X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Ffunctional_tests.rs;h=5185acfd63dbf7b29cae0d9ff7566791d1c9f534;hb=d15b7cb86efb4d7e5cf0337b7b2fd1d68081a8d1;hp=eb6d7032fee67d7714005f807d2ac121c48a9a8d;hpb=22c367b13b7210a8ee082cc32bf175c42c16ce6c;p=rust-lightning

diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
index eb6d7032..5185acfd 100644
--- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
@@ -558,6 +558,7 @@ fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 	confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 	connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 	create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
+	expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 }
 
 #[test]
@@ -2951,26 +2952,8 @@ fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
 	mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
 	check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 	check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
-	{
-		// B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
-		let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
-		assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
-		check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
-	}
 
 	connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
-	{
-		// B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
-		// some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
-		// original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
-		// shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
-		let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
-		if node_txn.len() == 1 {
-			check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
-		} else {
-			assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
-		}
-	}
 
 	expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
 	check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
@@ -3711,11 +3694,23 @@ fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken
 	}
 
 	let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
-	assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
-	match events_1[0] {
-		Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
-		_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
-	};
+	if messages_delivered == 0 {
+		assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
+		match events_1[0] {
+			Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
+			_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+		};
+		match events_1[1] {
+			Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
+			_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+		};
+	} else {
+		assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
+		match events_1[0] {
+			Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
+			_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+		};
+	}
 
 	nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
 	nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
@@ -3952,6 +3947,8 @@ fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
 		},
 		_ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
 	};
+	expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+	expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 
 	// When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
 	// broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
@@ -8001,22 +7998,6 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
 	connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
 	let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
 	connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
-	{
-		let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
-		assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
-
-		check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
-		check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
-		// Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
-		if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output  {
-			assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
-		} else {
-			assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
-			assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
-		}
-
-		node_txn.clear();
-	};
 
 	// Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
 	connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
@@ -9429,6 +9410,7 @@ fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
 	let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
 	let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
 	update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
+
 	send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
 }