 0});
 						match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) {
@@ -1995,8 +2172,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 		let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
 		let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
 		let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
-			Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
-				ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
+			Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => {
+				ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint))
 			},
 			Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
 				ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
@@ -2064,7 +2241,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 			assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
 			let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
 			let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
-			let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap() as u32); // We can safely unwrap given we are past channel opening
+			let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32);
 			log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
 			let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
 			per_input_material.insert(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value });
@@ -2080,7 +2257,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 		} else { (None, None) }
 	}
 
-	fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>, Vec<(Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial)>) {
+	fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>, Vec<(Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial)>) {
 		let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
 		let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
 		let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
@@ -2088,85 +2265,71 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 
 		macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
 			($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
-				if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
-					if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
-						if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
-							spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
-								outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
-								key: local_delayedkey,
-								witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
-								to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
-								output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
-							});
-						}
-					}
+				if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
+					spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
+						outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
+						key: local_delayedkey,
+						witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
+						to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
+						output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
+					});
 				}
 			}
 		}
 
 		let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
 		let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
-		for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
+		for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().output.iter().enumerate() {
 			if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
-				add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
+				add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness(), idx as u32);
 				break;
 			}
 		}
 
-		for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
-			if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
-				if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
-					if htlc.offered {
-						log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
-						let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
-
-						htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
-
-						htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
-						htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
-						htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
-						htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
-
-						htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
-						let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
-						htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
-
-						add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
-						let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
-						let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
-						per_input_material.insert(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
-						//TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too
-						log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
-						pending_claims.push((htlc_timeout_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
-						res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
-					} else {
-						if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
-							log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
-							let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
-
-							htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
-
-							htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
-							htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
-							htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
-							htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
-
-							htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
-							let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
-							htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
+		if let &Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } = &self.key_storage {
+			for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+				if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+					if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sigs {
+						if htlc.offered {
+							log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
+							let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
+							let (our_sig, htlc_script) = match
+									chan_utils::sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_timeout_tx, their_sig, &None, htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key, &self.secp_ctx) {
+								Ok(res) => res,
+								Err(_) => continue,
+							};
 
-							add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
+							add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
 							let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
 							let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
-							per_input_material.insert(htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
+							per_input_material.insert(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
 							//TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too
-							log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
-							pending_claims.push((htlc_success_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
-							res.push(htlc_success_tx);
+							log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
+							pending_claims.push((htlc_timeout_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
+							res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
+						} else {
+							if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
+								log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
+								let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
+								let (our_sig, htlc_script) = match
+										chan_utils::sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_success_tx, their_sig, &Some(*payment_preimage), htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key, &self.secp_ctx) {
+									Ok(res) => res,
+									Err(_) => continue,
+								};
+
+								add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
+								let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
+								let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
+								per_input_material.insert(htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
+								//TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too
+								log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
+								pending_claims.push((htlc_success_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
+								res.push(htlc_success_tx);
+							}
 						}
-					}
-					watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
-				} else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
+						watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
+					} else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
+				}
 			}
 		}
 
@@ -2222,17 +2385,37 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 		// HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
 		let mut is_local_tx = false;
 
+		if let &mut Some(ref mut local_tx) = &mut self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+			if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
+				match self.key_storage {
+					Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
+						local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
+					},
+					_ => {},
+				}
+			}
+		}
 		if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 			if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
 				is_local_tx = true;
 				log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
+				assert!(local_tx.tx.has_local_sig());
 				match self.key_storage {
-					Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
-						append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
+					Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
+						let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height);
+						append_onchain_update!(res);
 					},
-					Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
-						append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
-					}
+					Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { }
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		if let &mut Some(ref mut local_tx) = &mut self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+			if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
+				match self.key_storage {
+					Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
+						local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
+					},
+					_ => {},
 				}
 			}
 		}
@@ -2240,13 +2423,13 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 			if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
 				is_local_tx = true;
 				log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
+				assert!(local_tx.tx.has_local_sig());
 				match self.key_storage {
-					Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
-						append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
+					Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
+						let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height);
+						append_onchain_update!(res);
 					},
-					Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
-						append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
-					}
+					Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { }
 				}
 			}
 		}
@@ -2309,12 +2492,21 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 	/// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
 	/// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
 	/// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
-	pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
+	pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&mut self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
+		log_trace!(self, "Getting signed latest local commitment transaction!");
+		if let &mut Some(ref mut local_tx) = &mut self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+			match self.key_storage {
+				Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
+					local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
+				},
+				_ => {},
+			}
+		}
 		if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
-			let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
+			let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness().clone()];
 			match self.key_storage {
-				Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
-					res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), 0).0);
+				Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
+					res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, 0).0);
 					// We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
 					// The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
 				},
@@ -2326,11 +2518,27 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 		}
 	}
 
-	fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
+	/// Called by SimpleManyChannelMonitor::block_connected, which implements
+	/// ChainListener::block_connected.
+	/// Eventually this should be pub and, roughly, implement ChainListener, however this requires
+	/// &mut self, as well as returns new spendable outputs and outpoints to watch for spending of
+	/// on-chain.
+	fn block_connected<B: Deref>(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>)
+		where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface
+	{
+		for tx in txn_matched {
+			let mut output_val = 0;
+			for out in tx.output.iter() {
+				if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
+				output_val += out.value;
+				if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
+			}
+		}
+
+		log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
 		let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
 		let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
-		let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
-		let mut bump_candidates = Vec::new();
+		let mut bump_candidates = HashSet::new();
 		for tx in txn_matched {
 			if tx.input.len() == 1 {
 				// Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
@@ -2388,43 +2596,61 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 			// While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
 			// can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
 			// we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
-			let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height);
-			if updated.len() > 0 {
-				htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
-			}
+			self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height);
 
 			// Scan all input to verify is one of the outpoint spent is of interest for us
-			let mut claimed_outpoints = Vec::new();
-			let mut claimed_input_material = Vec::new();
+			let mut claimed_outputs_material = Vec::new();
 			for inp in &tx.input {
-				if let Some(ancestor_claimable_txid) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&inp.previous_output) {
+				if let Some(first_claim_txid_height) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&inp.previous_output) {
 					// If outpoint has claim request pending on it...
-					if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&ancestor_claimable_txid.0) {
+					if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&first_claim_txid_height.0) {
 						//... we need to verify equality between transaction outpoints and claim request
 						// outpoints to know if transaction is the original claim or a bumped one issued
 						// by us.
-						for claim_inp in claim_material.per_input_material.keys() {
-							if *claim_inp == inp.previous_output {
-								claimed_outpoints.push(inp.previous_output.clone());
+						let mut set_equality = true;
+						if claim_material.per_input_material.len() != tx.input.len() {
+							set_equality = false;
+						} else {
+							for (claim_inp, tx_inp) in claim_material.per_input_material.keys().zip(tx.input.iter()) {
+								if *claim_inp != tx_inp.previous_output {
+									set_equality = false;
+								}
 							}
 						}
-						if claimed_outpoints.len() == 0 && claim_material.per_input_material.len() == tx.input.len() { // If true, register claim request to be removed after reaching a block security height
-							match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
-								hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
-								hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
-									entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request: ancestor_claimable_txid.0.clone()}]);
+
+						macro_rules! clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay {
+							() => {
+								let new_event = OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request: first_claim_txid_height.0.clone() };
+								match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
+									hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+										if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
+											entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
+										}
+									},
+									hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+										entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
+									}
 								}
 							}
+						}
+
+						// If this is our transaction (or our counterparty spent all the outputs
+						// before we could anyway with same inputs order than us), wait for
+						// ANTI_REORG_DELAY and clean the RBF tracking map.
+						if set_equality {
+							clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
 						} else { // If false, generate new claim request with update outpoint set
-							for already_claimed in claimed_outpoints.iter() {
-								if let Some(input_material) = claim_material.per_input_material.remove(&already_claimed) {
-									claimed_input_material.push(input_material);
+							for input in tx.input.iter() {
+								if let Some(input_material) = claim_material.per_input_material.remove(&input.previous_output) {
+									claimed_outputs_material.push((input.previous_output, input_material));
+								}
+								// If there are no outpoints left to claim in this request, drop it entirely after ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
+								if claim_material.per_input_material.is_empty() {
+									clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
 								}
 							}
-							// Avoid bump engine using inaccurate feerate due to new transaction size
-							claim_material.feerate_previous = 0;
 							//TODO: recompute soonest_timelock to avoid wasting a bit on fees
-							bump_candidates.push((ancestor_claimable_txid.0.clone(), claim_material.clone()));
+							bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid_height.0.clone());
 						}
 						break; //No need to iterate further, either tx is our or their
 					} else {
@@ -2432,22 +2658,40 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 					}
 				}
 			}
-			for (outpoint, input_material) in claimed_outpoints.iter().zip(claimed_input_material.drain(..)) {
+			for (outpoint, input_material) in claimed_outputs_material.drain(..) {
+				let new_event = OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material };
 				match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
-					hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
+					hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+						if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
+							entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
+						}
+					},
 					hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
-						entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint: *outpoint, input_material: input_material }]);
+						entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
 					}
 				}
 			}
 		}
+		let should_broadcast = if let Some(_) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+			self.would_broadcast_at_height(height)
+		} else { false };
+		if let Some(ref mut cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+			if should_broadcast {
+				match self.key_storage {
+					Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
+						cur_local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
+					},
+					_ => {}
+				}
+			}
+		}
 		if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
-			if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
-				log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(cur_local_tx.tx));
-				broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
+			if should_broadcast {
+				log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(cur_local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness()));
+				broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness());
 				match self.key_storage {
-					Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
-						let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height);
+					Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
+						let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height);
 						spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
 						if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
 							watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
@@ -2457,17 +2701,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 							broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
 						}
 					},
-					Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
-						let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None, height);
-						spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
-						if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
-							watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
-						}
-						for tx in txs {
-							log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
-							broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
-						}
-					}
+					Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { },
 				}
 			}
 		}
@@ -2475,12 +2709,21 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 			for ev in events {
 				match ev {
 					OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request } => {
-						// We may remove a whole set of claim outpoints here, as these one may have been aggregated in a single tx and claimed so atomically
-						self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&claim_request);
+						// We may remove a whole set of claim outpoints here, as these one may have
+						// been aggregated in a single tx and claimed so atomically
+						if let Some(bump_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&claim_request) {
+							for outpoint in bump_material.per_input_material.keys() {
+								self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
+							}
+						}
 					},
 					OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
 						log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
-						htlc_updated.push((htlc_update.0, None, htlc_update.1));
+						self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
+							payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
+							payment_preimage: None,
+							source: htlc_update.0,
+						});
 					},
 					OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, .. } => {
 						self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
@@ -2488,26 +2731,37 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 				}
 			}
 		}
-		for (ancestor_claim_txid, ref mut cached_claim_datas) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter_mut() {
+		for (first_claim_txid, ref mut cached_claim_datas) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter_mut() {
 			if cached_claim_datas.height_timer == height {
-				bump_candidates.push((ancestor_claim_txid.clone(), cached_claim_datas.clone()));
+				bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid.clone());
 			}
 		}
-		for &mut (_, ref mut cached_claim_datas) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() {
-			if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &cached_claim_datas, fee_estimator) {
-				cached_claim_datas.height_timer = new_timer;
-				cached_claim_datas.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
-				broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
+		for first_claim_txid in bump_candidates.iter() {
+			if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate)) = {
+				if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get(first_claim_txid) {
+					if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, fee_estimator) {
+						broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
+						Some((new_timer, new_feerate))
+					} else { None }
+				} else { unreachable!(); }
+			} {
+				if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(first_claim_txid) {
+					claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
+					claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
+				} else { unreachable!(); }
 			}
 		}
-		for (ancestor_claim_txid, cached_claim_datas) in bump_candidates.drain(..) {
-			self.pending_claim_requests.insert(ancestor_claim_txid, cached_claim_datas);
-		}
 		self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
-		(watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
+		for &(ref txid, ref output_scripts) in watch_outputs.iter() {
+			self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect());
+		}
+		(watch_outputs, spendable_outputs)
 	}
 
-	fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) {
+	fn block_disconnected<B: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)
+		where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface
+	{
+		log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
 		let mut bump_candidates = HashMap::new();
 		if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
 			//We may discard:
@@ -2519,8 +2773,6 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 					OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material } => {
 						if let Some(ancestor_claimable_txid) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&outpoint) {
 							if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&ancestor_claimable_txid.0) {
-								// Avoid bump engine using inaccurate feerate due to new transaction size
-								claim_material.feerate_previous = 0;
 								claim_material.per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
 								// Using a HashMap guarantee us than if we have multiple outpoints getting
 								// resurrected only one bump claim tx is going to be broadcast
@@ -2625,15 +2877,13 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 
 	/// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
 	/// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
-	fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)> {
-		let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
-
+	fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) {
 		'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
 			let mut payment_data = None;
-			let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
-				|| (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
-			let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
-			let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
+			let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
+				|| (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
+			let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
+			let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
 
 			macro_rules! log_claim {
 				($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
@@ -2727,10 +2977,18 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 				let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
 				if accepted_preimage_claim {
 					payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
-					htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
+					self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
+						source,
+						payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
+						payment_hash
+					});
 				} else if offered_preimage_claim {
 					payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
-					htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
+					self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
+						source,
+						payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
+						payment_hash
+					});
 				} else {
 					log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 					match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
@@ -2753,7 +3011,6 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 				}
 			}
 		}
-		htlc_updated
 	}
 
 	/// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize coutnerparty onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock expiration
@@ -2824,7 +3081,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 		for per_outp_material in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.values() {
 			match per_outp_material {
 				&InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref is_htlc, ref amount, .. } => {
-					inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if !is_htlc { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput] } else if script.len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC] } else if script.len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC] } else { &[] });
+					inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if !is_htlc { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC] } else { unreachable!() });
 					amt += *amount;
 				},
 				&InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount, .. } => {
@@ -2864,7 +3121,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 						bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1));
 					}
 					bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes());
-					log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Penalty Transaction {} claiming revoked {} output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if !is_htlc { "to_local" } else if script.len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { "offered" } else if script.len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { "received" } else { "" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
+					log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Penalty Transaction {} claiming revoked {} output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if !is_htlc { "to_local" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { "offered" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { "received" } else { "" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
 				},
 				&InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
 					if !preimage.is_some() { bumped_tx.lock_time = *locktime };
@@ -2896,7 +3153,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
 
 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
 
-impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
+impl<R: ::std::io::Read, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable<R>> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
 	fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 		let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 		macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
@@ -2914,17 +3171,18 @@ impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM
 			return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
 		}
 
+		let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 		let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
 
 		let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
 			0 => {
+				let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
+				let funding_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
 				let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
 				let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
 				let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
 				let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
 				let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
-				let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
-				let latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
 				// Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
 				// barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
 				let outpoint = OutPoint {
@@ -2935,13 +3193,13 @@ impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM
 				let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
 				let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
 				Storage::Local {
+					keys,
+					funding_key,
 					revocation_base_key,
 					htlc_base_key,
 					delayed_payment_base_key,
 					payment_base_key,
 					shutdown_pubkey,
-					prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
-					latest_per_commitment_point,
 					funding_info,
 					current_remote_commitment_txid,
 					prev_remote_commitment_txid,
@@ -2952,6 +3210,8 @@ impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM
 
 		let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
 		let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
+		let funding_redeemscript = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
+		let channel_value_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
 
 		let their_cur_revocation_points = {
 			let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
@@ -2971,11 +3231,7 @@ impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM
 		let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 		let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
 
-		let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
-		for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
-			*secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
-			*idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
-		}
+		let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
 
 		macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
 			() => {
@@ -3035,23 +3291,12 @@ impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM
 		macro_rules! read_local_tx {
 			() => {
 				{
-					let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
-						Ok(tx) => tx,
-						Err(e) => match e {
-							encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
-							_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
-						},
-					};
-
-					if tx.input.is_empty() {
-						// Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
-						return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
-					}
-
+					let tx = <LocalCommitmentTransaction as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
 					let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
 					let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
 					let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
 					let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
+					let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
 					let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 
 					let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
@@ -3060,7 +3305,7 @@ impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM
 						let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
 						let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
 							0 => None,
-							1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
+							1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
 							_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
 						};
 						htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
@@ -3068,7 +3313,7 @@ impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM
 
 					LocalSignedTx {
 						txid: tx.txid(),
-						tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw,
+						tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
 						htlc_outputs: htlcs
 					}
 				}
@@ -3103,6 +3348,12 @@ impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM
 			}
 		}
 
+		let pending_htlcs_updated_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_htlcs_updated_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
+		for _ in 0..pending_htlcs_updated_len {
+			pending_htlcs_updated.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
+		}
+
 		let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
 		let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
 		let to_remote_rescue = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
@@ -3166,18 +3417,35 @@ impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM
 			onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
 		}
 
+		let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+		let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Sha256dHash>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
+		for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
+			let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
+			let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+			let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Script>()));
+			for _ in 0..outputs_len {
+				outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
+			}
+			if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
+				return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+			}
+		}
+
 		Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
+			latest_update_id,
 			commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
 
 			key_storage,
 			their_htlc_base_key,
 			their_delayed_payment_base_key,
+			funding_redeemscript,
+			channel_value_satoshis,
 			their_cur_revocation_points,
 
 			our_to_self_delay,
 			their_to_self_delay,
 
-			old_secrets,
+			commitment_secrets,
 			remote_claimable_outpoints,
 			remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
 			remote_hash_commitment_number,
@@ -3187,6 +3455,7 @@ impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM
 			current_remote_commitment_number,
 
 			payment_preimages,
+			pending_htlcs_updated,
 
 			destination_script,
 			to_remote_rescue,
@@ -3196,6 +3465,7 @@ impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM
 			claimable_outpoints,
 
 			onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
+			outputs_to_watch,
 
 			last_block_hash,
 			secp_ctx,
@@ -3217,370 +3487,17 @@ mod tests {
 	use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
 	use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
 	use hex;
+	use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
 	use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
 	use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, InputDescriptors};
 	use ln::chan_utils;
-	use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
+	use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
 	use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
 	use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
 	use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
 	use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
 	use std::sync::Arc;
-
-	#[test]
-	fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
-		// Test vectors from BOLT 3:
-		let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
-		let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
-		let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
-		let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
-
-		macro_rules! test_secrets {
-			() => {
-				let mut idx = 281474976710655;
-				for secret in secrets.iter() {
-					assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
-					idx -= 1;
-				}
-				assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
-				assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
-			};
-		}
-
-		{
-			// insert_secret correct sequence
-			monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
-			secrets.clear();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-		}
-
-		{
-			// insert_secret #1 incorrect
-			monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
-			secrets.clear();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
-			assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
-					"Previous secret did not match new one");
-		}
-
-		{
-			// insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
-			monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
-			secrets.clear();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
-			assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
-					"Previous secret did not match new one");
-		}
-
-		{
-			// insert_secret #3 incorrect
-			monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
-			secrets.clear();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
-			assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
-					"Previous secret did not match new one");
-		}
-
-		{
-			// insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
-			monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
-			secrets.clear();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
-			assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
-					"Previous secret did not match new one");
-		}
-
-		{
-			// insert_secret #5 incorrect
-			monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
-			secrets.clear();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
-			assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
-					"Previous secret did not match new one");
-		}
-
-		{
-			// insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
-			monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
-			secrets.clear();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
-			assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
-					"Previous secret did not match new one");
-		}
-
-		{
-			// insert_secret #7 incorrect
-			monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
-			secrets.clear();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
-			assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
-					"Previous secret did not match new one");
-		}
-
-		{
-			// insert_secret #8 incorrect
-			monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
-			secrets.clear();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
-			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-			test_secrets!();
-
-			secrets.push([0; 32]);
-			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
-			assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
-					"Previous secret did not match new one");
-		}
-	}
+	use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
 
 	#[test]
 	fn test_prune_preimages() {
@@ -3650,12 +3567,29 @@ mod tests {
 			}
 		}
 
+		let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
+			&secp_ctx,
+			SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
+			SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
+			SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
+			SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
+			SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
+			[41; 32],
+			0,
+		);
+
 		// Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
 		// old state.
-		let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
-		monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
+		let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys,
+			&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
+			(OutPoint { txid: Sha256dHash::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
+			&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
+			&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
+			0, Script::new(), 46, 0, logger.clone());
+
+		monitor.their_to_self_delay = Some(10);
 
-		monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
+		monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
 		monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
 		monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
 		monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
@@ -3681,7 +3615,7 @@ mod tests {
 
 		// Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
 		// previous commitment tx's preimages too
-		monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
+		monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
 		secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 		monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
 		assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
@@ -3689,7 +3623,7 @@ mod tests {
 		test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
 
 		// But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
-		monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
+		monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
 		secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 		monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
 		assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
@@ -3763,7 +3697,7 @@ mod tests {
 		for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
 			sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
 		}
-		assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]),  claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+		assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]),  claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
 
 		// Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
 		claim_tx.input.clear();
@@ -3785,7 +3719,7 @@ mod tests {
 		for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
 			sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
 		}
-		assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]),  claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+		assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]),  claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
 
 		// Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
 		claim_tx.input.clear();
@@ -3805,7 +3739,7 @@ mod tests {
 		for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
 			sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
 		}
-		assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+		assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
 	}
 
 	// Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.