X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lightning%2Fsrc%2Fln%2Ffunctional_tests.rs;h=54817f35d7bea17ac0f13e5250220c4958e49a71;hb=5ed3f25b21a4dcd9075e550735dc688d820b9f41;hp=76487ddcfd16967369bfde624ac1df4a4b77bb83;hpb=44fa3acae85888982b2c808bc4b401e96d33822f;p=rust-lightning

diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
index 76487ddc..54817f35 100644
--- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
+use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
+use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
 
 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
@@ -2201,7 +2203,7 @@ fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
 	send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
 
 	// Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
-	nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+	nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 	check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 	check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 	{
@@ -2222,7 +2224,7 @@ fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
 
 	// Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
 	// broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
-	nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+	nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 	check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 	check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 	{
@@ -2262,7 +2264,7 @@ fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
 
 	// nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
 	// HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
-	nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+	nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 	check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
 	check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
 	let node2_commitment_txid;
@@ -2515,10 +2517,10 @@ fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
 	let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 
 	// Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
-	send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
+	send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
 	// node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
-	let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
-	let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
+	let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
+	let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
 
 	// Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
 	let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
@@ -2541,9 +2543,9 @@ fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
 		check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 		check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 		connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
-		expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
+		assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 
-		let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+		let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 		assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
 
 		assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
@@ -2560,7 +2562,13 @@ fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
 
 		// Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
 		assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
-		assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
+		check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
+
+		// Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
+		// ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
+		mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
+		connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+		expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
 	}
 	get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
 	assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
@@ -2579,11 +2587,11 @@ fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
 	let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 
 	// Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
-	send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
+	send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
 	// node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
 	// time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
-	let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
-	let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
+	let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
+	let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
 
 	// Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
 	let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
@@ -2605,9 +2613,9 @@ fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
 		}
 
 		connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
-		expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
+		assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 
-		let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+		let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 		assert!(node_txn.len() == 9 || node_txn.len() == 10);
 
 		// Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
@@ -2635,6 +2643,14 @@ fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
 		assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
 		assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
 		assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
+
+		// Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
+		// ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
+		mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
+		mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
+		mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
+		connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+		expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
 	}
 	get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
 	assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
@@ -3387,7 +3403,7 @@ fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
 	create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 
 	route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
-	nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+	nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 	connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
 	check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 	check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
@@ -3450,7 +3466,7 @@ fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
 	// state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
 	// transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
 
-	nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+	nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 	check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
 	check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
 	check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
@@ -4777,7 +4793,7 @@ fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
 	let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 
 	let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
-	nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+	nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 	check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 	check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 	check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
@@ -4806,7 +4822,7 @@ fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
 	let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 
 	let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
-	nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+	nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 	check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 	check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 	check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
@@ -7282,37 +7298,25 @@ fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
 		check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 		check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 		assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+
 		connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
-		timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
+		timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
+			.filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
+		check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
+		// For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
+		// dust HTLC should have been failed.
+		expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
+
 		if !revoked {
-			expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
 			assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
-			// We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
-			mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
-			assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
-			connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
-			expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
 		} else {
-			// If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
-			// commitment tx
-			let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
-			assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
-			let first;
-			match events[0] {
-				Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
-					if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
-					else { first = false; }
-				},
-				_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
-			}
-			match events[1] {
-				Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
-					if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
-					else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
-				},
-				_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
-			}
+			assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time, 0);
 		}
+		// We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
+		mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
+		assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+		connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+		expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -8361,7 +8365,7 @@ fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
 		_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 	}
 
-	nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+	nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 
 	let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 	assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
@@ -8396,7 +8400,7 @@ fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
 	let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 	match events[0] {
 		Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
-			nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+			nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 		}
 		_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 	}
@@ -9049,7 +9053,7 @@ fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain
 		force_closing_node = 1;
 		counterparty_node = 0;
 	}
-	nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+	nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 	check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
 	check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
 	check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
@@ -9485,7 +9489,7 @@ fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_t
 	nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
 	nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
 
-	nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
+	nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 	check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 	check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
 	check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
@@ -10329,3 +10333,45 @@ fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
 	do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
 	do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
 }
+
+#[test]
+fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
+	let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+	let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+	let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+	let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+	let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
+	let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+	nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
+	let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+	nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
+
+	let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
+
+	let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
+	let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+	let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: 0x1, witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
+	assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+	let mut tx = match events[0] {
+		Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
+			// Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
+			Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: best_height + 3, input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
+				value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
+			}]}
+		},
+		_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+	};
+	// Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
+	match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
+		Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
+			assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
+		},
+		_ => panic!()
+	}
+
+	// However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
+	tx.lock_time -= 1;
+	assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
+	get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+}