X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Ffunctional_tests.rs;h=06cc80cc18b0a5b770be83ce25cbb82535d932ba;hb=e06484b0f44155e647ff29810d2f187967e45813;hp=980c6ea40f1f0e812d99fbeca432421cf9cc5744;hpb=6f16453275638e2753dbb0791e852f096a633b9d;p=rust-lightning

diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
index 980c6ea4..06cc80cc 100644
--- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
@@ -1297,22 +1297,27 @@ fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
 
 	// Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 	// needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
-	let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point) = {
+	let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
 		let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 		let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 		let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
+		// Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
+		chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
+
 		let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 		(pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 		 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
-		 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx))
+		 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
+		 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
 	};
-	let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point) = {
+	let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 		let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 		let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 		let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 		let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 		(pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
-		 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx))
+		 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
+		 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
 	};
 
 	// Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
@@ -1341,6 +1346,7 @@ fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
 			commitment_number,
 			95000,
 			local_chan_balance,
+			false, local_funding, remote_funding,
 			commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 			feerate_per_kw,
 			&mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
@@ -4048,7 +4054,7 @@ fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
 				bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key },
 				bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key },
 				excess_data: Vec::new(),
-			};
+			}
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -7981,7 +7987,7 @@ fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
 	// commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
 	// commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
 	// channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
-	// EnforcingSigner would have paniced as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
+	// EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
 	// check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
 	// we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
 	// implement that).
@@ -7992,11 +7998,19 @@ fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
 	let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
 
 	let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
-	let keys = &guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
+	let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
+
 	const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
+
+	// Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
+	keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
 	let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
+
 	// Must revoke without gaps
+	keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
 	keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
+
+	keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
 	let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
 		&SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());